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Abstract 
Towards a Textual Theory of Metonymy 
A Semiotic Approach to the Nature and Role of Metonymy in Text 
Abdul Gabbar Al-Sharafi 
This thesis argues that the scope of metonymy throughout history remains severely 
reduced to a process of word substitution and the signifying potential of the trope is 
limited to lexical representation. The study therefore proposes a semiotic approach to 
take the trope beyond this limitation and to develop a textual theory to the trope. A 
background study related to how metonymy is treated in previous studies is therefore 
necessary. This review of literature covers a long period starting from ancient Greece 
and going up to the present day. Chapters one and two of this thesis, which give this 
general background, show that the hypothesis is to a large extent valid. The thesis then 
examines another related hypothesis which is that metonymy is semiotic in nature and a 
semiotic approach to metonymy wil l solve the problem of reductionism in the treatment 
of this trope. Chapter three is devoted to an examination of this hypothesis. It shows that 
a semiotic approach to metonymy is not only possible but also crucial. 
The semiotic approach to metonymy basically concerns the treatment of metonymy as a 
sign which cuts across three domains of representation. These are the domain of words, 
the domain of concepts and the domain of things or objects. The last domain is itself 
treated from a semiotic perspective to stand for the domain of context at large. On the 
basis of this semiotic approach to metonymy a textual model of metonymic relations in 
text is constructed. This model is put to the test in chapter four. Here the metonymic 
relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, FORM FOR THING, THING FOR FORM and CONCEPT 
FOR FORM are brought to bear on the formal and semantic connectedness of text. In 
chapter five the metonymic relations of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, THING FOR 
THING and THING FOR CONCEPT are used to explain how these metonymic relations interact 
to provide a linkage between language, cognition and context. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
Metonymy is traditionally defined as a process of substituting one word for another with 
which it is associated. The fundamental hypothesis of this thesis is that this is a 
reductionist view of the nature of metonymy. My aim in this thesis, therefore, is to take 
metonymy beyond its traditional confinement and investigate the textual potential of the 
trope. This thesis argues that metonymy is not a process of substitution. Rather it is a 
process of representation. Moreover, the thesis argues that metonymy is not only a 
process of representation between words but also between concepts and objects. 
Furthermore, metonymy is not a process limited to lexical representation but also a 
process of textual representation. 
This thesis, therefore, proposes a semiotic approach to metonymy to account for the 
three-dimensional aspects of the trope. It argues that metonymy is not only a process of 
substitution between words as the majority of classical rhetorical treatises perceive of it. 
Nor is it only a process of substitution between concepts as the majority of modern 
figurative accounts of the trope claim. In fact, metonymy is believed to include a further 
level of signification. This is the level of things and objects which is seen in this thesis 
to be primarily the dimension of context. Out of this semiotic treatment of metonymy a 
textual model of the trope is proposed to account for the nature and role of metonymy in 
text. Text is popularly defined as any stretch of language that stands as a unified whole. 
My definition of text is that of an interaction between language, cognition and context 
from two separate perspectives. The first is the world of the producer and the second is 
the world of the receiver. Text coherence is the natural result of the successful 
interaction between these three domains on the one hand and between these two worlds 
on the other. 
Let me now provide a definition of metonymy as I treat it throughout this thesis. 
Metonymy is a process of R E P R E S E N T A T I O N in which one word/concept/object stands 
for another by contiguity or causality. In my attempt to develop a textual theory of 
metonymy, I begin by surveying the definitions and treatments of the trope in classical 
rhetoric. Al l definitions of metonymy since ancient times tend to agree that the process 
of metonymy is that of substitution. However, after this general agreement comes a 
diversification in the treatment of the specificities of this substitution. Three main trends 
can be distinguished with regard to this variation. 
Introduction 
The first is that which defines metonymy as the substitution between 'words'. This I call 
the linguistic trend; it treats metonymy as a linguistic phenomenon that pertains to 
linguistic signification. The linguistic trend also subsumes the semantic theory of 
metonymy to which belong almost all the treatments of metonymy in western classical 
rhetoric and Arabic rhetoric. To this paradigm also belong the treatments of metonymy 
within stylistic circles, notably that of Jakobson. The second trend is that which defines 
and treats metonymy as the substitution between 'concepts' and this I call the cognitive 
trend. This goes beyond the formal manifestation of the trope as a substitution between 
forms to address cognitive principles of reasoning and understanding of metonymy. 
This is obviously the cognitive theory of metonymy to which many modern figurative 
accounts of the trope belong especially those dealing with the application of this 
cognitive theory in areas such as artificial intelligence and machine text processing. The 
third trend is that which defines metonymy as the substitution between objects in the 
real world. Some philosophical and rhetorical discussions highlight this aspect of 
ontological signification with respect to metonymic reasoning. Bredin's theory of 
metonymy discussed in chapter 2 section 2.1.1.4. of this thesis is a good illustration of 
philosophical accounts of the ontological reality of metonymy. The theories of 
metonymy as propounded by the Auctor [Cicero] and that of John of Garland also fall 
into this category.1 
Each of the above trends looks at metonymy from a rather narrow perspective in the 
sense that each trend takes the phenomenon from a different angle. There is clearly 
something missing in all of these treatments. This missing element is the unified and 
integrative approach to metonymy that combines all of these aspects. Moreover, in all of 
these treatments metonymy is dealt with as a lexical phenomenon, i.e. it is confined to 
the level of the lexis. The treatment of metonymy as a process of substitution of things 
or objects in reality is also a narrow one in relation to the new conception of reality as 
context introduced in this thesis. 
This thesis argues that metonymy is not only a figure of speech whose impact is limited 
to the level of lexical substitution. Rather metonymy is a fundamental mode of 
cognition and a principal source of knowledge, i f not the ultimate source of knowledge. 
See the discussion of these theories in chapter one section 1.3. 
Introduction 
In answer to the question 'what is knowledge' or 'what does it mean to know 
something?' we may say that to know something is to be able to define it. To define an 
entity is to mention what it is made of, i.e. its constituent parts. Alternatively, we can 
define an entity by giving its function. It often happens that we combine both forms of 
definition and we add to that for the sake of simplification some exemplification. So, a 
pen, for example, is a device which has liquid ink inside a cylinder which is linked to a 
metal tip. The pen could also be defined as a device which is used for writing. We can 
combine both types of definition and add examples. We can say 'a pen is a device 
which contains liquid ink in a plastic cylinder which is connected with a metal tip. Pens 
are used for writing. Examples of pens include, Parker pens and Pilot pens'. This is 
actually the way most definitions are constructed. This principle applies to almost 
everything. In any case, both types of definitions are actually metonymic because while 
the former is constructed via the PART FOR WHOLE metonymic relation, the latter is 
constructed via the CAUSE FOR E F F E C T metonymic relation. 
This thesis aims to establish a textual theory of metonymy because it views text as 
knowledge applied to a specific context. Text is viewed in this thesis as a dialectic 
interaction between knowledge presented in the text and knowledge stored in the mind 
of the receiver of this text. In view of the shortcomings of the traditional accounts of 
metonymy outlined above, this thesis aims to develop a semiotic approach to metonymy 
in which a comprehensive theory of the trope can be located to account for metonymy 
as a phenomenon that cuts across all the various domains mentioned above, i.e. the 
domain of words, the domain of concepts and the domain of things. This is actually a 
prerequisite to establishing a textual theory of metonymy because the assumption is that 
knowledge in text is not limited to the formal organisation of linguistic elements but is 
rather an amalgamation of forms, concepts and contexts. 
The thesis argues that metonymy cuts across various realms. These are the realm of 
epistemology (i.e. the world of concepts), the realm of ontology, (i.e. the world of 
objects), and the realm of language (i.e. the world of forms). By doing this metonymy 
becomes a really powerful theory of how these various realms interact in the textual 
world. This thesis is a study of how a semiotic theory of metonymy provides principles 
for the creation of text and principles for the organisation of text. The semiotic approach 
does not stop at this level. Rather it goes beyond this to offer principles of text 
interpretation. 
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Research Hypotheses 
This thesis examines the following four hypotheses related to metonymy: 
1. The scope of metonymy has been too limited and the potential of 
metonymy has been largely underestimated in previous accounts of the 
trope. 
2. Metonymy is semiotic in nature. 
3. A semiotic approach to metonymy leads to a comprehensive theory of 
metonymy as representation that cuts across the ontological, 
epistemological and linguistic dimensions of metonymic signification. 
4. Based on the representational view of metonymy a textual theory of 
metonymy could be developed. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one outlines the general theoretical framework and the historical background. 
In the first section of this chapter, I show that there is a strong link between rhetoric and 
textlinguistics. The second section of this chapter argues that there is a link between 
figurative theory and textlinguistics. The assumption underlying the discussion is that 
figurative language is a fundamental part of our cognition and not merely a form of 
deviation from normal modes of thinking. This discussion draws from cognitive 
linguistics sources which argue that figurative language is not merely a tool for 
adornment and embellishment or a matter of defamiliarisation as it is commonly held 
among formal theories of criticism. Rather it is an important mechanism of our 
perception. 
Section three goes into a specific discussion of the definitions of metonymy in the 
Western rhetorical traditions. This section tells us that the definitions provided for 
metonymy in these traditions limited the scope of the trope to either a substitution 
between words or a substitution between concepts. The section concludes with an 
observation that the history of metonymy in western classical rhetoric suffers from this 
limitation and therefore we need to look for some other source of rhetorical scholarship. 
2 By previous accounts of the trope 1 mean studies on metonymy that are previous to this study from 
Greek rhetorical scholarship up till present-day discussions in figurative theory and cognitive linguistics 
circles. This will be clear once the reader has gone through chapter one and two of this thesis. 
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This takes us to section four of the chapter, which is the discussion of the trope in the 
Arabic classical rhetorical scholarship. This section proves to be not easy because the 
Arabs recognised three forms of transference which could correspond to what is known 
in western rhetoric as metonymy. The section has to propose a reorganisation of the 
figurative spectrum in Arabic rhetoric bringing the three modes of figuration, namely 
kinayah 'implicitness' majaz 'aql'i 'cognitive transference' and majaz mursal 'loose or 
non-similarity transference' to bear on the notion of representation as a fundamental 
metonymic operation. 
The aim here is to construct a semiotic account of the trope in the Arabic rhetorical 
scholarship in such a way that kinayah would correspond to treatments of metonymy as 
a representation between words since the essence of this type of transference in Arabic 
rhetoric is basically linguistic. In addition, the intention is to relate majaz 'aqh to 
cognitive accounts of metonymy, because, as its name suggests, this type of 
transference in Arabic rhetoric is essentially cognitive. Majaz mursal is also linked to 
the notion of ontological signification specifically with the representation of objects 
because the relations that underlie this type of transference in Arabic rhetoric are mainly 
existential relations including part/whole, whole/part, situationality, positionality, 
adjacency and so on. Here I argue that in both traditions there were no attempts to 
discuss the trope from a multi-dimensional perspective but rather from a single 
dimension of signification. In short, a clearly semiotic treatment of the trope was 
missing from both traditions. 
Chapter two investigates whether any semiotic treatment has been proposed in modern 
accounts of metonymy in both fields of figurative theory or cognitive semantic studies. 
The chapter reaches the conclusion that the same reductionism can be witnessed also in 
modern accounts of metonymy. The only exception to this generalisation is the 
treatment of the trope proposed by Radden and Kovecses (1999) which is a semiotic 
analysis of the trope par excellence, albeit that it suffers from a lexical orientation in 
most of its discussions. Radden and Kovecses' study does not proceed from this 
semiotic analysis to discuss the textual powers of metonymy. The treatments in recent 
accounts of the trope are restricted to the lexical level of signification, and to the best of 
I mean the Greek and Latin traditions. 
5 
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my knowledge no work has been done on a semiotic model of the textual level of 
metonymic signification which is characteristic of my semiotic approach to the trope. 
The thesis then goes on to provide a more detailed account of the semiotic dimension of 
metonymy. This is taken up in chapter three of this thesis where I develop a semiotic 
theory of metonymy that would correspond to the triadic representations of the notion of 
sign in semiotics. On the basis of an argument that metonymy is an 'index' in the 
Peircean4 sense. Metonymy is argued to be a sign: it is a signifier in the form of words 
or expressions and it is a signified in the form of either real objects in the world or 
cognitive concepts in the human brain. The chapter develops a relational model of 
metonymy, which recognises representation as the primary metonymic type of relation, 
and assigns relations of contiguity and causality to this principal relation. Then the 
chapter moves on to propose a textual model of metonymic relations based on the 
relation of representation. The model highlights specifically the following nine types of 
relations: 
1. Metonymic representational relation of form for form 
2. Metonymic representational relation of form for concept 
3. Metonymic representational relation of form for thing 
4. Metonymic representational relation of concept for form 
5. Metonymic representational relation of thing for form 
6. Metonymic representational relation of concept for concept 
7. Metonymic representational relation of concept for thing 
8. Metonymic representational relation of thing for concept 
9. Metonymic representational relation of thing for thing 
The model is interactive in nature but it is possible to specify the first 1-5 relations to 
account for the formal and semantic aspects of text cohesion while the remaining 6-9 
relations account for text coherence. The interactive nature of these relations captures 
the textual potentialities of metonymy in that in text there is always dynamic interaction 
between forms, concepts and contexts. The higher level of textuality although realises 
cognitive and contextual relations like those of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, 
THING FOR CONCEPT and THING FOR THING, the forms play a major role as triggers to these 
cognitive and contextual processes. 
4 This argument is discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Chapter four explores the proposed relation between metonymy and text cohesion and 
provides examples illustrating how metonymy actually contributes to the cohesion of 
text. The chapter integrates the metonymic relations 
1. FORM FOR FORM 
2. FORM FOR CONCEPT 
3. FORM FOR THING 
4. CONCEPT FOR FORM 
5. THING FOR FROM 
into a model of cohesive patterning in text. The chapter takes Halliday and Hasan's 
(1976) model of cohesion in English as a framework and argues that these metonymic 
relations are in fact more realistic and more comprehensive as an account of the bonds 
of cohesive ties than Halliday and Hasan's model. The reason is that when we say that 
the two elements in the discourse must form a tie, this deems it necessary that there 
should be explicit mention of the forms in the text leaving it difficult to integrate 
elements which do not appear on the surface but have to be assumed. The metonymic 
model of the above mentioned relations solves this problem because i f the two or n 
elements are explicit then this is accounted for by the FORM FOR FORM metonymic relation 
while i f they are implicit they are still accounted for by the CONCEPT FOR FORM relation. 
Chapter five integrates the four metonymic relations 
1. CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT 
2. CONCEPT FOR THING 
3. THING FOR CONCEPT 
4. THING FOR THING 
into a model of coherence in text. The chapter takes as a framework the work done in 
the conceptual representation of knowledge structures, notably that of Schank and 
Abelson (1977), Minsky (1975), Rumelhart (1977). The chapter proposes that 
knowledge structures such as schemata, frames, scripts, scenarios, plans and goals are 
essentially mental structures that are based on metonymic relations of PART FOR WHOLE or 
WHOLE FOR PART, CAUSE FOR E F F E C T and E F F E C T FOR CAUSE relations and as such the movement 
between these conceptual structures in text processing is facilitated by the 
representational relations of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR THING, THING FOR CONCEPT , and 
THING FOR THING. Perceived as such these knowledge structures are fundamentally 
metonymic in nature and once triggered by linguistic forms in the text establish 
relations of metonymic reasoning between parts of text as either being parts forming 
wholes or vice versa, or causes pertaining to effects or vice versa. The chapter presents 
7 
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a reorganisation of these knowledge structures into a unified model based on whether 
the particular knowledge structure is descriptive or procedural in nature. Within the 
procedural knowledge structures, I distinguish between those knowledge structures that 
are conventional and those which are arbitrary and this is related to the two major 
principles of metonymic reasoning of contiguity and causality. The thesis concludes 
with an envoi which addresses areas of further research that need to be further 
investigated in the area of metonymy . 
8 
Chapter One Theoretical Framework and Historical Background 
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework and Historical 
Background 
The impulse to speak and think with metonymy 
is a significant part of our everyday 
experience. Traditionally viewed as just one of 
many tropes, and clearly subservient in most 
scholars' minds to the master trope of 
metaphor, metonymy shapes the way we think 
and speak of ordinary events and is the basis 
for many symbolic comparisons in art and 
literature.1 
1.0. Introduction 
This chapter aims to place this research project in its theoretical and historical context. 
The first section deals with the relationship between rhetoric and textlinguistics. The 
second section considers the relationship between figurative theory and textlinguistics. 
Section three deals with the history of metonymy in western rhetorical traditions. 
Section four moves on to discuss metonymy in the Arabic rhetorical tradition. The aim 
of these two sections is to test the following hypothesis 'the treatment of metonymy, as 
one of the main figures discussed in both rhetorical traditions, suffers from two major 
problems: 
1. Theoretical reductionism by reducing the nature of the trope to a mere 
substitution of words neglecting its cognitive and pragmatic dimensions. 
2. Practical reductionism by reducing the role of the trope to the level of lexical 
substitution neglecting its potential power at the level of textual representation \ 
1.1. Rhetoric and Textlinguistics 
Before outlining the relationship between rhetoric and textlinguistics it is necessary to 
start with the questions 'what is rhetoric?' and 'what is textlinguistics?' Let me begin by 
a definition of textlinguistics. Crystal points out that 
in recent years, the study of texts has become a defining feature of a 
branch of linguistics referred to (especially in Europe) as 
textlinguistics, and 'text' here has central theoretical status. Texts are 
seen as language units which have a definable communicative 
function, characterised by such principles as COHESION, 
COHERENCE, and informativeness which can be used to provide a 
formal definition of what constitutes their identifying textual ity or 
2 
texture. 
1 Gibbs(1999: 61). 
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So textlinguistics is the study of human textual interaction or their use of language in 
real life situations. In this sense the scope of the discipline covers both written as well as 
spoken texts and in fact this is the sense that is sustained throughout this thesis. 
Now let us move to define rhetoric. Wales defines rhetoric as follows: 'from Greek 
techne rhetorike 'art of speech', originally a discipline concerned with the skills of 
public speaking as a means of persuasion'.3 In his discussion of the relationship between 
rhetoric, stylistics and textlinguistics Enkvist argues that 'the expansion of linguistics to 
cover text and discourse increasingly motivates a new reading of rhetoric and 
stylistics'.4 He then defines rhetoric as 'that branch of language study which is 
teleologically oriented towards effective communication. Everything that fits into this 
loose and spacious envelope then becomes, actually or potentially, part of rhetoric'.5 
Plett also highlights the aspect of'persuasion'as a fundamental feature of rhetoric. He 
argues that 'rhetoric originally was a technique or art of producing persuasive texts'.6 
Plett asserts that rhetoric as a technique 'was always characterised by a set of rules. 
These did not coexist in a random manner, but regularly strove towards logical 
consistency and structural coherence'.7 He maintains that these rules constituted a 
system which 
retained an amazing solidity which lasted for almost two thousand 
and five hundred years. It was handed down from generation to 
generation and formed the basis for the production of public and 
private texts such as political speeches, sermons, letters, declamatory 
exercises, advertisements, and, most significant of all, literature. Thus 
o 
rhetoric can truly be termed a science of discourse. 
These spacious definitions of rhetoric allow for the discipline to account for human 
communication in general. Textual interaction being one major type of human 
communication is then regarded under this definition as a branch of rhetoric. Enkvist 
proposes four text theories which according to him provide a convenient means of 
comparing rhetoric and textlinguistics and 'reflect the history of textlinguistics in terms 
of its expansion from the study of intersentential links to the investigation of everything 
2 Crystal (1991: 350). 
3 Wales (1989: 405-406). 
4 Enkvist (1985: 11). 
5 Ibid. (16). 
6 Plett (1985: 61). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 10 
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that goes into the pragmatics of discourse'.9 The first is the sentence-based model or 
theory of text. Enkvist argues that the text linguists in this tradition 'tried to describe the 
cohesive ties that cement sentences into texts, often by extending traditional 
grammatical methods'.10 Enkvist associates the work in this tradition with the work of 
Halliday and Hasan (1976). 
The second theory of text according to Enkvist is called 'the predication-based model'. 
This model arose from the shortcomings of the previous model concerning the 
difficulties of manipulating or altering the sentence division of the text. But such 
manipulation, according to Enkvist, 'was necessary to reveal the relations between texts 
and to answer the question "could two texts in fact be regarded as variants (allotexts) of 
the same underlying set of elements (texteme)"'?" This model starts from an ultimate 
basic unit of text which Enkvist calls 'text atoms, relations between the text atoms, and 
a text strategy steering the linearization, grouping, coordination and embedding 
12 
processes that produce surface texts from the underlying set of text atoms'. 
The third theory is that which Enkvist calls 'the cognitive model', which 'tries to 
13 
describe some area of human cognition, usually in the form of cognitive networks'. 
This model emerged as a result of the need to know where the sentences in the first 
model or the predications in the second model come from. Perceived as such, the 
cognitive model provides a higher characterisation of sentences as cognitive 
propositions in the mind before they are expressed as sentences. Enkvist relates this 
model to the work of Minsky (1975) and Schank and Abelson (1977) in semantic 
schema or frames. 
The fourth theory of text proposed by Enkvist is the interaction-based model which 
highlights the multidimensional aspect of human communication. This model stresses 
the conceptualisation of a sender, receiver, and the relations between them as well as 
other situational and contextual factors influencing the communication activity. Enkvist 
9 Enkvist (1985: 23). 
1 0 Ibid. 
1 1 Ibid. 
1 2 Ibid. 
1 3 Ibid. 11 
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relates these models of text to the various parts of classical rhetoric.14 The'sentence-
based' model and 'the predication-based' model of text, according to Enkvist, 
correspond to the third part of rhetoric known as 'elocution' or style. The 'cognitive' 
model, Enkvist argues, corresponds to the part of rhetoric known as 'invention' which is 
the search for material to be textualised. Usually this material exists in a cognitive form 
in the mind of the speaker. The 'interaction-based' model is argued to correspond to the 
nature of rhetoric as emphasising the effectiveness of communication. It should be 
noted here that the link I intend to establish between rhetoric and textlinguistics is laid 
down along the lines proposed by Enkvist. I shall, therefore, focus my discussion in this 
thesis on the nature and role of metonymy in text. I shall, however, limit the discussion 
to the first and the third models, i.e. the sentence-based model and the cognitive model. 
The logic behind this limitation is that the second model is too logical to be 
incorporated into the argument of this thesis given the fact that the overall orientation of 
the thesis is cognitive. This will obviously prevent the adoption of the logical view of 
language and cognition. Besides, the logical view stipulates that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between concepts and categories and assumes that language is a 
reflection of reality. This undermines the approximative nature of communication and 
overlooks the inherent nature of fuzziness in concepts and categories. Consequently, 
this makes the space for figurative treatment within this framework rather difficult. For 
the first model I discuss the Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion in chapter four of 
this thesis. Minsky's and Schank and Abelson's work on the cognitive model of text is 
discussed in chapter five of this thesis. With regard to the last model, i.e. the 
interactional model, I argue that the semiotic approach that I propose for the treatment 
of metonymy is interactionist because it captures contextual factors as well as cognitive 
and linguistic factors involved in textual communication and metonymic signification. 
1.2. Figurative Language and Textlinguistics 
As I perceive it, in textlinguistics there should not be any distinction or preference for 
literal or figurative language. In fact, there is usually a tendency to consider the 
distinction marginal or even irrelevant. The reason is that textlinguistics, since its 
emergence in the 1960s, has incorporated a large number of ideas from various 
disciplines, notably, cognitive psychology and sociology. It also benefited a great deal 
12 
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from philosophical theories of human communication and language use.15 This 
diversified input has made the whole orientation of the discipline essentially semiotic.16 
According to this view, there is no clear line between figurative and literal language 
because a great deal of human communication is approximative, and linguistic concepts 
are generally fuzzy. 1 7 
With this in mind, textual practice is then a reflection of this fuzziness in linguistic 
concepts and the approximative nature of communication. Therefore, it is difficult to 
claim that the text is a reflection of either the state of affairs in the real world or the 
conceptual representation of this state of affairs. There is a great deal of interaction and 
negotiation between the world of text, the world of concepts and the world of things. 
This interaction between these three different worlds gives a good chance for imprecise 
representation and leaves the process of text generation, organisation and interpretation 
only imperfect. This means that we employ figurative language for the purpose of 
approximation and compromising exactness in almost all types of language and not only 
poetic language. Consider the following examples (1-4): 
/. / can hear you. 
2. Zena went shopping. 
3. Tom hit John. 
4. Adam likes apples. 
1 8 
Although the above examples are individual sentences and they look very normal and 
typical of everyday language, their interpretation involves a great deal of help of 
cognitive processes that are typical of what might be called figurative understanding. 
Example (1) involves a double level of non-literal understanding. The first is that when 
we hear people we only hear their voices and not them as a whole, but because the voice 
of someone is very typical of their personality and their self, the voice is used to 
represent the person. The second level of non-literality is evident in the fact that when 
See the discussion of these parts in Kennedy (1994) and Dixon (1970). 
1 5 To give but four examples, the notion of 'context' from anthropology, Maiinowsky (1923); from 
philosophy, speech act theory, Austin (1962), cooperative principle and the maxims of communication, 
Grice (1975); from sociology, politeness and face, Brown and Levinson (1978). 
This term will be discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis. 
1 7 C . f . Goatly(1997: 14). 
I have called these examples sentences. In fact they should properly be considered examples of texts 
because the understanding of each of them requires an activation of all sorts of cognitive, linguistic and 
situational factors. 13 
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we say ' I can hear you', the interpretation of the utterance is not understood as 'ability' 
as its form suggests. Rather, the interpretation is that T am hearing you' in actuality. 
Example (2) shows another form of figurative understanding of the utterance. We know 
that the act of shopping involves many sub-actions. In the example we have no problem 
imagining them although they are not mentioned in the text. Because this act is 
ritualised in our life, the whole stands for the parts of this whole and we come to 
activate this ritualised knowledge and make sense of the text. 
Example (3) looks very literal but in fact is not because it is not possible that the whole 
body of Tom hit the whole body of John. In actuality, it is only one part of Tom that hit 
one part of John; perhaps the former's hand and the latter's nose were involved in this 
action. Again our understanding of this text is made successful only through nonliteral 
understanding of it. Due to the fact that the hand and nose are parts of the bodies of both 
Tom and John, the whole of their bodies are used to signify the parts. In example (4) 
there is an element missing but we never normally realise it. We know that Adam does 
not like apples "for their sake" and that when we say this we mean Adam likes eating 
apples. We understand all these examples, and in fact we always miss the fact that they 
are examples of figurative language because the cognitive structure of our brains is, as it 
were, structured along the lines of similar principles. Let me now illustrate the process 
of linguistic communication by the following model after Goatly.19 
A ^ state of affairs physical 
• 
B , thought mental 
Figure 1.1. A simple model of linguistic communication. 
The production stage of communication starts at the top of the diagram with the state of 
affairs to be communicated or communicated about. This, according to Goatly's model 
C proposition mental 
3 4 
Text D physical 
1 9 Ibid. 14 
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above, is the physical stage because it exists in the world of things and objects or 
entities. However, it could be argued that this level is not only physical but it also 
involves some psychological and abstract phenomena, which pertain to abstract 
concepts. Through a mental process which can be paralleled with 'stringing of concepts 
into thought' this state of affairs becomes thought which in turn by another mental 
process becomes a proposition which is realised by linguistic data as text. So the 
production of a text is a result of an interactive process between reality, mind and 
language. The reception stage goes along similar lines but in a reverse order, starting 
this time with the text and then building up propositions as to what this text may mean. 
Then from the proposition there is a process of guessing and inferencing to arrive at the 
thought which the speaker might have had in mind about a certain state of affairs. The 
development of communication through these different worlds is bound to show some 
sort of imperfect correspondence between one world and another. We know for sure 
now that there is not a perfect correspondence between objects and linguistic categories 
because the relationship is not that clear cut. Culture plays a major role in forming our 
linguistic categories of objects we see in reality. A prototypical house for a European is 
not the prototypical house for a Bedouin Arab. Categories shift from language to 
language, culture to culture and from time to time within the same culture and the same 
language. 
The understanding of the following text is dependent on activating pieces of knowledge 
that are not mentioned in the text. In other words the interpretation of this text goes 
beyond its literal expression. This is the figurative dimension of text interpretation. How 
is this possible? Consider the text in (5) below: 
5. Mary went to the kitchen. She found the fridge empty. She opened the freezer and 
took out some ice cream. 
It is easy to interpret this text because the text activates a schema of a kitchen and this is 
what makes our understanding of the text possible and easy. In fact, the items referred 
to using the definite article are regarded as given and known. The text is made 
interpretable because it utilises a routinised script which helps us expect the rest of the 
text because we know what someone going into the kitchen would do next. The text is 
also possible to interpret because it makes use of a general pattern of causal 
connectivity. We know that people go into kitchens because they want to eat. To 
15 
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achieve this goal we can easily interpret the opening of the fridge and then the freezer. 
In fact, we could also predict that i f Mary did not find the ice cream in the freezer the 
text would continue making other searches until the goal of getting something to eat is 
fulfilled. We can conclude that Mary ate the ice cream although this is not mentioned in 
the text at all but from our knowledge of similar situations we can expect someone who 
opens the freezer and takes out some ice cream to eat it. 
This series of prediction, expectation and supplying of information not otherwise 
expressed in the text is the link I want to establish between figurative language and 
textlinguistics and this is the treatment I propose for metonymic reasoning in text. To 
conclude, a textual approach does not recognise these figures as forms of deviation but 
rather as fundamental parts of our cognitive structure that help provide coherence to 
reality. This approach views figures in general not only as ways of conveying meaning 
at the lexical level but also at a much wider level of textual communication. Sometimes 
the whole text is employed to realise one single figure of speech, such as metaphor or 
allegory. Animal farm is a good illustration of such types of texts, which realise one 
particular figure of speech. The whole novel functions as an allegorical account of the 
Russian communist revolution. Jakobson's approach to metonymy as characterising 
20 
realist prose is just another attempt to map the workings of figures onto textual 
models. In fact, the textual model I am proposing for metonymy is not just this general 
attempt. It goes beyond this to provide an investigation of a more detailed description 
and explanation of how metonymy contributes to text creation, organisation and 
interpretation. 
1.3. Metonymy in Western Rhetoric 
According to Stanford 
Herodotus and Thucydides, and later Plato, used the word 
perova^c t v to mean to call by a new name, to change something's 
name, and in the passive voice to receive a new name. But in none of 
its contexts does (ieTovd^s: L V suggest any of the significance of the 
term peiuvuij ia as afterwards applied to metonymy, a particular 
21 
kind of metaphor. 
This quotation opens our eyes to two vital issues related to the discussion of metonymy 
in western classical rhetoric. The first issue is that because rhetoricians and philosophers 
were interested in the poetic use of language they regarded metaphor as primary to the 
C.f. Jakobson's proposal in his article (1971) and the discussion of this proposal in chapter two section 
(2.1.1.1.) of this thesis. 
2 1 Stanford (1936: 3). 16 
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figurative domain and neglected metonymy because it does not involve symbolism and 
22 
double-unit signification as there is no transfer on the semantic plane. This 
observation applies to the western as well as the Arabic rhetorical traditions because 
both traditions were preoccupied with the study of poetic language. This is usually 
conveyed through metaphorical expressions which reveal the excellence of the 
creativity of the poet in bringing together different worlds by means of putting them in a 
similarity relation through metaphor. The second issue is that even when there is a 
discussion of metonymy, the treatment appears to be very fragmented and rather 
narrow. 
It seems that Greek rhetorical scholarship at one time became entirely poetic 
scholarship. Poets and rhetoricians were equally interested in how to attract the attention 
of their audience by the use of metaphorical language. This involved a transfer on the 
semantic plane and the poetic power of both the speaker and the listener reflects the way 
analogies are produced by the speaker and reduced by the listener. Literary scholarship 
in Greece meant that both participants had to put in some effort towards the 
understanding of the poem or the oration. This is why they undermined practical and 
purely referential discourse because it was seen as banal and not containing anything 
new, strange, or shocking. This is not surprising to us today as this view conforms to 
modern figurative and stylistic theory also, especially that which is expounded by 
Jakobson, who maintains that metaphor is a predominant feature of symbolic and poetic 
• • 23 
language, whereas metonymy is the predominant feature of realist prose. 
Stanford also argues that the word LieiaOopa which meant 'metaphor', 'first appears 
in Isocrates, Evagoras 190D'. 2 4 Isocrates was trying to draw a distinction between 
poetic language and non-poetic language. The claim is that prose writers do not have the 
same linguistic privilege or what we call today the 'poetic license' to use whatever 
linguistic structure is possible to draw the attention of the recipient of the 
communicative message to the message itself. Isocrates claims that prose writers are 
22 
Jakobson observes in this connection that 'similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a 
metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with 
the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes 
the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a 
different principle, easily defies interpretation. Therefore, nothing comparable to the rich literature on 
metaphor can be cited for the theory of metonymy. (1971: 95). 
2 3 Jakobson (1971: 96). 
2 4 Stanford (1936: 3). 17 
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handicapped in this regard because their discourse has to conform to the forms and 
terms used by the citizens and to those arguments which are precise and relevant to the 
subject matter. In other words, Isocrates proposes here that metaphor is a distinctive 
feature of poetic language because it conveys the experience of the word afresh and 
provides a kind of defamiliarisation in the way the citizens perceive the world. Again it 
is quite clear that the reference is made here to metaphor and not to metonymy. 
I f we turn now to Plato to see to what extent his accounts of the rhetorical figures can 
help us in our quest for developing an understanding of classical metonymy, we will be 
disappointed because Plato's idealistic philosophy prevented him from dealing with 
25 
rhetoric except to condemn it and criticise it as the enemy of truth. The Platonic 
dialogues reflect the uncomfortable feeling that Plato had towards rhetoric. Plato's 
ethical philosophy launched an attack against the'sophists'who were the trainers of 
rhetoric at that time. However, one should not ignore the Platonic debates regarding 
whether or not there is some intrinsic relationship between words and their meanings. 
Householder argues that the question '"is the sound-meaning relation of all or some 
Greek words inevitable and natural?" is the main topic of discussion in Plato's 
26 
Cratylus'. Householder maintains that 
Democritus (as quoted in Proclus' commentary on the Cratyius 16) 
offered four arguments (with four specially coined names) in favour 
of arbitrariness: (a) 'homonymy' or 'polysemy', i.e. the same 
sequence of phonemes may be associated with two or more unrelated 
meanings; (b) 'polyonymy' or 'isorrophy', i.e. the existence of 
synonyms, (c) 'metonymy', i.e. the fact that words and meanings 
change; (d) 'nonymy', i.e. the nonexistence of single words for 
27 
simple or familiar ideas. 
We can see that metonymy was a theory of linguistic signification and a process of 
meaning creation in ancient Greek philosophy. This corroborates the view expressed 
above that by being a trope or a semantic operation that involves movement within one 
and only one semantic domain metonymy attracted the attention of philosophers 
interested in meaning creation more than rhetoricians and orators who were mainly 
interested in poetic language. 
2 5 Ibid. (4), and Harris and Taylor (1997: 19). 
2 6 Householder (1995: 92). 
2 7 Ibid.(93). 18 
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Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric and the poetic devices seems to be more explicit and 
perhaps more fruitful. From his treatment of metaphor in his Poetics and Rhetoric we 
can derive an understanding of metonymy, since Aristotle deals with some metonymic 
relations under metaphor but without explicitly using the word 'metonymy'. In the 
Poetics, Aristotle argues that 
Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from 
the genus and applied to the species or from the species to the genus, 
28 
or from one species to another or else by analogy. 
In his account, Aristotle discusses four types of metaphor. He regards what is known 
today as metonymy as one of these types. Of the four types of metaphor Aristotle 
discusses, the first two apply to what we know today as synecdoche. The third type is 
what we know today as metonymy and it is only the fourth type that corresponds to 
what we know today as metaphor. In addition to the third type of Aristotle's metaphor, 
there are some examples which are based on metonymic relations in his fourth type of 
metaphor. Those Aristotle obviously did not discuss as metonymic. 
We can see clearly the metonymic basis of metaphor in Aristotle's example. 
6. A cup is to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares. 
The basis of the figurative relation in this example is metonymic in the first place. This 
metonymic basis starts by providing a contiguous relation in which the words 'cup' and 
'wine' are realised as metonymic by virtue of the first being the container and the 
second the content. So when we refer to Dionysus' cup we mean the drink in the cup, 
i.e. the wine. Similarly, Dionysus is the maker of this wine so the relationship here is 
that of inventor for invention. So Dionysus is used to mean the thing he makes, i.e. the 
wine. Metonymic relations also underlie the words 'shield' and 'Ares' by means of the 
mediating notion 'war'. Ares is the maker of shields so it is an inventor for invention 
metonymic relationship that is at work here. Also there is a contained for container 
metonymic relationship evident in the example in which the shield is a salient feature of 
war, thus 'shield' is contained within 'war'. So the whole process as we can see is 
essentially metonymic. The metaphor comes only after all these metonymic processes 
have been cognitively resolved and processed. The metaphor is realised by taking 
Dionysus' cup for Ares' shield and vice versa. 
Aristotle (1927: chap. 21 7-11). 19 
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Lodge argues that Aristotle's definition of metaphor has been very influential 
throughout the history of rhetoric in the west. Lodge goes on to claim that because 
Aristotle treated metonymy as a subclass of metaphor, metonymy continued to be 
discussed as such til l the late 1950s when Jakobson proposed that metaphor and 
metonymy are in fact two distinct figures based on two opposite principles. However, 
30 
it should be noted that not only was Aristotle aware of the effect of metonymy in 
language, but also he was aware of it in cognition. It is however strange how the 
connection between these two fundamental aspects of metonymy was missed 
throughout the history of the trope. Koch argues that Aristotle sets up three relations to 
account for the process of remembering 
The treatment of the notion of 'contiguity' by Aristotle as an aid to memory is 
suggestive of a cognitive view of rhetoric at the time. However, when rhetoric was 
reduced to the critical analysis of written texts, the part of rhetoric known as 'memory' 
32 
dropped out. This is in fact how the gap began to appear between rhetorical theory and 
the theory of remembering or rather cognitive science in general. As a result, 
rhetoricians after Aristotle did not benefit from his cognitive treatments of the fourth 
part of rhetoric. It should be stressed that the cognitive dimension is one of the vital 
issues that this thesis intends to bring up and relate to other dimensions of metonymy, 
namely the linguistic and contextual or pragmatic dimensions. 
I now move on to discuss Demitrius' account of metonymy in his treatise On Style. The 
treatise addresses metaphor in five successive sections, which is an indication of the 
importance given to the figure in the discussion of style. The work seems to be devoted 
to the treatment of the features of prose style and the difference between this and poetic 
style. One gets this impression when Demetrius states that: 
In the first place, then, metaphors must be used; for they impart a 
special charm and grandeur to prose style. They should not, however, 
be crowded together, or we shall find ourselves writing dithyrambic 
poetry in place of prose. Nor yet should they be far-fetched, but 
33 
natural and based on a true analogy. 
so we track down the sequence [of our ideas] by starting from the 
present moment or from something else and from something similar 
or opposite or close [to it]. That is the way remembering comes 
about 3 1 
29 Lodge (1977: 75-76). 
As a phenomenon although he did not give it this name. 
Koch (1999: 141). 
C.f. Enkvist (1985:17) and Dixon (1971: 46). 
Demetrius. (1927: II, 78). 20 
30 
31 
32 
33 
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There is no mention of metonymy in Demetrius' work. This supports the view that 
metaphor dominated the scene of western classical rhetoric because it was able to 
provide this charm and grandeur. 
Like Demetrius, Longinus' On the Sublime also includes no mention of metonymy. To 
conclude this section, it is useful to cite Eco about the dominance of the whole 
rhetorical domain by metaphor. Eco holds that 
the term metaphor for many authors- and this is true for Aristotle and 
Emanuele Tesauro- has served to indicate every rhetorical figure in 
general; the metaphor, as the Venerable Bede put it, is "a genus of 
which all the other tropes are species". To speak of metaphor, 
therefore, means to speak of rhetorical activity in all its complexity.34 
Moreover, Group mu express scepticism about the incapability of ancient rhetoric to 
formulate a satisfactory definition for metonymy in the statement 
La rh&orique ancienne" a 6te" incapable de formuler une definition 
satisfaisante de la metonymie. 
This observation is quite supportive of the hypothesis that I have been discussing 
throughout this section which is mainly that the classical rhetorical accounts are not 
helpful as far as metonymy is concerned. However, the Latin account of metonymy 
seems to be more elaborate and it is to this tradition that I turn now. 
I f we move to the Latin account of metonymy we find that it begins with the Auctor's 
treatise Rhetorica ad Herennium (86-82 B.C.) and continues until Laborintus (1250) by 
the German Eberhard. Rosiene divides this quite long tradition into four phases. The 
first is the classical period which covers the Auctor, Cicero (106-43 B.C.) and 
Quintilian (first century A.D). The second is late antique grammar: this covers Sacerdos 
(3 r d century), Donatus (mid-fourth century), Charisius (mid-fourth century), Diomedes 
(late fourth century), Pompeius (late fif th century) and Sergius (fifth or sixth century). 
The third period is the mediaeval period: this covers Cassiodorus (490-575), Isidore of 
Seville (570-636), Julian of Toledo (642-690), Isidore Junior (653-704) and Bede (673-
735). The fourth period is late mediaeval poetics which covers Matthew of Vendome 
(1175), Geoffrey of Vinsauf (??), Gervase of Melkley (???), John of Garland (1195-
1272) and Laborintus (1250). The Latin tradition continues til l the Middle Ages and 
perhaps to the Renaissance. 
Eco (1984: 87). 
Group mu, (1970: 117). 21 
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I shall start my discussion with the definition provided by the Auctor in his rhetorical 
treatise known as Rhetorica ad Herennium. The Auctor defines metonymy as 
the figure which draws from an object closely akin or associated an 
expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own 
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name. 
This definition contains a number of elements that need to be discussed. The first 
element in the definition above is that of'drawing'which is a cognitive process very 
much similar to 'abstracting', that is abstracting from an object or let us say an 'entity' 
because object is rather physical and this abstraction can occur even within abstract 
entities. The second element is that of 'closeness' or 'association', which gives the 
sense of 'neighbouring' both physically and cognitively. This is a fundamental 
characteristic of metonymy and in fact a distinctive feature of metonymic figuration that 
distinguishes the trope from other figurative tropes. 
That the relation that underlies metonymy is of a neighbouring nature is what makes it 
different from other tropes in general and from metaphor in particular, the underlying 
relation of which is that of analogy, similarity and resemblance. The third element is the 
use of the word 'expression' in the definition. Rosiene argues that 'expression' in both 
translations is not quite a successful translation of the Latin word'oratio'. Rosiene 
further argues that what the Auctor meant by the word 'oratio' is not 'expression' as 
Caplan and Achard translated it. Rather he meant a Latin translation of the Greek 
logos.37 Rosiene then engages in a discussion of the Greek notion of 'logos' to conclude 
that the meaning of 'expression' i f seen under the Stoic linguistic philosophy in fact 
38 39 
translates among other things as 'relation'. Rosiene argues that the Auctor's 
definition of metonymy and his term 'denominatio' which is translated as 'metonymy' 
has four distinct processes which are fundamental to the understanding of the nature of 
metonymy. These are: 
1. it denominates things 
2. and it abstracts a relation from these things 
3. in such a way that a thing may be understood 
The Auctor [Cicero]. (1954: iv, 43). 
Cf. Rosiene (1992: 178-180). 
Ibid. (181). 
Rosiene (1992: 183). 22 
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4. that may not be not called by its common name 
So in any metonymic signification we have four separate processes. These start by 
denominating, i.e. signifying or picking up a referent. Then there is a process of 
abstracting a relation between referents. This abstracting is actually the result of 
perceiving of relations of contiguity between phenomena and things. Understanding is 
the result of the perception of these relations. The metonymic process is then concluded 
by the process of calling that thing by a name that it is not its common name but one 
with which it is associated. Perceived as such then metonymy wil l be a figure of speech 
in which there is a process of abstracting a relation of proximity between two words to 
the extent that one will be used in place of another. 
I f we move to Cicero we find that he begins his discussion of metonymy by 
emphasising its importance and value in the stylistic embellishment of the oration. He 
states 
This [metonymy] is a valuable stylistic ornament; but care must be 
taken to avoid obscurity - and in fact it is usually the way in which 
what are called riddles are constructed; but this mode does not turn on 
a single word but consists in the general style, that is, in a series of 
words.4 0 
It is interesting to note that Cicero's definition of metonymy swings between 
considering metonymy as a trope pertaining to'general style'as Caplan translates the 
Latin term 'oratio' or to 'verbal succession and rhetorical period', which is Rosiene's 
translation of the term, and the consideration of metonymy as a trope pertaining to the 
word. The first part of Cicero's definition conveys the impression that for him 
metonymy is a periodical trope as he relates its processes to the series of words rather 
than to a single word. However, as one goes on in his definition one arrives at the 
conclusion that Cicero reduces the scope and the tropical power of the trope to the level 
of the word. In fact, this last reductionist view is what Cicero adheres to when he 
formulates his last conception of the trope when he maintains that metonymy occurs 
when 'for the sake of ornament one proper name is substituted for another'.41 The 
definition of metonymy in Cicero is both lexically-based and ornamentally motivated. 
This shows clearly how metonymy was severely reduced to merely a substitution of 
names for aesthetic purposes. 
w Cicero. (1927: III, 167). 
4 1 Ibid. 23 
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The fact that Cicero's definition lacks the concept of 'closeness' which appears in the 
Auctor's definition is an indication of a remarkable change in the rhetorical tradition at 
this early stage of the classical Latin period. This does not suggest that rhetorical theory 
in this period was not progressing in an evolutionary manner. Rather the development 
was individual or personal. I think the Auctor's concept of'closely akin or associated' 
is a significant development of a conception of metonymy away from the influence and 
bias of metaphor. However, there is a notable regression to the Greek conception of 
metaphor being the trope of tropes when the notion of 'closeness' is cancelled from the 
definition of both Cicero and Quintilian and the trope is reduced to a mere substitution. 
This reduction makes the trope rather vague and difficult to distinguish from other 
tropes, particularly from metaphor which also involves substitution. 
Now I turn to the definition of metonymy provided by Quintilian who defines 
metonymy as a trope which 
consists in the substitution of one name for another, and as Cicero 
tells us, is called hypallage by the rhetoricians.42 
This definition is nothing but another version of Cicero's definition we discussed above 
except that the word 'proper' is missing in Quintilian's definition. Perhaps this is a 
significant late antique change in the way tropes are viewed in isolation rather than in 
relation to one other. That is to say that the tendency of classical Latin rhetoricians to 
say that in metonymy we encounter a movement from a proper name to another was 
mainly an attempt to define metonymy in relation to metaphor which constituted a 
movement form a proper name to an improper one. It should also be noted that the 
notion of'proximity' is missing from Quintilian's definition as it is also from Cicero's. 
When we move towards the late antique period we find that the number of orators and 
rhetoricians who treated rhetorical tropes in a practical manner was increasing due to 
the fact that rhetoric was increasingly becoming a subject in the school curriculum. This 
meant that the rhetorical treatises of these periods were in large measure practical 
accounts of how to improve writing skill and how to sharpen critical ability. In the late 
antique period, we first meet Sacerdos of the third century whose definition of 
metonymy is suggestive of a remarkable departure from previous definitions. This 
departure is embodied in the fact that the definition does not include the traditional 
terms like 'words' or 'name'. Instead we have the term'signification'used. This is a 
4 2 Quintilian. (1979: VIII. Vi. 23). 24 
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very interesting point because it stresses the issue of the relationship between figurative 
theory and signification, which is the issue to be raised in the third chapter of this thesis. 
Sacerdos defines metonymy as 
Speech descending from a proper signification to a proper [one] 
through an interpretation of proximity. 
In Sacerdos' definition we notice a return to the notion of'proximity'which I think is 
both a sign of maturation in tropical understanding and also an indication of a 
continuation from classical traditions. The account is illuminating in the sense that the 
two prime elements of the cognitive processes involved in metonymic processing are 
included in this definition. These are 'signification' and 'proximity'. In essence 
metonymic processes are semiotic because there is a use of a linguistic sign which has a 
meaning other than itself. The notion of proximity is also important because this is what 
makes this signification resolvable and makes it cognitively accessible and easily 
retrievable. 
After Sacerdos we begin a tradition of naming rather than defining the trope. In other 
words rhetoricians became interested in how to name the trope or what to call it. This 
was a real problem for them due to the fact that the terms used oscillated between Greek 
metonymia of the grammarians and hypallage of the rhetoricians as Cicero tells us, on 
the one hand, and between the Latin denominatio, transnominatio and transmutatio, on 
the other. Donatus, for example, defines the trope as 'diction one might call 
"transnomination" as it were'.4 4 So it is the 'naming' that is sought here and the 
hesitation is indicative of a rather confused account of the trope. 
For Charisius, metonymy is 'diction transferred from some signification to another 
proximity'. 4 5 There is hope in this definition of a progressive account of metonymy. The 
definition seems compatible with classical definitions and accounts for both the process 
of signification and the relation of proximity. This is reminiscent of Sacerdos'account 
of the trope. However, Diomedes' definition brings us back to the concept of propriety 
in the relation between elements in a tropical domain while at the same time it lacks the 
4 3 See Rosiene (1992: 210). 
4 4 Ibid. (239). 
4 5 Ibid. (219). 25 
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notion of proximity. He defines metonymy as 'diction translated from some proper 
signification to another proper [one]'. 4 6 
Towards the end of late antiquity we witness a return to the reductionist view of 
metonymy in which the nature of the trope is not given real importance and is only 
given a name. Metonymy for Pompeius, for example, is 'what one might call 
denominatio'.47 Without the hesitation witnessed in Donatus'"as it were", Pompeius 
can be seen as a starting of a tradition in which rhetoricians will try to simply give the 
name 'denominatio' to the trope without any hesitation. Cassidorus describes metonymy 
as the process in which 'we indicate the meaning of a thing in diverse ways by means of 
alien translated words'.4 8 Cassiodorus maintains that 'the trope is called metonymia in 
Greek, transnominatio in Latin'. 4 90ne thing that is significant about Cassidorus' 
definition is that it shifts the description from names or words to 'things'. This is 
important for the semiotic treatment of the trope since it tells us that the substitution can 
actually take place between things also, not only names or words. 
Isidore defines metonymy as 'metonymia, transnominatio, the translation [of a name?] 
from some signification to another proximity'. 5 0 Julian's metonymy is ' what one might 
call "transnomination" as it were'.51Bede gives the same definition for metonymy as 
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'what one might call "transnomination" as it were'. Isidore Junior defines the trope as 
'metonymia is transnominatio as it were'.5 3 
Gervase of Melkley describes the trope as follows: 'metonymia is the same as 
transnominatio. For meta [is] trans, onoma nomen'.54Matthew of Vendome states that 
'metonymia is transmutatio'.55Geoffrey of Vinsauf argues that 
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among the figures is a certain figure called metonymia when 
container is posed for contained. 
John of Garland uses the name denominatio with description to denote a process 
when one draws a relation from neighbourly things, by means of 
which a thing may be able to be understood that was not called by its 
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common name. 
To conclude this section it should be pointed out that my hypothesis outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter that metonymy in western rhetorical scholarship suffers 
from theoretical reductionism, prima facie, is not valid. This is because the investigation 
shows that western rhetoricians acknowledged that metonymy is not only a substitution 
of words, but also a process of substituting things for things. The treatment of 
metonymy as a process of substituting a word for a word is evident in Cicero's 
treatment of the trope, in Quintilian's treatment, Isidore of Seville and Diomedes. The 
treatment of metonymy as a process of substitution which involves things is evident in 
the Auctor, Cassiodorus and John of Garland. The treatment of metonymy as a process 
of signification is evident in Sacerdos, Charisus, Diomedos and Isidore of Seville. All 
other definitions of the trope by the scholars discussed above are naming definitions. 
However, on a deeper level the brief history provided above shows that although these 
definitions take metonymy beyond its linguistic boundaries and include other 
dimensions like ontology, these treatments neglect the cognitive basis of metonymy and 
are not integrated into a coherent model. Rather they are scattered and random attempts. 
They, therefore, appear at one time and disappear at another. Some scholars treat 
metonymy as substitution between words, others between things and others as involving 
signification. These treatments were never integrated into a coherent model and the 
history is not progressive in the sense that once a step is achieved the next generation 
takes the discussion from there and develops it further. Rather we have several 
examples of some progress which was followed by a total fallback on narrow views. In 
short, the history of metonymy continued to oscillate between reduced and abrupt 
definitions and returning back to classical definition or resorting to a method of giving 
names rather than definitions, as we have seen towards the late mediaeval period. At 
other times the treatments of metonymy involve nothing but giving examples of 
metonymy. 
0 0 Ibid. (248). 
5 7 Ibid. (250). 27 
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Besides, the treatments were all carried out under the assumption that metonymy is a 
poetic device which conveys some sort of deviation from normal modes of language 
structure to provide some charm and grandeur to the style. Furthermore, the treatments 
were all confined to the lexical level and no treatment attempted to discuss the role of 
the trope in providing connectivity to text. It should be illuminating to provide a brief 
history of metonymy in the Arabic rhetorical tradition to see how it was treated here and 
whether there were similarities or differences in the Arab account of the trope with that 
of the western account of it; more importantly, to see whether my hypothesis will still 
hold as far as the Arabic treatment of metonymy is concerned. It is to this aspect that I 
turn now in the last section of this chapter. 
1.4. Metonymy in Arabic Rhetoric: 
The title of this section is somewhat strange because metonymy is a western concept 
and there is some sort of imposition of this notion on Arabic rhetorical scholarship. 
However, in bilingual Arabic/English dictionaries there is a constant tendency to 
translate the word kinayah as metonymy. This section aims to show that metonymy as a 
substitution of one word for another with which it is related is wider than this dictionary 
rendering and involves more than what is conventionally regarded as kinayah. I provide 
the following illustration of the classification of figuration in Arabic rhetoric which 
shows the place of kinayah in relation to the overall figurative space in Arabic rhetoric: 
majaz (transference) 
/ \ 
majaz lughawi 
linguistic transference 
majaz 'aql'i 
cognitive transference 
majtiz al-mushabahah majaz al-mulazamah 
Similarity Contiguity 
majaz al- 'aid 'iq al- 'ukhrd 
Other relations 
(borrowing) 
isti 'arah kinayah 
(covering) 
majdz mursal 
(loose transference) 
Figure 1.2. Classification of types of transference in Arabic rhetoric. 
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The diagram above shows that in Arabic rhetorical theory there are two major types of 
transference. The first is linguistic transference and the second is cognitive transference. 
Within linguistic transference we have borrowing, covering and other loose relations. I 
am not interested in transference which is based on mushabahah relations, represented 
in the diagram by the Arabic term isti 'arah, i.e. borrowing. I am interested in three 
types of transference which I believe are related or at least can be related to build up a 
model of non-similarity transference. The first of these is the transference based on 
cognitive relations. This is termed in the diagram above as majaz 'aqli "cognitive 
transference'. The second is the type of linguistic transference which is based on 
mulazamah 'contiguity' relations, which is termed in the diagram above as, kinayah. 
The third type of majaz I am interested in is the type of transference which is based on 
loose relations and is termed in the diagram above majaz mursal. 
The division of transference into two major categories is a remarkably significant 
attempt by Arab rhetoricians to view transference not only as a linguistic phenomenon 
but also as a cognitive phenomenon. This takes the discussions of Arab rhetoricians of 
transference far beyond formal substitution and considers the whole process in its wider 
cognitive as well as linguistic context. I therefore argue that the term metonymy 
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involves the following three types of transference discussed in Arabic rhetoric: 
1. Majaz 'aqli 
2. Majaz mursal 
3. Kinayah 
The logic behind this classification is that while the first and third of these pertain to the 
worlds of concepts and language respectively, in view of the fact that they are known in 
Arabic rhetoric as cognitive and linguistic respectively, the second pertains to the world 
of things and objects, in view of the fact that the relations underlying it are essentially 
existential relations such as adjacency, positionality and contingency. With this I 
conceptualise metonymy in Arabic rhetoric as having three dimensions: the cognitive 
dimension represented by majaz 'aqli, the linguistic dimension represented by kinayah 
See Miftah for a similar attempt to treat both kinayah and majaz mursal as one phenomenon. In this 
connection he argues that majaz mursal becomes one special case of kinayah because both involve a 
relation between two things', ibid. (1985: 114-115)29 
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and the ontological dimension represented by majaz mursal.59 This is the semiotic 
approach under which I intend to deal with the trope and develop a textual model in 
which the three levels of representations interact to provide unity and connectedness to 
text in its three realms. The following is an illustration of the three-dimensional 
transference I am calling contiguous transference in Arabic rhetoric. 
"majdz mursal 
ontological transference 
Figure 1.3. The three dimensions of contiguous transference in Arabic rhetoric. 
In the following paragraphs, I shall present the definitions provided for these three types 
of contiguous transference by Arab rhetoricians. 
1 . 4 . 1 . Kinayah: 
We find the first reference to kinayah by Abu 'Ubaydah60 in his book Majaz al-Qur 'an. 
He refers to it as a linguistic phenomenon and uses the grammarians' conception of it 
when he considers it the omission of the noun and its substitution with a pronoun. In 
other words, Abu 'Ubaydah treats kinayah as 'implicitness' in linguistic reference 
where only a pronoun is mentioned without any nominal antecedent before it or any 
resolvable reference after it. The examples he uses include the following verses from 
the Qur'an: 
7. Kullu man 'alayhd fan. The Qur'an. (55: 26).^ 
8. Hatta tawarat bi al-hijab. The Qur'an. (38: 32).** 
9. Falawld 'idhd balaghati l-hulqum. The Qur'an. (56:83).6 3 
kinayah 
linguistic transference 
majaz 'irtibati 
majaz 'aql'i 
cognitive transference 
This type of majaz is based on existential relations like totality, partiality, situationality and 
positionality. These relations obviously pertain to the world of things and objects and not so much to the 
world of words or concepts. 
6 0 Died 833/210). 
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All that is on it will perish. 
Until it was hidden in the veil of night. 
Yea when it reaches to the collar-bone. 30 
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Then Abu 'Ubaydah comments that the pronoun highlighted in (7) means 'the earth' 
and in (8) means 'the sun' and in (9) means 'the soul'. This is a subtle explanation of a 
linguistic phenomenon known nowadays as exophoric reference where there is no noun 
in the text and yet a pronoun is used to be interpreted by means of context because the 
reference is outside the text. The referent might be construed in the immediate context 
of situation or it might be a salient feature of the universe of discourse. What is 
interesting in Abii 'Ubaydah's treatment is that he considers kinayah an example of 
implicitness or covering a linguistic item. This treatment, although primitive, constitutes 
the first attempt to account for this linguistic phenomenon by giving it a rhetorical 
explanation. 
Al-Jahiz also alludes to kinayah in his book al-Bayan wa al-Tabyin when he reviews the 
definitions of rhetoric in other cultures. He presents the definition of rhetoric in the 
Indian tradition as follows: 'rhetoric is insight in proof and the awareness of when to 
exploit chances of argument'. Al-Jahiz then comments that the indication of the 
awareness of these two principles in rhetoric is to avoid explicitness and resort to 
implicitness i f explicitness would be more difficult for the audience.64 According to al-
Jahiz, the sign of rhetoric is the use of implicitness65 where it is appropriate and the use 
of explicitness where it is fitting.66 This, of course, corresponds to the definition of 
rhetoric in the Arabic culture as the appropriateness of speech to the context of speech. 
I f the context requires a grand style then it is mandatory to use grand style, and i f it 
requires a middle or a low style then it is considered foolishness to use grand style in 
this type of context. 
Al-Mubarrad6 7 in his book al-Kdmil, instead of defining kinayah, identifies a number of 
functions of kinayah. It should be noted however that the treatment of kinayah by al-
Mubarrad is entirely linguistic; this is not surprising due to his linguistic and 
particularly grammatical background and orientation. In fact, most rhetorical remarks 
were first identified by grammarians trying to explain the various styles of Arabic 
0 4 Al-Jahiz (1948: vol. 1,88). 
The word used in the Arabic text is 'kintiyah' which could be translated as metonymy but I preferred 
to use the general meaning which is intended in the original text as contrasted to tasrih, i.e. explicitness. It 
should be noted here that the term kintiyah in Arabic is always associated with implicitness - a point that 
will be elaborated further in the course of this chapter. 
6 6 Ibid. 
6 7 Died in 898/285. 31 
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sentence construction. It is important to note here that al-Mubarrad and other 
grammarians did not do rhetorical study any significant benefit and it was only with the 
work of rhetoricians like al-Jurjani, al-'Askari, Ibn al-Athi'r and al-Sakkaki and others 
that rhetoric began to emerge as an art separate from grammar, although it continued to 
exhibit a strong grammatical affiliation. In addition to the discussion of the linguistic 
aspect of kinayah, Al-Mubarrad discusses the social aspect of kinayah which is not 
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relevant to the course of this thesis. 
I shall turn now to a well-known book in Arabic rhetoric. This is Kitdb al-Badi' by Ibn 
al-Mu'tazz who attempted to search for the origins of badi' in classical sources of the 
Arabic language, i.e. in the classical poetry of the pre-Islamic period and the very early 
Islamic poetry as well as in the Qur'an and in the Traditions of the Prophet. His aim was 
to prove that the innovative styles were not actually new and that they had their origins 
in classical Arabic poetry and in the Qur'an. Ibn al-Mu'tazz seems to regard kindyah 
and ta 'r'idh 'allusion'' as the same phenomenon. Other Arab rhetoricians, on the other 
hand, regard the former as an example of indirect meaning interpreted by means of an 
attribute or a word semantically related to the omitted word, while the latter corresponds 
to a phenomenon whereby the indirect meaning is interpreted by means of context.69 
The next important author is Qudamah ibn Ja'far,70 who was one of the leading literary 
critics of the tenth century. He discussed kindyah under the heading 'irddf which could 
roughly be translated into 'contiguity or adjacency'. He defined it as 
the process in which the poet intends a meaning but does not give a 
word conveying that meaning. Rather he gives a word that conveys a 
meaning contiguous or adjacent to that meaning.71 
We can see from this definition that Qudamah considers kindyah and 'irddf as the same 
phenomenon. The treatment of kindyah and 'irddf as one and the same trope has been 
used by rhetoricians and critics other than Qudamah. For example Khafaji also holds the 
C O 
Al-Mubarrad's social functions of kinayah revolve around the social values designated to covering 
names by means of title 'kunayah'. It should be noted here that some Arab rhetoricians give examples of 
what they perceive as kinayah that are derived totally by means of convention rather than by means of 
proximity or contiguity. For example, they would interpret the word na'jah 'ewe' which is mentioned in 
the Qur'anic verse inna hadhii 'akhi lahu tis'un wa (is'iin na'jatan 'this man, who is my brother, has 
ninety nine ewes' as 'woman'. 
Context here refers to the wider notion of context which is the cultural context as in the case of idioms 
for example. 
7 0 Died 945/337. 
7 1 Qudamah (1958: 113). 32 
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same view and gives al-Buhturi's line in which he describes the way he killed a wolf as 
an example.72 The line runs: 
10. Fa'atba'tuhd 'ukhrdfa'adhlaltu naslahd 
73 
bihaythu yakunu al-lubbu wa al-ru 'bu wa al-hiqdu. 
According to Khafaji 7 4 there is a use of kinayah in the line in the words 'where reason, 
fear and malice reside'. The poet intended to say the heart but instead of this word he 
used words for feelings that usually occupy the heart so he used a container/content 
relationship in this kinayah. Then Qudamah gives a line of poetry that describes a 
woman: 
JJ.Ba'idatu mahwa al-qurti 'imma linawfalin 
75 
'abuha wa 'imma 'abdu shamsin wa hashimi. 
Qudamah maintains that the earring being described as long is a kindyah because the 
intended meaning is that the woman's neck is long and this according to the Arabs is a 
sign of beauty in a woman. The semantic adjacency or the semantic entailment of the 
expression stems from the fact that i f the woman's earring ornament is long then this 
entails that she has a long neck. 
Abu Hilal al-'Askari who was both a rhetorician and a literary critic is said to have 
transformed balaghah 'rhetoric' into criticism.7 6 He is a proponent of the scholastic 
school of al-Jahiz and Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir and others. This can be understood from 
his pursuit of the significance of form in the rhetorical organisation of a piece of speech, 
be it a poem or a piece of prose. In this sense, he was a supporter of al-Jahiz's formal 
school.77 Therefore, we find that al-'Askari's discussion of kindyah is included under 
the part of rhetoric known as badi' 'embellishment', which is basically the adornment 
of form. In his discussion of kindyah Al-'Askari treats kindyah and ta 'r'idh as the same 
7 2 See for a further discussion Kanazi (1989:156). 
73 
/ stabbed it again and made the spear head 
disappear where reason, fear and malice reside 
7 4 See for details Kanazi (1989: 156). 
7 5 Her ear-hanging ornament is long. Her Father is 
either of the Nawfal House or of' Abd Shams or HSshim. 
7 6SeeMatlUb(1978: 140). 
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phenomenon. He discusses them both under one heading entitled al-kindyah wa al-
ta 'ridh 'metonymy and allusion'. The definition he provides for kinayah and ta 'ridh is 
'the manner in which meanings are expressed in a suggestive way rather than a 
declarative way'. 7 8 He gives two examples illustrating kindyah and ta'ridh. Both 
examples are Qur'anic verses: 
\2.'aw jd'a 'ahadun minkum min al-ghd'iti 'aw Idmastumu al-nisd'. The Qur'an (4: 
43) ." 
80 
13.wafurushin marfii'ah. The Qur'an (56: 34). 
In (12), there are two examples of kindyah where the word 'privy' is used to give the 
meaning of 'passing the bowels' and the word 'touch' is used to denote an extended 
meaning beyond touching which is 'sexual intercourse'. Both metonymic examples are 
actually euphemistic examples of metonymy to express taboo meanings. In example 
(13) the word 'couches' is used to suggest women. This type of interpretation is 
warranted by following discourse. 
Among the literary critics who discussed kindyah in their critical works is Ibn Rashi'q 
al-Qayrawani82 who wrote a book entitled al- 'Umdah ft Sind 'at al-Shi 'r wa Naqdihi. 
Al-Qayrawani included a chapter on the rhetorical aspect he called tatbi'. Looking at 
the examples he provided one reaches the conclusion that he meant by tatbi' the concept 
of kindyah. Moreover, al-Qayrawani's tatbi' corresponds to Qudamah's 'irdaf. A l -
Qayrawani defines tatbi" as a type of signalling and he points out that some people call 
it transference in which the poet intends to mention something but omits that thing itself 
83 
and mentions something strongly associated with it. The first example al-Qayrawani 
gives to illustrate tatbi" is 'Imru'u al-Qays' line: 
7 7 For details see Tabbanah (1981) who discusses al-'Askari's theory of form in a whole chapter (127-
150). 
7 8 AI-'Askari(1952: 360). 
79 
if you come from the privy, or you have touched women. 
on 
and on couches raised high. 
8 1 ibid. 
8 2 Died 1063/456. 
8 3 Al-Qayrawani (1907: 215). 
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N.Yabitu futdtu al-miski fawqa firashiha na'iimu al-dhuha lam tantatiq min 
tafadhdhuli.84 
In this example al-Qayrawani argues that kinayah is in the phrase 'forenoon sleeper' by 
which the poet intended to convey a meaning that the woman is a prosperous woman 
who does not get up early in the morning to bring the necessary things like wood for 
cooking because she has servants to do such things for her. Another level of reasoning 
comes into action once we know that she is a prosperous woman and that she has 
servants doing all the housework for her. This is that she is a soft woman because she 
does not hurt her body with work. Of course, softness is regarded among the signs of 
beauty and this is why the poet has described her as such. 
In his book Dald 'il al- 'i'jdz, al-Jurjani defines kinayah as 
the situation in which the speaker wants to convey a meaning which 
he does not convey via the conventional word in the language. Rather 
he goes to a meaning which is adjacent and contiguous to that which 
he wants to convey; so with this he indicates the conventional 
85 
meaning. 
The examples Al-Jurjani gives to illustrate his definition include 
15. Tawil al-nijad86 
87 
16. Na 'um al-dhuhd. 
88 
17. Kathiru ramadi al-qidr. 
In example (15) we have the expression 'long sword' giving the meaning that the man is 
tall. Because i f the sword is long this entails that the man carrying that sword is tall. 
This example seems to exploit a cause-effect metonymic relationship in which the fact 
that the sword the man wears is long is because the man himself is tall. This example is 
similar to the woman having a long earring. The fact that the earring is long means that 
the neck of the woman is long. In example (16) of the woman who sleeps in the 
forenoon, the meaning intended is that she is a prosperous woman because according to 
the life patterns of the Arabs, women get up early in the morning and spend the whole 
morning working to earn their living. This woman sleeps in the forenoon because she 
has servants doing the job for her. This means that 'Imru'u al-Qays' lover is beautiful 
and soft because she does not do any work. Example (17) shows that the more ash 
84 
The bits of musk remain in her bed till late morning 
A forenoon sleeper who does not wear work clothes 
8 5 See al-Jurjani (1964: 52). 
he has a long sword. 
87 she sleeps in the forenoon. ^ ^  
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found under one's pot the more generous one is, simply because this means that he 
cooks a lot which in turn means that he feeds a lot of guests. Therefore, kathir al-ramdd 
'he has a lot of ash' is a sign that is associated with generosity. 
In the three examples given by al-Jurjani we find a common feature shared by all of 
them which is a distinctive characteristic of kindyah. This is the strong association 
between the term substituted and the term substituted for. The definitions above provide 
a ground to claim that a principal feature of kindyah is the meaning associations in 
which one meaning calls or conjures other related meanings either from the immediate 
context of situation as probably example (15) shows or from the broader context of 
culture like that depicted in examples (16) and (17). 
Al-Sakkaki gives a quite different definition for kindyah in which he states that kindyah 
is 
to leave pronouncement of a term and resort to mentioning what that 
term entails to transfer the interpretation from the mentioned item to 
the left item.8 9 
What is interesting in the treatment of al-Sakkaki is his concentration on the notion of 
entailment; lazim 'the entailing' and malzum 'the entailed' in the definition of kindyah. 
This reminds us of the logical background of the man as one of the leaders of the 
scholastic school of rhetoric. This school focussed on the application of logic to the 
study of rhetoric and their contribution was in the classification and categorisation of 
figurative notions and rhetorical concepts. Al-Sakkaki then gives a number of 
frequently-cited examples of kindyah like that of the woman who sleeps in the 
forenoon, of the man who has a long sword, and the man who has a lot of ash under his 
pot. 
Al-Qazwi'ni in his 'idhdh defines kindyah as 
the term used to entail something semantically concomitant with it, 
90 
with the possibility of intending the literal meaning of this term. 
The fact that the use of the expression tcrw'ilu al-nijdd 'long sword' to mean the tallness 
of the body of the carrier of this sword is a type of kindyah is true in view of the logical 
inference that is motivated by the expression 'long swords'which suggests that the 
people wearing these long swords must be tall. This is the metonymic use because we 
he has a lot of ash under his cauldron. 
See al-Sakkaki (1937: 189). 
Compare al-Qazwmi (n.d.: 183). 36 
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do not mean the literal meaning of the words 'long sword' but we go beyond it to mean 
its semantically related concept of tallness. However, the speaker may also intend the 
literal meaning of the words 'long sword' and this according to al-Qazwi'ni is the 
difference between kindyah and majaz 'metaphor'. In metaphor only the transferred 
meaning is intended because when you say that Zaid is a lion you cannot mean that Zaid 
is the animal in reality. In kindyah, by contrast, you can mean the literal meaning of the 
term also. So you can use the expression 'He is the man who has a long sword' to mean 
that he has a long sword and nothing more. 
Ibn al-Athi'r91 defines kindyah as 
the word which refers to a meaning that can be taken on both planes, 
i.e. the literal and the figurative by means of a general term relating 
92 
the two types of meaning. 
Ibn al-Athir gives the example of the word najatan 'ewe' which is used in the Qur'anic 
verse given here as (18) 
18. 'inna hddha 'akhi lahu tis 'un wa tis 'tin najatan wa liya na'jatun wdhidatun. (The 
Qur'an, 38: 23). 9 3 
Ibn Al-Athi'r argues that the word na'jatan 'an ewe' in this verse is a metonymic 
expression for woman because both 'woman' and na'jah 'ewe' agree in one semantic 
feature which is that they are both'+feminine'. In this case Ibn Al-Athir substantiates 
his theory of kindyah as pertaining to the two levels of signification; the literal as well 
as the figurative because the word na'jah 'ewe' could be interpreted as 'woman' and 
could also be interpreted as na'jah 'ewe' and nothing else.94 
Al-'Alawi in his treatise Al-Tirdz gives a three-level definition of kindyah. Two of these 
are literal and the third is figurative. The first linguistic meaning of kindyah is the root 
kanaya or kanawa:95 this means 'titling'. The Arabs were used to addressing one 
another with titles as a sign of respect. For example they would call someone Abu Al i 
(the father of Ali) i f he has a son called Al i . The second linguistic meaning is derived 
from the meaning of 'covering'. This explains why the third meaning, which is the 
3 1 Died 1237/637. 
9 2 C.f. 'Atiq (n.d. 44). 
This man, who is my brother, has ninety nine ewes and I have only one ewe. 
9 4 Ibid. This view is very important in view of modern treatments of metonymy which view the trope as 
comprising two types; one is called referential metonymy and the other predicative metonymy. (See 
chapter 2, sections 2.1.2.4. and 2.1.2.5. for details of this. 
9 5 Both forms are morphologically possible. 37 
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rhetorical meaning, is also, to some extent, based on this second definition. In this case, 
however, the covering is figurative rather than physical. 
Then al-'Alawi reviews a set of definitions provided by rhetoricians before him, such as 
al-Jurjani, al-Maliki and Ibn al-Athir. Al-'Alawi seems to reject the definitions provided 
by these rhetoricians. He attempts a refutation of these definitions, which he sees as 
containing some faulty expressions of kinayah. After he refutes the definitions of 
kinayah provided by these scholars, he provides his own definition in which he states 
that kinayah is 'the term referring to two different meanings, literal and figurative, 
without a medium and not in a declarative way'. 9 6 Having posed this definition, al-
'Alawi then explains the elements of his definition. Each element of the definition is 
explained and narrowed down to eliminate all other semantic possibilities of the 
element. This is a logical method in which precision in definition is sought. The use of 
the word 'referring' in the definition is significant because this distinguishes kinayah 
from ta 'r'idh 'allusion' which is understood by contextual interpretation rather than by 
semantic reference. The reason why he uses 'two meanings', al-'Alawi argues, is to 
differentiate kinayah from other words that have one meaning like'man'and'horse'. 
The use of the term 'different' in the definition is to distinguish kinayah from 
synonymy. The use of the terms 'literal and figurative' is to distinguish kinayah from 
simple polysemy, where words have more than one meaning but all of them are literal. 
The term 'without a medium' is to distinguish kinayah from simile, which is expressed 
via a linguistic medium, i.e. the particle ' l ike'or 'as ' . The term'not in a declarative 
way' tells us that kinayah is indirect and that it is metaphor, which is expressed via 
direct declaration of the term. 9 7 
1 . 4 . 2 . Majaz 'aql'r. 
This is what has been translated earlier as 'cognitive transference'. It is the type of 
figuration in which the verb or the action is predicated to an agent other than the real 
doer. In western rhetorical traditions discussed in this chapter section 1.3., this type of 
figuration is discussed under the general heading of metonymy. In this section, I shall 
review the set of definitions provided by Arab rhetoricians for this type of figuration. In 
the discussion of this type of figurative use, attention will be paid to the insights we can 
3 0 See al-'Alawi (1914: 373). 
9 7 Ibid. 38 
Chapter One Theoretical Framework and Historical Background 
extract from these definitions to incorporate into a combined approach to the way 
metonymy is viewed and how it functions in texts. 
In his book al-SinM'atayn, Abu Hilal al-'Askari is mainly interested in the discussion of 
majdz in its general sense. That is to say he concentrates on the discussion of 'isti 'drah 
'metaphor' and provides numerous examples for this type of majaz in the Qur'an and in 
the speech of the Arabs whether poetry or prose. It seems that at that early stage of 
Arabic rhetoric the concept of majaz was not yet developed into a fully-fledged theory 
as expounded in the writings of al-Jurjani or al-Sakkaki who came later towards the 
fifth century and onwards. Therefore, the discussion of majaz 'aqli is lacking in earlier 
treatises. 
Al-Jurjani discusses majdz 'aqli in some detail in his book Asrar al-baldghah. In this 
book al-Jurjani considers the distinction between majaz 'aqli and majaz lughawi. The 
discussion is detailed and sophisticated. It strongly suggests the importance of the 
distinction between haqiqah and majaz due to the religious background this distinction 
came to represent. In fact, the differences that cropped up between the various Muslim 
groups involved in the scholastic debates known as 'Urn al-kaldm was basically the 
issue of interpreting the verses which exhibit figurative use of the language. The main 
thrust of al-Jurjani's discussion of majaz is the distinction between three elements in the 
sentential semantic structure. The first element is that of musnad 'ilayh 'subject', the 
second is that of musnad 'predicate' and the third element is the relationship of 'isndd 
'predication'. On the basis of this distinction al-Jurjani proposes his theory of majdz. He 
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maintains that i f the transfer is in the word that is functioning as predicate then the 
type of figuration is lughawi' 'linguistic' because it is going to be a play on the meaning 
of the word - a quality that is provided by the language as a conventional system. 
However, i f the transfer is in the predication then the type of figuration is 'aqli 
'cognitive' because the action will be attributed to some entity other than the real doer -
a phenomenon that can only be interpreted by means of a cognitive judgement that there 
is some kind of relationship between the real doer of the action and the subject used. 
This relationship has to be a relationship other than similarity otherwise the figuration 
will be that of metaphor. 
Cf. Al-Jurjani (1954: 345-360). 39 
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One very interesting point al-Jurjani puts forward in his discussion is that of 
'intentionality' in majaz 'aql'i. He states that the use of the deviated form in the 
construction of majaz 'aql'i has to be intentional. This is to say that the user has to opt 
for this deviated form to achieve aesthetic effect, and that he should not believe that the 
subject used is the real doer of the action. He illustrates this from the Qur'an including 
the verse in which God speaks on behalf of the nonbelievers who say: 
19. wa mayuhlikund 'ilia al-dahr. The Qur'an (45: 24)." 
Here we cannot say that these nonbelievers were opting to use majaz 'aql'i when they 
attributed the action of destroying to time instead of God. The reason for this is that they 
really think that it is Time that destroys them and they said this without the intention of 
using language figuratively in this particular example. The definition that al-Jurjani 
provides for majaz 'aql'i is 
any sentence whose semantic judgement is transferred from that 
which it normally conveys with the purpose of figuration is wa/'az. 1 0 0 
In his book Dala'il al-'ijaz al-Jurjani discusses majaz, which he thinks is vital to the 
understanding of how language is used in real life situations to create certain aesthetic 
effect. Al-Jurjani defines majaz 'aqli as that type of figuration which does not involve a 
transfer in the meaning of a word but a transfer in the predication or rather in the 
attribution of actions to entities that do not normally do them. Al-Jurjani gives as an 
example the verse in which God says: 
20. 'ula'ika alladhina 'ishtaraw al-dhalalata bil- hudafama rabihat tijdratuhum. The 
Qur'an (2: 16). 1 0 1 
Al-Jurjani dwells on the concept of'profit 'being a verb predicated to'trade'which is 
obviously not capable of doing any action. This predication, al-Jurjani maintains,102 is a 
good example of majaz 'aql'i because the transfer is not in the nature of the meaning of 
the verb 'profit' itself, but in the fact that it is being predicated to 'trade' - a subject that 
is not animate and hence not capable of performing an action of profiting. Al-Jurjani's 
argument centres on the fact that the meaning of the word 'profit' is by no means 
transferred because the original meaning of it is still intact. However, it is the 
And nothing but time destroys us. 
1 0 0 Cf. Al-Jurjani (1954: 356). Here he means majaz 'aqli because the whole discussion is devoted to this 
type of majaz and the examples are illustrations of it. 
They are those who bought guidance for error so their trade did not profit. 
1 0 2 Cf. Al-Jurjani (1946:227). 40 
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predication of this verb to 'trade' that makes the desired aesthetic effect by means of a 
cognitive transfer. 
Al-Sakkaki defines majaz 'aqli as 
speech that is transferred from its conventional meaning for the 
103 
purpose of creating some kind of interpretation. 
Among the examples Al-Sakkaki gives are the following: 
21. yunbitu al-rabi'u al-baql.104 
22. yashfi al-tabibu al-maridh.105 
23. kasa al-khalifatu al-ka 'bata.106 
24. bana al-waziru al-qasr.107 
Al-Sakkaki's discussion of majaz 'aqli does not differ very much from al-Jurjani's 
discussion. It seems, however, that al-Sakkaki's discussion is more of a logical nature, 
and that the rhetorical significance of majaz 'aqli is lost in the detailed logical 
discussion of the issue. 
Ibn al-Athir includes majaz 'aqli in his discussion of the notion of majaz. He introduces 
more or less the same arguments provided by rhetoricians before him. However, he 
concentrates on majaz lughawi as it is, according to him, the core of figurative use of 
language since there is a transfer in the conventional meaning of the word whereas 
majaz 'aqli involves a transfer in the construction or in the predication of actions to 
subjects other than the real doers of those actions. This is more or less a similar 
treatment to that of al-Jurjani. 
Al-Qazwi'ni in his book 'idhah defines majaz 'aqli as 
the predication of the verb or its meaning to an agent that it is not its 
108 
agent in the conventional sense for the purpose of interpretation. 
Al-Qazwini engages in a detailed discussion of the notion of majaz 'aqli. He discusses 
the various forms of this type of figuration which he attributes to the relationship 
between the verb on the one hand and the subject, object, infinitive, time, place and 
cause on the other. It is very interesting to note that Al-Qazwi'ni discusses majaz 'aqli as 
1 0 3 Al-Sakkaki (1937: 185). 
1 0 4 The spring grows radish. 
1 0 5 The doctor cured the patient. 
1 0 6 The Caliph clothed the Ka'bah. 
1 0 7 The minister built the palace. Ibid. 
1 0 8 Al-Qazwini (n.d.: 21). 41 
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an aspect of ma 'ani 'notions'. In this respect, his analysis differs from that of those who 
preceded him who regarded this type of figuration as an essential aspect of baydn 
'eloquence'. In fact, Al-QazwTni draws our attention to this point at the end of his 
discussion of this majdz because it discusses the states of predication which is 
essentially an aspect of ma 'ani -the branch that deals with the way the construction of 
sentences reflects appropriateness of the speech to the context.109 
Al-'Alawi's treatise of Al-Tirdz does not account for majdz 'aqli in the way other 
contemporary rhetoricians do. 1 1 0 He provides a detailed discussion of fifteen types of 
majdz mufrad 'transference in the individual words' and he includes some examples of 
majdz 'aql'i among the examples he provides for these types. Also he discusses this sort 
of majdz but under a different name, i.e. under what he calls majdz murakkab 
'constructional transference'. This is precisely what al-Jurjani calls majdz 'isndd'i 
'predication transfer' and what al-Sakkaki calls majdz 'aql'i 'cognitive transfer'.This is 
in fact the name under which this type of majdz came to be known. 
1.4.3. Majaz mursal 
Majdz mursal as the name suggests is a type of transference. Arab rhetoricians call this 
type of figuration majdz mursal for two reasons. First, the relations underlying it are 
open and not confined to a specific type of relation. Second, the relationships 
underlying it are not those of similarity. 1 1 1 There is a great deal of similarity between 
majdz mursal and majdz 'aqli because they both refer to a phenomenon whereby the use 
of a word or a construction is intended to convey a meaning other than its conventional 
one with the aid of a strong connection between the meaning intended and the 
conventional meaning of the word or the construction. The first difference between the 
two however is that while the first occurs in individual words the second occurs in the 
construction. Furthermore, another vital difference between these two types of majdz is 
that while the first one is an example of majdz lughawi the second is an example of 
majdz 'aqli. This means that the former utilises the linguistic possibilities of word 
meanings and builds the transfer on a kind of deviation from the norms of the word 
meaning provided by the language. 
1 0 9 Ibid. 
1 1 0 I mean here al-Qazwini who showed some sort of systematicity in his discussion of majaz. 
1 1 1 Cf. Af(q(n.d.: 143). 42 
Chapter One Theoretical Framework and Historical Background 
By contrast, the latter capitalises on a deviation from cognitive processes that are the 
outcome of transfer of predication. While the words themselves are used in their 
conventional sense, it is the construction or the predication that deviates from normal 
language construction in that verbs or actions are attributed to subjects other than their 
real doers. This might be seen as 'personification' in the western sense which according 
to Wales is 'a figure of speech or trope in which an inanimate object, animate non-
human, or abstract quality is given human attributes'.112 Wales gives as an example of 
personification the following lines from Gary, (the personification is marked bold) 
25. Here rests the head upon the lap of Earth 
A youth to fortune and to fame unknown. 
Fair Science frowned not on his humble birth, 
And Melancholy marked him for her own 
(Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard) 
In the example above the verb 'frowned' is attributed to an inanimate abstract noun 
'science' which is unable to do any sort of frowning. This is regarded as a major feature 
of poetic language which attributes a sense of animation and sometimes a sense of 
humanity to non-animate or non-human objects. 
I think the difference between majdz 'aqli and personification is that majdz 'aql'i is a 
much broader concept than personification because it not only includes verbs or actions 
but also extends to include predication, which in Arabic includes all forms of noun 
phrases. Besides this transfer is based on logical connectedness and cognitive 
association between the subject used and the subject omitted. 
Al-Jurjani alludes to majdz mursal although he does not give it this name. In his book 
Asrdr al-baldghah, al-Jurjani goes into detail about the various forms of majdz and 
suggests that majdz is the area where there had been dispute before him because the 
issue is very much related to the disputes between Muslim religious groups regarding 
the names and attributes of God. Therefore, al-Jurjani attempts to outline a standard to 
which Muslims can refer to in their debates. Al-Jurjani begins his discussion of this 
figurative aspect by introducing a definition of majdz in general. His definition runs: 
majaz is every word that is used for a meaning other than that for 
which it was originally invented by virtue of a connection between 
the first and the second. 
1 1 2 C.f. Wales (1989: 349). 
1 1 3 Cf. Al-Jurjani (1954: 325). 43 
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This 'connection' is what came to be known in later rhetorical circles as the 'relation' 
that ties the two meanings, i.e. the conventional meaning and the figurative meaning. 
Al-Jurjani then cites the verse in which God says: 
26. Bald qddirina 'aid 'an nusawwiya bandnahu. The Qur'an (75: 4 ) . m 
In this verse the word bandnahu 'fingertips' is used in a part-whole relationship in 
which the whole finger is meant. This then enters into a cyclical metonymic 
signification to mean the whole hand.1 1 5 
Al-Sakkaki discusses majdz mursal under the heading of 'linguistic figuration attributed 
to the meaning that is devoid of any exaggeration of likeness'. He then defines it as 'the 
transfer of the meaning of the word from its original meaning with the aid of a context 
to another meaning for the purpose of establishing a form of connectedness between the 
two respective meanings'.116 It is clear from al-Sakkaki's definition that context is 
needed to determine the interpretation of this figurative use. The emphasis on the 
establishment of a form of connectedness between the two meanings of the two words 
in question is a characteristic of this type of majaz and the set of relations underlying it 
illustrate this aspect in more detail. 
Al-Qazwi'ni is considered the first Arab rhetorician to use the word mursal to describe 
this type of majdz lughawi.1,7 In his book 'idhdh, al-Qazwi'ni divides majdz according to 
the type of relation underlying each type into two types. The first he calls mursal and 
the second 'isti 'drah. Then, he defines majdz mursal as 
the majdz in which the relation between the meaning used and the 
original meaning is not that of similarity, like the word 'hand' when it 
118 
means 'benevolence'. 
Rather it is a relationship of semantic connectedness in which the hand is the instrument 
by which the blessing is bestowed. Therefore, one can call this an 'instrumental' 
relationship. 
Although al-'Alawi is a contemporary of al-Qazwini we find that al-Qazwini in his 
'idhdh is more systematic in his division and classification of the types of majdz. A l -
1 1 4 Nay, we are able to make his fingertips equal. 
1 1 5 According to one interpretation, the verse means that by making fingers equal, man will not be able to 
do skilful things with his hands. 
1 1 6 Al-Sakkaki (1937: 200). 
1 1 7 Cf. Haddarah(1989: 59). 
1 1 8 Cf. Al-Qazwini (n.d. : 154). 44 
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' Alawi divides majaz into fifteen types. Some of these types fall under majaz 'aql'i like 
the examples he gives in type number four ." 9 In this example, al-'Alawi treats the 
predication in 
27. Sdla Al-Wddi.120 
as a type of majaz mufrad 'figuration in individual words'. However, this type of 
predication is in fact a type of majaz 'aql'i because the transfer involved in this example 
121 
is not in the meaning of individual words but in the predication. That is to say that the 
words 'valley' and 'flowed' as individual words are used in their literal meaning. The 
transfer nonetheless is in predicating the action of flowing to the valley while the real 
subject is the water and not the valley. This type of majaz is based on a spatial 
relationship, i.e. because water runs through the valley we can figuratively say that the 
valley flows. 
To conclude this section it is essential to make the following observation. The treatment 
of metonymy in Arabic rhetoric is also severely reduced and rather unsystematic. 
Although the treatment in this section seems systematic, it is because the model which 
has been imposed on the data makes the treatment generally systematic. The triadic 
scheme of signification that is used in this section has considered metonymy in Arabic 
rhetoric from the perspective of the three domains of metonymic signification. These 
are the domain of words, the domain of concepts and the domain of objects. The section 
argues that kinayah could be the type of signification involving words, majaz 'aql'i the 
type of signification involving concepts and majaz mursal the type of signification 
involving objects. The connection between the first two is evident while the connection 
with regard to the third is plausible, especially i f we take into consideration that the 
relations underlying majdz mursal are actually relations which conform to the realm of 
ontology. The relations are those of contiguity, adjacency, totality, partiality, locality, 
and positionality. 
The Arabic tradition it could be safely argued therefore was no better than the western 
tradition as far as the treatment of metonymy is concerned. The trope in both traditions 
suffers from epistemological limitations, and from confinement to the lexical level in 
1 1 9 AI-'Alawi (1914: vol.1: 70). 
120 
The valley flowed. 
121 Although this might involve some modification in the semantic structure of the verb. 
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addition to its treatment as a phenomenon pertaining to the language of poetry or highly 
elevated styles of diction rather than to everyday language and normal modes of 
thinking. 
1.5. Summary 
This chapter has centred around two issues. The first was to place the thesis in its 
theoretical context by relating it to its parent disciplines, namely rhetoric, figurative 
theory and textlinguistics. The second was to place the thesis in its historical context by 
providing a discussion of the various treatments of metonymy in western and Arabic 
rhetoric. The chapter concluded that metonymy in classical rhetoric was sometimes 
discussed as substitution between words, sometimes between things and sometimes 
between concepts but never all of these together. Besides, metonymy in these rhetorical 
treatments was treated as a stylistic ornament and as a process pertaining to the lexical 
level. The treatments fail to address the semiotic aspect of metonymic signification that 
cuts across language, mind and reality. Before the thesis moves on to outline the 
characteristics of a semiotic approach to metonymy, it should be wise to trace the 
treatment of metonymy in what I call a modern figurative theory of metonymy to see i f 
modern accounts of the trope are able to capture this semiotic potential. It is this aspect 
that I shall turn to in the next chapter. 
46 
Chapter Two Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory 
Chapter Two: Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory 
Metonymy may in fact be more common 
than metaphor, and indeed is held by 
some to be the distinguishing mark of 
realist prose, yet it is seldom subjected 
to the detailed and lengthy investigations 
that metaphor undergoes. And not only 
is it not widely studied but most accounts 
of it are unsatisfactory.1 
2.0. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have seen that the majority of studies of metonymy in 
classical rhetoric treated the trope as a process of substitution mainly involving words 
and hence reducing the power of the trope to linguistic substitution. In addition, 
metonymy has been treated as a process of substitution at the lexical level only. I have 
shown that this is a narrow view in both respects: as will be shown in the course of this 
thesis, metonymy is not only a process of word substitution ^ >r a process only limited to 
the lexical level. This chapter investigates the nature and function of metonymy in 
modern figurative theory. The aim is to see whether and to what extent have modern 
accounts been able to capture these two important aspects of metonymy? The word 
'modern' in the title of this chapter refers particularly to the work carried out in the area 
of metonymy from the early 1950s till the present day. This date marks the early 
attempts to apply structural techniques to the study of literature and figurative language. 
It is generally accepted that the structural analysis of figurative language has benefited 
the field of figuration in terms of systematisation and paved the way for the creation of 
modern rhetoric. This is by no means to discredit the works of I . A. Richards (1936) and 
K. Burke (1945) which to some extent revolutionised the study of rhetoric and gave it 
fresh insight. Rather the interest is precisely centred on the attempts to carry out 
structural analysis of rhetorical devices as principles underlying and regulating human 
cognition and communication. 
This chapter draws from three main sources to discuss the concept of metonymy. The 
first source is the rhetorical and figurative studies carried out recently on metonymy. 
The second source is those semantic studies that have investigated metonymy as a 
semantic phenomenon dealing with shifts of meanings and referents. The third source is 
1 Bredin(1984: 45). 
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the cognitive approach, which enriches our understanding of the concept of metonymy 
as a conceptual structure and as a mode of cognition. I believe that each of these sources 
has its own merits and taking one and leaving the others would lead to an awkward 
theory of metonymy. Taking them separately would also lead to unsatisfactory results 
because the merits of each will not be combined with the merits of the others to provide 
a coherent account of metonymy. 
2.1. Theories of metonymy 
Metonymy is the figure of speech which involves the substitution of one word with 
another with which it is associated. This definition has been alluded to on several 
occasions in this and the previous chapter. Metonymy has not, until recently, been 
sufficiently studied. This section deals with the various theories of metonymy that have 
begun to emerge since the 1950s. It aims to provide a survey of views regarding the 
concept in order to assess the status of metonymy in modern figurative theory. 
2.1.1. Linguistic theories of metonymy 
In this section I am concerned with reviewing the theories of metonymy that have been 
proposed by linguists or people working in the field of rhetorical studies. I consider both 
fields of linguistics and rhetoric to share more or less similar concerns throughout 
history. Rhetoric was one of the principal disciplines for the study of language in use in 
classical times and it continued to be so through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 
In the post-Renaissance period rhetoric as the study of the language of argumentation 
declined and was reduced to the study of a handful of figures. The term 'rhetoric' 
acquired its pejorative sense in this period as mere nonsense and an act of adorning 
language to conceal factual defects. However, rhetoric and linguistics nowadays work 
hand in hand to explore language in use and to study all forms of effective 
communication. This is to say that there should not be any confusion between the two 
disciplines as far as this section is concerned. Moreover, it should be stressed here that 
the most natural home for rhetoric in modern linguistics would be textlinguistics or 
discourse analysis. This is what I think rhetoric is and it is what I advocate throughout 
the course of this thesis. 
2.1.1.1. Jakobson 
In his paper 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances' 
Roman Jakobson attempts to bring literature under the scrutiny of linguistics to give the 
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study of literature more precision and objectivity. Jakobson outlined a very influential 
and controversial theory at the same time about the application of linguistic techniques 
combined with fundamental aspects of figurative theory to the study of literature and 
writing in general and in fact to various aspects of cultural phenomena. Jakobson's 
article has been a subject of extensive study since its publication. In this section I will 
try to discuss this paper which initiated a considerable amount of interest and drew the 
attention of linguistic and literary circles to the role of these two poles of metaphor and 
metonymy in language in the development of discourse. 
Jakobson's theory of metonymy and metaphor comes in a highly technical treatment of 
the subject of language disorders. From this specialised discussion which seems initially 
irrelevant to both linguistics and critical theory, Jakobson builds his theoretical 
constructs of 'selection' and 'combination' by relating these two concepts to the 
Saussurean concepts of paradigmatic and syntagmatic arrangements of the linguistic 
sign. Jakobson argues that 'speech implies a S E L E C T I O N of certain linguistic entities and 
their C O M B I N A T I O N into linguistic units of a higher degree of complexity'.3 Jakobson 
develops on this and establishes his semiotic theory of the linguistic sign involving 
metaphor and metonymy as two fundamental modes of signification. 
The next step came naturally to apply these two concepts to shed new light on the 
traditional typology of tropical figures. Among those who have discussed rhetorical 
figures Jakobson is the most reductionist of all. 4 He reduced the figures into two main 
ones, metaphor and metonymy. The Renaissance period reduced the classical tropes into 
four: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony. Jakobson reduced this fourfold 
classification into two. Jakobson regards synecdoche as belonging to the metonymic 
realm as both among other relations express contiguous relations of genus to species 
and vice versa. 
I am concerned with outlining Jakobson's theory of metonymy in an attempt to show 
how his theory has benefited the subsequent study of metonymy. Jakobson argues that 
This is perhaps why the paper remained for quite a long time very much unnoticed by linguists or 
critical theorists. Lodge (1977: 73) rightly argues that the paper did not seem very inviting to literary 
critics due to the fact that its contents did not sound relevant to their concerns. 
3 Jakobson (1971: 72). 
4 Bansloben (1996: 8) argues that'critics such as Burke and White consider the two-fold model far too 
limiting. Instead, they advocate the more traditional four trope approach to rhetoric'. 
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metonymy is based on contiguity whereas metaphor is based on similarity. The question 
that I want to raise and that has been raised by a number of scholars before me5 is: what 
does Jakobson mean by the term 'contiguity'? The term 'contiguity' seems to have 
caused a remarkable confusion among linguists, cognitivists and literary critics who 
attempted to study Jakobson's theory of tropes. Perhaps the term 'contiguity' was also 
confusing for Jakobson himself. This feeling can be elicited from his statement that 
' metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation'.6 This 
observation comes after Jakobson tries to give a justification of why the literature on 
metaphor is far larger than that on metonymy. His justification is that metonymy being 
based on contiguity is more difficult to interpret. Jakobson wants to say that the relation 
underlying metonymy is heterogeneous rather than homogenous. In other words, the 
principle underlying metonymy does not provide the researcher with a homogenous 
means to deal with it. The most plausible interpretation of this is that 'contiguity' is a 
heterogeneous term or an umbrella term covering more than one principle of 
interpretation. 
From a linguistic perspective, 'contiguity' can be interpreted as linguistic contiguity or 
more precisely concatenative contiguity the most obvious aspect of which is linguistic 
D E L E T I O N . The evidence that theorists adopting this approach provide is that examples 
like (1) 
1. The keel ploughed the deep 
actually realise an underlying deep structure of the type in (2) below: 
2. The keel of the ship ploughed the deep sea. 
The word 'keel' stands in contiguous relation to the word'ship'and the word'deep' 
stands in contiguous relation to the word 'sea' because they can coexist in 
concatenation. In this case the two forms coexist in a virtual code but because of 
problems related to 'redundancy' the surface structure realises only the informatively 
essential elements. From a cognitive perspective, 'contiguity' can be interpreted as 
'cognitive contiguity'. In this case, example (1) above would be interpreted as the 
concept 'keel' is contiguous to the concept 'ship' and the concept 'deep' is contiguous 
to the concept 'sea' by means of cognitive adjacency because they coexist in some form 
of adjacency in a conceptual schema. 
5 Cf. Lodge (1977, 1988), Osterwalder (1978) and Bansloben (1996). 
6 Jakobson (1971:95). 
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The idea that 'contiguity' is heterogeneous is also evident in another respect. The 
principle of 'similarity' underlying metaphor is always interpreted as a mapping 
between two entities pertaining to two different domains by means of a similarity 
established between a tenor (T) and a vehicle (V) 7 on the basis of a particular ground 
(G). In metonymy, however, it is difficult to establish such a coherent metalanguage 
because each metonymic relation is unique and therefore it is essential to account for 
metonymy by means of a typology of metonymic relations or metonymic concepts 
rather than formulas like in the case of metaphor. The list of metonymic relations 
provided by linguists and cognitivists which is calculated at 46 by Radden and 
Kovecses (1999) is a good example of how diverse and heterogeneous the concept of 
contiguity is. Moreover, in metonymy, tenor and vehicle are not similar and also are not 
based on one relation. They might be existentially contiguous, cognitively contiguous or 
causally related. This is perhaps why Jakobson thought that metonymy does not provide 
the researcher with a homogeneous means to deal with it. 
My view is that one can still argue that even i f metonymy is based on contiguity and 
even i f contiguity has diverse manifestations this does not necessarily mean that the 
interpretation of metonymy is problematic. In fact, a counter argument against Jakobson 
could be levelled here since he implies that the interpretation of metaphor is easier than 
the interpretation of metonymy. I think the problem lies in the linguistic approach 
Jakobson is imposing on the interpretation of tropes. Had Jakobson approached the 
issue with a cognitive orientation, I think hjs conclusion would have been different. The 
reason is that cognitively speaking metonymy is in fact much easier to interpret than 
metaphor because the signification of metonymy, unlike metaphor, does not involve a 
transfer between different domains which normally involves more effort in message 
comprehension and processing. Rather the substitution takes place between different 
aspects or elements of the same domain. This feature should make interpretation easy 
rather than difficult. It should be easier to understand metonymy because one does not 
need to make a conceptual shift between domains but shifts within the same domain. 
As the French linguist Gaston Ensault argues, metonymy 'does not open up new paths 
to follow as metaphorical intuition does; instead it hurries over the stages in paths that 
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are too well-known and shortens the distances so as to facilitate the rapid intuition of 
things that we already know'. Nerlich et al comment on this quotation and argue that 
metonymy therefore 'enables us to say things quicker, to shorten conceptual distances'.9 
They further assert that metonymy is 'a universal strategy of cost-effective 
communication'.10 The plethora of studies on metonymy that were produced after 
Jakobson's paper11 shows that Jakobson's thesis about the polarity of metaphor and 
metonymy in the progression of discourse and indeed in areas other than linguistics is in 
fact fundamental and intellectually significant. The only problem with Jakobson's 
treatment is his linguistic or rather his formal approach which led to the categorisation 
of metonymy as problematic. 
The argument that I am putting forward here is that a linguistic approach on its own is 
not sufficient to account for metonymy because it will wrongly assume that metonymy 
is difficult to deal with by means of the traditionally established terms of tenor, vehicle 
and ground. From this wrong assumption a wrong conclusion would be drawn that it is 
difficult to interpret metonymy simply on the ground that metonymy does not offer a 
homogeneous means for the study of its various manifestations. My argument is, 
therefore, diversity is not at all a problem for interpretation. In fact, it seems that we do 
not understand things only because they are similar to one another but also because they 
stand next to each other. 
Metonymy is realistic, it is referential and it is contextually relevant, and this is what 
makes it a concept of powerful interpretive force. As soon as we apply a cognitive 
methodology to approach the issue we shall find that metonymy presents us with such 
remarkable interpretative power that it must be seen as an aid to cognition and by 
implication to interpretation. The fact that metonymy is inherently referential makes it 
more geared to the literal side of the scale i f there is one. In this case it is more easily 
interpretable. The concern of metonymy with details that belong to what semanticists 
call 'semantic fields' or what researchers in artificial intelligence would call 'schemata' 
7 Terms invented by I.A. Richards in his The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Goatly uses topic instead of tenor 
and uses the term ground (G) (1997). 
8 Cited in Nerlich et al (1999: 362). 
9 Ibid (363). 
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make metonymy an inherently semantic and cognitive phenomenon that is not exotic to 
our normal conceptualisation processes. 
2.1.1.2. Group mu 
Group mu is the nickname of a group of French linguists comprising Dubois, Jacques, 
Edeline, Francis, Klinkenberg, Jean-Marie, Minguet, Philippe, Pire, Francois, & 
Trinton, Hadelin, who were interested in reviving rhetoric. They saw in it a subject that 
could help the study of language and communication. This was a view that had gone 
into oblivion as a result of the mediaeval reductionist approaches to rhetoric which 
reduced the scope of this discipline to the study of how to ornament and adorn the style 
of the message rather than how to compose, persuade and convince by means of 
argumentation. The Group's theory of metonymy is developed within a general 
treatment of the fundamentals of rhetoric. After considering both metaphor and 
synecdoche, the Group discuss metonymy. The first reference they make is to 
Jakobson's theory of metonymy as opposed to metaphor. 
The Group criticise traditional rhetoric as a pre-scientific whole and attempt to apply 
the principles of the structuralist project to provide some coherence and systematisation 
to rhetoric. The main aim of the structuralist project as Rosiene sees it is 'to place the 
13 
"essentially taxonomic" character of classical rhetoric upon firm scientific ground'. 
The Group accuse classical rhetoric of offering an unsatisfactory definition of 
metonymy on the ground that the definitions provided by classical rhetoricians merely 
enumerated either the types or the examples of the trope rather than defining the nature 
or the function of the trope. Rosiene14 contends this view and argues that the Group's 
claim is not quite right because in the definitions of the classical rhetoricians one finds 
really useful accounts of metonymy. He gives as an example the definition of 
metonymy provided by the Auctor1 5 whose definition of metonymy has been discussed 
in chapter 1 section 1.3. and is reproduced here for convenience. 
1 1 Cf. Bonn, (1984: 534-550). 
1 2 Cf. Rosiene (1992: 24). 
1 3 Ibid. (33). 
1 4 Ibid. (173-199). 
1 5 As we have seen in chapter one, this is the name Rosiene uses for an unknown Latin Antiquity 
rhetorician to whom Rhetorica ad Herennium is credited. Sometimes the treatise is ascribed to Cicero and 
as a result the author is sometimes referred to using the name Cicero and between square brackets [the 
Auctor]. This is the way the author is referred to in the bibliography of this thesis. 
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the figure of speech which draws from an object closely akin or 
associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called 
by its name. 
Rosiene argues that this is a satisfactory definition of metonymy because it involves 
four fundamental operations that characterise the process of metonymic understanding. 
These four operations are: 
1. denomination 
2. abstraction 
3. intellection 
4. appellation17 
The Group take metonymy to mean the substitution of one verbal expression for 
another, whenever the expressions are related to one another within a web of 
18 
connotative associations. They present their theory of metonymy under two main 
headings, each of which pertains to a fundamental principle underlying the process of 
metonymy. They begin their discussion by borrowing the concept of'contiguity'from 
Stephen Ullmann who used it in his definition of metonymy as a transfer of meaning 
'based on sense-contiguity'19 and then attempt to assess the relevance of this concept to 
metonymisation. The Group argue that the notion of 'contiguity' might not be 
sufficiently helpful and as a result might not be 'a beginning of a satisfactory theory of 
20 
metonymy'. However, it could be a useful notion to use to provide a specification of 
metonymy. In this case metonymy could be easily identified and distinguished from 
other closely related tropes, notably metaphor. It does not seem at all surprising that the 
Group are actually concerning themselves with the particularities of and differences 
between tropes because their main thrust is to provide a complete system of all the 
tropes. However, despite their vigilance, they fall in the trap of reductionism. In fact, 
they actually reduce the tropes or at least propose a reductionist approach to the 
interpretation of tropes. They use Aristotle's definition of metaphor in which he talked 
1 6 Cicero [the Auctor] (1954: IV, xxxii). 
1 7For discussion of this argument and the four operations see chapter 1 section 1.3. 
1 8 See also Bredin's account of the Group's theory of metonymy (1984: 49). 
1 9 Ullmann (1951: 223). 
2 0 The Group mu (1981: 120). 
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about species- genus, genus-species as a basis to postulate that in fact the trope of tropes 
is synecdoche.21 
With reference to metaphor, the Group maintain that metaphor 
is not a substitution of meaning, but a modification of the semantic 
content of a term. This modification is the result of the conjunction of 
22 
two basic operations: addition and suppression of semes. In other 
23 
words, metaphor is the product of two synecdoches. 
With regard to metonymy the Group's view centres around the argument that i f 
'contiguity' is spatial, temporal and causal then there would be little difference between 
metonymy and synecdoche, for in both cases there is a relation of some sort of 
contiguity. Leech confirms this when he comments on Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary's definition of metonymy as 'a figure of speech that consists in 
using the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is associated'. 
Leech comments that this definition 'covers all rules of transference, including that of 
metaphor, since similarity is a form of association'.24 
It seems that the Group are unhappy with linking the concept of metonymy, or perhaps 
any rhetorical figure, to the ontological domain since this makes it difficult to abstract 
relations and establish systems from a diverse variety of phenomena. The Group are 
also not content with the idea of assigning the workings of metonymy to the realm of 
language alone. They have expressed unhappiness with the term 'thing' which keeps 
recurring in many definitions of metonymy as a transfer of reference of'things'. They 
consider the problem of metonymy to lie in this particular aspect of pragmatic 
understanding of the concept of metonymy. Reference to things implies a realistic and 
contextual account of the trope which tends to highlight the types, species and examples 
of metonymy rather than derive a universal principle to account for the phenomenon. In 
other words, ontological approaches to metonymy were, for the Group, reminiscent of 
2 1 See for further details on this Bredin (1984: 46). 
" In semiotics and semantics, the term semes as Wales asserts is 'from Greek sema'sign', and by 
analogy with PHONEME and MORPHEME, seme is used in European STRUCTURALISM and semantics (e.g. 
Greimas 1966; Coseriu 1967) to describe a minimal DISTINCTIVE F E A T U R E of meaning or COMPONENT'. 
Semes define the essential denotations of different lexical items within a lexical field in terms of binary 
oppositions: e.g. items of clothing can be marked as being 'with [+] or without [-] sleeves' (e.g. jacket vs. 
waistcoat), Wales (1989: 415). 
23 
The Group (1981: 107). In page (109) the Group maintain that to construct a metaphor, we must couple 
two complementary synecdoches that function in a precisely inverse way and that fix an intersection 
between the terms S and R. 
2 4 Leech (1969: 152). 
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previous unscientific accounts of rhetorical tropes as taxonomies of unrelated 
phenomena. The Group emphasised a twofold theory of metonymy in which both'the 
semantic plane' and 'the material plane' are accounted for. In our terminology their 
theory is at the same time epistemological and ontological. 
The Group aim to place metonymy on well-defined borders from other tropes. Part of 
their unrest with traditional rhetoric is the confusion between metaphor, metonymy and 
synecdoche especially after the general treatment of Aristotle's metaphor which in fact 
subsumed metonymy and synecdoche. The Group, therefore, cite Du Marsais' account 
on the distinction between metonymy and synecdoche in which he argues that in the 
first figure the 'relation between the objects is such that the object whose name is 
borrowed remains independent of the thing whose idea it awakens and does not form a 
whole with it .... While the union found between objects in synecdoche assumes that 
25 
the objects form a whole, such as the whole and a part'. The Group argue that 'within 
the vagueness of this formulation, we find, believe it or not, metonymy's specific 
26 
character'. It seems that the Group found what they seek in terms of separating 
metonymy and synecdoche. So metonymy is a relation which does not involve union 
between the objects, and synecdoche is a relation that does. Although this seems a 
promising criterion in terms of which metonymy and synecdoche could be 
distinguished, the criterion itself is certainly derived from a linguistic conception of the 
nature of both relations rather than a cognitive conception. Studies in semantic domains 
and semantic fields support the view that it is extremely difficult to distinguish between 
metonymy and synecdoche. In fact, the concept of'contiguity'the relevance of which 
to metonymy the Group attempt to discuss makes the possibility of drawing a line 
between metonymy and synecdoche extremely difficult. The argument of the Group 
seems futile because they tend to impose a metaphorical model on the interpretation of 
metonymy when they talk about the relations between 'objects' although we know and 
the Group know also that the relations underlying both metonymy and synecdoche do 
not involve more than one object or one semantic domain. When the Group try to 
distinguish metonymy from synecdoche they argue that the relation that underlies 
metonymy remains independent and does not involve union with the objects. However, 
when they compare metaphor and metonymy, also to separate metonymy from 
25 
26 
The Group mu( 1981: 120). 
Ibid. 
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metaphor, they identify metonymy with 'co-inclusion of semes in a whole' on the 
semantic plane and they identify it with 'membership in a material whole' on the 
material plane.27 
I find the Group's position confusing and quite contradictory. Their argument that 
in the metonymic operation, the passage from the first starting term 
(S) to the resulting term (R) is made via an intermediary term (I) that 
28 29 30 
includes S and R in either mode £ or mode n ' 
is ample evidence that there is a sense of totality in the metonymic operation and that 
the criterion of union or totality is not a useful tool to distinguish the two commonly 
confused tropes. In fact, when the Group offer an example to illustrate their point, they 
resort explicitly to the notions of unity and totality in their explanation of what is going 
on in the interpretation of the example. 
3. Take up your Caesar 
spoken by a teacher to tell his students that they were to continue their study of De 
Bello Gallico'. 3 1 When they come to explain the metonymic operation involved in the 
example they point out that 
the intermediary term will be the spatio-temporal totality, including 
the life of the famous consul, his loves, his literary works, his wars, 
his times, his city. In this totality of type n, Caesar and his book are 
contiguous.32 
It is clear from this discussion that the theory of metonymy offered by the Group does 
not provide criteria which are sufficiently well defined to separate this trope from 
synecdoche. The Group confuse the two tropical operations of metonymy and 
synecdoche and instead of distinguishing the two tropes they in fact blur the view of the 
two tropes altogether. I think this is the natural result of any attempt to separate the two 
tropes because they are simply inseparable especially i f they are looked at from a 
33 
'levelling' point of view for the purpose of developing a coherent theory of how 
z / I b i d . (120-121). 
28 
This is the symbol the Group use to designate 'semantic plane'. 
29 
This is the symbol the Group use to designate the 'material plane'. 
3 0 Ibid. 
3 1 Ibid. 
3 2 Ibid. 
3 3 Osterwalder cites George S. Klein who has labelled two basic attitudes; levelling and sharpening. The 
former 'tends towards the obliteration of differences to facilitate categorisation'while the latter'is a 
tendency to be hypersensitive to minutiae, to respond excessively to fine nuances and small differences' 
(1978: 17). 
57 
Chapter Two Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory 
'contiguity' functions in discourse. This is the theme of this thesis and I feel inclined to 
accept the view that metonymy and synecdoche are inseparable especially when they 
are taken as the manifestations of contiguous relations in both cognition and language. 
The Group then move to discuss the notion of 'connotation' and its role in the 
metonymic operation. Two important points can be made about the Group's position in 
this respect. The first concerns their view that metaphor is denotative whereas 
metonymy is connotative. This model falls sharply in contradiction with the model 
Osterwalder provides and which views metonymy to be denotative and metaphor 
connotative.34 Osterwalder argues, and perhaps many structuralists would agree, that 
metaphor being a trope based on a mapping from one level of conceptualisation to 
another on the basis of a similarity established between the two levels, is in fact 
connotative or brings connotative experience into play, as the degree of similarity and 
the distance between the tenor and the vehicle will be determined by the cultural values 
of the society in question. 
Recalling Esnault's statement that metaphor opens new paths of metaphorical intuition 
it is plausible to see how connotative metaphor is. It makes sense also to see how the 
gap that metaphor tries to create and bridge at the same time is by no means understood 
by means of the denotation of the conceptual sense of the word. In other words, 
metaphor produces an infinite multiplicity of meaning intuitions. Metonymy, however, 
can be seen as a reductive operation on understanding in which the multiplicity of 
meanings is actually zoomed down to fit into a particular context. This context may be 
either linguistic, by means of syntagmatic contiguity, or cognitive, by means of spatio-
temporal contiguity. Given this position let us see why the Group hold the view that 
metaphor is actually denotative and metonymy is connotative. 
The Group state that 
metaphor brings out denotative semes, nuclear semes, included in the 
definition of terms. Metonymy, on the other hand, brings out the 
connotative semes, that is, those contiguous to the array of a larger 
grouping and combining to define this grouping. 
This argument is simply built on a wrong assumption that metaphorical interpretation 
does not call for general meanings. It is based on a myth that what is involved in the 
3 4 Osterwalder (1978: 23). 
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similarity between the two things is in fact the critical features that define each thing or 
what is known in semantic studies as the intentional features of that thing. This is 
obviously not true: the essence of metaphor is to allow imagination an open space to 
draw fictional worlds to try to reconcile the tension created by the violation emanating 
from the metaphorical operation. My position, which is opposed to that of the Group 
and Osterwalder, is that there is a great deal of connotation involved in both tropes. I 
agree with Osterwalder that metaphor involves connotation and disagree with him that 
metonymy is only denotative. In the same way I agree with the Group that metonymy 
involves a great deal of connotation and disagree with them that metaphor is only 
denotative. In any act of figuaration there is a connotative background and what might 
sometimes seem denotative is nothing but an act of lexicalisation through the process of 
demetaphorisation or demetonymisation whereby the signifier-signified relationship 
gets naturalised to the extent that people think it is real and mandatory while in reality it 
is a connotation. In other words there is no 'denotation' in figurative language. I f we 
seek to be referential in a literal sense then there is no need to use figurative language. 
In fact, our minds are figuratively structured in such a way that we approach the real 
world in a figurative way and this makes our use of language amount to an act of 
connotation. 
The second point that needs to be commented upon is the model of metasememe 
interpretation provided by the Group. This model underestimates the figurative nature of 
both metaphor and synecdoche because it claims that the interpretation of these two 
processes takes place in a normal straightforward manner. Only when this 
straightforward and default mode of interpretation fails is a metonymic interpretation 
sought. It places metonymic understanding as the last resort to be sought only when all 
other options are exhausted. The Group maintain that 
the reader has recourse first to analytic procedures to reduce 
metasememes. He will first see whether the figure is synecdoche, 
metaphor or antiphrasis. It is only when the consideration of the 
semic datum (nuclear and coded and therefore certain) has failed that 
he will seek connotative extrapolations that will allow him to identify 
metonymy. 
The most readily attainable interpretation of the Group's statement is that metonymic 
interpretation is figurative while metaphoric and synecdochic understanding is literal. 
35 
36 
Ibid. (121). 
Ibid. (122). 
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This is a strange position that is not supported by solid evidence from empirical 
cognitive investigation. 
2.1.1.3. Ullmann 
Stephen Ullmann's theory of metonymy is outlined in two of his semantic books, 
namely Principles of Semantics (1951) and Semantics: an Introduction to the Science of 
Meaning (1962). I have alluded to Ullmann's account of metonymy when I discussed 
the Group's notion of 'contiguity' in the previous section. There I mentioned that the 
Group discuss the notion 'contiguity' which they found in Ullmann's account of 
metonymy. Ullmann's theory of metonymy comes within his discussion of semantic 
change which he ascribes to associations of similarity and associations of contiguity. 
Like the associations of similarity, the associations of contiguity, Ullmann argues, can 
be either between the senses or between the names. For the former type of association 
he talks about examples like the 
"tongue" as the principal organ of speech-activity is associated with 
the latter. (Resultant semantic change (metonymy): 'the English 
tongue').37 
For the second type of contiguity association, i.e. that between names, Ullmann gives 
the example of the contiguous link established between the words 'private' and 'soldier' 
to the extent that this connectedness led to a semantic change manifested as 'deletion' in 
occurrences like 'a private'.3 8 
Ullmann returns to a more or less similar argument regarding the motivation of 
semantic change a few pages later where he discusses examples like 'the French 
'bureau' office'. In this example the motivation of the semantic change is based on 
the most peculiar trait of changes of meaning, the coexistence 
i n 
of old sense and new within the same synchronous system. 
In the example above the semantic change is motivated by a contiguity association 
established between the office and one of the salient pieces of furniture normally 
available in an office. This is the'bureau'which is the writing desk. In fact, the word 
'bureau' has undergone a double change from the burel an old French word meaning a 
type of cloth used for covering desks. Then the word came to stand for the whole 
3 7 Ullmann (1951: 80). 
3 8 Ibid. 
3 9 Ibid. (89). 
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writing desk and then the word bureau came to stand for the whole office where there 
wil l usually be a desk.40 
Ullmann argues that metonymy is 'less interesting than metaphor since it does not 
discover new relations but arises between words already related to each other'.41 
However, after supporting his argument by a quotation from Esnault regarding the 
difference between both metaphor and metonymy, Ullmann asserts that ' i f metonymy is 
of limited interest to the student of style, it is an important factor in semantic change'.42 
This shows clearly that Ullmann's theory of metonymy develops out of an interest in 
semantic change and how this change is semantically motivated. I think Ullmann's 
argument that 'metonymy is of less interest to the student of style' is outdated and falls 
short of accounting for the power of metonymy in both composition and stylistic 
analysis. In this respect, Jakobson's paper that I have discussed in (2.1.1.1.) above 
shows how metonymy is in fact a way of conceptualising and of understanding. 
Metonymy, Jakobson argues, is one of the two ways in which a'discourse may take 
place'.43Also, metonymy for Jakobson is one of the two modes in which 'an individual 
exhibits his personal style, his verbal predilections and preferences'.44 
Ullmann tries to provide a classification of various metonymies based on the various 
types of contiguous relations underlying each of the metonymic occurrences. He talks of 
metonymies that are based on spatial relations. The example he gives for this type of 
metonymy is the shift from the Latin coxa 'hip' to French cuisse 'thigh' as these two 
organs are two contiguous parts of our body therefore the semantic shift was 
contiguously motivated. I think examples of this semantic shift can be found in many 
other languages particularly those languages which exist in two different varieties45 like 
This is of course indicative of a cyclical metonymic signification process which begins with the cloth 
moving to the desk and then to the whole office. 
4 1 Ullmann (1962: 218). 
4 2 Ibid. 
4 3 Jakobson (1971: 90). 
4 4 Ibid. (91). 
4 5 This situation is usually referred in sociolinguistic studies as'diglossia'. The first occurrence of the 
term 'diglossia', according to Harry (1993), was in Krumbacher's (1903) in which he discussed both 
Greek and Arabic diglossia. Charles Ferguson reintroduced the term in his influential paper bearing the 
name 'diglossia' as its title. He defines 'diglossia' as a relatively stable language situation in which, in 
addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), 
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Arabic; where one variety is classical (at least in origin) and the other modern. It should 
be easy to trace the meaning change from the classical to the modern varieties and vice 
versa. My guess is that a large proportion of sense change that has taken place between 
the two varieties is metonymically motivated. 
The second type of contiguity is that of temporal relations and in this type of relation the 
stress is on time contiguity. Either preceding or following actions or events come to 
stand for an event or a state. So the Arabic words sabiih and 'asha meaning 'breakfast' 
and 'supper' respectively; both are derived from the temporal meanings of the periods 
in which these meals are usually eaten. The word sabuh is derived from subh meaning 
'morning' and the word 'asha is derived from 'isha' meaning 'evening'. So the name of 
the time period came to represent the meal eaten around that period. Ullmann then talks 
about other metonymic relations than the spatial and temporal contiguities. Here he 
talks about the relation of 'part for the whole'. The example he gives for this relation is 
the word 'redbreast' for 'robin' in which the part of the bird, i.e. its breast, comes to 
stand for the whole bird. 4 6 This last type of metonymy shows that Ullmann does not 
distinguish between metonymy and synecdoche as some rhetoricians do. It seems that a 
semantic theory of tropes would usually undermine the minute differences in favour of 
deriving more general rules governing the phenomenon or the results of the 
phenomenon, in Ullmann's case it is the semantic change that results from the 
metonymic extension. 
The previous three types of relations are relatively easy to interpret because there is 
some sort of logical link between the substituted element and the element substituted for 
whether that relation is spatial, temporal or part-whole contiguity. However, there are 
examples where the interpretation of metonymy is difficult to attain by means of 
intensional judgment from the canonical and critical features of the item itself but rather 
has to be made on the basis of the extensional properties and events that surround the 
utterance both situationally and culturally. The examples Ullmann provides for this 
category of metonymic relations are those designating social class like 'redcoat', 
'redcap', and 'blue-stocking'. These are culturally motivated metonymies and need 
there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the 
vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech 
community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken 
purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation', (1964: 435). 
4 6 Ullmann. (1962:218-219). 
62 
Chapter Two Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory 
familiarity with the culture to be able to interpret them. The same thing applies to 
certain metonymies which apply to the Arabic context but seem to be difficult to 
interpret in other contexts. The ramad 'ash' example discussed in chapl. section 1.4. 
and repeated here as (4) is a case in point. 
4. Kathiru al-ramddi 'idhd ma shatd. 
He has a lot of ash in the winter. 
The fourth category of semantic change which Ullmann discusses is that which relates 
to what is usually called in figurative accounts of metonymy the 'inventor for invention' 
relation or 'producer for product'. The example Ullmann gives for this category is the 
utterance said by a physicist 'one ampere is the current that one volt can send through 
one ohm'.4 7Ullmann argues that this utterance involves three examples of metonymy. 
Al l are 'inventor for invention' metonymies in which the name of the man who invented 
the instrument, the Frenchman Andre Ampere, the Italian Count Volt, and the German 
Georg Ohm, came to stand for the instruments they invented. 
One more aspect of Ullmann's theory of metonymy that needs to be elucidated here is 
his distinction between contiguity of senses and contiguity of names. He calls the first 
category 'metonymy' but the second he calls 'ellipsis'. I have outlined the definition of 
'contiguity of senses' above. As regards the 'contiguity of names' Ullmann defines it as 
'those words which often occur side by side'.48 The association that exists between 
these words is not due to a semantic relatedness that is inherent to the lexical item by 
virtue of sharing a similar semantic field. Rather, it is a conventional one that exists 
between words as a result of their co-occurrence in similar linguistic environments. Two 
words keep recurring in similar linguistic environments until a conventional link is 
established between them. A further development takes place when one of these two 
words is usually omitted because its meaning has transferred to the sense of the other 
word. A good example is found in the utterance 
5. She is going to the ladies. 
The original form is 'she is going to the ladies' toilet' but because there has existed a 
link between the two words the word 'ladies' is regarded as informative enough and the 
addition of the word 'toilet' could be regarded as redundant. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. (222). 
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Ullmann's distinction seems to be based on a semantic principle that distinguishes 
'system' and 'use'. In the 'contiguity of senses' which Ullmann gives the term 
'metonymy' the 'system', i.e. the semantic properties of the lexical items involved are 
seen to be inherently related due to some sort of a contiguity relation. However, in the 
'use' case the two items come to have this connectedness because of rules of use. In 
other words Ullmann's view throws some light on the notion of'motivatedness'. He 
seems to argue that there are two types of motivatedness. The first is cognitive 
motivatedness in which the meaning is cognitively motivated because it appears in 
domain relationships. The second is the situation in which the meaning is 
conventionally motivated by rules of use. In the view of metonymy as I am developing 
it, there is no such distinction between conventional motivatedness and cognitive 
motivatedness. 
2.1.1.4. Bredin 
Bredin begins his paper entitled 'metonymy' by criticising the general tendency to 
augment metaphor at the expense of metonymy, which he thinks could be more 
common than metaphor. He then moves on to assess the modern status of the trope 
especially with reference to its being'the distinguishing mark of realist prose'.49 Here 
he thinks that the effort of Jakobson which was further augmented by the study of 
Lodge gave metonymy a real boost and called attention to the potential of this trope as a 
mode of cognition. Bredin attacks the 'enumeration' accounts of metonymy which he 
thinks are prevalent even in the most contemporary reference works. The problem does 
not stop, according to Bredin, at trying to provide exhaustive lists of metonymic 
instances and species. In fact, it extends to the general disagreement among 'various 
authorities' as to what these instances are.50 The most scientifically alarming problem is 
that the number of examples that have been suggested by scholars in the field have 
varied considerably and there seems to be no attempt to develop an organising principle 
that would systematise the relation between objects or names underlying metonymy. 
Bredin holds that in the history of metonymy there has been a great deal of confusion 
and obscurity as to both the nature of the trope and its relationship to other closely 
related tropes like metaphor and synecdoche. The history of metonymy has swung 
between taxonomic enumeration of species, types and reductionism of the system of 
4 9 Bredin (1984: 45). 
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tropes. The former was actually the central feature of the classical rhetoric project of 
which Aristotle, the Auctor and Cicero are chief examples. The latter is the central 
feature of the structuralist project of which Jakobson, Lodge and the Group mu are good 
examples. Whenever there is an attempt to derive rules and principles there tends to be 
some sort of reductionism in the treatment of the data. When there is an attempt to stress 
the types and species there is usually a tendency to enumerate examples rather than 
explain the nature of the trope. Bredin is not content with either approach. He is keen to 
explicate the nature of metonymy and at the same time place a well-defined border 
between metonymy and other closely related tropes, i.e. metaphor and synecdoche. 
The 'transfer of the name of a thing to something else', which is the standard definition 
given to metonymy in many rhetorical treatises, is seen by Bredin to be too general to 
the extent that it is in fact a definition of trope in general since any trope involves a 
transfer. He thinks that this is a beginning of a definition of any trope because it outlines 
the genus to which each trope belongs. Bredin then emphasises the need to give what he 
calls the '"differentia", which distinguish metonymy from other tropes. It is here that 
difficulty arises Bredin argues.51 For Bredin the difference between different tropes lies 
in the difference in the nature of the relation which holds between the two elements 
between which the transfer takes place. Therefore, characterising the nature of the 
relation that holds between what is sometimes called the trigger and target in 
metonymic interpretation is the beginning of the solution to the confusion and obscurity 
in metonymic understanding. 
Of course Bredin cannot claim that he is the first to think of this because Jakobson and 
even Ullmann before thought about the nature of the metonymic relation and tried to 
characterise it in an attempt to distinguish this type of relation from other figurative 
relations especially from that of metaphor. Bredin expresses his discontent with the 
accounts of this relation that were offered by classical rhetoricians like Quintilian, Bede 
and Doyle who according to Bredin favored a very general definition of metonymy that 
suits the definition of trope in general and completely ignored the nature of the relation 
underlying the trope. He does not agree also with the formulations provided by Cicero, 
5 1 Ibid. (46). 
52 See for these terms Fauconnier (1985, chapter one pp: 3-34). 
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Abrams and Preminger who characterise the relation between the objects involved in the 
transfer in general terms as 'closely associated'or'closely related'. Nor does Bredin 
feel happy with Fraunce's 'agreement' or with Jakobson's'contiguity'on the ground 
that these are still too general accounts to give the specific character of metonymic 
relations. 
Thus, Bredin rejects all previous accounts of metonymy and places himself in a position 
to offer a new account on the nature of the trope and the relation underlying it. Bredin 
begins this endeavor by a provocative claim regarding the essence of the trope. He 
argues that the essence of metonymy is not a transfer in the'sense'of the name of a 
thing to something else but rather a transfer of the 'reference' of a thing to the reference 
of something else. He alludes to Frege's distinction between 'sense' and 'reference' and 
uses this distinction to serve his goal of situating metonymy on the ontological level of 
representation as an aspect of reference. It is worth mentioning that the notion of 
transfer in metonymy has been contested and the majority of researchers in metonymy 
assert that there is no actual transfer in metonymy as there is only one domain involved 
in the operation. What is actually involved is'substitution'. The word'transfer'seems 
to be biased towards the implication of two domains while the term 'substitution' 
reveals an internal movement between parts and wholes and other single domain spaces. 
The methodology Bredin uses to achieve his goal, which is to provide an unambiguous 
definition of metonymy, is to compile a list of metonymies in an attempt to derive a 
general principle from the mass of examples and species. He gives a list of 11 
metonymic relations. Each of these can be reversed giving a total of 22 examples. I am 
not particularly concerned with the typology offered by Bredin, just as I am not 
interested in various other typologies proposed in the literature. This is because 
typologies are not important to the course of this thesis which tries to transcend the 
enumeration of types, species and examples in order to probe into the nature of the trope 
and derive general rules as to how it actually operates in real-life language use. 
Therefore, I am here concerned with the treatment of Bredin's attempt to present 
metonymy as independent from other related tropes. Bredin's adoption of the view that 
metonymy actually operates on objects rather on senses leads him to criticise the 
Group's conception of the web of connotative associations. This is simply because the 
connotations pertain to the verbal expression rather than to the objects themselves. 
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Bredin rejects the Group's theory of metonymy as insufficient to reveal the specific 
character of metonymy in an unambiguous manner. 
Bredin thinks the Group's use of the notion 'connotative association' blurred the picture 
regarding which of these connotative relations is actually metonymic and which is not. 
There are examples of connotative relations that seem related but they cannot be 
examples of metonymy, argues Bredin. The words 'inflation' and 'economy' are related 
but 'replacing one expression by the other would be neither figurative nor intelligible'. 5 3 
Bredin argues that one may agree with the Group that there are two modes of 
connotative association, one being conceptual and the other material, a view the second 
half of which would suit Bredin's view of metonymy. Even in this case however, the 
problem is that according to the Group's theory of metonymy it 'is not enough simply to 
classify connotations as semantic or referential. For what we want to know is which 
connotative relations are, in addition to being connotative, metonymical as wel l ' . 5 4 
Then Bredin moves to discuss yet another theory of metonymy proposed by Albert 
Henry. According to Bredin, Henry draws a distinction between two fundamental 
modes of meaning. One is the intensional mode and the other is the extensional mode. 
Metonymy is then related to the mode of intension. This mode means that 
the intension of a word is the set of constituent concepts which, taken 
together, constitute the 'concept entity' designated by the word. 5 5 
Henry's argument is that metonymy arises when one constituent concept is used to 
designate the whole 'concept entity'. On the same grounds that Bredin criticises the 
Group's notion of the web of connotative associations, Bredin also attacks Henry's 
notion of 'concept entity'. Bredin gives an example to show that Henry's notion of 
'concept entity' does not necessarily create a metonymy. The semic field of the 
expression 'publishing company', includes such concepts as 'book', 'distribution', and 
'profit'; yet it is impossible to employ the name of any of these as a metonymical 
replacement for "publishing company'".56 Bredin concludes that the accounts of 
metonymy since ancient rhetoric have been rather general, lacking an analysis of what 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Ibid. (50). 
Ibid. 
Ibid. (51). 
Ibid. (52). 
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Lakoff and Johnson call the 'systematic' character of metonymy. Bredin states that 
'metonymical connections are not random, but are specific types of connection'. Bredin 
further asserts that ' i t is this specificity which is lacking in Group mu and in Henry, 
58 
despite their best efforts'. 
I would argue that the most legitimate proposal to provide'specificity' can only be 
found within the confines of a cognitive theory of meaning in which the notions of 
'semic fields' and 'concept entity' could be cbgriitively studied to see what actually 
forms a concept totality or a semic field in the cognition of language speakers. This is 
with regard to the solution to the 'specificity' issue in metonymic operation. A more 
important issue here is that this research is not particularly interested in pursuing the 
debates regarding the differences between metonymy and other related tropes because it 
is believed that some overlap is inevitable since we are dealing with modes of thinking 
rather than with formal systems of logic or language. Cognitive theories of metonymy 
will be the topic of section 2.1.2. below. Let me now turn back to Bredin's theory of 
metonymy. 
I wil l use the diagram which Bredin gives to illustrate his theory of metonymy in 
relation to other closely related tropes. In fact his model is able to account for several 
major tropes. Thus the model attains a significant empirical power. 
Relations 
Structural 
(Synecdoche) 
Extrinsic 
Simple 
(metonymy) Dependent 
i 
Similarity 
(metaphor) 
Others 
Figure 2.1. Bredin's theory of metonymy. 
C.f. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 37). 
Bredin(1984: 52). 
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Bredin maintains that the model is based on the 'well-known distinction of analysis and 
synthesis'.59 Cognition, Bredin argues 'is a connected series of encounters between 
subject and object in which we analyse things into their constituents, synthetically 
combine objects in larger or more abstract wholes, such as concepts, classes and 
kinds'. 6 0 After outlining the distinction between analytic and synthetic dimensions of 
cognition Bredin then relates the first to his concept of structural relations which he 
thinks are essentially intrinsic because they are relations within things. To the synthetic 
dimension of cognition Bredin relates the concept of 'synthetic' relations because these 
are extrinsic relations which involve a great number of synthesising processes to group 
things among things not within things. 
Bredin associates 'synecdoche' with the analytic structural relation, as it is believed that 
the trope involves relations within the same object: part for the whole or whole for the 
part. This is reminiscent of the Group's account of metonymy when they refer to Du 
Marsias as 'one of the rare classical rhetoricians to have asked himself summarily about 
the difference between metonymy and synecdoche'.61 Du Marsias assigns metonymy a 
feature of independence from both objects of signification whereas in synecdoche there 
is union between these objects. It is worth pointing out here that Bredin's classification 
of relations into structural and extrinsic is not theoretically justified because it can be 
argued that all relations are, in fact, structural whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic; 
otherwise they cannot be called relations. So there would have been greater 
systematicity i f the schema proposed was actually divided into intrinsic and extrinsic 
structural relations. 
The extrinsic type of relation breaks down into two types of relation, one simple and the 
other dependent. Bredin relates metonymy to the simple relation because metonymy, 
according to him, 
neither states nor implies the connection between the objects involved 
in it it relies wholly upon those relations between objects that are 
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Bredin relates metaphor and other tropes to the dependent type of the extrinsic relation 
and asserts that these are dependent because they involve a twofold synthesis: 
a conceptual synthesis based upon a shared property of the relata. (A 
and B have length) and the synthesis of the relation itself (A is longer 
than B ) . 6 3 
Bredin argues that the difference between metonymy and metaphor lies in the fact that 
'metaphor creates the relation between its objects, while metonymy presupposes that 
relation'.6 4 
Bredin holds that metonymy can never articulate a newly discovered insight and thus 
lacks the creative depth of metaphor. He concludes that metonymy is 'irresistibly and 
necessarily conventional'.65 Because metonymy is based on a simple extrinsic relation 
and because it presupposes the relation between the objects involved then it is 
conventional, in the sense that it involves relations that are known already to exist 
between the objects involved in the metonymic operation. We know that a 'keel' is part 
of a 'ship' in example (6) below 
6. The keel ploughed the deep. 
The problem of metonymic interpretation is its arbitrariness which makes it subject to 
change from one culture to another and from one generation to another within the same 
culture. Towards the end of his paper Bredin argues that ' i t is no doubt this arbitrariness 
which has caused the remarkable and general failure to discern its true nature'.66 
Two points should be raised in connection with the above treatment of metonymy. First, 
metonymy is not a hackneyed operation where the information conveyed is sort of banal 
and already known. I f this were the case the trope would not be regarded as a trope in 
the first place. It is true that metonymy involves the transfer of the name or the object on 
the basis of well-known relations of contiguity and causality. However, it is not true that 
metonymy does not add new insight simply because the motives behind the transfer 
cannot be regarded as commonplace. Rather they are ideologically loaded and convey a 
great deal to the overall meaning via the metonymic interpretation. The choice of one 
part to represent the whole or the whole to represent a particular part cannot be seen as 
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an innocent one. Always there is extra meaning resulting from the simple choice of 
things to stand for other things. 
In example (6) above, there is strong evidence that metonymy does convey new 
information. It is not a matter of conventionality that the word 'keel' comes to stand for 
the word 'ship'; why not any other part of the ship? Is this random? Or arbitrary? It is 
certainly not. Metonymic relations are motivated and purposeful. In fact, in metonymic 
operations there is a great deal of suppression of certain aspects of cognition for the 
sake of foregrounding other aspects. Indeed, metonymy is perhaps the most prominent 
example of motivatedness in language. Therefore, assigning the features of 
'conventionality' and 'arbitrariness' to the operations of metonymy will not do justice to 
the trope in any objective way. The reason is that the notion of'conventionality' boils 
down to the concept of 'symbolicity' in linguistic signification. I shall discuss these 
aspects of linguistic signification in the next chapter sections 3. 4.3. and 3.4.4. Here I 
want to stress the fact that metonymy resides in the indexical mode of signification 
which is causal or contiguous.67 
2.1.1.5. Lakoff 
Lakoff s theory of metonymy is first encountered in his Metaphors We Live By, which 
he co-authored with Mark Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson begin their discussion of 
metonymy by giving a general definition of the trope. They hold that metonymy is 
'using one entity to refer to another that is related to i t ' . 6 8 They attempt to distinguish 
metonymy from personification, which is commonly confused with metonymy. The 
reason for this confusion is that personification involves assigning animate or human 
properties to non-animate or non-human subjects. This is a common aspect of the 
metonymic operation also. So in the example 
7. The Times has not arrived at the press conference yet 
which Lakoff gives as an example of metonymy, the verb 'arrived' is attributed to a 
non-animate and non-human subject. The difference that Lakoff and Johnson see 
between metonymy and personification is clarified in the example 
8. Inflation robbed me of my savings. 
6 7 I am using the term 'indexical' in the Peircean sense. See the discussion of this point in the next 
chapter section 3.4.2. 
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They think this example is personification because there is no reference to a person. 
Rather the term 'inflation' is given the qualities of an animate and human subject as a 
matter of metaphorical personification. Inflation refers to inflation. However, in the 
example 
9. The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. 
as well as example (7) above, there is an actual person referred to in the example and 
the words 'the ham sandwich' and 'the Times' are used to refer to something other than 
themselves. The reference is to a person who is related in some way to these entities. 
This start makes Lakoff and Johnson maintain the view that 
metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of 
another, and its primary function is 'understanding'. Metonymy, on 
the other hand, has primarily a referential function; that is, it allows 
us to use one entity to standfor another. 
It looks as i f Lakoff and Johnson are attempting a reductionist view of metonymy as 
nothing but a referential trope. This undermines its role in interpretation and 
understanding. I f metonymy is merely referential then it is of marginal importance to 
cognitive processes because it does not contribute much to the conceptual structuring of 
our experience. Its 'standing for' relation is characteristic of an ontological account of 
experience only and does not participate in the epistemological dimension of our 
experience. It should be noted that Lakoff and Johnson later admit that the role of 
metonymy is not and cannot be merely referential. Metonymy, they argue, contributes 
to understanding in that the item used highlights particular aspects that are deemed 
particularly important to the communication. 
Lakoff and Johnson refer to the metonymic example 
10. we need some good heads 
in which 'heads' stands for 'people' because of the part-whole relation that stands 
between heads and people. However, the function of metonymy does not stop at the 
level of referentiality alone. Rather it extends that to the level of cognitive informativity 
because the use of 'heads' to stand for people in this particular example is not random 
or innocent. In fact, it is purposeful, it is informative and it serves the function that we 
need 'intelligent' people not just any people. In this case'intelligence','heads'and 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 35). 
Ibid. (36). 
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'people' stand in contiguous relations and they enter into multiple signification. 'Heads' 
stands for 'intelligence' because 'intelligence' is thought to be a property of the human 
brain, which is situated in the head, and the head is part or perhaps the most important 
part of the body. By the same token we can think of the example 
11. / have been reading Shakespeare 
in which the use of the term Shakespeare to refer to his work is not a result of a random 
or purely innocent choice, but of a purposeful choice to signify that the whole life of the 
man, his comedies, his tragedies and his sonnets were all in my mind even though I was 
reading only one particular work. Therefore, there is an act of implied cognitive 
hyperbole which augments our conceptual space. 
Lakoff and Johnson extend the argument of the cognitive power of metonymy to 
include even seemingly pure referential examples of metonymy. Example (12) below: 
12. The ham sandwich wants his check 
is used as an act of'dehumanising' in which case the aspect of the referent highlighted 
is that of being a customer nothing more and nothing less. One could also add that in 
example 
13. Table 10 is waiting for the order 
the metonymy is not purely referential but it serves to highlight a physical aspect of the 
restaurant arrangement which is all that is important in the conceptual structuring of the 
experience of the waiter/waitress. It is of particular relevance to the course of this thesis 
to include the statement with which Lakoff and Johnson conclude their chapter on 
metonymy. They assert that 
in fact, the grounding of metonymic concepts is in general more 
obvious than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually 
involves direct physical or causal associations. 7 0 
Lakoff and Turner discuss further the hypothesis which Lakoff and Johnson make in 
(1980) regarding the referential nature of metonymy. This relates metonymy to the 
pragmatic phenomenon of deixis, a term defined by Crystal as 'the term used in 
linguistic theory to subsume those features of language which refer directly to the 
personal, temporal or locational characteristics of situation within which an utterance 
Ibid. (39). 
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takes place, whose meaning is thus relative to that situation; e.g. now/then, here/there, 
I/you, this/that are deictic expressions'.71 In example 
14. We are ahead of time 
Lakoff and Turner claim that there are two metonymies involved in this example. They 
argue that 
we stands for the point that we are at on the path from past to future 
events, and time stands for the point on that path at which we were 
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scheduled to be at the present time. 
Whether the example is readily interpretable as metonymic or not is irrelevant. The 
interesting part of the argument is the linking of metonymy to the process of deictic 
reference. This point will be elaborated further when I discuss Nunberg's and Stallard's 
theories of metonymy in this chapter sections 2.1.2.4. and 2.1.2.5. respectively. The 
point will also be raised in the next chapter when I discuss metonymy as an index in 
section 3.4.2. 
Lakoff and Turner introduce the notion of 'schema' in relation to the set of conceptual 
structures that metonymic expressions activate. I think this notion is very useful in the 
explanation of the nature of metonymy. Seeing metonymy as being primarily a 
cognitive process involving schematic mapping between two parts or aspects of the 
same conceptual domain will make clear how basic the notion of schema is to the 
operation and interpretation of metonymy. Lakoff and Turner provide as an example of 
how metonymy activates schemas the lines from Yeats's "The Second Coming": 
15. ... but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle 
In this example the 'rocking cradle' stands for the baby inside the cradle which is Jesus 
Christ and the sense of rocking is suggestive of the cyclic return of Jesus. These images 
are activated in our schema once we read 'twenty centuries' which is a reference to 
Christ first coming and evokes a sense that i f there is a first coming there will surely be 
a second coming. This sense is particularly activated by the word 'rocking' which 
evokes images of continuity and repetition. 
7 1 Crystal (1991: 96). 
7 2 Lakoff and Turner (1989: 46). 
7 3 Ibid. (101). 
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2.1.2. Cognitive theories of metonymy 
In this section I intend to complement the discussion in the previous section which 
primarily focused on the linguistic theories of metonymy by an account of the 
increasingly growing interest in the trope in cognitive circles. The discussion will 
include work done in cognitive semantics and in artificial intelligence. 
2.1.2.1. Fass 
Fass discusses metonymy as one of the contiguity-based tropes along with synecdoche, 
merism, antonomasia, periphrasis, toponymy, euphemism and dysphemism. He chooses 
for the trope a definition proposed by Perrine (1992): 'the substitution for the thing 
meant of something closely associated with i t ' 7 4 Fass holds that the distinction between 
metonymy and synecdoche is disappearing75and argues that the difference in nature 
between metonymy and metaphor leads to a difference in function. While metaphor 
maps things or names among domains by virtue of its comparison and similarity power, 
metonymy maps things or names within domains by means of its connectivity and 
contiguity power. Fass further asserts that the function of both metonymy and metaphor 
can be further distinguished on the lines that 
metaphor is a brief and often creative way of illustrating certain 
features of a word by drawing from another domain, whereas 
metonymy is a concise way of allowing one thing to stand for another 
within one domain. 
Fass points out to a phenomenon he calls 'twice-true metonymy' which highlights the 
process of meaning transfer involved in metonymic interpretation. He selects an 
example from Fauconnier77: 
16. Ari painted a tanker. 
Fass mentions that this example has two interpretations one is literal and the other is 
metonymic. In the metonymic interpretation the 'tanker' means 'an image' of a tanker. 
As for the literal meaning 'Ari painted a tanker'means'Ari covered the tanker with 
paint'. I would argue that this phenomenon informs us about the issue of factuality 
/ H See Fass (1997: 32). 
75 
I think the reason for this is that there is a shift in theoretical perspectives in which modern accounts of 
tropes tend to be more intellectually driven to find out general rules and principles governing the 
cognitive processes involved in both of these two tropes. This focus is obviously different from that 
which is characteristic of traditional accounts of the tropes and which aimed to provide taxonomies of 
figures and strive to enumerate types, examples and species without actually providing general principles. 
See for further discussion on this Cooper (1986: 12-20). 
7 6 Ibid. (48). 
7 7 Fauconnier (1985: 24). 
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inherent in the nature of metonymy. This is to say that in the example whether in its 
literal or its metonymic interpretation there is an actual tanker involved. Perhaps the 
multiple interpretation is caused by an inherent ambiguity in the verb 'paint' itself. It 
might have acquired two independent senses. One meaning is 'to cover with paint' and 
the other meaning is 'to draw with paint'. In any case, the distinctive feature of 
metonymy and synecdoche is that there is a referential function involving actual 
referents as opposed to metaphor which involves imaginative concepts. In the example 
17. John is a fox 
there is no actual reference to a fox but rather to a feature that the fox has which is in 
turn shared by John. The view of metonymy as a form of indirect reference has been 
78 
proposed by Nunberg (1977). 
In his account of metonymy Fass mentions also the process in which there is a chain of 
metonymic interpretation; he selects an example from Reddy79: 
18. You '11 find better ideas than that in the library. 
In this example a chain of metonymies is evident. According to Reddy cited in Fass 
'ideas are expressed in words, words are printed in pages, pages are in books, books are 
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found in libraries'. Although this chain of metonymies is based on a part-whole 
metonymy there are chains of metonymy which are based on other relations also. The 
causal relation underlying the chain of metonymy in the 'ash' example mentioned in 
chapter one section 1.4. of this thesis in relation to metonymy in Arabic rhetoric is a 
case in point. The ash stands for a lot of cooking. A lot of cooking stands for a lot of 
food. A lot of food stands for a lot of guests and a lot of guests stands for generosity, 
which is the ultimate metonymy intended when we say that someone has a lot of ash. 
Perhaps this example is culture specific and is not generalisable. Nevertheless, the point 
to be made is that in chain metonymies there is a considerable space for cultural 
variation due to the connotative nature of this type of multiple signification. 
Fass' cognitive account of metonymy and his attempt to find a solution to the problems 
created by the arbitrariness of the trope is very interesting. I f metonymy is arbitrary, the 
argument forwarded by Bredin as we have seen earlier in section 2.1.1.4. then 
C.f. the discussion of this view in this chapter in section 2.1.2.5. 
Reddy (1979: 309). 
Fass (1997: 73). 
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metonymic relations are in fact open-ended. This makes the trope a murky area where 
there are no clear boundaries. Fass' proposal to constrain 'what can and cannot be a 
metonymy' on the basis of viewing metonymy as relationships between case roles 
should be regarded as a genuine attempt to address the specific character of metonymy. 
However, it is still an account of species and types rather an account of principles 
underlying the nature and process of metonymic operations. 
Fass seems to be interested in a grammatical analysis of metonymy and his proposal of 
case role relations is indicative of this inclination. However he goes beyond this to 
consider grammatical variation in the realisation of metonymy. He refers to metonymies 
in noun sense extensions such as 
19. A watched pot never boils 
in which the noun 'pot' is extended to mean the contents of the pot and not the pot 
itself. These metonymies have been called C O N T A I N E R F O R C O N T E N T metonymies. It is also 
worth mentioning here that the traditional view of metonymy is that it is a trope that 
occurs only in nouns, hence the 'nymy' root from Greek meaning noun. However, this 
is not actually true because verbs, for example, can function metonymically as well. In 
the example 
20. I went to court 
the verb 'went' is used metonymically to stand for the whole scenario that takes place 
when people go to courts, because 'going to court' is one act of the whole scenario of 
going there and standing in the dock and arguing your case, and so on and so forth. 
Similarly, in the example 
21. I went shopping 
the verb 'went' signifies the whole scenario of shopping which includes going from one 
shop to another, scanning the products, deciding what to buy and what not to buy, 
thinking about the prices and perhaps bargaining about these prices. Fass' account of 
metonymy falls within this view of thinking that metonymy is actually prevalent in all 
language. 
The discussion of'metonymic objects' which Fass cites from Curme (1964: 134) makes 
us think of how metonymy could function as a semantic interpretation of certain 
syntactic processes. The example cited is 
22. He wiped the table 
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in which the table is not the real object of the verb because the wiping off is not done to 
the table but to the dust on the table. In this example there is clear reference that 
metonymies occur with objects in the same way they do with subjects. Due to the 
contiguous relationship between the table and the dust on it, it becomes conceptually 
possible to metonymically substitute one for the other. Fass goes beyond the noun sense 
extensions and metonymic objects to discuss other metonymic lexical combinations. He 
talks about preposition-noun metonymies as in examples like 
23. After the alarm 
which is a preposition-noun metonymic combination as the preposition and noun both 
cooperate to create this metonymy. 'After the alarm' means after the sounding of the 
81 
alarm, because after 'expects an event as its object'. 
Fass also discusses adjective-noun metonymies, citing examples from Quillian (1969: 
469) like 
24. young client 
which 'involves inferring that the client's age is being judged young, which is not 
• 82 
explicit'. Other examples of adjective-noun metonymies include 
25. jealous letter 
26. angry report 
Fass argues that a possible analysis of these adjective-noun combinations is in terms of 
a metonymic chain consisting of a P R O P E R T Y F O R W H O L E metonymy, where 'jealous' is the 
P R O P E R T Y and 'person' is the W H O L E , followed by an A R T I S T F O R A R T F O R M metonymy in 
which A R T I S T is 'person' and A R T F O R M is 'letter'. After outlining the various types of 
grammatical variation in metonymic operations, Fass moves on to review some of the 
accounts related to the interpretation of metonymy. Fass tells us that not much literature 
on the interpretation of metonymy is available and that the 'best work is in the 
computational literature'.83 
Not only is Fass interested in exploring the nature of metonymy but also in investigating 
how metonymy is recognised and interpreted. I am more interested in discussing his 
account on metonymy recognition than his account on metonymy interpretation. I 
8 1 Fass (1997: 92). 
8 2 Ibid. 
8 3 Ibid. (93). 
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believe that metonymy recognition necessarily involves metonymy interpretation 
because metonymy cannot be recognised without it being interpreted. In other words the 
distinction between metonymy interpretation and recognition is baseless. Fass 
distinguishes between two approaches in the interpretation of metonymies. One is 
conventional or conventionalised and the other is novel. The distinction is based on the 
assumption that the former is the approach which considers metonymies as 'knowledge-
specific relationships and that metonymic interpretation is the application of those 
relationships'.84 The latter regards metonymies as 'essentially arbitrary relationships'8S, 
(whose interpretation is always new and fresh each time they occur). 
Fass relates the conventional view to the work of Lakoff and Johnson and the works 
inspired by them. The novel view is related to the work of Stallard (1993) who seeks a 
characterisation of the argument structure of metonymic utterances and Nunberg (1995) 
who looks at the predicative and referential aspects of metonymies. In fact, the 
typologies proposed for metonymic relations fall under the conventional view because 
they assume that the trope is or has been conventionalised into certain concepts or types. 
Within the conventional view, there exists a notion that is similar to the concept of 
metonymy. This is the concept of 'coercion', which according to Grosz 'occurs 
whenever some property of an object is used to refer indirectly to the object'.8 6 
With regard to metonymic recognition, Fass distinguishes three views that have been 
offered in the literature. The first concerns the syntactic clue of'proper nouns with 
indefinite determiners'. The words 'Ford' and 'Boeing' are typical examples of proper 
names used for products which they make. A use of any indefinite article before these 
names renders the expression metonymic and signals the non-literal usage. However, in 
names like ampere, ohm and volt which were discussed above the matter is not as 
straightforward because the substitution has been very much conventionalised and as a 
result has been naturalised to the extent that one finds it difficult to recognise the 
metonymy in such instances. Therefore, there are perhaps different levels of recognition 
within this view depending on the extent of how live, active or dead the metonymy is. 
8 4 ibid. 
8 5 Ibid. 
8 6 Grosz et al (1987: 213), cited in Fass (1997: 94). 
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The second view of how metonymy can be recognised is through violations of selection 
restrictions. This is, according to Fass, 'the most common approach to metonymy 
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recognition'. It is the most common because the overall view of figures is that they are 
semantic deviations, hence they violate the normal categorisation that verbs 
subcategorise in their argument structure. A point has to be raised here though. This 
concerns the notion of violation of selection restrictions and how it relates to tropes in 
general and to metonymy in particular. Metaphor is recognised by violations of 
selection restrictions, as is personification. So what makes the violations in the case of 
metonymy distinct? Consider the following examples: 
27. Table 10 is getting angry 
28. The sea is getting furious 
29. Inflation robbed me of my savings 
Examples 27, 28 and 29 all exhibit violations of selection restrictions. 'Tables' cannot 
get angry whether they are 10 or 11 because 'angry' is an attribute peculiar to animate 
entities. The 'sea' cannot be 'furious' because 'furious' is an adjective that pertains only 
to animate objects. Also 'inflation' cannot rob; only human beings can rob. It seems as 
i f violation of selection restrictions is a working strategy in the recognition of 
metonymy as well as metaphor and personification. It also seems as i f the process of 
recognition goes in the following manner. First, violation of selection restrictions gives 
rise to the recognition of a figurative use in general. There follows another process to 
recognise the type of transfer involved. I argue that it is at this second stage that a 
distinction is drawn between the various types of violations leading to various types of 
figuration. In the case of metonymy the recognition of the trope is characterised by a 
recognition of a discrepancy between a surface subject and a surface predicate. The 
violation on the surface structure of the utterance conceals a harmony in the underlying 
deep structure in which the underlying real subject is in agreement with the predicate in 
terms of semantic features. 
Fass offers a third view of metonymic recognition based on Stallard's application of 
Grice's maxim of quantity. This maxim is in fact one of four-dicta that make up what 
Grice calls the "Cooperative Principle", which is 
Ibid. (97). 
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make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
88 
talk exchange in which you are engaged. 
Fass tells us then that Stallard argues that the maxim of quantity prevents a referential 
interpretation and supports a predicative interpretation of example (30) below: 
30. Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver? 
The reason is that a predicative interpretation conforms to the maxim of quantity and 
thus does not give superfluous information while a referential interpretation does give 
redundant information. This is because i f the intended meaning is the set of flights and 
not the set of airlines then there is redundancy because flights are necessarily on 
airlines. 
2.1.2.2. Gibbs 
This section deals with Gibbs' account of the nature and role of metonymy in language 
and thought. The immediately striking thing about Gibbs' chapter entitled 'metonymy' 
is the statement he makes at the outset of the chapter which runs 'this chapter explores 
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the role of metonymy in thought and language'. This is quite remarkable as it shows 
clearly that Gibbs is not interested in the nature of the trope as it has been debated for 
more than two thousand years. Instead, he is proposing a new way of looking at 
metonymy. This dwells on the role or function of metonymy rather than the nature and 
the principles underlying it. It is worth pointing out here that this is generally the view 
that I am putting forward in this thesis. I argue that the most useful way of 
understanding the workings of metonymy is by looking at its role in discourse and its 
function in understanding. 
Gibbs does not provide a definition of metonymy apart from his general comment on 
our understanding of a poem which he mentions at the beginning of the chapter. In this 
regard he states that this understanding 
depends on our ability to think metonymically at the mention of parts 
90 
of some event and infer something about an entire situation. 
Gibbs asserts 'that metonymy is a fundamental part of our conceptual system'.91 While 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) talk about metonymic 
concepts, Gibbs talks about metonymic models and thinks that 
Grice( l975: 45). 
Gibbs (1994: 320). 
Ibid. (319). 
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speakers' frequent use of metonymic expressions and listeners' 
understanding of these utterances are motivated by metonymic 
models that form a significant part of our everyday conceptual 
92 
system. 
The first issue that Gibbs deals with in his treatment of the role of metonymy in 
language and thought is how to set metonymy out as distinct from metaphor and 
synecdoche. This has been a concern of many rhetorical theorists, linguists, 
philosophers and cognitive psychologists. I have referred to such debates in a previous 
section in this chapter section 2.1.2.1. Here I am more interested in Gibbs' discussion of 
metonymy as a cohesive device. 
Gibbs' interest in the cohesive power of metonymy reflects the basic thrust of this thesis 
and his assertion that 
many conversational inferences about what speakers mean by what 
they say require metonymic reasoning. Metonymy serves in many 
such instances as an important cohesive device in text and discourse 
93 
understanding 
constitutes the basic hypothesis that this thesis aims to validate. The textual function of 
metonymy which Gibbs refers to here is not only the global function that has been 
identified by scholars like Jakobson in which the literary production of poets, novelists 
and playwrights is classified globally according to whether it is metonymically or 
metaphorically dominated. Rather it goes beyond this generality and becomes more 
specific when we also look at patterns of local connectedness. 
Gibbs discusses the role of metonymy in thought, drawing evidence from experimental 
cognitive psychology about the ways people categorise and classify objects in reality. 
Of particular relevance to this issue is the notion of prototypes which involves judging 
'certain members of categories as being more representative of those categories than 
other members'.94 One source of prototype effects is metonymic, Gibbs argues. The 
following example shows how people use metonymic models in their everyday life: 
31. A: How did you get to the airport? 
B: I waved down a taxi. 
Gibbs maintains that this example shows how 'conversational implicature' helps us 
make inferences about the speaker's intended meaning. Gibbs then questions the 
Ibid. (320-21). 
Ibid. (323-324). 
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epistemological basis of these conversational inferences. He asks 'How does a listener 
infer that B actually found a taxi to take him to the airport?'9 5 The answer is that this is 
possible through metonymic utilisation of idealised models in which one part of the 
model evokes the entire model. This is what happens in the interpretation of B's 
utterance in which the listener will take'waving down a taxi'as representative of the 
whole scenario of getting to the airport. 
Similar to this is his example of anaphoric reference in the following example: 
32. They were told to expect the prime minister at twelve the next day. Punctually at 
noon the car drove up in front of the State Department. 
In which the noun phrase 'the car' in the second sentence anaphorically refers to the 
phrase 'prime minister' in the first sentence. Gibbs highlights the issue of conceptual 
anaphors and even argues that they are sometimes more easily interpretable than 
grammatical anaphors due to the fact that people apply metonymic processes when they 
attempt to interpret discourse. Gibbs provides examples: 
33. A: I need to call the garage. 
B: They said they '11 have it ready by five o 'clock. 
Gibbs argues that 
a series of experimental studies demonstrate that people rate as more 
natural and read more quickly sentences with conceptual anaphors 
than they do sentences with appropriate singular pronouns. 9 6 
As the example above shows, the pronoun 'they' is grammatically incorrect because it 
does not agree with its antecedent in number. The garage is singular and the pronoun is 
plural. However, the interpretation of this utterance is made easier with the plural 
pronoun because of our pervasive ability to establish a metonymic relation of P L A C E F O R 
P E O P L E W O R K I N G IN T H E P L A C E . The garage stands for the people who work in it. It is 
conventionally known that garages are usually run by more than one person. Therefore, 
the use of the pronoun 'they' is more natural than ' i t ' . 
Gibbs argues also that metonymy is a main source of our ability to understand implicit 
cause-effect relations. These relations are activated by a set of causal associations 
Ibid. (325). 
Ibid. (327). 
Ibid. (329). 
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between certain lexical items. These associations are essentially metonymic in nature. 
The example Gibbs provides to illustrate this point is the tale: 
34. He wanted to be king. 
He was tired of waiting. 
He thought arsenic would work well. 
There are causal and procedural connections between the parts of this tale which make 
our understanding of the tale depend on general knowledge rather than on the linguistic 
structure of the tale. It can be argued that between the word 'king' and the word 
'arsenic' there is a conceptual association of some kind. It can be asserted that within 
the 'semic field' or the 'concept entity' of the word 'arsenic' there is a sense of 
assassination of a political rival'. This sense gets activated by the word 'king' which is a 
political term. This lexical signalling of causal relations underlying the narrative 
structure of the tale facilitates our interpretation of the tale i f explicit information about 
the plan of the tale is missing. 
Understanding metonymic expression is an important aspect of Gibbs' theory of 
metonymy. In this regard Gibbs talks about two main principles underlying the 
understanding of metonymic expressions. These are 'sense creation' and 'sense 
selection'. Gibbs argues that in metonymic understanding the listener/reader does not 
only perform an act of selection of the appropriate sense of the word used from the set 
of potential senses available to him in his mental lexicon. In fact, s/he also has to apply 
the principle of 'sense creation' because in many cases the sense intended by the 
utterance wil l not be specified within the mental lexicon. As soon as the listener/reader 
realises the lack of a contextually appropriate sense in his mental stock and given that 
the utterance is anomalous i f interpreted literally, s/he will try to create a sense that suits 
the context and facilitates his/her understanding of the utterance. This is a temporarily 
created sense which is facilitated by means of other clues within the utterance, mainly 
lexical clues. 
The example Gibbs gives to illustrate his argument of sense selection and sense creation 
is 
35. John fired the tuxedo because he kept dropping the tray. 
Gibbs argues that readers do not find a difficulty in understanding the utterance despite 
the apparent anomaly due to the use of the word'tuxedo'. How they find it easy to 
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interpret the utterance, according to Gibbs, is by first recognising that there is a sort of 
discrepancy between the literal meaning of the word 'tuxedo' and the overall meaning 
of the whole utterance. Second, listeners and readers resort to the process of sense 
creation since 'the contextually appropriate meaning of 'tuxedo' cannot be selected 
from a short list of potential meanings in the lexicon'. 9 71 think that the metonymic 
interpretation of the utterance is guaranteed by virtue of the relation of association 
between the word 'tuxedo', which means a dinner jacket, with the person wearing it. 
Nevertheless, the problem now is how listeners and readers interpret the word 'tuxedo' 
as a butler? In principle the word 'tuxedo' could stand for many types of people. 
Essential here is the role of lexical signalling within text to establish relations of 
associations between lexical items. The verb 'fired' establishes a relation between 'He' 
and the 'tuxedo' as that of employer/employee. Then the word 'tray' further specifies 
the schema in which 'an employee with a dinner jacket holding a tray' is activated, thus 
creating the sense of'tuxedo' as butler. 
Gibbs also considers the role of metonymic reasoning in the interpretation of colloquial 
tautologies. These are expressions used to give some sort of emphasis to the utterance or 
to convey certain attitudes whether positive or negative, towards the nouns mentioned in 
these tautological constructions. There are two main types of tautologies; one has the 
construction N (singular) is N (singular) such as 
36. War is war. 
37. Politics is politics. 
The other has the structure N (plural) will be N (plural) such as 
38. Murderers will be murderers. 
39. Rapists will be rapists. 
Gibbs argues that these expressions exhibit a metonymic reasoning in that a mention of 
a whole stands for one particular quality of these wholes. According to the context of 
interpretation, 'the whole boy' in the expression 
40. Boys will be boys 
will come to stand for one property of boys or the boy as a token will stand for the 
whole class of boys. Boys will be boys means boys wil l be unruly or sweet and 
lovable.9 8 
Ibid. (337). 
See the interesting discussion of the pragmatic aspects of tautologies in Wierzbicka (1991: 392-452). 
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With respect to the interpretation of these metonymic tautologies, Gibbs presents three 
different views. The first of these is the pragmatic view which suggests that 
the interpretation of nominal tautologies is context-dependent, with 
different meanings attached to the same tautology, depending on the 
99 
conversational context and the shared beliefs of the participants. 
The second is the semantic approach which argues that 
there is a good deal of regularity in the interpretation of colloquial 
tautologies because these phrases are to some extent language 
• R 100 specific. 
In other words the meanings of these colloquial tautologies can be accounted for by 
means of semantic representation of the various structural patterns which realise these 
colloquial tautologies. The examples mentioned above of the structure N (singular) is N 
(singular) and the structure N (plural) will be N (plural) is just a case in point. Each of 
these structures tends to impose some sort of regular interpretation regarding the attitude 
behind the expression. According to Gibbs, the first type of structure tautologies tend to 
convey a sober, mostly negative, attitude toward complex human 
activities that must be understood and tolerated. 
Those of the second type of structure tend to 
refer to some negative aspects of the topic but also convey an 
indulgent attitude toward this relatively unchangeable negative 
. 101 aspect. 
The third view is a hybrid theory 'that captures aspects of the previously described 
views'. This view regards the interpretation of colloquial tautologies as an interaction 
between the systematic and conventional meaning of these tautologies and the 
speaker's/listener's conceptual knowledge of the objects referred to in the construction 
of the colloquial tautology. This view seems reasonable and compatible with evidence 
from studies which show that listeners and readers seem to apply stereotypical 
knowledge about certain nouns included in these tautological structures. This 
knowledge seems to be shared and quite regular to the extent that it can be generalised 
and coded within a semantic system. However, it also gets modified according to 
contextual factors determining between two possible stereotypical features surrounding 
a category. In this case the pragmatic approach helps in setting the parameter as to 
which feature is contextually more appropriate. 
99 
Gibbs (1994: 346) and see also Wierzbicka for similar views. 
1 0 0 ibid. 
1 0 1 Ibid. (347). 
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Gibbs also addresses the role of metonymic reasoning in the interpretation of indirect 
speech acts. Gibbs argues that the use of metonymic reasoning in the form of 
indirectness in making requests and orders helps to maintain face among the participants 
in the conversation. The issue of face has been raised in sociological and pragmatic 
studies of language in use and pertains to the psychology of the addresser when he 
expresses the directive or regulative function of language through which he is able to 
modify and direct the behaviour of the addressee. In most cases of indirect speech acts 
there is a metonymic relation of the type PART FOR WHOLE or WHOLE FOR PART. SO in the 
request: 
41. Can you lend me ten dollars? 
metonymic reasoning involved in the interpretation of the request as a request to give 
the person the amount of money specified and not about the ability to lend. Our 
understanding of such examples is facilitated by our metonymic reasoning which 
stipulates that people infer a whole series of steps from only part of this whole 
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scenario. 
The obstacle hypothesis which Gibbs discusses in relation to the metonymic 
interpretation of indirect speech acts suggests that the 
This means that the particular act of the whole exchange which the speaker feels might 
constitute an obstacle to the listener comes to stand for the whole exchange. For 
example having the time might be an obstacle to answering the question 'What is the 
time?' So the request of a passer-by about the time is appropriately carried out with the 
part that is believed to form the obstacle. That particular part of the exchange comes to 
represent the whole speech act. The question then appears in the form, as Gibbs argues, 
42. Do you have the time? 
I find Gibbs' theory of metonymy compatible with his overall aim of arguing for the 
poetic nature of mind and supporting his argument with empirical evidence. This is why 
apparent conventionality of an indirect request depends largely on the 
extent to which an utterance specifies an addressee's projected 
obstacles in complying with the speaker's request.104 
102 Ibid. 
103 Panther and Thornburg (1999) treat this type of metonymy as potential for actual. 
Ibid. (354). 
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his theory of metonymy is very distinct from other accounts. He concerns himself 
centrally with the role of metonymy in language and thought providing examples of 
how metonymy is interpreted in natural language data. Unlike other researchers he does 
not occupy himself with the investigation of the classification of the trope. For example, 
he is not particularly interested in enumerating the species or types of metonymy. This 
is by no means to say that these are not important. Rather, Gibbs' theory of metonymy 
is functional 1 0 5 and this is what makes it particularly relevant to the theory I am 
developing throughout this thesis. My theory of metonymy is a theory of its textual 
function. One effect of this orientation on Gibbs' account of the four principal tropes is 
that he treats metonymy and synecdoche as the same phenomenon. He is not very 
interested in minute differences, especially given that his goal is to outline the function 
of these closely related tropes in discourse. It should be noted that the same approach is 
adopted in this thesis in that the two tropes of metonymy and synecdoche are not 
sharply distinguished because the orientation is functional and in their function 
metonymy and synecdoche tend to overlap. 
2.1.2.3. Radden and Kovecses 
Radden and Kovecses state at the outset of their paper that their aim is to propose a 
coherent conceptual framework for metonymy. They also contest the traditional view of 
metonymy which treats the trope purely as a matter of language. They argue that their 
theory goes beyond the traditional definition of metonymy 'as a figure of speech that 
consists in using of the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is 
associated'.'06 
Radden and Kovecses identify four fundamental shortcomings of the traditional view of 
metonymy. The first of these is the treatment of metonymy as an aspect of language. 
This treatment falls short of current findings in cognitive studies which assert that 
metonymy is essentially conceptual in nature. The second point which Radden and 
Kdvecses raise pertains to the nature of the relation underlying metonymy. While they 
admit that the notion of contiguous connection between entities is fairly uncontroversial, 
they question whether the term is clearly enough defined to identify the specific 
character of metonymy. They refer to the debate surrounding the nature of contiguity 
1 0 5 Here functional has not terminological load. It refers to the fact that Gibbs is more interested in the 
function of metonymy in discourse. 
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between ontological and cognitive studies. Each of these looks at the term in accordance 
with its own theoretical framework. So ontological theories look at metonymy as a set 
of relations in the 'world of reality', whereas cognitive theories consider metonymy as 
the set of relations in the conceptual world. The authors express their satisfaction with 
the notion of ICMs (idealised cognitive models) proposed by Lakoff (1987). Lakoff 1 0 7 
defines each of these idealised cognitive models as 'a complex structured whole, a 
gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles: 
- propositional structure, as in Fillmore's frames 
- image-schematic structure, as in Langacker's cognitive grammar 
- metaphoric mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson 
- metonymic mappings, as described by Lakoff and Johnson 
An ICM is, as Gibbs states, 'a prototypical "folk" theory or cultural model that people 
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create to organise their knowledge'. Gibbs further argues that ICMs make some 
sense, given that ICMs are idealised and don't fit actual situations in a one-to-one 
correspondence but relate many concepts that are inferentially connected to one another 
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in a single conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole'. 
Radden and Kovecses argue that these ICMs 'may capture metonymic processes 
best'."0 This is because they do not account for the immediate conceptual components 
of a particular domain but rather characterise the cultural models of which the domains 
are parts. The notion of ICMs, Radden and Kovecses argue, is'not restricted to either 
the world of reality, the world of conceptualisation, or the world of language but.. .may 
cut across these ontological realms'."1 In this way the authors think that the notion of 
ICMs will solve the problem of scattered interest in metonymy among cognitivists, 
philosophers, linguists and rhetoricians and bring them all under one unified theory. 
The third issue Radden and Kovecses discuss with reference to the shortcomings of the 
traditional view of metonymy is the notion that metonymy 'has referring function 
Radden and KGvecses (1999: 17). 
Lakoff(1987: 68). 
Gibbs (1994: 58). 
Ibid. 
Radden and KOvecses (1999:20). 
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(only)'. The authors attribute this shortcoming to the erroneous assumption that 
metonymy is a substitution of things. Metonymy, they argue, also occurs 
at the purely conceptual level (categorisation, linguistic reasoning), at 
different levels of language (lexis, morphology, syntax, discourse), 
and as a linkage interrelating different ontological realms (concepts, 
forms and things/events). 
The fourth point deals with the way the traditional view defines metonymy as 
'substitution'. Radden and Kovecses argue that'metonymy does not simply substitute 
one entity for another entity, but interrelates them to form a new, complex meaning'. 
In their attempt to solve this problem they refer to Langacker's cognitive explanation of 
metonymy in which he talks about metonymy as a 'reference-point phenomenon' in 
which 'one conceptual entity, the reference-point affords mental access to the desired 
target'.114 
The discussion of these four shortcomings of the traditional view of metonymy leads the 
authors to formulate their own definition of metonymy which is entirely cognitive as 
expected. Their definition runs as follows: 'metonymy is a cognitive process in which 
one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, 
the target, within the same idealized cognitive model'. 1 1 5 Radden and Kovecses suggest 
that the development of a theoretical framework for metonymy involves answering four 
fundamental questions related to ICMs and metonymy. These questions revolve around 
the following four issues: 
1. the ontological realms in which metonymy occurs 
2. the conceptual relationships which may lead to metonymy 
3. the cognitive principles governing the selection of the preferred vehicle 
4. factors overriding the preferred default routes and yielding 'non-default' cases of 
metonymy. 
In their discussion of the first issue Radden and Kovecses argue that metonymy occurs 
within and cuts across three realms: the world of concepts, the world of things and 
events, and the world of forms. Examples of metonymies that result from the interaction 
1 1 2 Ibid. (21). 
1 , 3 Ibid. (19). 
1 1 4Langacker(1993: 30). 
1 1 5 Radden and Kovecses (1999: 21). 
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between concepts within one realm in which a concept stands for another concept 
include: 
(form) concept (A) for concept (B) 
(mother) "mother" for "housewife-mother" 
The interaction between forms and concepts, in which the metonymic operation cuts 
across two different realms, is exemplified by: 
form (A) for concept (A) 
dollar for "money" 
The interaction between the realm of concepts and the realm of things is exemplified by: 
Concept (A) for thing (A) 
"cow" for thing cow 
The interaction between the realm of form, concepts and things is exemplified by: 
form -concept (A) for thing (A) 
cow -"cow" for thing cow 
The interaction between two forms and one concept is exemplified by forms of clipping 
and acronyms. 
form (A) - concept (A) for form (B) concept (A) 
UN for United Nations 
As for the second issue 'conceptual relations which may lead to metonymy', Radden 
and Kovecses present a lengthy discussion of various types of metonymic relations. The 
main idea of the classification is that 'the types of metonymy-producing relationships 
may be subsumed under two general conceptual configurations: 
(i) Whole ICM and its part(s) 
(ii) Parts of an I C M ' . " 6 
They argue that the first possibility realises whole-part relations and their converses. 
The second shows part-part metonymies. The authors provide a detailed explanation and 
enumeration of the various types of metonymic expression that result from certain 
conceptual relations. The discussion is carried out in two broad sections. The first 
section deals with configurations within the whole-for-part conceptual system and the 
reverse of this system. The second section deals with the configurations within the part-
for-part conceptual system. 
1 1 6 Ibid. (30). 
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Radden and Kovecses give a detailed discussion of various aspects relating to 
metonymy which due to the aim of this thesis need not be included in the discussion of 
their theory here. It should be noted however that the authors seem to have probed 
deeply not only into the nature of metonymy but also into the motivation behind the 
metonymic relation and the selection of the particular vehicle. There is, nonetheless, a 
remarkable shortcoming in this treatment in that the authors provide too many 
principles1 1 7which involve repetition. I propose therefore that the principle of 
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'relevance' is a crucial governing principle in the selection of a particular vehicle. 
Thus the principles of functionality, immediacy, interactionality and so on which 
Radden and Koveceses suggest can be reduced to one global principle, which is 
'relevance'.1 1 9 Each speaker will normally assess the situation and judge what is 
'relevant' to him and accordingly select the vehicle. This conceptualisation supports the 
hypothesis that metonymic signification is actually motivated signification because the 
selection of the vehicle is based on certain intentional aspects governing this selection. 
Radden and Kovecses also maintain that metonymy can be motivated by certain 
expressive goals that the speaker has in mind due to social needs or rhetorical purposes. 
In the first case the metonymic expression violates the communicative principle Clear 
over Obscure. So the speaker will resort to obscure constructions in order to achieve this 
expressive need. In the second situation it is claimed that the violation involves one or 
more cognitive principles. This leads to the creation of a non-default metonymy that 
exhibits striking aspects of figuration. Due to the underlying intentionality the resulting 
metonymic expression shows personal style and personal preference of metonymic 
vehicles. 
1 1 7 The number of these principles reached 21. 
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C.f. Sperber and Wilson (1986) particularly when they argue that 'people have intuitions of relevance: 
that they can consistently distinguish relevant from irrelevant information, or in some cases, more 
relevant from less relevant information', ibid. (119). 
1 1 It should be stressed that my critique of Radden and Kovecses which is outlined here is based on an 
earlier version of the paper 'Towards a theory of metonymy' that was published on the internet by 
Radden himself at the address http://www.uni.vechta.de/termine/ostwest/radden.html. I have to confess 
also that in the final version of their paper which appeared in the volume entitled 'Metonymy in Language 
and Thought', Radden and KOvecses have made radical changes to the paper and consequently avoided 
this repetition and reduced the number of these principles and more importantly included the principle of 
relevance which they did not include in the previous version of the paper. 
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Radden and Kovecses relate euphemism-based metonymies to the violation of the 
communicative principle in that there is tendency to favour obscure over clear 
expressions which is against the cooperative principle of communication. However, for 
sociolinguistic reasons pertaining to keeping face and solidarity, the violation is 
licensed. The example given is the use of the word 'redundancies' instead of 
'dismissals'. The argument is that 'dismissals' is a more direct word than 
'redundancies' and that the former might constitute a threat and hence a negative face 
whereas the latter is a much more mitigated expression. The lack of clarity in the 
expression 
43. Where can I powder my nose? 
is justified on the grounds that it is a euphemistic expression for the more literal and 
relevant expression 
44. Where can I urinate? 
Thus the speaker overrides the cognitive principle of relevant over irrelevant by 
selecting 'powdering the nose' which is totally irrelevant to the act of urinating as the 
vehicle of the metonymy. 
With regard to the violation of cognitive principles Radden and Kovecses assert that 
metonymy is first and foremost a figurative mode of thought. Like other figurative 
modes of thought, it is usually used to achieve rhetorical effects as in humour, jargon, 
literature, persuasion, slang, poetry and the like. The result of the violation of cognitive 
principles results naturally in the creation of unmotivated original and live metonymies 
that had attracted the attention of rhetoricians, philosophers and linguists since ancient 
times. This feature has also recently attracted the attention of cognitive psychologists 
who have extended their analyses to original and live metonymies to look into the 
nature of more conventional and more cognitively motivated metonymies, as these are 
believed to shed more light on the conceptual structure of our cognition. 
2.1.2.4. Stallard 
David Stallard (1993) distinguishes between two kinds of metonymy. The first is 
referential metonymy and the second is predicative metonymy. Stallard begins by 
asserting that 'the phenomenon of semantic coercion is quite a common one in natural 
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language'120 What is special in Stallard's treatment of the trope is that he challenges the 
universal view of metonymy as a process of indirect reference in discourse. He contends 
that this view is not adequate to account for data in which the reference is actually to the 
direct surface noun phrase and the expression still exhibits a metonymic operation. 
Stallard's approach is semantically oriented and he develops the distinction between the 
two types of metonymy on the basis of two main examples, the interpretation of which, 
he thinks, differs radically. 
45. The ham sandwich is waiting for his check 
46. Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver? 
Stallard argues that in example (45) there is an act of indirect reference. The proof of 
this is the intra-sentential anaphora in which we find the pronominal 'his' referring to 
the subject noun phrase. This shows that the agreement is actually with the deep or 
indirect antecedent noun phrase (NP) 'the person ordering the ham sandwich' and not 
the surface or the direct (NP) 'the ham sandwich'. The indirect reference is necessitated 
by virtue of the violation of the selection restrictions. This renders the literal 
interpretation problematic, since ham sandwiches do not normally wait, only humans 
do. By contrast, in example (46), although there is a violation of selection restrictions in 
the predication of the verb ' f l y ' to 'airlines' which do not normally fly, literal 
interpretation is actually necessary. The dilemma arises when we realise that a non-
literal interpretation would yield an absurd answer to this question, for example, i f the 
listener were to answer this question by giving the set of flights going from Boston to 
Denver. 
Stallard indeed discovered a deep problem in traditional metonymic interpretation. But 
this means that the majority of metonymic examples are in fact predicative because the 
agreement is usually with the surface and direct literal antecedent. It seems as i f in the 
case where there is a shift in rank between the literal and direct and nonliteral and 
indirect referent there tends to be a referential function of metonymic relations. In fact, 
this is what Stallard asserts when he says that: 
as for the referential type of metonymy, we have found only a few 
cases of it in this corpus. We hypothesize that the reason for this is 
that referential metonymy, involving as it does an encoding of a 
reference in terms of a categorically different thing, is a more marked 
and unusual even in psychological terms. Predicative metonymy on 
the other hand involves no such operation, merely the convenient 
Stallard (1993: 87). 
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making-way of a predicate for a non-standard but related argument. 
For this reason, our work prefers predicative metonymy as the default 
121 
choice in processing when no other evidence is present. 
Stallard defines 'referential metonymy' as the process in which 'the metonymic noun 
phrase does indeed have an intended referent related to but different from its literal 
122 
meaning'. Predicative metonymy however, Stallard continues, is the process in which 
'the actual and intended referent of the noun phrase is just the literal one, and it is more 
accurate to say that the predicate is coerced'.123 Stallard suggests two criteria by which 
we can generate the correct reading. The first one is 'the external binding agreement 
condition on applying the referential metonymy schema'.124 Stallard continues 
explaining this first criterion ' i f an NP's external semantic context agrees with its literal 
referent, but not its referentially coerced version, then referential metonymy is ruled out 
for that NP'. The second criterion is the intra-sentential anaphora which figures out in 
examples like: 
47. The ham sandwich is waiting for HIS check. 
48. Which airline flies to ITS headquarters? 
Stallard argues that in example (47) 
the pronoun 'his' cannot agree with the literal referent, but can agree 
with the metonymically interpolated PERSON, and so provides 
evidence for the referential reading. 
In example (48), Stallard continues, 
the pronoun 'its' cannot agree in number with the interpolated set of 
flights, but can agree with the singular 'airline' and so provides 
evidence for the predicative reading. 
So in both examples we have linguistic constraints determining the preferred reading of 
the metonymic type involved. 
One could perhaps further demonstrate the distinction by adding an appropriate 
adjectival phrase to the relevant metonymic noun. Consider examples 42 -45 below: 
49. * The ham sandwich, which was carefully prepared in our own kitchen is 
waiting for his cheque. 
1 2 1 Ibid. (93). 
1 2 2 Ibid. (88). 
1 2 3 Ibid. 
1 2 4 Ibid. (92). 
1 2 5 Ibid. 
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50. The ham sandwich, who's obviously in a hurry, is waiting for his cheque. 
51. This airline, which was founded in 1983, flies from London to Newcastle. 
52. *This airline, which was built in Japan, flies from London to Newcastle. 
In the example, 
J J . Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver 
the constraint that determines the reading of this utterance as predicative is not a 
linguistic constraint however. It is a pragmatic constraint related to Grice's maxim of 
quantity. This stipulates that any superfluous and redundant information is rejected by 
virtue of the principle that communicators are generally cooperative and do not provide 
more information than is needed. The pragmatic constraint tells us that the intended 
referent in the example above is in fact the surface NP because i f it were the 
interpolated NP it would lead to some sort of superfluous information because all flights 
are actually on airlines. 
Fass comments on these proposals and argues that Stallard's analysis 'though 
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impressive appears to be incomplete'. Fass thinks that Stallard did not explain why 
examples like 
54. Nixon bombed Hanoi. *They sang all the way back to Saigon, 
fail the agreement test.128 He asks what type of metonymy is the one in this utterance. Is 
it referential or predicative? According to the rules Stallard provides it is predicative 
because the pronominal reference 'they' is ruled out since the intended referent is 
actually the surface noun phrase which is singular. I think the referential/predicative 
metonymic distinction is also useful in other respects. For example, it has been rather 
difficult to integrate examples of personification where it is felt that there is some 
metonymic relation underlying these types of expressions. 
55. Inflation robbed me of all my savings. 
The traditional account of example (55) is that it is 'personification'. However, 
Stallard's predicative metonymy extended the scope to include transfer on verbs as well 
as nouns. Here the noun phrase intended is actually the surface noun phrase 'inflation'. 
However, there is still violation of selection restrictions in that 'inflation'does not 
126 
This asterisk shows an unacceptable form. 
1 2 7 Fass (1997: 86). 
96 
Chapter Two Metonymy in Modern Figurative Theory 
actually rob. So the solution is that there is a predicative metonymy involved in which 
the verb 'rob' actually changes its argument features. 
2.1.2.5. Nunberg 
I move on now to discuss Geoffrey Nunberg's treatment of metonymy in his paper 
'Transfers of Meaning'. Nunberg distinguishes two types of metonymy. The first is 
'predicate transfer' metonymy and the second is 'deferred reference' metonymy. 
Nunberg states 
By 'transfers of meaning' I mean the ensemble of productive 
linguistic processes that enable us to use the same expression to refer 
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to what are intuitively distinct sorts of categories of things. 
Nunberg tries to distinguish between transfers and rhetorical figures on the ground that 
the former category is essentially a linguistic phenomenon whereas the latter is a 
conceptual matter. He asserts that 
granted that there is a salient correspondence between monarchs and 
crowns, for example, it still has to be explained why the word crown 
can be used to refer to monarchs - or for that matter why this fact 
should have any linguistic consequences at a l l . 1 3 0 
Nunberg introduces the distinction between the two types of metonymic reference in his 
discussion of the mechanism of transfer. He provides two examples uttered in the 
context of 'a customer hands his keys to an attendant at a parking lot and says either: 
56. This is parked out back, 
or 
57. I am parked out back'. 
Nunberg argues that both examples involve metonymies in the sense that both subjects 
in (56) and (57) can be thought as related in some way to the car and the location where 
the car is parked. Whereas the reference in (56) is actually to the intended deep referent, 
i.e. the car, and not to the surface demonstratum. In (57) the reference is to the surface 
noun phrase. The evidence of this characterisation of the nature of referentiality of the 
NP in the two utterances is based on some linguistic tests which provide evidence for 
the distinction. The first is the gender test in which the example (56) This is parked out 
back, is translated into Italian (an inflecting language showing gender differences). The 
Compare also 'Nixon, who was a staunch anti-communist, bombed Hanoi almost immediately after 
taking office', which is surely predicative. 
1 2 9 Nunberg (1995: 109). 
1 3 0 Ibid. (109-110). 
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translated version shows that the referent rather than the demonstratum determines 
agreement in the Italian example. Similar results will be obtained when examples like 
(56) are translated into Arabic, an inflecting language for gender and number and 
person. The inflection for gender and number would clearly show that the intended 
reference in example (56) above is deferred and the real reference is made to the car and 
not to the person or the key. This demonstrates that the above example is in fact a case 
of deferred reference. 
The second test is that of conjunction in which we conjoin additional information about 
the subject in the first clause. The conjunction wil l show us whether the agreement in 
the second clause depends on the surface NP or the deep NP. I f the first case then it is a 
case of deferred reference. I f it is the second case then it is an example of predicate 
transfer. The example Nunberg gives for this is (58) below: 
58. This is parked out back and may not start. 
The conjunction in (58) above supports the view that the intended reference is not the 
surface demonstratum but the implied referent 'the car', because the additional 
information conjoined is essentially a description of a car and not of a key. Regarding 
example (57), the gender as well as the conjunction tests support the view that the 
intended referent is the surface NP. A tag question to ascertain the example above will 
be shown in (59) below. 
59. I am parked out back, aren 't I'? 
A conjunction test will reveal that it is only possible to conjoin information referring to 
the person having the car rather than to the car itself. So the conjunction examples 
Nunberg gives are: 
60. I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes. 
61. *I am parked out back and may not start. 
For this type of meaning transfer, Nunberg suggests the term 'deferred ostension or 
deferred indexical reference'. This is 
a process that allows a demonstrative or indexical to refer to an object 
that correspond in a certain way to the contextual element picked out 
by a demonstration or by the semantic character of the expression.131 
Example (61) exemplifies another kind of transfer, Nunberg argues. 
The principle here is that the name of a property that applies to 
something in one domain can sometimes be used as the name of a 
1 3 1 Ibid. (111). 
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property that applies to things in another domain, provided the two 
132 
properties correspond in a certain way. 
Nunberg calls this type of metonymic transfer 'predicate transfer' indicating that that 
the transfer that is evident in utterances like (61) for example, is not a transfer of the 
noun phrase but a transfer in the semantic properties that the predicate projects on its 
arguments. 
2.2. Summary 
With the exposition of Nunberg's theory of metonymy I reach the end of this chapter 
which has considered the various linguistic and cognitive theories of metonymy. The 
aim has been to investigate the nature of metonymy in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of the workings of the trope. The conclusion of this chapter is that 
although a theory of metonymy as a cognitive phenomenon is evolving, a great deal of 
reductionism is still witnessed in terms of treating the trope as a lexical and not as a 
textual phenomenon. Therefore, the need to develop a comprehensive semiotic approach 
to metonymy is deemed necessary. The next chapter is therefore an attempt to outline a 
semiotic approach to metonymy which will lead the researcher to develop a specific 
definition of metonymy based on which the textual model of the trope will be proposed. 
1 3 2 Ibid. 
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Chapter Three: Metonymy and Semiotics 
3.0. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to develop a semiotic approach to 
metonymy. In this connection I argue for a theory of motivatedness in linguistic 
signification based on the conceptualisation of metonymy as a mode of contiguous and 
causal signification. Metonymy is viewed essentially as a way of abstracting a relation 
between concepts, words and objects. This relation is fundamentally a relation of 
representation. As such metonymy resembles to a great extent the notion of a sign 
which is perceived as a three-dimensional entity covering the three modes of 
knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of words, the knowledge of concepts and the knowledge 
of objects or things. This chapter aims to develop a semiotic approach to metonymy 
based on this rudimentary assumption. The second aim is to develop a textual model of 
metonymy based on this semiotic approach. 
In this chapter I shall give a general overview of semiotics and discuss metonymy as 
representational signification. The aim is to link semiotics, signification, communication 
and metonymy together and propose a textual model of metonymic signification. The 
chapter hopes to bring to the understanding of the reader the view that metonymy is not 
only a semiotic operation on lexical items; more than this, it is a process of 
representational signification that stretches beyond the individual lexical item to the text 
level. In short, metonymy with its signifying power is seen to be a major factor in text 
cohesion and coherence. 
3.1. Semiotics: a general perspective 
'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty 
said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means 
just what I choose it to mean- neither 
more nor less'.1 
It is therefore possible to conceive of a science which studies the role 
of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social psychology, 
and hence of general psychology. We shall call it semiology, (from 
the Greek semeion 'sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs and 
1 Lewis Carroll quoted in Aitchison (1995: 91). 
In the Peircean perspective as shall be discussed below. 
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the laws governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say 
for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready 
for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general 
science. The laws which semiology will discover will be laws 
applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a 
clearly defined place in the field of human knowledge. 
With these words the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure was actually proclaiming the 
birth of a new discipline or perhaps predicting its birth. But in any case, it was a 
discipline that had the right to exist because it is there in our everyday conscious or 
unconscious life or as Saussure put it ' i t has a place ready for it in advance'. The 
scholar's task with regard to this discipline is to identify the rules and the principles that 
underlie and govern the process of signification. As far as the subject matter of this 
discipline is concerned it was already there even before Saussure because it is the 
essence of cognition and communication. In fact, the concept of signification is not new 
or a breakthrough of the 19 th or the 20 t h century. Rather it is a concept that was debated 
in ancient Athenian society. What is usually referred to in books dealing with semiotics 
as 'Plato's puzzle4' is a good illustration that the notion of signification has attracted the 
attention of philosophers from ancient time. 
The main concern of semiotics or as Saussure and his followers prefer to call it 
'semiology' is the study of the system of signs. There is not a big difference between 
semiology and semiotics. The former has its origins in the theory propounded by the 
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure around the early years of the 20 t h century and the 
latter goes back to the work on signification undertaken by the American philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce who gave it the name 'semiotics'. In the course of this section I 
shall need to refer to the differences between both theories and the implications of such 
differences on the development of the discipline in Europe and America. Stam et al 
define semiotics as 'the study of signs, signification and signifying systems'.5 I f 
semiotics is the study of how signs are created, transmitted and interpreted, then 
semiotics is actually a theory of meaning.6 This is in fact the premise on which I have 
decided to discuss the semiotic dimension of metonymy. Semiotics, I believe, will be of 
3 Saussure. Harris (1983: 15-16). 
4 Keller (1998: 47) coins this term to refer to Plato's mystery of how is it possible'when I utter this 
sound, [and] 1 have that thing in mind....[that] you know that I have it in mind'? 
5 Stam et al (1992: 1). 
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immense help in the explication of the meaning of the concept of metonymy or rather in -
broadening our understanding of metonymy. Moreover, taking metonymy as a form of 
signification promotes the concept to the level of communication, instead of keeping it 
restricted to the level of lexical meaning. 
Semiotics is also defined as the science of signs especially by those who draw from 
Peirce, the founder of semiotics. These quote his famous statement in which he asserts 
that logic can be seen as 'the science of the general necessary laws of signs'7 However, 
the attribution of the quality of 'science' to this discipline is far from settled yet. 
Semiotics has "thick" descriptive power; what I mean by this is that it allows for a deep 
treatment of the data and looks at the data from a multidimensional perspective. Yet it 
suffers from a lack of agreement as to its 'scientificity'. Perhaps the reason is that 
although it has "thick" descriptive power it does not, however, have predictive power, 
which is the basic principle of scientific inquiry. Semiotics cannot predict the future of 
any signifying system or what could be signified in a particular situation because this 
depends entirely on various factors that are difficult or perhaps impossible to bring 
under control. Al l semiotics claims to do is to provide causal explanation by relating 
objects and actions to their underlying norms of social and cultural systems, semiotic 
explanations do not have predictive power. Linguistic semiotics for example does not 
aim to predict although it 'shows why the sequence has the form and meaning it does by 
relating it to the system of language'. 
Semiotics is largely qualitative and favours thick description of the phenomenon in 
which a grounding theory emerges from the data rather than imposing on the data 
preconceived categories and patterns of an a priori system. In fact, the vastness of the 
phenomena that semiotics purports to deal with 9 makes it difficult to consider it a 
scientific discipline because almost all social sciences have something to do with 
semiotics in one way or another. This obviously reduces the definiteness and 
discreteness of semiotics. 
6 In this connection, Fiske and Hartley maintain that'the central concerns of semiotics ... are: ... the 
relationship between a sign and its meaning; and the way signs are combined into codes' (1978: 37). 
7Peirce (1955, vol. 2. Para.227). 
8 Culler (1986: 73). 
9 For a good survey of this vastness see Eco (1976: 9-14) who refers to the numerous areas that are 
related in some way or another to the semiotic field as the political boundaries. 
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According to Ullmann, 1 0 C. Morris divided semiotics into three areas: 
• Semantics: the meaning of signs (the relationship of signs to what they stand for) 
• Syntactics: the relations between signs 
• Pragmatics: the ways in which signs are used and interpreted. 
This classification is very much influenced by linguistics and the levels represented here 
are used widely in linguistic studies. The remarkable difference is that while the 
classification of linguistic data begins with the material or the substance and then moves 
on to the form, here we have only form because the substance as far as semiotics is 
concerned is presumably not important since what is important is the systematisation of 
this substance.11 
The relationship between semiotics and linguistics is quite special because among all 
systems of communication or rather of signification, language is the most systematised 
and the most conventionalised one. In fact, no other forms of signification qualify as 
fully-fledged systems of communication due to the fact that these systems have not yet 
12 
been fully conventionalised into proper systems of communication. In discussing the 
concept of arbitrariness Saussure refers to the relationship between linguistics and 
semiology as follows: 
We may therefore say that signs which are entirely arbitrary convey 
better than others the ideal semiological process. That is why the most 
complex and the most widespread of all systems of expression, which 
is the one we find in human languages, is also the most characteristic 
of all. In this sense, linguistics serves as a model for the whole of 
semiology, even though languages represent only one type of 
13 
semiological systems. 
'"Ullmann (1962: 15). 
1 1 It should be noted that even in linguistics the level of substance is usually regarded as to fall outside the 
scope of linguistics. C.f. Aitchison (1995: 8), where she illustrates the scope of linguistics by a diagram 
and maintains that 'in the centre is phonetics, the study of human speech sounds. A good knowledge of 
phonetics is useful for a linguist. Yet it is a basic background knowledge rather than part of linguistics 
itself. 
It should be noted here that 'sign' language which is a non-verbal system of communication has 
acquired quite a lot of conventionality and systematicity. This would make it a proper communication 
system albeit a restricted one. Hawkes shows the validity of this assumption when he argues that 'a 
language, .... , does not construct its formations of words by reference to the patterns of'reality', but on 
the basis of its own internal and self-sufficient rules. The word 'dog' exists and functions within the 
structure of the English language, without reference to any four-legged barking creature's real existence. 
The word's behaviour derives from its inherent structural status as a noun rather than its referent's actual 
status as an animal', Hawkes (1977: 16-17). 
Saussure. Harris (1983: 68). Elsewhere Saussure asks 'why is it that semiology is not yet recognised as 
an autonomous science with its own object of study, like other sciences? Saussure provides an answer to 
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Dickins argues in this connection that 
this extraordinary communicative ability of natural languages is 
linked to (and can be regarded as a consequence of) an extremely 
high degree of complexity at the abstract analytical level.1 4 
Dickins further asserts, quoting Micheal Lamb, that 
natural languages seem to be of such a higher degree of complexity as 
compared with other semiotic systems that one might reasonably 
expect any analytical situation exhibited in other semiotic systems to 
be exhibited in natural language also. One would not however, expect 
analytical situations exhibited in natural language necessarily to be 
exhibited in other semiotic systems.15 
Eco treats the issue of verbal and non-verbal signification as problematic as far as 
semiotics is concerned. He asks: what is the proper object of study of semiotics? Is it 
verbal language, which is language proper, or is it all other languages? Eco concludes 
that 'the problem could be solved by saying that the theory of signification and 
communication has only one primary object, i.e. verbal language, all other languages 
being imperfect approximations to its capacities and therefore constituting peripheral 
and impure instances of semiotic devices ... so that linguistics is not the most important 
branch of semiotics but the model for every semiotic activity'. 1 6 
Hawkes holds that the main thrust of semiotics is to study communication and in this it 
overlaps with structuralism because, as he argues, the 'interests of the two spheres are 
not fundamentally separate'.17 Hawkes defines structuralism as 'a way of thinking about 
the world which is predominantly concerned with the perception and description of 
structures'.18 In fact, Hawkes predicts that the future will witness a unification of 
semiotics and structuralism under one heading called 'communication'.19 However, this 
comprehensive view is by no means the only way semiotics has been discussed. 
Semiotics has also been reduced to a mere methodology of structural analysis. In this 
connection, Lye argues that 
structuralism enables both the reading of texts and the reading of 
cultures: through semiotics, structuralism leads us to see everything 
this stating that 'nothing is more appropriate than the study of languages to bring out the nature of the 
semiological problem', ibid. (16). 
1 4 Dickins (1998: 17). 
1 5 Ibid. 
1 6 Eco (1976: 172). 
1 7 Hawkes (1977: 124). 
1 8 Hawkes (1977: 17). 
1 9 Hawkes (1977: 124). 
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as textual, that is composed of signs, governed by conventions of 
20 
meaning, ordered according to a pattern of relationships. 
Sapir also conceives of communication as a fundamental characteristic of human 
beings. He maintains that 
every cultural pattern and every single act of social behaviour 
21 
involves communication either in an explicit or implicit sense. 
Semiotics has changed quite a lot since its early modern theorisation by Saussure and in 
fact it has grown increasingly less Saussurean. The standard terms have changed as 
well, notably; semiology is not very much used now and has given way to semiotics, the 
new term coined by Peirce. Semiotics has also changed in terms of the perspective it has 
adopted. Saussure looked at it as the super-discipline under which linguistics would be a 
branch. Nowadays, however, linguistics is seen to be the general heading under which 
semiotics is discussed. Semiotics is divided regarding the issue of semiosis, which is a 
term coined by Peirce and defined by him also as 
an action, an influence, which is or involves a cooperation of three 
subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant, this tri-relative 
influence not being in anyway resolvable into actions between 
• 22 
pairs. 
Later semioticians, such as Eco2 3, used the term 'semiosis' to explain the phenomenon 
whereby a particular culture creates signs or imposes meanings on signs. Sebeok 
regards semiosis as a sign action and thus perceives semiotics not to be about the "real" 
world at all but mainly about 'complementary or alternative actual models of it and - as 
Leibniz thought - about an infinite number of anthropologically conceivable possible 
worlds'. 2 4 
Semiotics has changed focus also. Traditional accounts of semiotics concern the 
classification of signs and sign systems and their structural organisation; i.e. they mainly 
study the architecture of signs and sign systems. Modern theories of semiotics however, 
concentrate on the modes of production of signs and meanings and the work performed 
through these signs. This study of the modes of production of signs covers a vast area 
Lye (1996: 2). This quotation is taken from 'some aspects of structuralism and its application to literary 
theory' in a website belonging to the author at the following address: 
http://www.brocku.ca/english/courses/4F70/struct.html 
2 1 Sapir (1949: 104). 
2 2 Peirce (1960, vol.5: 488). 
2 3 Cf. Eco (1976: 125-128). 
2 4 Sebeok, T. (1991: 12). 
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and may become a risky game of 'arrogant imperialism' as Eco expects the discipline to 
25 • 
do when it claims to define 'everything' as its proper object. This shift casts some 
doubt on the reliability of semiotics as a theory of communication, because it claims to 
be concerned with all forms of communication or rather with all that signifies, be it 
conventional or non-conventional, systematic or non- systematic and intentional or 
unintentional. 
Turner for example maintains that among these forms of communication are 'writing, 
26 
speech, photography, fi lm, television, and so on'. This claim for such a comprehensive 
empirical power renders the boundaries of semiotics quite vague. In spite of such 
critical accounts, some linguists like Kress and Hodge, argue that 'semiotics offers the 
promise of a systematic, comprehensive and coherent study of communication 
27 
phenomena as a whole, not just instances of i t ' . Semiotics helps us understand more 
the concept of linguistic determinism and cultural relativism, the idea known today as 
the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis, because it tells us how through the process of semiosis 
each social community constructs its own reality as it interacts with its environment 
through language. 
It should also be stressed that semiotics has been used in text linguistics. Semiotic-
28 • 
oriented approaches to text analysis have provided text linguistics with really deep-
rooted insights into the nature of textual communication and how meaning is created 
through communication, in contradiction to the view that communication is the result of 
meaning. Through semiotics we see everything as textual as far as it is composed of 
signs, governed by meaning conventions and ordered in patterns by means of various 
relationships. Semiotic-conscious text analysis grants the text analyst a grounding 
theory that emerges from the text itself and makes the data alive. Semiotics makes text 
analysis an intellectually demanding and rewarding practice rather than a 
mathematically dry endeavour. This is to say that traditional text analysis was mainly 
concerned with the quantification of the number of times each linguistic item is 
2 5 Cf. Eco (1976: 6-7). 
2 6 Turner (1992: 17). 
2 7 Kress and Hodge (1993: 1). 
Halliday is a pioneer in this respect. His theory of language as social semiotic and his concern for the 
functions of language in society have helped him to offer a detailed model of language in society which 
attempts to explain how language is actually used by people in real life communicative situations. 
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mentioned in the text. This quantification, although apparently scientific, deprives the 
treatment of the text as a living organism which creates meanings all the way through its 
generation and interpretation. Quantification is based on the assumption of fixed 
meaning and fixed interpretation. However, semiotics is based on the assumption of 
multiple interpretation and this assumption is the part and parcel of an illuminating 
textual analysis. 
To conclude this section I think it is essential to cite an important definition of semiotics 
provided by Umberto Eco, who writes 'semiotics is in principle the discipline studying 
29 
everything which can be used in order to lie'. According to Eco anything that cannot 
be used to tell lie cannot be used to tell the truth and in fact cannot be used to tell at 
a l l ' . 3 0 The assumption underlying this definition is presumably the paramount 
importance Eco places on the idea of intentionality and conventionality as two 
important aspects of signification. It looks as i f these two concepts lie at the heart of 
Eco's conception of what could qualify as a sign. However, this property would 
ultimately lead to the limitation of Eco's semiotics to the conventional systems of signs 
that are used for communication notably human language, because other semiotic 
systems seem to lack the property of lying. 3 1 Lying in language can occur in various 
ways, for example literally by flouting the maxim of quality according to Grice's 
maxims or figuratively by using figures of speech like irony, hyperbole or metaphor. In 
fact, both of these ways manifest themselves in figurative language. Cook gives an 
example where the use of a figure of speech actually leads to the flouting of the maxim 
of quality. In example (1) below: 
32 
1. I've got millions of beer bottles in my cellar 
there is an exaggeration involved in this example and this figurative speech is mainly 
achieved via the flouting of the maxim of quality. In other words there is an act of lying 
in the example. In fact, any literal interpretation of the example would lead to absurd 
responses like 'You English people must have very big houses!'33 
" Eco (1976: 7). 
3 0 Ibid. 
C.f. Lyons (1977b: chap.3) who argues that prevarication is one of the main properties of human 
language because human language is perhaps the only system of communication that allows for 
misinforming. 
3 2 Cook (1989: 31). 
3 3 Ibid. 
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According to speech act theory correspondence between sentence meaning and 
utterance meaning in speech results in literal speech acts.34 So declarative sentences are 
seen to be assertions, interrogative sentences questions, and imperative sentences 
orders. But figurative language always plays on the lack of correspondence to create 
some sort of tension between literal and figurative interpretation. This aspect is also 
discussed by Searle when he discusses metaphorical expressions and the issue of truth 
35 36 
conditions. A woman in classical Arabic culture upon seeing the Caliph said the 
following: 
2. 'ashkii 'ilayka qillata al-jirthan f i bayt'i 
I complain to you of the lack of mice in my house. 
Taking this sentence as a declarative sentence realising a complaint would totally miss 
the point. The utterance requires a figurative interpretation based on a causal 
inferencing of the type 'mice have left my house because there is no food there'. An 
indirect speech act, which is a request for financial help, would therefore result from 
this interpretation. 
3.2. On the notion of signification 
In this section I shall discuss the notion of signification. This will require a discussion 
of the concept of sign. Most of the work consulted here wil l be by Saussure and Peirce. 
The section aims to provide a general overview of the nature of signs and the various 
definitions that have been provided for the process of signification. Also of importance 
will be the discussion of the various types of signs and more particularly the various 
modes of signification. The ultimate aim of this section is to develop a semiotic 
approach to metonymic signification. 
3.2.1. The nature of signs 
In his Encyclopedic Dictionary of Language and Languages, David Crystal defines the 
word sign as 
a feature of language or behaviour which conveys meaning, 
especially when used conventionally within a system (such as speech, 
writing, gesture, dance); also called a symbol (but many writers make 
37 
a distinction between these terms). 
34 Searle (1975: 60). 
35 See for detail Searle (1979: 113). 
36 A king or a commander. 
Crystal (1992: 353). 37 
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Wales provides the following definition: 
From Latin signum 'mark, token', sign is sometimes used 
interchangeably with symbol to denote 'something' which stands for, 
38 
or refers to something else, in a meaningful way. 
The principle of interpretation says 'a sign is something by knowing which we know 
something more'.39According to Peirce, a sign is 'something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity'.40 Morris asserts that 
something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of 
something by some interpreter. Semiotics, then, is not concerned with 
the study of a particular kind of phenomenon, but with ordinary 
phenomena insofar (and only insofar) as they participate in 
• • 41 
semiosis. 
In essence signs are mediators between messages and signals or between thought and 
expression. Signs are meaningful units. These units include words, images sounds, 
gestures or objects. When we invest these units with meaning, then they become signs. 
So there is a process of semiosis that the word, image, gesture or any form of 
signification has to undergo for it to be regarded as a sign laden with meaning. To this 
end Turner argues that for something to qualify as a sign 
it must have a physical form, it must refer to something other than 
itself, and it must be recognised as doing this by other users of the 
sign system. 
In this concise definition of the notion of sign, Turner provides us with three criteria for 
anything to qualify as a sign or rather as a signifier. It should have a physical form and 
this could be a sound, an image, an object or a gesture. In other words this signifier 
should be something that can be seen, heard, touched, smelt or tasted. It must signify 
something other than its own entity and it must be conventionalised in the sense that it 
must be recognised by the users of the code as doing so. 
It is worth mentioning in this connection*that Saussure's view of both the signifier and 
the signified is a mentalistic one because he excludes reference to any object in the 
world. He asserts that 'the linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity'. 4 3 
Moreover, Saussure points out that 'a sign is the combination of a concept and a sound 
J 0 Wales (1989: 419). 
3 9 Peirce cited in Eco (1984: 2). 
4 0 Peirce (1960, vol.2 : 228). 
4 1 Morris (1938: 20). 
4 2 Turner (1992: 17). 
4 3 Saussure. Harris (1983: 66). 
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pattern'. However, he then alters this terminology by proposing 'to keep the term sign to 
designate the whole, but to replace concept and sound pattern respectively by 
signification and signal'.™ For Saussure both signification and signal are concepts that 
reside in the mind of the speaker or perhaps in the collective mind of the speech 
community.45 Just like langue, which is the system of rules of a particular language 
being stored in the collective mind of the speech community, signification could be a 
mental concept that is stored in the collective mind of the speech community in some 
schematic shape. In this case every individual in this particular speech community 
would have some sort of manifestation of this system. Saussure's semiotic thought 
especially the concept of 'signification' could be perceived along the lines of his 
linguistic thought. 
Perhaps the most important thing to point out about Saussure's theory of semiology is 
the way he deals with the concept of 'sign' and how this affects his semiological theory 
in general. What Saussure calls 'sign' is the arbitrarily established link between a 
particular signifier and a particular signified. This link is conventionally established and 
has to be learned before one can actually use it. But what does Saussure mean by the 
arbitrariness of this association between the form and content? For Saussure a link is 
arbitrary i f and only i f it is established by convention alone. Any natural connection 
between the signifier and the signified would render the outcome a symbol rather than a 
sign.4 6 In this sense, words like 'house', 'white', 'see', etc. are essentially concepts 
pertaining to psychology and they 'become linguistic entities only by association with 
sound patterns'.47 Thus they would naturally qualify as signs because there is no natural 
connection between these forms and the contents they denote and this is why they are 
different in different languages. It is only the conventions of English that have 
" Ibid. (67). 
4 5 In this connection he argues that 'the individual's receptive and coordinating faculties build up a stock 
of imprints which turn out to be for all practical purposes the same as the next person's. How must we 
envisage this social product, so that the language itself can be seen to be clearly distinct from the rest? If 
we could collect the totality of word patterns stored in all those individuals, we should have the social 
bond which constitutes their language. It is a fund accumulated by the members of the community 
through the practice of speech, a grammatical system existing potentially in every brain, or more exactly 
in the brains of a group of individuals; for language is never complete in any single individual, but exists 
perfectly only in the collectivity. Saussure. Harris (1983: 13). 
4 6 C.f. his example of the symbol of justice 'the scales' which he wittily questions whether we can replace 
it with a chariot. Saussure. Harris (1983: 68). 
4 7 Saussure. Harris (1983: 101). 
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established such a link between the word 'cat' and the small furry four-legged animal 
that usually lives in houses. 
But in languages there are words that are not totally arbitrary, i.e. they express some 
kind of intrinsic natural relation between the word and the meaning it denotes. The 
clearest example is 'onomatopoeia' in which the word echoes the thing it refers to. This 
category and the category of exclamations are treated as 'symbolic' and thus the term 
'symbol' is used instead of sign as far as the Saussurean theory is concerned.48 
Therefore, the term 'sign' is reserved in Saussure's use of it to the total arbitrary relation 
between the signifier and the signified. This implies that for Saussure all motivated 
associations are not signification systems because they are marginal, as it were, to 
signification.4 9 It should be stressed here that it is the notion of arbitrariness in 
Saussure's theory of semiology that is going to be contested in this thesis because the 
assumption is that propositional and textual signification is largely motivated. In fact, a 
semiotic theory of metonymy leads to the conception that linguistic signification is 
highly motivated because our selection from the paradigmatic axis and our combination 
on the syntagmatic axis is loaded with intentions, ideologies and biases. 
Peirce's theory of semiotics exhibits a different conception of the nature of sign, 
signification and interpretation from that of Saussure.50 These issues will be dealt with 
in other sections of this chapter. What I intend to elucidate here are the key issues that 
are peculiar to Peirce's semiotics. It should be noted that while many examples of the 
differences between Peirce's semiotics and Saussure's semiology are treated in various 
sections of this chapter, the intention is to look with particular focus at the issue of the 
scope of the discipline as perceived by Saussure and Peirce. The scope of semiotics as 
portrayed by Saussure is quite narrow i f compared to that proposed by Peirce. 
Saussure's narrow conception of semiology stems from the fact that he perceives the 
discipline to be the science of signs as he defines them. Saussure treats signs as arbitrary 
and conventional. Other 'signs', which are produced as a result of natural motivation or 
generally 'signs' that are motivated, are not regarded as signs according to Saussurean 
4 8 See the discussion of onomatopoeia in ibid, (69). 
4 9 Ibid. 
5 0 As will be shown later in this chapter Peirce's conception of sign is more relevant to the course of this 
thesis because of its consideration of an ontological dimension of sign in addition to the cognitive and 
linguistic dimensions. 
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semiology. Now this conception of sign i f compared to Peirce's semiotics is only one 
subcategory of the vast conception of the Peircean sign. In fact, what Saussure 
conceives as a sign proper corresponds to what Peirce calls symbol which is arbitrarily 
signified. 
Peirce's semiotics goes beyond the concept of sign as symbol to include sign as index 
and sign as icon. It looks at the concept of sign from a philosophical perspective as a 
unit of understanding, knowledge and interpretation. He is interested in deriving a rule 
as to how signification operates in general, whether the source of this signification is a 
human being or is natural. For Peirce a sign like'smoke'coming out of a house is as 
important a sign as the utterance 'there is smoke coming out of that house' although the 
former is a natural sign that is produced by a non-human sender. Linguistic signs for 
Peirce are only a part of the system of signs that can be seen in nature. While Saussure 
stresses the importance of the sign being composed of a linguistic expression in order to 
qualify as a sign, Peirce regards as a sign any element in nature that yields knowledge 
and leads to interpretation. 
Semioticians generally regard the concept of sign as a unitary concept and the division 
of the elements comprising it as a matter of pedagogy rather than a real division. They 
see sign as a coin, having two faces, which cannot be separated from each other. 
Saussure compares the sign to a human being, comprising body and soul. Better still, 
according to Saussure, is the comparison with chemical compounds such as water 
which he argues 'is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen; but taken separately neither 
element has any of the properties of water'.51 This type of approach has encouraged 
such integrated conceptions of the notion of sign. Lewis maintains that 'the sign 
incorporates both signifier and signified: it is the material entity made meaningful'. 5 2 In 
Lewis' quotation we have a clear reference to the current trend of materialising the 
concept of sign. While Lewis agrees with Saussure regarding the integrated structure of 
the notion of sign, we find a departure from Saussure's mental conception of 
signification. It seems that there is a movement to bring the concept of semiotics into 
concrete manifestation in socio-cultural contexts. I believe this is likely to be a fruitful 
development, as communication cannot be thought of only as a mental phenomenon. In 
5 1 Saussure. (102). 
5 2 Lewis (1991: 27). 
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fact, it is more naturally a real life phenomenon that takes place within a material socio-
cultural context. Perceived as such communication is seen as the process of meaning 
creation. The process of meaning creation in communication is far from an arbitrary 
process. Rather it is a process of motivated selection of concepts and motivated 
combination of these into thought. 
53 
Some semioticians think of the concepts of signifier and signified as corresponding to 
the linguistic concepts of form and content. The signifier is paralleled with 'form' and 
the signified with 'content'. This view looks rather naive. The way signifiers are looked 
at as 'form' that is used to carry 'content', i.e. meaning, leads to some problematic 
understanding regarding the role of the signifier. First, this view looks at the signifier 
merely as a carrier of meaning, but not as an element that is itself meaningful. Second, it 
assumes a one-to-one correspondence between content and meaning. This might not be 
as straightforward as it is being presented by those who attempt to link semiotic 
concepts to linguistic concepts especially i f we take figurative language into 
consideration.54 In fact, meaning is the result of a process of interpretation and a result 
of a long series of inferences, and it is not merely a matter of relating a particular 
signifier to its conventionally established content or meaning. The problem becomes 
more particularly recognisable when we have one signifier representing more than one 
signified as is the case in polysemy, and the case of having one signified being 
represented by more than one signifier, for example, in synonymy. Regardless of the 
differences regarding the specific features of the signifier and the signified, and whether 
it is legitimate to relate these semiotic concepts to their linguistic counterparts of form 
and content, there is a general tendency among semioticians to agree that the concept of 
sign involves all the three elements of signification. These are the sign itself, the 
signifier and the signified. 
Given that Saussure's concept of langue is influenced by Durkhiem's notion of 
'collective mind' 5 5 , it is equally reasonable to argue that his concept of signification is 
5 3 Cf. Wells (1977:3), Anderson and Trudgill (1992: 75). 
5 4 C.f. Gibbs (1994: chap. 2.). 
5 5 Sampson (1980: 47) after a lengthy discussion of Durkeim's concept of'collective mind' and the clash 
between 'methodological collectivism' and 'methodological individualism' as two ways of thinking about 
the subject-matter of sociology, argues that this was 'very much a live issue in the intellectual milieu 
within which Saussure's views on language were formed'. Compare also Eagleton who refers to the 
concept as the 'collective consciousness' (1983:110). See also Ricoeur (1976: 3) for similar view. 
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also influenced by the same view. In this case Saussure could be interpreted to mean 
that the reference of the sign is not necessarily the object in the world but the mental 
concept the language users construct of that object. Each of the members of the speech 
community is expected to have his own mental concept of that thing in the world but 
these mental concepts will not be very different from each other because they are united 
with a stereotype of that thing. This perfect and holistic representation is what resides in 
the collective mind of the speech community. The link I intend to establish from this 
discussion is that the concept of sign in the Saussurean conception although mentalistic 
in nature is itself metonymic in the sense that the signification or the concept and the 
sound pattern or the signal stand in a metonymic relation of representation between 
language and cognition. Reality is virtually ignored in Saussurean semiology but 
nonetheless the model is still characteristically metonymic. 
Saussure's model of the sign could be represented in the following diagram: 
Signifier (mentalistic, sound image) 
• 
metonymic representational relation 
Signified (mentalistic, mental concept) 
Figure 3.1. Metonymy and the Saussurean notion of sign. 
For Eco a sign is 'always an element of an expression plane conventionally correlated to 
one (or several) elements of a content plane'.56 In fact, this definition of sign is 
reminiscent of Saussure's definition of sign as the correspondence between a signifier 
and a signified. In a sense it is the relation of correspondence that makes the sign and 
hence there is nothing physical called sign. It is an abstract relation that is drawn 
between a signifier and a signified by means of conventionalised norms. Hjelmslev 
suggests that 
it appears more appropriate to use the word sign as the name for the 
unit consisting of content-form and the expression-form and 
established by the solidarity that we have called the sign-function.57 
H jelmslev thus perceives 'sign' as a unit that is established by virtue of a correlation 
between an expression and content. This correlation becomes a sort of a code that as 
Eco (1976: 48). 
Hjemslev(1961: 58) 
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Eco argues 'provides a rule to generate signs as concrete occurrences in communicative 
intercourse'.58 This does not mean however, that Hjelmslev is concretising the concept 
of sign by looking at it as a unit. This unit is a theoretical construct and the focus is 
mainly on the set of relations that are established in the structure of the sign function. 
This is because the sign function is a type of a language and language for Hjelmslev is a 
'structure, not to be discovered by the linguist but to be established by him' . 5 9 
Peirce's model of sign, on the other hand, looks quite different because it perceives of 
the concept of sign as comprising three facets rather than two as in the Saussurean 
tradition. This is important to the course of this thesis which aims to establish a three-
dimensional model of metonymic signification. Saussure's notion of signifier is called 
representamen in Peirce's model and this is the form which the sign takes. This can be 
both material and abstract. In other words, an abstract concept can function as a signifier 
and can trigger some sort of interpretation of its own. The second aspect of sign is that 
of the interpretant which according to Pierce is not an interpreter but rather the sense the 
representamen signifies. Now according to the abstract view of the concept of 
representamen, the interpretant could as well qualify as a sign. So we have a kind of 
cyclic signification in which one sign triggers more than one interpretation in a 
successive way. Peirce's third concept is the object and here the referent is the object in 
the world. While Saussure's signified or reference is abstract, Peirce's is material: the 
thing in the real world. However, this does not mean that the Peircean concept of sign is 
material or that the sign is only physical. Rather, the sign might be physical and 
abstract. It is the referent in the Peircean sense that is physical. The following diagram 
illustrates Peirce's model and relates it to metonymy: 
Eco (1976: 49). 
See Mulder and Hervey (1972: 7). 
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Interpretant concept 
object epresentamen 
SIGN METONYMY 
Figure 3.2. Metonymy and the Peircean notion of sign. 
Figure 3.2. above shows a great deal of similarity between the notion of sign and the 
notion of metonymy. This similarity is warranted by the view of both notions as 
representational. A sign mediates between a representamen, an interpretant and an 
object. In the same way, metonymy mediates between a word, a concept and an object. 
The notions of sign and metonymy facilitate 'standing for' relations between forms, 
concepts and objects. This is the representational view of metonymy that is sustained 
throughout this thesis and will be discussed in detail in section 3.3. 
Saussure's concept of sign is structural in the sense that he was seeking an explanation 
of the internal structure of the sign and the processes of signification and interpretation. 
In other words his concern was to build a model with emphasis on internal structure 
within the sign system. This led to his theory of linguistic signification, an insightful 
work that helped to found the study of linguistics on semiological grounds. By means of 
its internal structure language creates its reality without the need to refer to the patterns 
of reality. The word 'cat' in the English language exists in the language without need 
for reference to the four-legged, long-tailed animal. How does language do this? The 
answer is simply by means of internal structure through which the word 'cat' behaves 
according to the laws of its status as a noun, i.e. an element in the linguistic structure 
and not according to its physical referent as an animal. While Saussure's semiology is 
instrumental, Peirce theory of sign is representational. From an epistemological 
perspective Peirce approaches the issue of signs and signification in an attempt to know 
how representamen 'stand for' their objects. 
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The Saussurean emphasis on the internal structure of the sign system justifies an early 
structural interest in looking at language as the determinant of our worldview. This was 
to evolve into what is now known as the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis. The view expressed 
by this hypothesis is that 
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in 
the world of social activity, but are very much at the mercy of the 
particular language which has become the medium of expression of 
their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to 
reality essentially without the use of language and that language is 
merely an incidental means of solving particular problems of 
communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the real 
world is to a large extent built upon the language habits of the group. 
No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as 
representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different 
societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with 
different labels attached.60 
Or as Whorf put it later on 
And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in 
which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the 
personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices 
or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his 
reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.61 
The more recent account of the issue is provided by Bickerton who writes 'the 
categories into which we divide nature are not in nature, they emerge solely through 
interaction between nature and ourselves'.62 This structuralist perspective regarding the 
dialectic relationship between language and thought has allowed for a huge body of 
cultural studies, which sprang from anthropological linguistics and sociolinguistics. The 
essence of signification is the interaction between cognition, language and reality. The 
structuralist quest has always been to explore the relationship between these three 
fundamentals. 
Saussure's theory of sign and signification tells us that language with its internal 
structure does not merely reflect reality, rather it creates its own reality.6 3 Saussure's 
concentration on the internal structure of the linguistic sign and his emphasis on the 
notion of conventionality inform us that his view of language is that of a medium as 
well as a topic. In other words reality is what the language creates. This view is quite 
o u Sapir (1949: 162). 
6 1 Whorf (1956: 252). 
6 2 Bickerton (1990: 53). 
6 3 As we have seen above in 3.1. Hawkes also echoes this view also. 
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important for the theory of motivatedness in linguistic signification that I am concerned 
with in this chapter. This is because i f the process of meaning creation is purely 
conventional, i.e. culturally produced, then there is cultural motivatedness in the 
creation of these meanings as we wil l encode our ideologies and perceptions into the 
process of semiosis. It is true that this aspect is not as clear i f we conceive of 
signification as taking place at the level of individual lexical items. However, once the 
signification process is seen at the level of text where the interaction between language, 
mind and reality is presumably in its most perfect form, the relationship between the 
signifier and the signified is not at all innocent and is largely motivated by all sorts of 
cultural and even ontological factors. The reason why motivatedness is much clearer at 
the level of text, is that once we select from the paradigmatic axis and put into strings of 
language to serve a particular communicative function, the processes of selection and 
combination are never innocent. 
An important conception in this regard is Saussure's concept of the arbitrariness of the 
linguistic sign. As we have seen, according to Saussure, there is no intrinsic relationship 
between the signifier and the signified.6 4 That is the relationship is a matter of 
convention and the sole source of this is the speech community. One result of this is the 
tremendous number of languages spoken around the world. This proves that the 
signifier is fundamentally a cultural product and is bound to change from one language 
to another unless the word in one language is borrowed from another to refer to the 
same meaning. In this case the act of borrowing is itself an intentional communicative 
act. Again we need to interpret this notion of arbitrariness in a special way because an 
arbitrary theory of language signification means in essence that there is no physical 
correspondence between the signifier and the signified. This means that nature does not 
impose its categories on language; rather language creates categories to describe and 
explain nature. I f we conceive of language as a social reality present in the unconscious 
of the speech community, then this unconscious will actively operate when meaning is 
created to reflect all sorts of rational motivatedness in linguistic signification especially 
at the textual level. The arrangement and organisation of signs is heavily influenced by 
ideological purposes and personal intentions as well as cultural patterns of cognition. 
In this connection Fairclough argues that 
C.f. Saussure. Harris (1983: 67). 
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Ideological struggle pre-eminently takes place in language. We can 
think of such struggle as not only in language in the obvious sense 
that it takes place in discourse and is evidenced in language texts, but 
also over language. It is over language in the sense that language 
itself is a stake in social struggle as well as a site of social struggle.65 
Similarly, Kress and Hodge advocate a theory of motivatedness in linguistic signs when 
they maintain that 'linguistic signs are always motivated conjuncts of form and 
66 
meaning'. This would mean that any use we make of language will be influenced by 
our ideological stance, the values we hold and the biases we adopt. Language is not an 
innocent reflection of reality rather it is a means by which we construct reality. What 
can be concluded from the above discussion is that our lexical and grammatical choices 
are not innocent choices. There is always a struggle to attain desirable things and a 
struggle to avoid undesirable things. Hence text linguistics should account for this 
important aspect of language as a social fact and as a product of social processes. 
Hatim and Mason argue that the notion of motivatedness underlies the essence of 
language because ' i t is this notion which provides the essential link between textual 
occurrences and the context in which they are embedded'.67 Birch argues, on the same 
line, that aspects of language 
signal different points of view, these in turn signal different realities, 
and these realities determine and are determined by different 
68 
(multiple) ideologies. 
He further argues that 'there is in any use of language a struggle for dominance; a 
struggle to bring about change'.69 Ghadessy puts forward a more specific argument 
about motivatedness in linguistic signification when he argues that 
our lexical and grammatical selections are not innocent choices. 
There is always a struggle for power which results in ideologically 
conflicting systems of classifying and controlling the world. 7 0 
The view of motivatedness in linguistic signification seems to be something that cannot 
be disputed and i f there is any chance to perceive language as innocent it is simply 
because we share the myths and biases expressed in our native languages. Cameron 
6 5Fairclough(1989: 88). 
6 6 Kress and Hodge (1993: 205). 
6 7 Hatim and Mason (1997: 24). 
6 8 Birch (1993: 43). 
6 9 Ibid. 
7 0 Ghadessy (1993: 3). 
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argues in this connection that 'there is always a point of view in language but we are apt 
to notice it only when it is not the one we share'.71 Fairclough asserts that 
the operation of ideology can be seen in terms of ways of constructing 
texts which constantly and cumulatively impose assumptions upon 
text interpreters and text producers, typically without either being 
aware of it. 7 2 
The above discussion aims to argue against the notion of arbitrariness in order to 
establish a theory of metonymy as a theory of motivated signification. 
3.2.2. Types and modes of sign 
73 
There are various types of signs and there are various classifications of signs. Perhaps 
the classification which is most useful and relevant to our discussion here is Peirce's 
classification, which is based on the relationship between the sign and its object. In a 
sense this can be seen as a classification based on the mode of signification. According 
to this conception signs have three modes of signification. I f the relation between the 
signifier and the signified or rather between the sign and its object is that of similarity 
then this is an iconic signification. The type of sign thus designated is an icon. I f the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified or rather between the sign and its 
object is that of symbolism in that the signifier symbolically signifies the object, then 
this mode is symbolic and the sign thus designated is a symbol. The third mode of 
signification is perceived when the relationship between the signifier and the signified 
or rather the sign and its object is that of causality in the sense that the signifier causes 
the signified or the object of the sign. In this case the former is called the cause and the 
latter is called the effect and the sign thus designated is an index. 74 
Another type of classification proposed by Peirce is that which is based on the nature of 
the interpretant which each sign represents. This classification includes, rheme, 
proposition and argument. A rheme can be understood as a referring expression and 
representing a particular kind of object. Therefore, proper names would fall into this 
category because they merely name an entity in the real world. A proposition on the 
other hand involves two entities. This is because propositions generally express an 
7 1 Cameron (1995: 74). 
7 2 Fairclough (1989: 83). 
73 
See Eco (1976) who provides a number of classification systems which have been used to classify 
signs. 
7 4 For a detailed discussion of the various types of Peirce's sign classification see Hervey (1982: 23-32). 
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assertive point of view regarding the state of affairs in the real world. In order to 
understand propositions one has to go beyond the proposition itself which is the sign 
according to this conception to examine the conditions of the world of the utterance to 
judge the sign as true or false. An argument is a sign that involves mediation between 
two entities. These are the premise and the conclusion. 
An example can be provided to illustrate these three divisions of sign according to the 
interpretant or the sense of the sign. I f I point to a chair and say'chair'then this is a 
referring expression and thus is understood as a way of naming or indicating that 
particular object. So the rheme is understood as a one-way process in which I do not 
need to draw a relationship between two or more interpretants. Now i f I point to this 
chair and say 'this chair is comfortable', I am making a proposition and to confirm or 
falsify this assertion I need to examine the conditions of the real world, i.e. to see 
whether the chair is actually comfortable or not. In this sense the interpretation of the 
interpretant requires a kind of a two-level process in which the sense of the signification 
is resolved by means of taking recourse to the world outside the sign-vehicle but which 
is part of the sign-object. The third example is that when I proceed further to make an 
argument about the state of the world and say 'because this chair is comfortable I 
always like to sit on it ' . Here the sign is mediating between a premise and a conclusion 
regarding the sense of the argument. This last type or model of signification is very 
relevant to this research project in two respects. First, it is related to the semiotic 
conception of metonymy as causal linking between significations and propositions. 
Second, it is related to a textual theory of metonymy because it allows for the notion of 
signification to go beyond the sentence level to account for textual relations underlying 
discourse. This theme will be elaborated further in the course of this study and will be 
used to derive a model of how semiotics could provide textlinguistics with useful 
insights into the nature of signification in the socio-textual world of discourse. 
3.3. On representational semiotics and metonymy 
This section aims to link the representational theory of semiotics and the 
representational relation of metonymy. I shall discuss the representational theory of 
semiotics by examining two theories that treat the process of signification as a process 
of representation. The first of these theories is that which was proposed by the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle in his book De Interpretatione. Aristotle's statement of his sign 
theory runs as follows: 
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Now spoken sounds [phonai] are symbols [symbola] of affections in 
the soul [pathemata], and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. 
And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are 
spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of -
affections of the soul - are the same for all; and what these affections 
are likenesses of - actual things [pragmata] - are also the same. ... A 
name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without time, none 
of whose parts is significant in separation. For in "Whitfield" the 
'field' does not signify anything in its own right, as it does in the 
phrase 'white field'. I say "by convention" because no name is a 
name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even 
inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal 
something, yet none of them is a name.75 
Underlying Aristotle's representational theory of signs is the assumption that the world 
of concepts is universal, and the world of actual things is universal too. It is only the 
world of names that changes due to the arbitrary nature of this name. So according to 
this conception signs 'represent'. That is, by way of conventionality, they symbolise 
affections of the soul, which naturally resemble the actual things in the world. This is a 
clever account designed to solve the dilemma of nature vs. convention which Greek 
philosophers long debated about.76 It is clever because it combines the conventional 
aspect of name and at the same time it accounts for the natural resemblance of 
affections of the soul to the actual things in the world. The question that arises is how is 
it possible to verify that the affections of the soul actually resemble the actual things in 
the world? And, in fact, more importantly what is the individual role of cognition? 
According to this conception all humans think in the same way but express these 
thoughts differently. I think this is quite a faulty postulation because although a 
considerable part of human thinking is objective, i.e. shared by the group or at least 
standing to some extent independent of the individual, the majority of the cognitive 
processes involved in experiencing reality result from personal interaction between the 
individual and the world. This is what is meant by the term'idea'that Frege77 talks 
about as being different from sense in this particular personal vs. communal or 
subjective vs. objective dichotomy. 
3 Aristotle (1984: 25), cited in Keller (1998: 25). 
7 6 Interesting discussions regarding the notion of nature vs. convention occupied much of Greek 
philosophy. Different views were provided by the two famous Greek schools of linguistic philosophy, 
namely, the Stoics and the Alexandrians. The former advocated the analogist perspective of language as 
being essentially regular due to the system of symmetries provided by convention. The latter advocated a 
view of language as anomalous and maintained that language lacks regularity due to the inherent 
irregularities in nature. See for further details Lyons (1968: 4-12). 
7 7 I shall present a discussion of Frege's theory of meaning in the next few paragraphs. 
122 
Chapter Three Metonymy and Semiotics 
From the above quotation it is possible to distinguish three levels of representation that 
concern the concept of sign and signification. These are what Aristotle calls'spoken 
sound', affections of the soul, and actual things. These respectively correspond to the 
linguistic, epistemological and ontological dimensions of phenomena. Aristotle's 
presumption that sounds symbolise affections of the soul which are like actual things in 
the real world gives rise to a crucial question as how these sounds or sound-forms 
symbolise these affections. A possible answer is that sounds symbolise their contents 
which are the affections of the soul here by means of standing for them or representing 
them. But this is not enough an answer because the same question comes to mind again 
'on what basis do sounds represent or stand for affections?' It seems as i f we are in a 
vicious circle in which no matter how precise we are in forming our answers to such 
questions the outcome will always lead to another question. 
The fundamental principle underlying Aristotle's representational theory of signs can be 
summarised in the following diagram: 
Expression—• Affections •Things 
Figure 3.3. The 'stand for' relations between the three domains of knowledge. 
The arrows in this diagram mean 'stand for'. So expressions stand for affections 
(concepts or ideas) which in turn stand for things in the real world. In a sense language 
as perceived by Aristotle is a representation of a representation or in other words 
language is a representation of an imitation. Aristotle suggests that language is 
conventional but cognition is imitative and universal. This conception is strongly 
challenged by cultural and anthropological studies. Most notably, the criticism of this 
theory comes from work done on some American Indian languages like Hopi and Maya 
in the Americas, by linguists like Edward Sapir, Franz Boas and subsequently by 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Berlin and Kay and Rosch. The final formulation of the 
relativistic hypothesis was formulated as what is now known as the Sapir/Whorf 
hypothesis, the main argument of which is that humans are at the mercy of their native 
languages and they dissect nature along lines laid down by those languages. The main 
issue of this hypothesis is that language is not innocent; it does not merely represent 
reality, rather it creates and constructs reality. 
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The relationship between the representational theory of signs and the concept of 
metonymy follows from the fact that metonymy is largely representational. Metonymy 
is essentially a cognitive process in which certain things'stand for'other things. This 
brings the process of metonymy very close to the phenomenon of linguistic 
representation in which a particular expression is conventionally associated with a 
particular content. Similarly, metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon where one thing 
becomes associated with another thing until it conventionally stands for it on many 
occasions. So in the example 
3. Sana 'a denied the accusations 
because 'Sana'a' is the place where the Yemeni government is based. This kind of 
contiguous association allows that the former concept to stand for the latter, i.e. it 
allows Sana'a to stand for the Yemeni government. 
Let us examine now a theory of signs as representation expounded by the 
mathematician and logician Frege. Frege (19666), in his paper entitled'On Sense and 
Reference', provides a theory of sense and meaning in which he also conceptualises the 
three levels of phenomena discussed earlier. He states that 
a proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses 
its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign 
78 
we express its sense and designate its reference. 
Frege talks of linguistic expressions like names, predicates and sentences. He also talks 
about 'sense', which could be taken to correspond to the epistemological level of 
representation discussed above. However, Frege distinguishes between two 
epistemological levels of experience. These are what might be called the communal and 
the personal levels. His analogy of observation of the 'moon' is indicative of this 
distinction. For him i f someone observes the moon through a telescope, then the moon 
itself will be the reference. The term 'reference' here means the object of the 
observation, i.e. what can be called the ontological level of representation (albeit in a 
different sense from the way I am using 'ontological' in this thesis). That is to say 
'reference' is not always the object of observation. Frege means by 'reference' also the 
truth-value of a designated predicate, i.e. a sentence. The sentence, according to Frege, 
results from the designation of a particular proper name to a specific predicate. When 
this sentence is created its reference becomes its truth-value. 
Frege (1966b: 61). 
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Again on Frege's analogy, the moon is the reference, and according to him also, the 
image on the lens of the telescope is called the 'real' image. Frege calls this the 'sense'. 
Then Frege talks about the retinal image and to this he gives the term 'idea' or 
'experience'. Now what is the difference between 'sense' and 'idea'? Frege answers this 
question by arguing that while the former is the 'objective' meaning the latter is 
'subjective' meaning. He states that 
the optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent 
upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch 
as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be 
arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one will have 
79 
his own retinal image. 
So 'sense' is what everybody gets from the sign as its direct literal meaning, and 'idea' 
is the personal input into this general interpretation. 
80 
Keller attempts a schematic overview of these Fregean concepts which it is useful to 
present here because it clearly illustrates Frege's representational theory of signs. Linguistic Level Epistemological Leve Ontological Level 
Sign Sense Meaning F 
Predicate Mode of presentation Concept 
Name Mode of presentation Object 
Sentence Thought Truth-value 
Figure 3.4. Frege's representational theory. 
The diagram shows that Frege perceives of signification to be triadic in the sense that 
the sign, which he regards as the linguistic level of representation or more precisely the 
linguistic expression, is related to other two corresponding levels of representation. 
These are the 'sense' which could be the ideational and cognitive level and 'meaning' 
81 
by which Frege means 'reference'. This is the actual thing in the world. But the 
question that arises now is what is precisely the relation underlying this type of 
correspondence? The answer to this question demands us to refer to his statement 
referred to earlier in which he explicitly maintains that a proper name stands for its 
reference. Frege, as I mentioned earlier, is a mathematician and a logician. His general 
7 9 Ibid. (60). 
8 0 Keller (1998: 42). 
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It is to be noted here that the English translation of Frege's Bedeutung is 'reference' which captures the 
ontological features that Frege himself intends. 125 
Chapter Three Metonymy and Semiotics 
theoretical framework is the rules of logic and his main interest is to achieve a theory of 
meaning that is essentially an attempt to explain the two major concepts of his article's 
title, i.e. 'sense' and 'reference'. It would seem as i f Frege is taking language for 
granted and it is this treatment that makes his theory more of a theory of interpretation 
than one of signification. Sense and reference are the mental idea and the actual thing 
respectively. However, language is in fact underlying the objective interpretation of the 
sign which Frege calls 'sense'. 
The fact that Frege's theory of meaning is perhaps more formal than communicative 
does not mean that it is totally devoid of interest for a theory of meaning as signification 
and more importantly a theory of meaning as representation. Although Aristotle's and 
Frege's theories of meaning are essentially representational, they exhibit certain 
differences. Perhaps the most notable of these is their account of the epistemological 
level. Whereas Aristotle thinks it is one for all human beings because it is the affections 
of the soul which resemble the actual things in reality, Frege conceives of two levels of 
epistemology; one universal or at least collective and the other personal and individual. 
Yet both theories regard the relations underlying signification as representational in 
which the sign 'stands for' the referent. 
Now I shall move on to discuss the relevance of this theory to the theory of metonymy 
as I am presenting it here in this thesis. The distinction that Frege proposes between 
'sense' and 'idea' is very relevant to the theory of metonymy for two reasons. The first 
reason concerns the way in which the Fregean theory of meaning allows for both a 
personal and subjective meaning, and a general and objective meaning. Now the whole 
realm of rhetorical figures and figurative language can be comfortably located on the 
personal subjective side of the meaning creation process, whereas the literal meaning 
can be seen to reside on the general and objective side of the continuum. In fact to this 
end Frege himself points out that even this notion of 'idea'- the personal side of 
meaning is also potential of achieving a consensus. According to Frege this is the way 
art is created because people do not depend on sense alone when they interpret art. 
Rather they make a great deal of use of human ideas, the absence of which 'would make 
82 * 
art impossible' as Frege puts it. So Frege distinguishes sharply between the sense of 
the word, the reference of the word and the idea that the word arouses in the hearer. 
Frege (1966b: 61). 
126 
Chapter Three Metonymy and Semiotics 
This intermediate level of representation which Frege calls 'idea' is where he places the 
interpretation of arts and it is the same level where I place figurative language as 
opposed to the literal language that can be said to correspond to the Fregean notion of 
'sense'. 
To drive home a point, Frege conceives of three terms, namely, sign, sense and 
reference. The fact that he recognises the sign to stand for the sense which in turn stands 
for the reference shows that he is totally involved with literal objective signification 
here. Perceived as such Frege's theory of meaning might not be as relevant as it is 
hoped to be for the theory of metonymy as a process of signification. However, Frege 
does not stop at this level of explanation, rather he goes further to outline his theory of 
'idea', i.e. his view of certain aspects of personalised meanings or more precisely those 
ideational aspects that are aroused by the words in the hearers of these words. In a sense 
this is the level of multiple interpretation of the sign. This does not mean that a 
particular sign has more than one interpretation. Rather it means that the sign undergoes 
a cyclical process of signification and interpretation. The sign signifies its referent and 
this referent itself becomes a sign on its own, arousing certain ideational meanings that 
might be peculiar to the hearer of the utterance. It is at this level of ideational 
representation that a potential for a figurative theory becomes available, because it is the 
level at which the initiator of the signification encodes his own ideas, myths and beliefs 
and tries to lead the receiver to accept these myths and beliefs. It is also the same level 
whereby the receiver adds his own ideas, myths and beliefs to the sense of the word or 
the utterance.83 
A simple example to illustrate the point might be the artificial sign of a fire alarm. This 
sign itself has been a target for mechanical signification that took place at a previous 
stage. This is the detection of fire or smoke which gave the signal to the fire alarm to 
make the ringing. This fire alarm, perceived as a signifier, yields various further types 
of signification and this I believe is the part where there might be a correspondence with 
the notion of 'idea' according to Frege and where figurative language use, as I argue, 
resides. People's responses to this sign differ widely. Some people might run away. 
Others will call the fire brigade. Others according to the sort of ideas this sign arouses in 
them might prefer to remain seated, especially those who are familiar with false alarms. 
127 
Chapter Three Metonymy and Semiotics 
This latter group might leave the place just like others but they wil l not have got the 
same meaning from the sign. That is the sign will not be a sign of a real fire for them.8 4 
I have tried to show that the Fregean notion of 'idea' is a useful tool for mapping 
figurative uses of language as being subjective and to a large extent aesthetic. This is 
true because literary language involves a great deal of personal preference for certain 
styles, personal use of imagery, and so on. However, not only is Frege's 
representational theory of meaning useful to metonymy in this general sense, but also it 
is quite promising for the theory of metonymy in a more specific way. That is to say, 
because Frege's theory of meaning accounts for all aspects of meaning starting with the 
linguistic, the epistemological and the ontological, it is helpful in treating metonymy as 
a process of signification encompassing all these levels. Metonymy is a signifying 
process whereby one linguistic item is substituted for another with which it is 
associated. Now the criterion on which the substitution is based might not be shared by 
all recipients of the message and might not be a normal way of perceiving signifying 
relations. In other words these relations might be examples of ' ideas' in the Fregean 
terminology simply because after all they are personal preferences for establishing a 
relation between the literal and the figurative meaning. Yet, this does not mean that they 
are left to random whims for their creation and interpretation. The reason is that the 
relations that underlie such a substitution are quite objective ones and these make the 
sign creation and interpretation remarkably objective. 
Soskice provides useful insights into the nature of representation in the metonymic 
operation. These, in fact, complement those of Frege's and Aristotle's representational 
view on signification. Soskice argues that metaphor and metonymy seem to be similar 
on the surface but in fact they are different as far as their underlying representational 
relations are concerned. Metonymy tends to be referential and this referentiality carries 
with it some factuality. She maintains that 
Metonymy and synecdoche seem superficially similar to metaphor, 
but they are functionally (that is, semantically) different. In 
Compare Hervey (1982: 136) for similar ideas expressed by Barthes' notion of connotation which itself 
draws on ideas from Hjelmslev. 
8 4 This can be related to the three types of speech acts which speech act theory postulates. The first is the 
locutionary level, which refers to the speech activity, which is here the signification activity. The second 
is the illocutionary act, which refers to the type of act the utterance is enforcing and which can be linked 
with the notion of warning of potential fire in our example here. The third level is the perlocutionary act 
which is the response of the receivers to the warning. See for further detail on this Lyons (1977b: 
chap. 16), Levinson (1983: chap.5). 
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metonymy and synecdoche, one word or phrase stands in for a more 
straightforward reference and this standing in is of a different nature 
from that which characterizes metaphor. The plugging in of an 
adjunct for the whole, or a more comprehensive term for a less, is 
essentially an oblique and less prosaic way of making a direct 
reference. Instances of metonymy and synecdoche point one directly 
to the absent item, it would be a failure in comprehension if, on 
hearing the phrase 'the White House said today' one wondered if 
85 
shutters and doors opened like mouths. 
Soskice concludes that 'with metonymy and synecdoche, meaning is largely subsumed 
86 
by the reference it makes'. The relation of reference believed to underlie the process 
of metonymy is quite important to the theory of metonymy as I am trying to develop it 
in this thesis particularly with reference to my interest in developing a textual model of 
metonymic relations in text. 
3.4. Metonymic aspects of the linguistic sign 
This section is directly concerned with the explication of the metonymic basis of the 
linguistic sign. The main aim is to argue that metonymy underlies a great deal of 
language use. The fact that we do not often recognise this does not mean that the 
argument is not valid. This is simply because metonymy is such an integral part of our 
cognition that most metonymies actually go unnoticed. Here, I am concerned with the 
semiotic dimension of metonymy and more particularly of metonymy as a feature of 
linguistic signs. 
3.4.1. Metonymy as signification 
I f signification, as I pointed out earlier in this chapter, is a process of naming two 
entities and then abstracting a relation of 'standing for' between them, then metonymy 
is this and something more. This is to say that metonymy involves the process in which 
one thing comes to give a meaning other than itself by means of various relations, hence 
it involves a process of signification or rather it is a process of signification. Metonymy 
also adds to this a process of thinking on which the relation underlying the signification 
is founded. This could be a relation of causality or contiguity in its various facets. This 
in turn means that the processes of metonymy are not arbitrary because they involve a 
considerable amount of thinking and rationality. 
8 5 Soskice (1985: 57). 
8 6 Ibid. (58). 
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In fact, i f we trace the development of the theory of metonymy over time 8 7 we find that 
signification is a common notion used in relation to the discussion of metonymy 
regardless of whether the rhetorical tradition is the western or the Arabic tradition. 
Among the western classical rhetorical treatises that treat metonymy as signification or 
at least make explicit use of this notion are those of Sacerdos, Charisus, Isidore of 
Seville and Diomedes.88 In the Arabic rhetorical tradition we find allusions to the notion 
89 
of signification by Al-Jurjani who in his definition of the trope uses the word 'ytimi'u' 
which translates as 'indicates' or even as 'signifies' as an allusion to the process of 
signification by indication. This in fact makes Al-Jurjani's definition even more relevant 
to the theory of metonymy as developed in this thesis than other classical proposals. 
This is simply because the theory of metonymy introduced in this thesis is a theory of 
indexical signification. This is the point that I turn to next. 
3.4.2. Metonymy as an index 
In the discussion of the various modes of signification I mentioned that Peirce perceived 
of signification as having three modes. I am concerned here with the third mode of 
signification suggested by Peirce. This is the mode he calls 'index' and he means by this 
the mode of signification in which the signifier and the signified are related to each 
other in some indexical relation. Peirce maintains in this connection that 
the demonstrative pronouns, 'this' and 'that' are indices. For they call 
upon the hearer to use his powers of observation, and so establish a 
real connection between his mind and the object; and if the 
demonstrative pronoun does that - without which its meaning is not 
understood - it goes to establish such a connection, and so is an 
index.90 
But Peirce's index is not only deictic. It pertains also to any kind of contiguous 
connection between an interpretant and an object with or without the mediation of the 
representamen. Nunberg defines the notion 'indexicals' as 
expressions whose interpretation requires the identification of some 
element of the utterance context, as stipulated by their lexical 
91 
meanings. 
See sections 1.3. and 1.4. in chapter one for historical background. 
QO 
This argument is founded on the translation of the definitions of metonymy by these authors. The 
trasnlations are those of Rosiene's in his thesis. 
89 
See the definition and the discussion of this definition in chapter 1, section 1.4.1. 
9 0 Peirce, C. (1955: 110). 
9 1 Nunberg (1993: 2). Nunberg argues that the meaning of indexicals like we, for example, has three 
components. The first is the deictic component which is 'a function from occurrences or utterances of an 
expression to elements of the context of utterance'. The second component is what Nunberg calls the 130 
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When a sign like smoke signifies fire this process of signification works on the 
cognitive relation of causality in which smoke is perceived to be caused by fire and as 
such smoke is an index to fire. Now this cognitive linking is not purely conventional 
because there is an intrinsic relationship between the sign and the signifier. However, it 
is difficult to argue that there is no element of conventionality involved in that people 
start associating smoke with fire in a conventional sense. In other words i f we imagine 
that there is a community which never saw fire or smoke, it would be difficult for them 
to conceptualise the causal relation. This brings us back to the overlap between 
denotation and connotation as two inseparable aspects of signs. 
Now I want to extend this notion further to include causality within the symbolicity of 
the linguistic sign. In other words, language items although generally believed to be 
symbolic still exhibit certain aspects of motivatedness or causality such that one 
meaning is seen to be the result of another. In language there are certain meanings that 
are seen to cause the existence of other meanings. In more technical terms there tends to 
be a relation of causality between specific meanings. The best example of this causality 
is the notion of saliency which is the major cause of metonymic expressions. So the fact 
that the customer ordering a ham sandwich is called 'the ham sandwich' is because this 
property is the salient feature of this customer in this particular context. So it is quite 
plausible to ask why is the customer called 'the ham sandwich?' That is asking for the 
motivation behind the naming process. Similarly when we say: 
4. the player headed the ball and scored the goal 
we can ask the question why the word 'headed' is used as a verb and we soon get the 
answer that the word 'headed' actually stands in a representational metonymic relation 
of part for whole with the whole action of 'the player hitting the ball with his head'. 
Again it is the saliency of the most important element in the action that comes to stand 
for the whole action. In this thesis I want to exploit this to argue that metonymy is one 
of the fundamental operations that accounts for the phenomenon of motivatedness in 
language. Metonymy is fundamentally indexical. This indexicality is broader than the 
classificatory component which is associated with the interpretation of an expression rather than with its 
index. This tells us about features of plurality and animacy of the expression. The third component is that 
which Nunberg calls the relational component which 'constrains the correspondence that has to hold 
between the index and the interpretation, ibid (8-9). Nunberg further argues that the main difference 
between a description and an indexical is that the former characterises its interpretation whereas the latter 
provides an object that corresponds to it. The object is an index according to Nunberg who maintains that 
this index 'stands in a "relation of contiguity" to its object, as a rolling gait to a sailor, a rap on the door to 
a caller, a symptom to a disease. This is the characteristic and most remarkable feature of these 
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concept of causality because it goes beyond it to cover relations of contiguity, part-
whole relations and figure-ground relations and of course deictic expressions which 
include both contextual and textual deixis. As such metonymy is seen as a theory of 
pointing in speech action and referencing in text and this gives the trope an empirically 
significant role in the creation and organisation of text. Metonymy as a signifying index 
will broaden the scope of the figure to include various facets of cognitive understanding. 
This indexical interpretation of metonymy is significant for the study of text. I believe 
that this conceptualisation will constitute a breakthrough in the study of texts in terms of 
accounting for these aspects in text and how they provide explicit cohesion and 
underlying coherence. This is the central aim of this thesis. 
3.4.3. Indexicality vs. Symbolicity in linguistic signification 
The linguistic sign is generally symbolic in terms of the nature of its signification. This 
means that in the majority of cases there is no link whatsoever between the signifier and 
the signified. This feature has been regarded as one of the main features of human 
language and is generally known as 'arbitrariness'. In fact, this feature makes the 
diversity of the languages of the world a comprehensible phenomenon. I f there are 
numerous languages in the world today it is because each and every language names 
things in reality according to the conventions of that speech community. The point that 
needs to be stressed here is that linguistic signs are not only symbolic as Peirce argues 
but they are also indexical. This is the challenge to Saussure's arbitrariness and it is also 
the point I have been raising to support a view of metonymy as motivated signification. 
The sign enters into various relations with its signified. The sign 'blade' in the example 
5. The blades will solve the issue 
enters into a part-whole relation with its signified. This is to say that the blade is a part 
of the sword, which is intended in the sentence. The meaning intended is 'the sword will 
solve the issue'. Yet the sign 'sword' which is the signified of 'blade' is itself a signifier 
for another signified. The sign 'sword' signifies 'war' and this signification is fulfilled 
through the relation of instrumentality in which the sword is the main instrument of war. 
It might be thought that one needs to specify and say 'pre-modern' war but this thought 
is to be rejected on the ground that although the sword is not used any more in wars of 
modern times, the word is still used on many occasions when there is reference to war. 
expressions. They enable us to turn the context itself into an auxiliary means of expression, so that 
contextual features are made to serve as pointers to the content of the utterance', ibid. (19-20). 
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In recent years there has been a tendency to use the word 'gun' in exactly the same way; 
this also involves metonymic signification. 
3.4.4. Indexicality vs. Iconicity in linguistic signification 
I have discussed the indexical aspect of signs in various parts of this chapter. However, 
something needs to be stated here regarding the relation between indexical signification 
and the concept of metonymy. This is the cognitive nature of this relation. In other 
words, the interpretation of the sign takes place in an entirely cognitive domain. The 
words function only as a formal realisation of this signification. The words'gun'and 
'pen' on their own do not convey any inherent indexical relationship with their 
metonymic expression, 'war' and 'knowledge' respectively. The words 'gun' and 'pen' 
stand for 'war' and 'knowledge' because we have associated these words with their 
signifieds so to speak and established this causality between these concepts. However, 
this relation is not naturally in-built in the concepts. An illustration for this argument is 
an imagined speech community which is basically an oral society. These people would 
not associate the 'pen' with knowledge. Perhaps they would associate the 'ear' instead. 
As regards the 'gun' example it is easy to assume a primitive tribe in the jungle who are 
still using arrows in their wars. In this case the word 'arrow' would be used instead of 
'sword' or 'gun'. What I want to say here is that the relationship of indexicality 
established is not natural between the words themselves as signs as is the case with the 
natural association between smoke and fire for example. It is rather between cognitive 
domains which are essentially established by convention. 
Similarly, the relation of iconicity is not a natural resemblance between the signifier and 
the signified only inasmuch as we think of onomatopoeia. But here of course I am not 
concerned with similarity between the signs in this sense. I am again concerned with the 
similarity established within the symbolicity of the linguistic sign and not the notion of 
sign in general. In metaphorical expressions like 
6. Juliet is the sun 
there is no relationship whatsoever of actual similarity between Juliet and the sun. The 
idea is that one aspect of the sun is likened to a corresponding aspect of Juliet and thus 
the metaphor is established. So the argument that I am putting forward here is that like 
contiguity relations, similarity relation are not natural relations but conventional and 
cognitive ones. The likening of Juliet to the sun is an iconic signification but of course it 
is not iconic in the sense of the iconicity of a portrait to the figure. This is natural 
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iconicity while the type of iconicity I am discussing here is conventional iconicity. To 
sum up this section we may say that in signification there are natural contiguous 
relations and there are natural similarity relations. These can be understood even 
without the intervention of language. In language, however, contiguity and similarity 
relations are typically between cognitive domains represented by language. 
In general semiotic terms the relations of indexicality and those of iconicity are both 
associated with the structure of reality in both its denotative and connotative aspects. 
The sign of a woman washing the dishes in a kitchen in a fi lm is indexical of the whole 
role of that woman. This in turn is a stereotypical interpretation of the role of women 
and is likely to vary from one culture to another. Underlying this scene are a number of 
indexical relations. The scene might stand in a part-whole relationship to its content, so 
the scene of washing the dishes is one part of the whole role of a woman. This 
signification might just be in terms of a standing-for relation in that the scene 
semiotically stands for or symbolises the role of the woman. 
3.5. A relational model of metonymic signification 
I am concerned here with outlining a relational model of metonymy which will be a 
practical tool to develop a textual theory of metonymy. The aim here is to choose a 
prime relation that could be said to characterise the process of metonymic signification. 
One might choose the term 'contiguity' suggested by Jakobson taking into consideration 
that it is in fact a general term covering all those spatial, temporal and part-whole 
relations. This seems a good term and it looks comprehensive, but unfortunately it is not 
comprehensive enough. Although it takes us far it does not take us far enough to group 
all the relations that underlie metonymy under one general term. That is to say, the 
notion of 'contiguity' alone misses out the relation of causality which is a fundamental 
metonymic relation. 
I believe that the crucial relation that underlies the process of metonymy is that of 
'representation'. So metonymy is then a process of signification in which the signifier 
represents a signified which is associated with it in some way. This macro-relation of 
metonymy is significant especially i f we take into account the aim that this thesis is 
trying to achieve. A representational theory of metonymy will help us to extend the 
notion of metonymy from its lexical confinement to account for textual analysis. A 
representational theory of metonymy wil l help us look at the function of metonymy as 
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that of representing one mode of knowledge by another. The representational process of 
metonymy is in fact cyclical uniting all the three knowledge domains.92 
So i f we have a text we can see this text as representing the cognitive processes 
underlying it. I f by means of cognitive reasoning we interpret something from the text 
without it being explicitly stated in the formal text, this means that the formal text 
stands in metonymic representational relation of PART FOR WHOLE to the cognitive text; 
obviously the cognitive text is the whole and the formal text is just a part of it. The same 
can be said with regard to the ontological domain. Any formal text will be just one way 
of encoding social experience. So the social potential stands in a metonymic 
representational relation to the formal actual. This relation of representation is realised 
in various ways. The following diagram illustrates the two fundamental metonymic 
principles that I take to be constitutive of the textual model of metonymy. The 
illustration should read as: metonymy is a process of signification whose prime nature is 
that of representation. Various relations underlying metonymy are perceived to emanate 
from this general relation. 
Metonymy 
T 
representation 
I 
contiguity causality 
part for whole whole for part cause 'for effect effect for cause 
Fig. 3.5. A relational model of metonymic signification. 
The representational nature of the trope is realised via two main principles. These are 
the contiguity principle and the causality principle. The contiguity principle realises, 
among other relations, the part for whole and whole for part relations. These are taken 
to be the most relevant contiguity relations to the development of the textual model of 
metonymy. The causality principle realises the cause for effect and effect for cause 
These are the knowledge of words, the knowledge of concepts and the knowledge of things that I have 
outlined in various places in this chapter. This inter-domain conception of metonymy has been integrated 
with a parallel three-dimensional conception of sign and also with a parallel three-dimensional conception 
of sign modes. 
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relations. These four relations are the substantial material for the more abstract relations 
which account for the interrelations between form, cognition and context.93 
The relational model of metonymy is in line with the general understanding of the 
patterns of knowledge structure. I argue throughout this thesis and particularly in 
chapter 5 below that knowledge is of two types. One is descriptive and the other is 
procedural. The first pertains to the knowledge of the 'what' and the second is 
concerned with the knowledge of the 'how'. For the first type of knowledge, it is 
argued, we need contiguity metonymic relations to describe and express relations 
between items that already exist in contiguous structure. In the second type of 
knowledge, it is argued, we need causality relations to realise the connections between 
pieces of text and in this we are invited to account for intentions and plans and goals of 
the communicative act as a whole. 
3.6. A textual model of metonymy 
So far in this chapter I have established the strong relation between the concept of 
metonymy and the concept of sign on the premise that both of them cut across domains 
of reality, language and mind and provide coherence to our experience and 
communication. I have also shown that metonymy seen as a semiotic signification is a 
powerful tool capable of providing unity and coherence to our textual practices because 
these latter are seen as a manifestation of the interaction between the three worlds of 
epistemology, ontology and language. In this section I intend to propose a textual model 
of metonymy based on a semiotic interpretation of the processes of the trope. This will 
be the ultimate result of this chapter and will provide the basis for further discussion to 
be carried out in the next two chapters which will apply this textual model to texts to 
identify their formal connectedness (cohesion) and their cognitive connectedness 
(coherence). The model I propose is fundamentally based on the conception of 
metonymy as representation, taking the metonymic relation 'stand for' to be the main 
and most relevant relation to the model in hand. The model is divided into two main 
parts. The first is the world of forms and the second is the world of concepts. I treat the 
first level as the level of formal signification in text which involves four metonymic 
relations. These are: 
1. CONCEPT FOR FORM 
2. FORM FOR FORM 
These more abstract relations will be outlined below when 1 propose the textual model of metonymy. 
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3. FORM FOR CONCEPT 
4. FORM FOR THING 
5. THING FOR FORM 
Metonymy and Semiotics 
I term this level of metonymic signification the level of cohesion. At this level the three 
realms of language, mind and reality interact but the interaction is led by language and 
thus form has primacy. The second is the level of cognition. This combines both the 
realm of concepts as well as the realm of objects because in textual interaction objects 
in reality do have independent existence outside cognition although they are seen as 
salient features of context in its immediate sense, i.e. situation and its wider sense, i.e. 
culture. This level is represented by the following relations: 
1. CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT 
2. CONCEPT FOR THING 
3. THING FOR THING 
4. THING FOR CONCEPT 
Two points need to be raised here about the model. The first is that the model is 
interactionist in nature and as such the semiotic level builds on the formal level. The 
second concerns the fact that the model also incorporates ideas from rhetoric. So the 
formal level in the model below corresponds to the parts of classical rhetoric known as 
'arrangement' and 'elocution' which can be both termed 'the level of text organisation'. 
This I have termed specifically 'the level of text cohesion'. The semiotic level 
corresponds to 'invention' and gives an idea about where the ideas and the forms in the 
text come from. This can be termed 'the level of text generation'. I have termed this 
level 'the level of text coherence'. 
L E V E L OF INVENTION 
L E V E L OF GENERATION 
L E V E L OF COHERENCE 
L E V E L OF ARRANGEMENT < 
AND ELOCUTION 
L E V E L OF ORGANISATION 
L E V E L OF COHESION 
Fig. 3.6. Model of textual metonymy. 
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3.7. Summary 
This chapter has centred on explaining the concept of metonymy as signification. It 
began by giving a general perspective on semiotics. Then it went into discussion of the 
notion of sign and signification. In this section various definitions of the concept of sign 
were reviewed especially those proposed by the founders of modern semiotics, i.e. 
Saussure and Peirce. The chapter went on to discuss the types and modes of 
signification to fit the concept of metonymy in one of these modes, namely the indexical 
mode of signification. Then the discussion proceeded to one of the very important 
sections of this chapter. This is the section concerned with the representational theory of 
semiotics and metonymy. The discussion then moved on to discuss the metonymic 
aspects of signification and in this section the notion of metonymy as an index was 
elaborated. The chapter then proposed a relational model of metonymy which 
highlighted the representational relation of metonymy and regarded it as the prime 
relation. The chapter concluded by outlining a textual model of metonymy based on the 
metonymic relation of representation. This model is to be put to application in the next 
two chapters. 
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Chapter Four: Metonymy and Text Cohesion 
The development of a discourse may take 
place along two different semantic lines: 
one topic may lead to another either 
through their similarity or through their 
contiguity. The metaphoric way would 
be the most appropriate term for the first 
case and the metonymic way for the 
second, since they find their most 
condensed expression in metaphor and 
metonymy respectively.1 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship between metonymy and cohesion. The aim is 
to apply the textual model of the metonymic relation of representation which has been 
developed in the previous chapter into a model of formal and semantic relations 
underlying textual signification. The chapter specifically applies the following 
metonymic relations: 
A: 1 .Form for Form "1 to deal with all forms of phonological cohesion in text. 
2. Form for Concept J 
B: 1. Form for Form 
2. Form for Concept^- to account for 'reference' in text. 
3. Form for Things 
C: 1. Form for Form "] to realise 'substitution' in text. 
2. Form for Concept J 
D: Concept for Form to realise 'ellipsis' in text. 
E: 1. Form for Concept 
2. Form for Thing Ito deal with patterns of lexical cohesion in text. 
3. Form for Form 
The following hypotheses underlie the chapter: 
• I f metonymy is essentially referential then it should help us understand more 
about referencing in text. 
1 Jakobson(1971:90). 
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• I f metonymy is the manifestation of the syntagmatic and combinational 
dimensions of signification then a theory of metonymy is in fact a theory that should 
help us to understand how combinations in language2 are actually licensed. 
• I f metonymy is based on relations of causality and contiguity, then metonymy is 
in fact capable of providing a complete theory of text cohesion. 
Metonymic processes and relations have as their primary function the cohesive link 
between ideas, between concepts and between discourses. The above hypotheses have 
been developed and nurtured since the early part of this thesis albeit in an implicit form. 
They awaited a relatively comprehensive account of the nature of metonymy to allow 
them all to be assimilated into the development of the textual theory of metonymy. In 
chapter one sections 1.1. and 1.2.1 have briefly outlined how textlinguistics originated 
from classical rhetoric and benefited from various modern disciplines such as stylistics, 
anthropology, sociology and cognitive psychology. In this chapter I am mainly 
concerned with considering a theoretical framework for metonymy as a textual cohesive 
device in relation to the theory of cohesion as outlined by Halliday and Hasan (1976). I 
shall however start this section by considering phonological cohesion which, among 
other grammar and syntax studies, I think is largely neglected in current textlinguistic 
studies.3 
4.1. Metonymy and cohesion 
In this section I intend to outline the relationship between metonymy as a textual 
cohesive device and the theory of cohesion as outlined by Halliday and Hasan ( l 976). 
Although my discussion of metonymy as a textual cohesive device is based on this 
framework, I am actually developing a new insight and approaching the topic from a 
new perspective. For example, I do not discuss cohesion as a set of surface text ties only 
but from the point of view of its creation by metonymic relations in text. I have a strong 
intuition that all the cohesive devices that Halliday and Hasan propose can actually be 
seen as metonymic relations contributing to the texture of discourse and making it stand 
as a unified whole. A fundamental feature of my treatment of this semantic aspect of 
By combination in language is meant combination within and beyond the level of the sentence. The 
combinations or connectivities beyond the sentence are referred to by Halliday as non-structural while 
combinations within the sentence are regarded as structural. 
See Kress and Hodge (1993) for a similar view in which they argue that 'currently, most forms of 
discourse analysis do not provide discussions of grammar and syntax', ibid. (202). 
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text is that it is semiotic. This springs up from the general semiotic approach under 
which the whole thesis is carried out. The semiotic approach to the interpretation of 
cohesion is evident in the treatment of the concept in Halliday and Hasan's framework 
albeit in a restricted sense. This framework treats the concept of cohesion as a semantic 
concept in which one element signifies the meaning of another within the text and 
overlooks extralinguistic signification as exemplified by exophoric reference. 
Occurrences do not have a meaning by themselves but by being linked to other 
occurrences in the form of a tie. 
Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion is entirely a theory of meaning in its actuality. 
It is a formal theory of meaning in text, in that it is the study of meaning as created by a 
set of formal features in the text. 'Text' for Halliday and Hasan is 'the word which is 
used in linguistics to refer to any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that 
does form a unified whole'.4 For Halliday and Hasan, however, a text is a semantic unit 
not a unit of form. They conclude from this conceptualisation that' [text] is related to a 
clause or sentence not by size but by REALIZATION , the coding of one symbolic system in 
another. A text does not consist of sentences; it is REALIZED B Y , or encoded in sentences'.5 
It is easy to trace the orientation of a formal approach to text from the definition above 
which highlights internal connectedness of pieces of language to form a formally knit 
whole. Text is better seen as a multidimensional unit that cuts across domains and not as 
a unit of language only. In chapter 3 section 3.2.1. above I related the notion of sign in 
its three-dimensional nature to the concept of metonymy which I established on a 
similar basis. I thus established a semiotic approach to account for the three fundamental 
aspects of signification this thesis is concerned with. The first is the three-dimensional 
model of metonymy. The second is the three-dimensional model of sign. The third is the 
three-dimensional model of text. Here I argue that text should also be seen from a three-
dimensional angle. The following is an illustration of the triadic representation of text: 
4 Halliday and Hasan (1976: 1). 
5 Ibid. (2). 
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Epistemology (cognition) 
Ontology (context) Language (form 
Figure 4.1. A Semiotic Model of Text. 
Text is not just a collection of sentences. Rather it is something more than the sum of 
these sentences. It is the contextual and cognitive dimensions that interact with the 
linguistic forms presented in the piece of language to make it 'text'. Text is not even the 
characteristic outcome of'texture' which is the actual presence of linguistic 'ties' in text 
as Halliday and Hasan argue. Text is essentially the process of 'meaning creation' using 
explicit and implicit resources in and outside the text. There is a continuous process of 
interaction, negotiation, expectation and prediction that a formal definition of text6 
misses. In text production and text interpretation sentences are not value-free because 
our understanding of these sentences necessarily requires a context. So it is better to 
view 'text' as a collection of utterances rather than a collection of sentences.7 Each 
utterance calls for a context for its interpretation and each utterance provides a context 
for the interpretation of following utterances. 
Halliday and Hasan then move on to discuss an important aspect related to textness. 
This is the concept of 'texture' which they view as a distinctive property of text. 
Although Halliday and Hasan's notion of text is fundamentally semantic, their notion of 
6 Like that of Halliday and Hasan. 
7 Here I attend to the tradition which distinguishes sentence meaning from utterance meaning on the 
ground that the former is the meaning that is conveyed by a sentence regardless of context and the latter is 
primarily the meaning the speaker intended to convey regardless of the form. See for this view Blakemore 
(1992: 5-6). From a semiotic perspective 'sentence meaning'would correspond to'meaning potential' 
while 'utterance meaning' would correspond to 'meaning actual' whereby the signification is reduced to a 
particular context or intended signification. 
Q 
See also Brown and Yule who propose a communicative definition of text when they state 'text,..., is the 
verbal record of a communicative event', ibid. (1983: 190). 
142 
Chapter Four Metonymy and Text Cohesion 
texture, however, is formal 9 because it is the 'linguistic features present in that passage 
which can be identified as contributing to its total unity and giving it texture'.1 0 Thus, 
they seem to disregard cognitive and contextual features that also provide texture to text. 
I argue that as soon as we incorporate metonymic processes as textual cohesive devices 
we will be able to view cognitive principles and contextual factors as contributing 
effectively to the texture of text. 
One of the principal devices of cohesion is that of reference. As we have seen earlier in 
chapter 2, sections 2.1.2.4. and 2.1.2.5. Stallard (1993) and Nunberg (1995) have 
proposed a theory of metonymy as a referential phenomenon. They suggest that 
metonymy accounts for the phenomena of indirect reference or deferred reference. 
Examples of this indirect reference include: 
1. A: The Cabinet decided in favour of an increase in petrol prices yesterday. 
B: They anticipated a lot ofprotest from the people though. 
In (1) above we notice an indirect anaphoric reference in the use of the pronoun 'they' to 
refer to a singular inanimate antecedent. This is a violation to a fundamental property of 
the pronoun 'they'. This pronoun normally refers to a plural antecedent. The solution to 
this 'textual tension' is provided by a metonymic interpretation of the whole exchange 
in which 'the Cabinet' is actually a surface NP standing for an underlying deep NP 'the 
ministers in the Cabinet' with which the pronoun 'they' naturally agrees. 
I would, in fact, go even further than this quite limited treatment of metonymy as only a 
phenomenon of indirect referentiality in text to argue that in fact, all types of reference 
are metonymic, in the sense that there is a process of substitution in referencing and 
there is a process of signification in substitution. This view is even more plausible i f we 
C.f. Halliday and Hasan's statement that'it is the underlying semantic relation ... that actually has the 
cohesive power', ibid. (229). However, as Brown and Yule argue 'they insist that it is the presence of the 
cohesive marker which constitutes 'textness', (1983: 192). Brown and Yule further argue that 'any 
adequate model of discourse description must be able to accommodate the various connections which do 
exist in texts ... The 'cohesion' model does not. It is however, only fair to point out that Halliday & Hasan 
are not concerned to produce a description which accounts for how texts are understood. They are, rather, 
concerned to examine the linguistic resources available to the speaker/writer to mark cohesive 
relationships', ibid. (204). Moreover, Brown and Yule hold that Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion 
does not make a distinction between 'the meaning relations which hold between items in a text and the 
explicit expression of those 'meaning relations'. This distinction as Brown and Yule state is 'an important 
distinction to be drawn, which many students adopting Halliday & Hasan's approach have failed to draw 
and which Halliday & Hasan themselves are somewhat ambivalent about' ibid (195). 
1 0 Ibid, italics mine. 
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take into consideration that 'cognitive reference' is primary while 'textual reference' is 
secondary because for a thing to be present in text is a special case of it being present in 
cognition at large. So in a sense whatever we find in a text stands in a part/whole 
relationship to what is in cognition. This is a proper metonymic relation. When we use a 
'pronoun' we use it to stand for a particular 'noun' or vice versa. Both of these terms, 
i.e. noun and pronoun are actually forms of language. So there is a stand for relation at 
stake. This is a fundamental process of metonymic interpretation in which one form 
stands for another form. Moreover, as we have seen in chapter 2, section 2.1.2.3. when I 
outlined Radden and Kovecses' theory of metonymy, which in particular provides a 
wider application of metonymy and claims that a relation of FORM FOR FORM is an 
important metonymic relation, we could easily argue that all types of 'reference' in text 
are actually metonymic of this type. Al l other types of cohesive devices can be dealt 
with in the same way as we have done with reference. This is not the place to elaborate 
on this. It will be discussed further in various sections of this chapter. 
Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion claims to be a theory of connectedness in text 
which they define as a semantic unit. I argue here that a semantic theory of text 
connectedness should not limit itself to the numeration of cohesive elements and 
cohesive ties because this quantificational approach has proved to be rather shallow. I f 
text is a semantic unit and not a unit of form it follows then that a textual theory must be 
based on a semantic interpretation of the nature of the relation that unites both elements 
in the cohesive tie. To ensure semantic interpretation of text we need to account not for 
the relation that connects 'John' to 'he' in the following example: 
2. John is a student. He studies at Durham 
but also we need to account for the identity of reference and the seeming discrepancy 
between the elements of a cohesive tie. Consider the following example: 
3. The lobster did not leave any tip because he was not happy with the service. 
A semantic theory of text connectedness should not limit its explanation to the statement 
that the NP 'the lobster' is connected to the pronoun 'he'. This is not enough. A 
semantic theory of text connectedness should address the nature of the relation between 
the two elements of reference. This aspect is not accounted for in Halliday and Hasan's 
model of cohesion but a metonymic model of text cohesion does. 
Substitution as a cohesive device is fundamentally metonymic, as metonymy itself is 
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basically a process of substitution. Now we can think of'substituting' one element for 
another in text as a relational operation which provides a text with formal 
connectedness.11 By the same token we can conceptualise metonymic substitution as 
playing a central role in providing logical and cognitive texture and connectivity 
because there are no surface elements mentioned on the surface text for this to be called 
formal connectedness. This is to say that metonymy provides text with a kind of 
schematic coherence in that both the virtual meaning and the actual meaning are brought 
up and activated in the mind of the reader to give the reading of the text a more 
encyclopedic interpretation. This is not at all to say that metonymy as a process of 
substitution does not provide formal cohesion. On the contrary, substituting one element 
for another is a fundamental part of the FORM FOR FORM metonymic relation. It is only to 
say that metonymic substitution in text provides both formal connectivity in text, i.e. 
cohesion and cognitive connectivity and relevance in text, i.e. coherence. 
I f we recall Ullmann's theory of metonymy as semantic change and his designation of a 
change based on 'contiguity of names' as 'deletion' we would appreciate highly the kind 
of logical link to be established now between metonymy and 'ellipsis'. Metonymy as a 
representational relation of CONCEPT FOR FORM where an empty slot stands for a previously 
mentioned form is essentially based on spatio-temporal contiguity. This feature figures 
out in linguistic structuring of utterances and in text organisation in general. So when 
we say 
4. The keel ploughed the deep 
we actually conceive of two types of contiguity. One is cognitive and is based on the 
PART FOR WHOLE relation. The other is a spatio-temporal contiguity created by the spatio-
temporal sequencing of the principle of combination of the syntagmatic axis of the 
linguistic structure. We could also say 
5. The keel of the ship ploughed the deep sea. 
Perhaps this was the original expression and as it became conventionalised people 
started to use the form 'the keel' to stand for the whole expression 'the keel of the ship' 
and 'the deep' to stand for the whole expression 'the deep sea'. The point I want to 
make here is that in metonymy as a process of ellipsis there is not only logical or 
There is actually an approach to the analysis of text which is known as'substitutional text linguistics' 
which perceives of the relations underlying textness as substitutions. See for example Harweg (1977). 
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cognitive ellipsis but also is there formal ellipsis as we can see from this example. 
Similarly, the example 
6. / want to go to the Gents 
is a good illustration of a metonymically based ellipsis in which the original expression 
is 'the Gents' toilets' but as this expression became very routinised, the word 'toilet' 
dropped out of the expression and the form 'Gents' came to represent the whole original 
12 
phrase. As we shall see 'ellipsis' plays a major role in text cohesion and text 
coherence since people tend to assume that their partners in the discourse are actually 
active inferencers so they leave out many details assuming that these details will be 
supplied by the general knowledge of the universe of discourse. This phenomenon of 
ellipsis can be accounted for from a metonymic perspective as well. Perceived as such 
metonymy ensures economy and compactness in text and thus shortens distances of 
interpretation. 
Conjunction is regarded by Halliday and Hasan to be 
somewhat different from other cohesive relations. It is based on the 
assumption that there are in the linguistic system forms of systematic 
relationships between sentences. There are a number of possible ways in 
which the system allows for the parts of a text to be connected to one 
another in meaning 1 3 
In this study, I treat conjunction as a semiotic relation pertaining to the semiotic level of 
text generation and interpretation because the linguistically explicit connectors between 
sentences are usually not useful in determining the underlying cognitive relation that ties 
sentences into text. Consider example (7) below: 
7. John fell and broke his leg. 
'And' in (7) above although additive (according to Halliday and Hasan's typology) it 
does not give this function only inasmuch as it pertains to adding one linguistic unit to 
another without accounting to the logical relation underlying both sentences. I argue that 
the relationship between the two sentences in (7) above is not additive but rather a 
metonymic representational relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT based on CAUSE FOR E F F E C T . 
The first sentence is the cause for the second and a proper reading of the text in (7) 
above should run as 'because he fell, he broke his leg'. From this we can see that 
1 2 It should be pointed out here also that the word'gents'is itself metonymic standing in a formal part-
whole relationship with the full form of the word 'gentlemen' of the type form for form exactly like the 
form UN stands in a part-whole relationship with the full form United Nations. 
1 3 Halliday and Hasan (1976: 320). 
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linguistic connectors are not usually helpful as indicators of underlying cognitive 
connectedness in text. Consider examples (8-11) which are taken from Halliday14-. 
8. They gave me fish to eat. And I don't like fish. 
9. That must be Henry. Yet it can't be; Henry is in Manchester. 
10. We are having guests tonight. So don't be late. 
11. He found his way eventually. Then he had left his papers behind. 
Halliday and Hasan argue that the type of conjunctive relations involved in examples (8-
11) above is 'internal' because it relates the sentences as linguistic units in the 
communication and not as events taking place in the external world outside language. I 
agree with Halliday and Hasan and emphasise that linguistic connectors are not usually 
adequate indicators to the underlying cognitive relations. The words 'and', 'yet', 'so' 
and 'then' are not indicating any additive, adversative, causal or temporal function 
respectively. They merely connect the sentences as linguistic events. 
Based on these observations I regard conjunction as a metonymic relation pertaining to 
the level of text coherence15 where the interaction between text and context explains the 
nature of the relation between texts. In short, I perceive conjunction to be realised by the 
metonymic relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT where the interaction takes place in the 
domain of conceptual representation. So the concept of ' fa l l ing ' in example (7) above 
stands in contiguous relation with 'breaking one's leg' because they are causally linked. 
Lexical cohesion is also a resourceful area in which metonymy can be fruitfully applied. 
I shall reserve my detailed discussion of all these cohesive devices to the appropriate 
sections which will be devoted to discussing with examples of authentic texts the role of 
metonymy in relation to each of these devices. All I am concerned about now is 
providing a general introduction to the relevance of the theory of metonymy as a textual 
tool for the theory of cohesion as propounded by Halliday and Hasan. It should be noted 
here that Halliday and Hasan discuss cohesion under two main headings; grammatical 
cohesion and lexical cohesion. These will be considered here under the same headings. 
1 4 Ibid (321) 
1 5 And therefore will be addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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However, before I go into the discussion of the two major areas of cohesion proposed by 
Halliday and Hasan I shall argue that cohesion is not only grammatical and lexical. It is 
also phonological. This concerns the phonological patterning of text and is an important 
aspect of cohesion that is not discussed in either account of cohesion. This is what I call 
phonological cohesion. Therefore, before I discuss grammatical and lexical cohesion I 
want to start by discussing how phonological recurrences contribute to the unity of text 
and how they also provide meaningfulness to the text. After this treatment I also intend 
to link all forms of phonological patterning to the theory of metonymy as a textual 
theory. 
4.1.1. Metonymy and phonological cohesion 
Our representational theory of metonymy allows us to adopt a bottom-up approach to 
account for the signifying relations in text. It allows us to begin with the phonological 
level. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the metonymic representational 
relations of FORM FOR FORM and FORM FOR CONCEPT account for all phonological patterns in 
text. By phonological cohesion is meant the set of phonological recurrences in text that 
provide unity to the text and contribute to the creation of meaning in that text. This 
aspect of cohesion might not be present in all types of text but its absence from certain 
texts does not mean that it should be ignored. Phonological patterning of text is a 
cohesive device that is commonly employed in poetic texts. Jakobson explains the 
reason for this in the following dictum: 'The poetic function projects the principle of 
equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination'.16 
Jakobson's dictum here is an attempt to give a systematic account of how to characterise 
poetic language from other types of language uses and thus how to distinguish the poetic 
function from other language functions. It has been a major interest among literary and 
linguistic circles to try to propose a definition of what literature is and how its language 
differs from everyday language. It should not be assumed that only poetry has 
phonologically structured language and that phonological recurrences based on the 
similarity principle are the distinctive features of poetry alone. Jakobson's argument is 
that any piece of language which exhibits phonological patterning based on similarity is 
1 6 Jakobson (1960), cited in Lodge (1988: 39). 
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poetic whether it is poetry or non-poetry. In an earlier work 1 7 I have applied the 
Jakobsonian theory of poetics to the analysis of an Arabic piece of argumentative prose. 
The findings were supportive of the Jakobsonian dictum; although the text was clearly 
prose it was actually poetic and exhibited striking similarities with the language of 
. 18 
poetry. 
Here I am concerned with the integration of this poetic model in the analysis of how 
phonological patterns contribute to the cohesion of text. The overall claim is that 
phonological recurrences in text are actually metonymic of the type FORM FOR FORM i f we 
treat these phonological recurrences as providing mental access to other similar forms in 
the text. They are also metonymic of the type FORM FOR CONCEPT when each occurrence 
cooperates with other similar occurrences to suggest a general conceptual image or 
impression of the whole text. This could be the onomatopoeic or the symbolic aspect of 
the sound repeated. As soon as we encounter a particular sound repeated throughout the 
text then we know that these 'similar' occurrences are actually parts of a general scheme 
that is abstract and governs the similarities between all these actual occurrences. The 
argument is much like the theory of abstractness of the phoneme. Any sound human 
languages have must be related to an abstract entity which represents its form. 
4.1.1.1. Metonymy and sound repetition 
4.1.1.1.1. Metonymy and alliteration 
Alliteration is the repetition of the same consonant at the beginning of two or more 
words. Sometimes it is loosely referred to as the 'initial rhyme'.1 9 Alliteration is a 
typical feature of poetic language as it gives aesthetic effects to the overall organisation 
of the text. The following line from Pope's The Rape of the Lock is a good illustration of 
how the repetition of similar sounds at the beginning of words adds an aesthetic effect 
and at the same time contributes to the meaning of the whole text. 
FORM FOR FORM FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT 
TT.—T . 12. While melting music steals upon the 7ky, 
And soften 'd sounds along the waters die. 
1 7 Al-Sharafi(1997). 
18 
The study concludes that in some cultures including the Arabic culture, if we want to draw a distinction 
between poetic and non-poetic language, the distinction should in fact be drawn not between poetry and 
prose but between elevated styles of diction on the one hand and everyday language on the other. 
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In addition to the aesthetic effect it gives and the musicality of the line, this 
phonological patterning in the line also brings the line into harmonious relation of 
meaning association with those lines that preceded it and those which followed it. The 
effect here is that of psychological onomatopoeia in which the sounds used in the 
construction of the word to describe something suggest what is being described. 
Alliteration also figures out in poetic language other than that used in poetry. The 
example Jakobson provides about the girl who used to talk about 'the horrible Harry' is 
quite suggestive of the prevalence of the phenomenon of playing with similar sounds at 
the beginning of words even in everyday talk. The girl when asked "Why horrible?" 
'Because I hate him.'"But why not dreadful, terrible, disgusting?"'I don't know why, 
but horrible fits him better'. Jakobson then comments on the incident that the girl was 
clinging to the poetic device of paronomasia without actually realising i t . 2 0 
The way alliteration is viewed as metonymic here is twofold. The forms stand in a 
representational relation; each one suggests the other in a systematic way. This is what I 
call representational metonymic relation of FORM FOR FORM . The sound on its own does 
not say much but once it is related to other actual similar forms in the text then it claims 
a functional role within the meaning of the whole line or the whole poem. Second, the 
sound as form stands for the meaning it invokes in the poem. 
4.1.1.1.2. Metonymy and assonance 
Assonance is 'a partial or half-rhyme much used in poetic language as an aspect of 
sound patterning and cohesion. The same stressed vowel is repeated in words, but with a 
different final consonant'.21 In the poem by Tennyson beginning 
FORM FOR FORM. FORM FOR CONCEPT 
• • * 
13. Break, break, break, 
On thy cold grey stones, O sea! 
the assonance in the sound /ei/, in addition to the musical effect it adds to the lines, also 
contributes to their expressiveness and their unity with other parts of the poem. The 
assonance suggests the steady movement of the sea paralleling this with the narrator's 
feelings. The following lines from Coleridge show assonance in the long vowel / i : / : 
1 9 Wales (1989: 18). 
2 0 Jakobson. See Lodge (1988: 38). 
2 1 Wales (1989: 39). 
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F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
14. Dear Babq, that steepest cradled by my side 
T • T 
Whose gentle breathing, hears in this deep calm 
The assonance in these two lines gives the sense of calmness and tranquillity, as the 
vowel is steady and long throughout the lines. 
Again Jakobson suggests that this is not at all a peculiar feature of poetry but a feature 
of poetic language in general. He gives the example of the political slogan 
F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
15. I like Ike 2 2 
This slogan was succinctly structured in this way to give more than its surface meaning. 
The similarity in the phonological structuring of the slogan suggests the meaning of the 
slogan. It suggests unity of the subject with the object and thus it suggests love between 
the person to elect and the person to be elected. The same metonymic representational 
relation of F O R M F O R F O R M is responsible of providing formal connectedness to the text 
above and the metonymic representational relation of F O R M F O R C O N C E P T is responsible for 
connecting the text to its context. 
4.1.1.1.3. Metonymy and rhyme 
Rhyme 'is a kind of phonetic echo found in verse: more precisely a phonetic 
23 
matching'. The following lines from Gray's Elegy written in a country churchyard are 
good illustrations of how rhyme, which is a phonological feature, actually signifies the 
meaning of the lines or what they talk about: 
16. The curfew tolls the knell of parting day,-4-
The lowing herd wind slowly o 'er the lea, -4-
The ploughman homeward plods his weary way, 
And leaves the world to darkness and to me. 4— 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
The slowing of the movement of the cattle and the general feeling of boredom because 
of the curfew are represented in the use of long vowels. It is difficult to perceive of this 
effect i f we restrict our attention to only one occurrence of this phonological feature, i.e. 
22 
Ike was a familiar name for General Dwight David Eisenhower, President of the US 1956-61.1 like Ike 
was a political campaign slogan. 
2 3 Wales (1989: 408). 
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rhyme. The effect is established only when we relate the set of these occurrences to a 
general and abstract schema of the long vowel and to the psychological effects this 
length creates in the individual and eventually bring all of this to attest for the meaning 
of the whole text. This is the essence of metonymic understanding of A C T U A L F O R 
P O T E N T I A L relation. 
4.1.1.2. Metonymy and rhythm 
Rhythm is 'the pattern of accented or stressed and unaccented or unstressed syllables in 
a language'.24 This is not a particular characteristic of poetry or even poetic language but 
a general feature of speech. It seems that speech in general is structured in such a way to 
show prominent and weak elements with regard to the content or meaning of each unit 
of language and how much this unit contributes to the overall meaning of the ultimate 
unit, be it the word, phrase, clause, sentence or even the text. Rhythm in poetic language 
is stressed for aesthetic as well as semantic reasons. The following example from 
Dickens' Dombey and Son illustrates how the pattern of rhythm suggests the movement 
of the train and the feeling of the person narrating the story in that train. 
F O R M F O R F O R M . F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
17. Through the hollow, on the height, 
\ / \ / 
By the heath, by the orchard, 
\ / \ / 
By the park, by the garden, 
\ / \ / 
Over the canal, across the river, 
\ , / \ / \ / 
Where the sheep are feeding, where the mill is going, where the barge is floating, 
\ / \ , / \ / 
where the dead are lying, where the factory is smoking, where the stream is running 
Rapid rhythm suggests rapid movement. We are able to abstract this effect only after we 
look at the text from a holistic point of view. Only when we relate the set of similar 
occurrences to a general unifying schema are we able to appreciate the effect of the 
patterns of rhythm in this text. The essence of this gestalt reasoning is metonymic. 
Wales (1989: 409-410). 
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4.1.2. Metonymy and grammatical cohesion 
4.1.2.1. Metonymy and reference 
Reference is treated in this thesis as a semiotic phenomenon realising signification 
between language, cognition and context. So the view expressed here of reference is that 
of a phenomenon that cuts the domain of form, concepts and objects and not only 
textual reference as it has been reduced in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) model of 
cohesion. Halliday and Hasan define 'reference' as that linguistic phenomenon in which 
certain items in language make reference to something else for their interpretation 
instead of being interpreted semantically in their own right.25The authors call such 
'reference items' 'directives', as they 'indicate that information is to be retrieved from 
26 
elsewhere'. This is not very different, it should be noted, from the treatment of the 
phenomenon called P R O - F O R M S by de Beaugrande and Dressier.27 Pro-forms are forms 
that 'can stand in the surface text in place of more determinate, context-activating 
28 
expressions'. However, these two views limit the scope of reference to formal 
signification. This is believed to be a reductionist treatment of the power of reference as 
a phenomenon that cuts across domains of epistemology, ontology and language. 
Both of these views are similar to the notion of 'sign' which, as we have seen in chapter 
3 can be defined as 'an element that conveys a meaning other than itself. I relate to 
these two perspectives a third one which concerns the conceptualisation of metonymy as 
a pro-form also. I f the reference item points at another item then that is some sort of 
signification. This signification can either be symbolic, iconic or indexical. With regard 
to 'reference' it is always indexical because there is an act of pointing each time there is 
reference. In the example: 
F O R M F O R T H I N G 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T * + 
F O R M F O R F O R M * X 
% 
75. John went to the market. He bought some apples. 
2 5 Halliday and Hasan (1976: 30), with some change to the actual definition. 
2 6 Ibid. 
9*7 
This model of cohesion is to be considered later in this chapter, 
de Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 60). 
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the reference item 'he' does not mean anything by itself apart from 'its own conceptual 
signification', i.e. third person singular pronoun. Its function in the organisation and 
interpretation of text is dependent on perceiving it as a component in a signifying system 
the resolution of which requires a backward cognitive movement to its antecedent. 
Whether we perceive the relation between 'John' and 'He' as forms or as concepts or 
even as entities and objects we cannot escape a metonymic interpretation of this 
relation. By means of the metonymic representational relations of F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M 
F O R C O N C E P T , C O N C E P T F O R F R O M , F O R M F O R THING, T H I N G F O R F O R M it is possible tO propose a 
universal model of reference in text. The first two relations account for the phenomenon 
of reference in languages like English and Arabic which have the tendency to use the 
proper noun or the common noun at the beginning of the text and rely on the use of 
pronouns to refer back to the proper or common noun throughout the discourse. The 
latter relations account for the phenomenon of reference in languages like Hebrew, 
Japanese and Chinese. According to Callow 'Hebrew, unlike English, prefers to use 
29 
proper names to trace participants through a discourse'. Baker also points out that'in 
some languages like Japanese and Chinese, a totally different pattern seems to be in 
operation. Pronouns are hardly ever used and, once a participant is introduced, 
continuity of reference is signalled by omitting the subjects of following clauses'.30 In 
this case reference is, in fact, some kind of ellipsis. It is, therefore, the concept of the 
identity of the participant that is retrieved each time an action or an event is attributed to 
that subject. As such it is the metonymic relation of C O N C E P T F O R F O R M that is in operation 
here. The remaining relations account for the pragmatic dimension of reference and 
particularly the reference involved in the use of deictic expressions. 
Halliday and Hasan classify 'reference' into two broad categories according to whether 
this reference is situational, i.e. referring to something outside the text, or textual, i.e. 
referring to something within the text. The following is a reproduction of their 
schematic diagram: 
2 9 Callow (1974), cited in Baker (1992: 183). 
3 0 Ibid. (185). 
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anaphora 
[to following text] 
cataphora 
Figure 4.2. Classification of reference according to Halliday and Hasan. 
Whether it is exophoric or endophoric, based on its function, reference is classified into 
three types: 
(a) . Personal Reference 
(b) . Demonstrative Reference 
(c) .Comparative Reference 
I shall take an example of personal reference to show how this is directly related to 
metonymic reasoning. Al l first and second personal pronouns show a tendency to 
express exophoric reference although they do not always do so. On the other hand, third 
person pronouns tend to express endophoric reference. However, in all these cases we 
are better off i f we interpret this reference as metonymic whether it is direct or indirect. 
This is to say that 'reference' in its reduced form as textual reference is able to explain 
phoric relations of the type: 
F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M F O R C O N C E P T , F O R M F O R T H I N G 
20. Janet is a lecturer in Arabic. She speaks very good Arabic. 
The relationship between 'Tim' and 'He' in example (19) and 'Janet'and'She'in 
example (20) is cohesive because both the identity of reference is maintained. But what 
are we going to say about texts like the following? 
19. Tim is a professor of politics. He lectures at Durham. 
F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M F O R C O N C E P T , F O R M F O R T H I N G 
F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
• -4 
21 Halliday is on the top shelf. You will find it in paperback. 
F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
22. Table 4 is getting impatient. He has been waiting for a long time. 
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^ O R M FOR FORM, FQRM^QR CONCEPT 
23. The ladies is getting dirty. It needs to be cleaned as soon as possible. 
^ ^ FORM FOR FORM, FORM F C j l CONCEPT 
24. The diabetes is leaving tomorrow. He is better now. 
Halliday and Hasan's notion of personal reference does not explain the change of the 
reference in the above examples but a metonymic processing of the text does. Textual 
cohesion is then established on the basis of metonymic reasoning of the two respective 
elements of reference, i.e. the surface NP and the deep NP. The text is formally 
connected when 'Halliday' and ' i t ' in example (21) above are related as two forms 
regardless of the discrepancy in the identity of the reference and the violation of 
agreement rules between 'Halliday' and ' i t ' and in fact in all the examples above. This 
account is not sufficient to account for meaning in text. Therefore, the metonymic 
representational relation of F O R M F O R C O N C E P T solves this problem by postulating that the 
reference is not actually to a form but to a concept which the form stands for. So ' i t ' in 
example (21) refers back to a concept which is 'the book by Halliday'. Although 
Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion claims to be a theory of text meaning, it clearly 
falls short of accounting for this phenomenon which is quite common in language.31 The 
notion of reference as proposed by Halliday and Hasan does not answer this discrepancy 
and indeed does not account for it. Therefore, I argue that Halliday and Hasan's notion 
of reference is not sufficient to account for all pronominal relations in text and 
particularly the identity of reference relations and hence the semantic interpretation of 
the discourse. 
The second problem with Halliday and Hasan's 'reference' relates to the fact that they 
limit the scope of referential cohesion to 'endophoric reference' or 'textual reference'.32 
They argue that exophoric reference is not a cohesive tie. It only 'contributes to the 
C R E A T I O N of text in that it links the language with the context of situation, but it does not 
Stirling maintains that 11.4% of anaphoric relations in a corpus of GP consultations are actually of 
metonymic nature (1996: 72). 
32 
Baker in this connection argues that 'the term reference is traditionally used in semantics for the 
relationship which holds between a word and what it points to in the real world... In Halliday and Hasan's 
model of cohesion, reference is used in a similar but more restricted way. Instead of denoting a direct 
relationship between words and extra-linguistic objects, reference is limited here to the relationship of 
identity which holds between two linguistic expressions', ibid. (1992: 181). 
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contribute to the integration of one passage with another so that the two together form 
33 
part of the same text'. This view shows once again the formal tendency of Halliday 
and Hasan's theory of cohesion. Their theory of textual cohesion pertains only to the 
formal texture of the linguistic features that make a text 'text'. This falls short of 
accounting for various phenomena which provide connectedness in text. We know that 
language without context is almost always indeterminate. Unless we know who said the 
utterance, where and why the utterance is said, it becomes very difficult to reach a 
proper interpretation of the utterance. 
Moreover, there are many cases in which the text might be dense with cohesive devices 
yet it does not make sense because there is considerable difficulty in construing a line of 
continuity in the flow of ideas to serve a particular communicative purpose. Consider 
example (25) below: 
25. The man went to the bath. Baths are usually warm. Warm is an adjective. The 
adjective in English usually comes before the noun. English is spoken all over the 
world. This is not strange. To be strange is not always funny. John speaks funny 
English. He is from England. 
Although the text in (25) above is cohesive, it does not make sense because the 
sentences are quite independent units and do not form a whole. This is in turn because 
they do not express a continuity of ideas and at the same time it is difficult to construe a 
purpose which the utterance is set to convey. On the other hand, there are examples of 
real language in use, which are not cohesive on the surface, but on the underlying level 
are coherent. 
Consider the following example from Cook:34 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
26. T wish someone had told me he was vegetarian. I could have made an omelette. 
In terms of Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion this text is not cohesive because it 
does not show any of the formal devices they identify as cohesive devices. Even the 
3 3 Ibid. (37). 
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referring expression T which is repeated in the text twice is, for Halliday and Hasan, 
riot cohesive because it is exophoric. However, the text is perfectly natural and it hangs 
together as a unified whole by virtue of the cognitive relations that underlie the text.3 5 
The combination of these two sentences is a text because it has a purpose. Besides, it is 
difficult to interpret the text unless we conceive of a metonymic relation between the 
word 'vegetarian' and the word 'omelette'. This metonymic relation is that of cognitive 
association. The word 'vegetarian' activates a schema in the mind which includes the 
concept 'omelette'. More specifically the relation is a part /whole relationship in which 
'omelette' is part of'vegetarian' food. 
In fact, metonymic reasoning in text interpretation does not stop at the level of cognitive 
linking in text but goes beyond this to contribute to the functional understanding of text 
also. Three metonymies are actually involved in a functional interpretation of the text in 
(26) above. The first is the metonymic relation of F O R M F O R F O R M in which we interpret 
the two sentences as actually standing for another intended underlying form which is ' i f 
someone had told me she was vegetarian, I could have made an omelette'. This gives us 
a chance to treat the surface text as providing mental access or a metonymic 
representational relation to an underlying conditional structure which is known as in 
grammatical studies as 'unreal'.3 6 Having established that, we as interpreters employ yet 
another metonymic relation which is F O R M F O R T H I N G . 3 7 With the help of the tense 
expressed in the sentences and with the help of the ' i f construction we come to realise 
that in reality none of the two actions mentioned in the two sentences had happened. 
That is to say no one had told the speaker she was vegetarian and therefore she did not 
make an omelette. This discrepancy between the form and the context gives rise to an 
indirect interpretation of the whole text and this serves to realise the functional aspect of 
3 4 Cook (1989: 6). 
3 5 All that I am proposing here is that the trace of cognitive relations, notably metonymic ones, in these 
two utterances is one major aspect of establishing connectedness in the text. I am not neglecting the fact 
that this unity could also be established via other means such as the thematic structure of the utterances 
with the repetition of the pronoun T . Even this textual aspect is not universal. Rather it is language-
specific. Baker illustrates how this specificity is manifested in an inflecting language like Arabic where the 
whole notion of Halliday's model of theme/rheme organisation is disturbed. In an Arabic TT Baker argues 
that 'the version tends to display a reasonable level of thematic continuity in its own right'. Baker (1992: 
127). 
3 6 C.f. Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: 325). 
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the text as an apology. The third metonymy serves in a functional linkage between the 
two sentences. This can be made explicit by postulating a cause/effect relation between 
the two sentences. This metonymic interpretation could be paraphrased as None of you 
had told me she was vegetarian. Therefore, I did not make an omelette. 
All the above arguments suggest that endophoric referential relations are not enough to 
provide textness. The need arises for exophoric relations which relate language to 
context. Above all the need arises for a metonymic interpretation of referential 
expressions in text which would include both endophoric as well as exophoric relations, 
and will go beyond them to solve problematic aspects of indirect reference in text also. 
The conclusion that Cook arrives at after assessing the extent of formal links in 
discourse supports my view to an extent. Cook maintains that'these [formal] links are 
neither necessary nor sufficient to account for our sense of the unity of discourse. Their 
presence does not automatically make a passage coherent, and their absence does not 
38 
automatically make it meaningless'. 
Much of the meaning of an utterance is conveyed through the understanding of the 
purpose and function of that utterance and this function and purpose is not conveyed 
only through the formal resources of the language. The function of the utterance is only 
achieved through the resolution of the context of this particular utterance. Much of 
contextual description is achieved mainly through metonymic details of the context of 
the text. My argument here then is that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion does 
not qualify as a fully-fledged textual theory of text interpretation.39 Regarding this 
particular point I argue that metonymy, as a textual approach is capable of providing a 
complete theory of textuality because in its F O R M F O R F O R M relation and F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
relation, metonymy subsumes the formal links proposed by Halliday and Hasan. 
Moreover, in its C O N C E P T F O R C O N C E P T relation, metonymy indeed explains cognitive 
37 
As I have shown in the introduction to this thesis I take the notion of'thing' in its widest sense to 
include the whole notion of ontology starting from the notion of object up to the notion of context. So in 
this particular instance 'thing' refers to 'context'. 
38 
Cook (1989: 21). It should be noted, however, that this aspect of density or otherwise of explicit 
cohesive devices is again to a large extent language-specific. Arabic texts especially standard Arabic texts, 
for example, tend to exhibit a relatively high constellation of formal links like fa, wa, and Wanna. It 
seems therefore that the lack of these formal links in a standard Arabic text would make the reader feel 
that the text is incoherent even if he/she could in principle provide a reasonable interpretation of its 
meaning. 
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principles underlying texture and thus relating the realm of language to the realm of 
cognition. In its referential nature, metonymy links language to context. Most narrative 
texts exploit metonymic details to set up the scene for the narrative.40 
Instead of discrediting cohesion and its explicit formal resources for the sake of 
coherence and its underlying relations, or perhaps stressing the reverse of this statement, 
metonymy actually provides the solution in that it incorporates both dimensions of text 
and opens paths for rich textual analysis and interpretation. This is to say that metonymy 
actually opens the text for social, cultural and ideological scrutiny, which amounts to 
thick and deep textual description and interpretation. At the same time it also regulates 
textual interpretation because metonymic concepts or relations constrain to a large 
extent cognitive processes during textual interpretation.41 Thus is the argument that I put 
forward regarding the distinction between situational and textual reference proposed by 
Halliday and Hasan. The position I take is that it is not useful for a theory of text 4 2 to 
make this distinction because meaning is not only that which is in the text but it is also 
that aspect which pertains to context. I argue that metonymy accounts for both 
situational and textual meaning. By virtue of the fact that metonymy is a 
multidimensional unit of signification it is evident that it will account for both 
situational as well as textual reference. Let us consider the following example: 
Upon coming home one day I found the following message on a piece of paper on my 
door. 
^ FORM FOR •yrMfi 
27. / came to see you. I can't wait now. I'll call in later. 
To interpret this text I had to understand the context of the utterance. Who is T ? Even 
the immediate context will not be of help either because the time of the utterance is not 
clear enough. The temporal aspect of the utterance is mixed between the past which is 
not sufficiently specified, and the future which is expressed by the phrase 'call in later' 
Although it is a comprehensive pedagogical theory of discourse description. 
4 0 It is a common way of starting novels to set up the scene by introducing the context and main 
participants. I argue that this scene setting is achieved via metonymic details of the context and via 
metonymic movements within that prescribed context. This issue will be raised again in chapter 5 of this 
thesis where I discuss metonymy and text coherence. 
4 1 This point is made in view of the metonymic relations of causality and contiguity which are fairly 
objective relations, hence they constrain our cognitive processes to ensure speed recognition and 
interpretation of discourse. 
Baker takes a similar position with reference to translation purposes (1992: 182-183). 
160 
Chapter Four Metonymy and Text Cohesion 
is even more indeterminate. When is this 'later'and it is later in relation to what? In 
order to understand this text I had to go beyond the immediate context and look for a 
wider source of knowledge which is the knowledge of the world outside the text and 
even outside the immediate context. I had to resolve the referent of the pronoun'I'. I 
had no problem understanding the text, not because the text as a collection of sentences 
helped me to do so but because I depended on my knowledge of other factors rather than 
the formal presentation of the text. I knew that I had an appointment with a friend and 
that I was late for the appointment. Anyone else reading the text would not be able to 
understand the intended reference of the pronoun T . In other words a reader of this text 
other than me would be able to understand the semantic input of the text but would not 
be able to interpret the pragmatic aspect of it, particularly the exact referents of the 
personal pronouns and time adverbials. 
Now I move on to discuss demonstrative reference and how metonymy could solve 
many problems of demonstrative reference in text that Halliday and Hasan's theory of 
cohesion is not able to solve. Metonymic reasoning of text also raises issues of textness 
that have not been accounted for by the Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion. I have 
raised the point in chapter 3 section 3.4.2. above that metonymy is actually a form of an 
indexical sign which guarantees an indexical form of signification. I f we agree with this 
view then my linking of demonstrative reference, which Halliday and Hasan define as 
'essentially a form of verbal pointing', to metonymy is justified on both theoretical and 
practical grounds. Generally speaking metonymy expresses a contiguity relation of some 
sort of spatio-temporal distance between elements in the language, the cognitive realm 
and the physical world. Demonstrative pronouns belong to all of these realms because 
they depict a relation of proximity between participants in the discourse on the one 
hand, and the surrounding physical environment. 
The formal theory of demonstrative reference proposed by Halliday and Hasan is able to 
deal with examples like: 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
28. I can't get any reliable information. This is what worries me.43 
From Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) 
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'This' in this example has an anaphoric reference hence it is textual or endophoric and 
according to Halliday and Hasan it is cohesive. However, given that Halliday and Hasan 
do not consider exophoric reference as cohesive as I have pointed out earlier, then their 
theory falls short of accounting for the most essential part of demonstrative reference 
which is fundamentally exophoric. In the following example from a dialogue between 
two nurses, 'this' has an exophoric reference and its reference is understood only via 
metonymic reasoning. The nurses are reviewing reports of patients in the hospital. 
FORM_FQR T H I N G . F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
29. A: Who is this? « -
B: this is the hernia. You know he has to be seen by the doctor today. 
We have a double metonymy here. The demonstrative pronoun 'this' refers 
exophorically to 'the report'. Although it is the report that is being referred to, the 
agreement is with the patient to whom the report belongs. The referent of the 
demonstrative 'this' is retrieved from the context and the agreement is with the 
possessor of this report. The NP 'the hernia' is metonymically understood as the patient 
who is having a hernia surgery. The reference to the patient is thus justified. This 
example is very similar to that which Nunberg provides in his paper 'Transfers of 
Meaning'. Nunberg gives the following example (already discussed in chapter 2, section 
2.1.2.5. The example has the background of 'a customer hands his key to an attendant at 
a parking lot' . 4 4 
F O R M F O R T H I N G 
30. This is parked out back. 
The demonstrative pronoun in this example although exophorically accompanied by the 
handing over of a key does not refer to the key but to the car. This is what Nunberg calls 
deferred reference and what Stallard calls indirect reference. Nunberg gives further 
evidence by conjoining another predicate to the previous example. The conjoining 
shows that the demonstrative pronoun actually refers to the car and not to the key. The 
following is Nunberg's example: 
F O R M F O R T H I N G 
31. This is parked out back and may not start. 
The argument I am putting forward in this connection is that metonymy explains all 
types of demonstrative reference in text, whether endophoric, exophoric or even indirect 
Nunberg (1995: 110). 
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demonstrative reference like the examples above. However, Halliday and Hasan's 
theory of cohesion falls short of accounting for the last two types of demonstrative 
reference. This means that metonymy is indeed a powerful textual tool that encompasses 
all aspects of textuality. 
I move on now to consider the third category of reference suggested by Halliday and 
Hasan's theory of cohesion. This is the type of reference they call 'comparative 
reference', which they divide into two broad types. One is general; this is deictic 
comparison. This type breaks down into three subtypes: identity comparison, similarity 
comparison and difference comparison. Examples of the identity comparison type 
include adjectives like, same, equal, identical and adverbs like identically. Examples of 
similarity comparison include adjectives like, such and similar, and adverbs like so, 
similarly and likewise. Examples of difference comparison include adjectives like other, 
different and else, and adverbs like differently and otherwise. The second type is 
particular and it is non-deictic. This type breaks down into two subtypes: numerative 
and epithet. Examples of numerative comparative reference include more, fewer, less, 
further, additional. Examples of epithet comparative reference include adjectives like 
better, so, equal, and a combination of adjectives and adverbs in occurrences like 
equally good. The most important point in comparative reference is that it has a 
referential role in text because nothing can be identical with itself or similar to itself or 
different from itself. There is always some other entity to which the comparison applies. 
This other entity is what brings about textual connectivity. 
Comparative reference relates to metonymy in the same way that reference in general 
relates to metonymy. This is to say that because comparative reference is referential then 
the stand for relationship is inherent in referential phenomena. In comparison the same 
kind of relation applies whether the relation of comparison is that of identity, similarity 
or difference. Consider the following examples: 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
32. A: Did you like the\ake? ^ 
B: Yes, can I have some more? 
33. A: I have listened to the^lecture. 
• 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
B: You will have better ideas in the book. 
163 
Chapter Four Metonymy and Text Cohesion 
4.1.2.2. Metonymy and substitution 
This section applies the metonymic representational relations of F O R M F O R F O R M , F O R M F O R 
C O N C E P T to explain patterns of substitution in text. The basis of my argument in this 
section regarding the close relationship between metonymy and substitution is the fact 
that metonymy itself is a form of substitution. Metonymy is a process of substituting one 
item for another with which it is associated. This is precisely the case with Halliday and 
Hasan's notion of substitution which they define as 'the replacement of one item by 
another'.45 Halliday and Hasan maintain that 'substitution, on the other hand, is a 
relation within the text. A substitute is a sort of counter which is used in place of the 
repetition of a particular item'. 4 6 The examples the authors give to illustrate this 
particular point are the following: 
^ F O R M F O R F O R M ^ 
• < * T 
34. My axe is too blunt. I must get a sharper one. 
- F O R M F O R F O R M ~ <~^f 
35. You think Joan already knows? -1 think everybody does. 
'One' in example (34) substitutes for the word 'axe' and 'does' in example (35) 
substitutes for the word 'knows'. Halliday and Hasan divide'substitution'into three 
main types according to the grammatical function of the substitute item. These three 
types are: 
NOMrNAL S U B S T I T U T I O N : O N E , O N E S , S A M E 
The following are some examples of nominal substitution taken from Halliday and 
Hasan. 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
w — < — < w 
36. These biscuits are stale. - Get some fresh ones. 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
37. This brZad's stale. - Get sorb"e fresh. 
F O R M FOR F O R M 
r—% 
38. Mummy will you buy me a bus? I want that red one. 
F O R M F O R F O R M ^ 
39. A: I'll have two poached eggs on toast please. 
B: I'll have the same. *~ 
C: I'd like to have the same, but... 
Halliday and Hasan (1976: 88). 
Ibid. (89). 
164 
Chapter Four Metonymy and Text Cohesion 
V E R B A L S U B S T I T U T I O N : D O 
Here are some examples provided by Halliday and Hasan for verbal substitution 
^ 4 F O R M F O R F O R M ^ 
40. The words did not come the same as they used to do. 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
41. I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't 
believe you do either! 
A ^ F O R M F O R F O R M ^ 
42. Does Granny look after you every day? - She can't do at weekends, because she 
has to go to her own house. 
C L A U S A L S U B S T I T U T I O N : SO, N O T 
I take the metonymic relation of F O R M F O R C O N C E P T responsible for clausal substitution 
relations because although the connector so in examples (43 and 44) below refers to the 
clause 'you agree to have a battle', and 'is there going to be an earthquake?' 
respectively, it clearly does not refer to the actual form of these grammatical units but to 
the proposition expressed by them. Let us consider the following examples of clausal 
substitution provided by Halliday and Hasan. 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T ^ 
43. Of course you agree to have a battle? Tweedledum said in a calmer tone. 
7 suppose £Q', the other sulkily replied, as he crawled out of the umbrella. 
F O R M F O R C O N C E P T 
• 
44. Is there going to be an earthquake? 
It says so. 
A 
Halliday and Hasan's notion of substitution relates to metonymy in various ways. 
Substitution is largely anaphoric in nature in that it usually refers back to elements 
mentioned earlier. The nature of this reference is nothing but some sort of internal 
signification, i.e. textual signification in which one form signifies another. Halliday and 
Hasan maintain that the difference between reference and substitution is that while the 
former is semantic the latter is essentially grammatical. I argue here that substitution is 
not only grammatical but it is also conceptual and example (44) above is a case in point. 
Therefore, I argue that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion once again falls short of 
accounting for conceptual substitution in text. I propose that metonymy accounts for 
both types of substitution in text. The formal substitution is accounted for by the F O R M 
F O R C O N C E P T relation and the conceptual substitution is accounted for by the F O R M F O R F O R M 
relation. 
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Substitution involves categories that not all languages have and this reduces the 
universal applicability of Halliday and Hasan's model of cohesion. For example, Arabic 
seems to lack 'auxiliary verbs' which take the place of main verbs to show connectivity 
via substituted forms. I f I want to translate the following example47 into Arabic: 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
45. You think Joan already kliows? I think everybody (loes. 
where 'does' stands in F O R M F O R F O R M metonymic relationship with'knows', I shall find 
difficulty in retaining the same substitution pattern in the Arabic rendering of the 
expression. Arabic would repeat the same verb as the example in (46) shows: 
F O R M F O R F O R M ( T H E S A M E F O R M R E P E A T E D ) 
i * 
46. halta 'taqid 'annajawanta'rip 'a'taqid 'anna al-kullya'rif. 
However, Arabic seems to accept nominal substitution in some marked structures like 
(47) below:48 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
• < T 
47. My axe is too blunt. I must get a sharper one. 
F O R M F O R F O R M 
• < T 
48. Fa 'si asbaha sdhinan. Yajibu 'an 'dkhudha wahidan 'akhar. 
My axe became blunt. I must get another one. 
where wahidan 'one' stands f o r k ' s 'axe'. There is also substitution of the type F O R M F O R 
C O N C E P T and is attested in both Classical as well as modern varieties of Arabic. Let me 
begin with an example from Classical Arabic and is taken from the Qur'an. Usually this 
substitution is motivated by factors related to euphemism and is usually expressed via 
the verb fa 'ala which means 'to do'. In the Qur'an for example, the Pharaoh argues with 
Moses about the latter's childhood in the former's palace. The text goes on as follows: 
49. qdla 'alam nurabbika find walidan wa labithta find min 'umurika sinina, wa 
fa'alia fa'lataka allatifa'alta wa 'anta min al-kaflrin, qdla fa'altuhd 'idhan wa 'ana 
min al-dhdllin.49 
Baker (1992: 187). 
The unmarked structure would involve a repetition of the word fa's 'axe'. 
The Qur'an. (26: 18-20). 
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(Pharaoh) said: 'Did we not cherish you as a child among us, and did you not stay 
among us for many years of your life? And you did your deed which you did while you 
were ungrateful. Moses said: I did it then when I was in ignorance.50 
The reference in the use of the verb fa'ala 'did'and its derivatives in example (49) 
above is to the action of Moses'killing of an Egyptian. It seems as i f the euphemistic 
function of the substitution involved in the verses above is dominating. Due to the fact 
that killing and death are considered and also were considered at that time 'taboo' the 
reference to them was conveyed via a general lexical item which is the verb fa 'ala 'did'. 
Similarly, this lexical item is still used in almost all dialectical varieties of Arabic today 
to convey the same euphemistic function. In a criminal report one would normally 
encounter the following: 
50. Ba'd 'an fa'ala al-mujrimun fi'latahum harabu. 
After the criminals did their deed they ran away. 
Now it could be argued that the two examples above are actually of the metonymic type 
FORM FOR CONCEPT rather than examples of substitution par excellence which is conveyed 
via the metonymic relation of FORM FOR FORM for the simple reason that there are no forms 
which have been substituted, i.e. it is a euphemistic style of covering taboo expressions. 
However, i f we conceive of text as an integral world of socio-cultural practice of a 
speech community then the notion of intertextuality and the concept of interactions 
between texts will be the norm of social cognition. As such, we will realise that the form 
fa 'ala 'did' and its derivatives in the Qur'anic verse is actually a substitution of the form 
qatala 'killed' which is mentioned in another Qur'anic verse - in a different chapter-
and hence the substitution is actually a FORM FOR FORM. The same thing applies to the 
criminal report example. One would easily assume that the actual form of 'k i l l ing 'or 
'raping' has been mentioned before, and these forms, i.e. fa'ala and its derivatives have 
as their reference forms also. 
4.1.3. Metonymy and ellipsis 
The aim of this section is to implement the metonymic representational relation of 
CONCEPT FOR FORM to explain patterns of ellipsis in text. Ellipsis is 'substitution by zero' 
4 9 TheQur'an. (26: 18-20). 
5 0 My own translation. 
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as Halliday and Hasan argue.51The authors define ellipsis as'something left unsaid'. 
Halliday and Hasan admit that this definition might be misleading due to its generality 
because not everything that is left unsaid is an example of ellipsis. The interpretation of 
any text involves a great deal of 'inferencing' in which we supply a great deal of 
information from outside the text. Is this ellipsis? For Halliday and Hasan it is not, nor 
is it cohesive, as it does not relate to textual relations. So what is ellipsis then? Halliday 
and Hasan point out that when talking about ellipsis 'we are referring specifically to 
sentences, clauses etc. whose structure is such as to presuppose some preceding item, 
which then serves as the source of the missing information'.5 2 They elaborate this point 
further and state that 'an elliptical item is one which, as it were, leaves specific 
53 
structural slots to be filled from elsewhere'. So the idea that differentiates ellipsis from 
any other form of information supplying or inferencing is that it forms a slot in the 
structure of the text. 
Like 'substitution', ellipsis is divided into three main parts: 
NOMINAL ELLIPSIS 
Halliday and Hasan define this type of cohesion as ellipsis that takes place within the 
nominal group. They give the following examples as illustrations: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• < • « T 
51. Which last longer, the curved rods or the straight rods? - The straight Hare less 
likely to break. 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• « • 
52. Which hat will you wear? - This is the bestn . 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
T « j 
53. The first three buds fell o f f . We '11 have to watch the next j — j . 
VERBAL ELLIPSIS 
Halliday and Hasan define this type of cohesion as ellipsis within the verbal group. They 
distinguish between two types of ellipsis: 
Lexical ellipsis. This occurs from the right, i.e. the lexical element in the verbal group 
which normally occurs to the right of the verbal group. 
5 1 Haliiday and Hasan (1976: 142). 
5 2 Ibid. (143). 
5 3 Ibid. 
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CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• < T 
54. Have you been swimming? - Yes, I havA I . 
Operator ellipsis. This is ellipsis from the left; the initial element or elements from the 
verbal group are omitted except the lexical verb. 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• « • 
55. What have you been doing? - Swimming. 
CLAUSAL ELLIPSIS 
According to Halliday and Hasan verbal ellipsis involves other elements in the clause 
which are not part of the structure of the verbal group but elements of the clause 
structure. This justifies their coining of clausal ellipsis to account for omissions external 
to the structure of the verbal group. Halliday and Hasan define the notion of clause in 
English as 'the expression of the various speech functions, such as statement, question, 
response and so on, [which] has a two-part structure consisting of MODAL ELEMENT plus 
PROPOSITIONAL ELEMENT'.54 
Halliday and Hasan define these two elements as follows.'The MODAL element, which 
embodies the speech function of the clause, consists in turn of the Subject plus the finite 
element in the verbal group'.5 5 With regard to the other element in the structure of the 
clause the authors continue 'THE PROPOSITIONAL ELEMENT consists of the residue: the 
remainder of the verbal group, and any Complement or Adjunct that may be present'.56 
They give the following example to illustrate the division: 
56. The Duke was 
Modal element 
%oing to plant a row of poplars in the park. 
Propositional element 
Figure 4.3. The two-part structure of the clause according to Halliday and Hasan. 
Halliday and Hasan conclude that 'the two types of verbal ellipsis are derivable from 
these two major divisions of the clause'.57 This is to say that in elliptical clauses it is 
either the modal element that is omitted or the propositional element. Halliday and 
54 
55 
56 
Ibid. (197). 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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Hasan argue that modal ellipsis occurs in response to WH- questions and provide two 
examples of this type of ellipsis as follows: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
T « T 
5 7. What were they doing? - Holding hands. 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• < • 
58. What were you doing? - Swimming? 
As regards the propositional type of ellipsis, Halliday and Hasan argue that it is 
associated with those instances where the mood and the polarity are the principal 
components of the message: typically, responses to statements and yes/no questions, 
where the subject is presupposed by a reference item'. 5 8 They provide the following two 
examples as illustration: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
T « T 
59. The plane has landed. Has it ? 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• < T 
60. Has the plane landed? Yes, it has . 
The classification of clausal ellipsis in Halliday and Hasan into two major groups as 
seen above corresponds to some extent to the division of /iaaVz/'ellipsis' in the Arabic 
rhetorical tradition. According to 'Ati'q 'the musnad [predicate] and musnad 'ilayhi 
[subject], which are the two fundamental components of the sentence, are subject to 
various operations for the sake of rhetorical purposes'59 Among these operations is 
hadhf which, according to 'Ati'q, is divided into three types. The first is the hadhf of 
musnad 'ilayhi which 'Ati'q explains in detail especially with regard to the reasons 
leading to this type of ellipsis. Among the examples of this type of ellipsis 'Atiq gives 
the following from the Qur'an: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
61. Wa'in tukhdlitjihumfa \j'ikhwanukum60 
I f you mix their affairs with yours then your brothers. 
Ibid. (198). 
'Atiq (1985: 122). 
The Qur'an (2: 220). 
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In the above verse there is an example of ellipsis in which the subject'they'is elided 
from the second clause. The verse should read'if you mix their affairs with yours then 
[they are] your brothers'. Here again we have the metonymic representational relation 
CONCEPT FOR FORM which provides unity and connectedness to the text. Whenever, this 
verse is read there is a cognitive slot felt to be filled with a subject. According to ' Atiq 
the passive constructions fall into this category of ellipsis because they involve the 
omission of the subject usually to hide the doer of the action for safety reasons or 
because it is so well-known that it need not be mentioned. An example given for this 
type of ellipsis is the following: 
62. Kusirat al-nafidhatu 
The window was broken. 
We could imagine a context of this utterance to be in a house, for example, where the 
mother is reporting the incident of one of the children having broken the window. She 
opts for the passive, deliberately omitting the subject so that the father does not beat the 
child. 
The second type of ellipsis in Arabic is related to the omission of the musnad 
'predicate'. An example of this type of hadhfis the following: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
63. A: Man huwa ahsan shd'ir Arabi? 
B: Al-Mutanabb'i 
A: Who is the best Arab poet? 
B: Al-Mutanabb'i. 
Here we have an ellipsis of the predicate because a complete answer to the question 
should have been 'Al-Mutanabbi is the best Arab poet'. The metonymic representational 
relation is obviously at work here to provide continuity for the text by means of the 
CONCEPT FOR FORM. 
The third type of ellipsis in Arabic is the omission of the 'object'. Among the examples 
given to this type of ellipsis are the following: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
? « • 
64. Walldhu yad'uEZD 'ila dari al-salam.61 
God calls to the Home of Peace. 
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CONCEPT FOR FORM 
T~> • 
65. Walaw shd 'a Alldhu Q lahadakum 'ajma "in.62 
Had He willed He would indeed have guided you all. 
In example (64) we have the object 'all his servants' omitted to give the utterance a 
generalising force. The verse means 'God calls [all His servants] to the Home of Peace'. 
Example (65) indicates an ellipsis of the object 'your guidance' to make the utterance 
more effective. The verse means 'Had He willed [your guidance] He would indeed have 
guided you all ' . In all these examples the type of ellipsis involved is that of syntactic 
ellipsis which is not significant for a textual interpretation of ellipsis. Nonetheless, we 
can see the metonymic representational relation of CONCEPT FOR FORM at work even though 
the concept is actually made obligatory because it is sometimes the object of a transitive 
verb. 
63 
Let us now take some more examples of the three types of ellipsis and see how 
metonymy could explain this phenomenon. 
Nominal ellipsis: 
66. A: 'And how many hours a day did you do lessons?" said Alice, in a hurry to 
change the subject. 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
t < W 
B: Two hours the first day', said the Mock Turtle: 'nine [] the next, and so on'. 
Verbal ellipsis: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
T « T 
67. John brought some carnations and Catherin^ j some sweet peas. 
Clausal ellipsis: 
CONCEPT FOR FORM 
• * T 
68. A: Who taught you to spell? B: Grandfather Q 
6 1 TheQur'an(10: 25). 
6 2 TheQur'an (6: 149). 
All the examples are from Halliday & Hasan, c.f. the chapter entitled 'ellipsis' in Halldiay and Hasan 
(1976). 
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4.1.3. Metonymy and lexical cohesion 
This section aims to explain the role of the metonymic representational relations of FORM 
FOR FORM, FORM FOR CONCEPT, FORM FOR THING in the development and organisation of lexical 
patterning in text. Lexical cohesion is the category of cohesion which concerns 
connectivity between lexical items in the text. It is thus different from the grammatical 
cohesive devices discussed so far in that it is not a feature of grammatical dependency 
and also it does not represent a relation between forms but between meanings and 
concepts. Lexical cohesion is the result of a network of semantic relations underlying 
the selection of lexical items in the text. The main argument underlying this section is 
that metonymy explains all the types of lexical cohesion and adds to this the fact that it 
brings all these relations under one coherent system of conceptual relations that apply 
globally in the text to ensure maximum ease of processing of the text as a unified whole. 
In the following sections this argument will be clear when we give examples showing 
how metonymy accounts for the relations of lexical cohesion in a more satisfactory way 
than the term 'lexical cohesion' itself. 
Halliday and Hasan talk about two major types of lexical cohesion namely, reiteration 
and collocation. Under the former category they include repetition, (same word) 
synonym (or near synonym), superordinate and general word. The second category 
which they describe as the most problematical part of lexical cohesion is a category by 
itself. Although Halliday and Hasan do not explicitly sub-classify collocation, they in 
fact give examples which indicate some kind of implicit classification. My comments 
about lexical cohesion will be more or less the same as those raised against grammatical 
cohesion. I argued earlier in this chapter that Halliday and Hasan's theory of 
grammatical cohesion is not satisfactory because it falls short of accounting for the 
multiple motives of cohesive devices. The most notable motive is the interaction 
between language and context. Here I argue that Halliday and Hasan's theory of lexical 
cohesion is also not satisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it is largely confined to 
the organising function and does not account for the generating function. In other words 
it does not tell us why the lexical cohesive devices are the way they are. It can be said 
that Halliday and Hasan's theory of lexical cohesion and perhaps their theory of 
cohesion in general is a theory that has descriptive adequacy but which lacks 
explanatory adequacy. Furthermore, Halliday and Hasan's theory of lexical cohesion is 
still formal because it picks up the items that are inherently related. It does not 
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however treat elements that are made related by means of language use in context to 
realise aspects of intentional meaning, ideological meaning and socio-cultural 
negotiation of meaning in text. 
I argue that the theory of metonymy as a textual tool accounts for all of the lexical 
cohesive relations by means of standing for based on PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART 
relations. Within 'collocation' Halliday and Hasan become confused. They provide 
many examples of the phenomenon without actually proposing a general principle 
governing all these examples. Their treatment of this particular aspect is rather general. 
For example, they maintain that 'there is cohesion between any pair of lexical items that 
stand to each other in some recognisable lexicosemantic (word-meaning) relation'.6 4 
However they do not specify these recognisable lexicosemantic relations. They further 
argue that 'this would include not only synonyms and near synonyms such as climb ... 
ascent, beam rafter, disease illness, and superordinates such as elm tree, 
boy .... child, skip .... play, but also pairs of opposites of various kinds, 
complementaries such as boy girl, stand up sit down, antonyms such as like. 
hate , wet .... dry, crowded deserted, and converses such as order obey'.65 As 
can be seen there is no general principle governing the features of lexical relations that 
are cohesive. These lexical relations can be subsumed under one metonymic relation 
which is the part/whole relation. Even opposites, antonyms, and converses can be 
included under this general relation i f we think that there is a particular cognitive 
domain in which both opposites or antonyms are actually co-members or using 
metonymic terminology they are both parts of the same cognitive domain. For example, 
the pair 'stand up' and 'sit down' is actually a pair which belongs to the cognitive 
domain of body actions which in a particular context the former might activate the latter 
and vice versa. 
Further on in the same section Halliday and Hasan assert that lexical cohesive relations 
'also include pairs of words drawn from the same ordered series. For example, i f 
'Tuesday', occurs in one sentence and 'Thursday' in another, the effect will be cohesive; 
similarly, dollar .... cent, north south, colonel brigadier. Likewise with any 
6 4 Halliday and Hasan (1976: 285). 
6 5 Ibid. 
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pairs drawn from unordered lexical sets, like basement roof, road .... rail, red .... 
green' . 6 6 Halliday and Hasan do not specify these relations and argue that 'the members 
of any such set stand in some kind of semantic relation to one another, but for textual 
purposes it does not much matter what this relation is ' . 6 7 This is exactly what has been 
criticised about traditional accounts of metonymy which characterise the essence of 
metonym as a substitution based on association. When we come to ask what type of 
association this is, no satisfactory answer is provided. Some argue it is 'contiguity' 
association, others assert it is that of inclusion and some others argue it is adjacency and 
concomitance. 
I argue that a stand for relationship is a general relation that satisfactorily describes all 
types of metonymic understanding and at the same time describes all types of cohesive 
devices in text. Although this relation is rather general, it is always based on certain 
specified cognitive principles and these actually constrain the vagueness of the term 
68 
'stand for'. I also argue that in the process of textual analysis we are required to show 
the set of cognitive models and conceptual schemata that actually generate the text and 
make it stand as a unified whole. These models can only be attained through a 
characterisation of what relations actually underlie the generation and organisation of 
the text. Therefore, I propose a new way of analysing a text which brings more than one 
factor together to the analysis process. First, it is not concerned only with the actual it 
also cares about the virtual. Second, it does not concern itself only with the organising 
principles of text but rather it goes deeper and is concerned about the generating 
principles of text. Many organising principles are as they are because of the influence of 
the generating principles of text on them. 
4.1.3.1. Metonymy and reiteration 
Halliday and Hasan use 'reiteration' as an umbrella term to cover certain lexical 
cohesive devices such as repetition, synonymy, superordinates and general words. They 
define 'reiteration' as a general phenomenon in which 'one lexical item refers back to 
6 6 [bid. 
6 7 Ibid. 
68 
This is to say that the metonymic relation might be representational, i.e. a stand for relation realising a 
cause for effect or the effect for the cause, or the part for the whole or the whole for the part. See the 
relational model of metonymy I provided in figure 3.5. in chapter 3 above. 
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another to which it is related by having a common referent' . 6 9 Reiteration as a lexical 
cohesive device is quite similar to 'reference' in that both devices have an anaphoric 
referential function. The only difference between them is that while the former uses 
pronouns the latter uses various forms of semantically related lexical items having the 
same referent. So in the following example the words 'bull ' , 'animal', 'creature', 
'buffalo', etc. are all words which have the same referent, i.e. the male cow. 
69. I was on the farm last weekend. I saw a bull there. The was friendly. animal 
creature 
buffalo 
bovine 
bison 
bull 
This example suggests a general principle of relatedness between the lexical item used 
and the noun with which it is co-referential. This relatedness might be synonymy, as in 
'buffalo' and 'bison' or superordinate as in 'animal', 'bovine' and 'creature' or it might 
be a simple repetition as in 'bul l ' . Perceived from a formal perspective the metonymic 
representational relation underlying the choice of any of the above lexical items would 
be that of FORM FOR FORM. SO the form 'creature' stands for the form 'bull ' in this 
particular example. However, since Halliday and Hasan define the nature of the relation 
between the lexical items in reiteration as that they have a common referent, this 
metonymic relation wil l not be sufficient to characterise the semantic linkage although it 
is useful in informing us that the two forms are related thus providing formal 
connectivity. It seems, therefore, that we need cognitive and contextual relations to 
account for the connectivity between the lexical items in the above example. Two 
fundamental relations are actually responsible for the connectivity between the lexical 
items. These are the FORM FOR CONCEPT and the FORM FOR THING. In this way we account for 
the relationship between the signifier which is a linguistic form and the signified which 
might be a cognitive concept in the Saussurean sense or an ontological object in the 
Peircean sense. 
Halliday and Hasan (1976: 279). 
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Let us consider the following example of lexical reiteration from Arabic a language70 
that is argued by Beeston to make more frequent use of reiteration than English.71 
70. 7 'lam 'annahii fi al-zamdni al-sdlif dhakaru 'annahu kana rajulun min al-
hukamd' rafiqan bi al-tjbbi, dakhala 'ild madinatin min al-muduni, fara 'a 'dmmata 
'ahlihd bihim maradhun khafiy la yash'uruna bi'illatihim, wa la yuhissilna bi 
da'ihim alladhi bihim. Fafakkara dhdlik al-hakimufi 'amrihim kayfa yuddwihim 
liyubri'ahum min da'ihim wayashfihim min 'illatihim allati 'istamarrat bihim, wa 
'alima 'annahii 'in 'akhbarahum bimd hum fihi Id yastimi'Una qawlahu wa Id 
yaqbalilna nasihatahu, bal rubbamd ndsabiihu bil-'addwati wasta'jazii ra'yahu, 
wastanqasii 'adUbahu, wastardhalu 'ilmahu. Fahtdla 'alayhimfi dhdlika lishiddati 
shafaqatih'i 'aid 'abna' jinsihi, wa rahmatih'i lahum wa tahannunih'i 'alayhim wa 
hirsihi 'aid muddwdtihim. 
Translation: 
You should know that in times gone by it was said that there was a wise man who was 
well-versed in medicine. This man once went into a town and saw that the mass of its 
people were afflicted by a hidden illness whose ill effects they could not feel and whose 
sickness they could not sense. The wise man thought about them and how to treat 
them, to cure them of their disease and to heal them from their sickness which had 
continued to ail them. He knew, however, that i f he told them that they were sick, they 
would not listen to his saying, and they would not accept his advice. In fact, they might 
even take him as an enemy. They would ridicule his opinion, belittle his views and 
disdain his knowledge. So he decided to go about his work surreptitiously out of his 
deep kindness towards his fellow human beings, and out of his mercy for them and his 
compassion and his caring for treating them. 
The reiterated lexical items are made in bold in the two versions of the text. Let me spell 
out the patterns of reiteration in the text above. We have four patterns of reiteration in 
the text above: 
Pattern One Pattern Two Pattern Three 
maradh (disease) yash'uriin (feel) yudawihim (treat) 
7 0 The example is taken from the third epistle of 'ikhwtin al-safa' the 'Brethem of Purity' cited in Dickins 
and Watson (1999: 540). 
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'illatihim (illness) 
da°ihim (sickness) 
yuhissiin (sense) yubri'ahum (cure) 
yashfihim (heal) 
Pattern Four Pattern Five Pattern Six 
Yastami'una (listen) 
Yaqbalun (accept) 
qawlahu (saying) 
nasi'hatahu (advice) 
asta'jazii (ridicule) 
astanqasii (belittle) 
astardhalii (disdain) 
Pattern Seven Pattern Eight 
shafaqatihi (kindness) 
rahmatihi (mercy) 
tahannunihi (compassion) 
hirsihi (caring) 
ra'yahu (Opinion) 
'adabahu (views) 
'ilmahu (knowledge) 
Each lexical item in each pattern stands in a metonymic representational relation of FORM 
FOR CONCEPT in relation to the other lexical items in the same pattern because all the 
lexical items in each pattern belong to one general concept. We should not forget the 
interactive metonymic relations of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT which connect the patterns 
together to unite the text and provide it with cohesion. For example, one cannot ignore 
the metonymic relation of contiguity between the first three patterns because they 
include very closely associated concepts like 'disease', 'feel' and 'treat'. Similarly, it is 
not easy to ignore the associative relationship between patterns four and five because 
they convey a set of closely contiguous concepts like those of 'advice', 'accept'. By the 
same token the relations of association between the concepts 'opinion' and 'ridicule' in 
patterns six and seven is inevitable. The interactive nature of these associative relations 
ensures that the text is unified as a whole and that it is cohesive. 
4.1.3.1.1. Metonymy and synonymy 
Synonymy is the semantic relation which 'can be said to occur i f the items are close 
enough in their meaning to allow a choice to be made between them in some contexts, 
without there being any difference for the meaning of the sentence as a whole'. 7 2 Cruse 
treats synonymy as the case whereby 'certain pairs or groups of lexical items bear a 
special sort of semantic resemblance to one another'.73 He asserts that 'synonyms are, 
7 1 Beeston(1970: 112). 
7 2 Crystal (1991: 340). 
7 3 Cruse (1986: 265). 
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then, lexical items whose senses are identical in respect of'central'semantic traits, but 
differ, i f at all, only in respect of what we may provisionally describe as'minor'or 
'peripheral' traits'.7 4 Lyons7 5 suggests a three-level classification of synonyms: 
1 .Synonyms are fully synonymous if, and only if, all their meanings are identical; 
2.Synonyms are totally synonymous if, and only if, they are synonymous in all contexts; 
3.Synonyms are completely synonymous if, and only if, they are identical on all 
(relevant) dimensions of meaning. Then Lyons argues that absolute synonymy is the 
phenomenon that exists in expressions that are fully, totally and completely 
synonymous. Obviously, it is impossible that two lexical items could reach this degree 
of sameness because they might be fully synonymous but with a chance of variation due 
to certain shades of affective, social or collocational meaning.76 
Synonymy is related to metonymy in two different ways. One is lexical and the other is 
textual. The lexical relationship between synonymy and metonymy springs from the fact 
that metonymy is a phenomenon in which two different lexical items are brought 
together to have the same referent. Then one of these two lexical items (usually the 
unfamiliar) is used instead of the more familiar one. So in the example: 
71. The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 
there is a cognitive synonymy created between the person ordering the ham sandwich 
and the sandwich itself. In this case one of the two expressions is used instead of the 
other yielding the same meaning albeit with a slightly different stylistic effect. This 
relatedness between metonymy and synonymy is as I said lexical and is motivated by a 
definition of synonymy provided by Cruse as 'the lexical relation which parallels 
identity in the membership of two classes is, of course, synonymy'.77 The other relation 
is textual and this concerns the fact that synonymy or near synonymy has a referential 
7 4 Ibid. (267). Perhaps the terms 'central' and 'peripheral' can be correlated with their semiotic 
counterparts of 'denotative' and 'connotative' respectively. So the central semantic traits are those which 
pertain to the denotative and basic dimension of signification whereas the peripheral traits are those which 
are concerned with the behaviour of lexical items in texts and social contexts which is a value added to the 
basic core meaning. 
7 5 Lyons (1981: 50). 
7 6 For further detail on this issue see the discussion of'absolute synonymy' in Cruse who argues that if we 
conceive that 'two lexical units would be absolute synonyms if and only if all their contextual relations 
were identical', then 'it would, of course, be quite impracticable to prove that two items were absolute 
synonyms by this definition, because that would mean checking their relations in all conceivable contexts 
(it would be theoretically impossible, if, as is probably the case, the number of possible contexts is 
infinite). 
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function in text. The use of synonymous or the near-synonymous items in text provide 
cohesion and they can be treated as metonymic examples of the type FORM FOR FORM or 
• 78 
FORM FOR CONCEPT metonymic relations. The following is an example of the generating 
patterns of synonymy in text to create ideological perspectives.79 The example80 is taken 
from Hatim and Mason.81 
72. The genuine ulema of Islam have never given in to capitalists, money-
worshippers and landlords, and they have always preserved this decency for 
themselves. It is a vulgar injustice for anyone to say that the hands of the genuine 
clergy siding with Mohammadan Islam are in this same pot and God does not 
forgive those who make publicity in this way or who think in this way. The 
committed clergy are thirsty for the blood ofparasitical capitalists. They have never 
been in a state of conciliation with them- and never will be. 
C^genuine ule 
landlords 
Cgehuine clergy^ 
parasitical capitalists 
Figure 4.4. Patterns of FORM FOR C O N C E P T in the text 72. 
It should be emphasised here that textual synonymy is slightly different from lexical 
synonymy in various ways. Lexical synonymy is a feature of the semantic system of 
language and the synonyms identified are virtual synonyms irrespective of context. This 
is to say that lexical synonymy is a context-free phenomenon. However, textual 
synonymy is an aspect of meaning in context. In my search for synonyms in text I am 
not looking for virtual context-free synonyms only but also for the context-bound 
7 7 Ibid. (88). 
78 
C.f. the example and discussion of reiteration above. 
79 
This is a common feature of lexical relations in text which are mainly used to impose an ideology. 
80 
This example is an extract from a translation of a message addressed by the late Ayatollah Khomeini to 
the instructors and students of religious seminaries in Iran. 
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synonyms or rather what the writer treats as synonyms even i f they are not actually 
synonyms in their semantic structure. This is in line with the general approach of 
motivated signification that has been proposed in the previous chapter section 3.2. In 
addition, this approach ensures a contextual and a cognitive treatment of the text to 
show us the set of ideologies underlying the generation of text which are realised by 
creating or coercing a set of cognitive synonyms between elements which are not 
synonymous otherwise. 
4.1.3.1.2. Metonymy and hyponymy 
Hyponymy is one of the relations of inclusion. Like superordinateness and meronymy, 
which are going to be discussed shortly in this chapter, hyponymy is a relation which 
designates an internal relationship of association between lexical items. This association 
is that of belonging or membership. This sense is found in Cruse who defines hyponymy 
as 'the relationship corresponding to the inclusion of one class in another'.82 The sense 
of inclusion figures also in Crystal who defines the concept as 'the relationship which 
obtains between specific and general lexical items, such that the former is 'included' in 
83 
the latter'. Lyons discusses hyponymy within a wider framework of sense relations 
which he divides into two broad categories. These are substitutional sense relations and 
combinatorial sense relations. He relates the former to the Saussurean notion of 
paradigmatic relations and the latter to the Saussurean notion of syntagmatic relations. 
Hyponymy is dealt with within the former category of relations simply because it is 
essentially a result of a substitutional process between closely related lexical items. 
Within the latter category Lyons mainly deals with collocational relations because they 
exhibit several combinatorial features in terms of frequency and acceptability of co-
occurrence.84 
The relationship between hyponymy and metonymy is obvious since one of the 
fundamental relations of metonymy is that of signifying inclusion through part/whole 
1 Hatim and Mason (1997: 148-49). 
2 Cruse (1986: 89). 
3 Crystal (1991: 168). 
4 Lyons (1995: 124). 
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relations. The following example from Gibbs85 illustrates the point. It is a passage that 
describes a person: 
73. fine eyes, in steel-rimmed glasses and a most expressive and sensitive mouth, by 
turns tremulous, amused, morally reproving or full of scorn. It was the mouth, one 
felt, of a man defending the right to be sensitive. Physically he was awkward, limp 
and still at the same time. He would stand askew, as it were, holding himself 
together by gripping his left hand in his right. By contrast his gestures were most 
graceful. 
The following diagram illustrates the patterns of these hyponymy relations which relate 
to the description of the man. Some of these relations are hyponymy/hyponymy relations 
while others are hyponym/superordinate relations. On the whole all relations are 
metonymic whether those of species to species or those of species to genus because the 
principle is the same, i.e. all of the relations are of inclusion. 
glasses mouth eves 
the mouth 
man 
his left hand - his right 
Figure 4.5. Patterns of hyponymic relations in text 73. 
The part/whole relations can be represented more explicitly as follows: 
Man Gestures 
holding gnpping 
eyes mouth glasses left hand right [hand] 
Figure 4.6. A metonymic model of hyponymic relations in text 73. 
The relation underlying the diagram on the left is that of physical hyponymy which is 
taken to mean a relation of physical inclusion. The relation underlying the diagram on 
Gibbs (1994: I I ) . 
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the right is that of cognitive hyponymy. According to the triadic semiotic model of 
metonymic signification proposed in this study, the distinction between the cognitive 
and the physical or ontological is realised in such a way that physical hyponymy 
signifies ontological inclusion while cognitive hyponymy signifies epistemological 
inclusion. So it could be argued that the diagram on the left shows ontological 
hyponymic relations and that on the right shows epistemological hyponymic relations. 
However, both of these types of relation are actually metonymic given that metonymy 
covers both epistemology and ontology. 
It should be noted that Halliday and Hasan do not include hyponymy in their inventory 
of cohesive devices. This is one of the shortcomings taken of against their model. The 
model, for example, subsumes 'same' and'different'under similarity, and'included' 
and 'including' under superordinate without further elaboration on these subtypes of 
relations. This hampers its operationality. Hasan has alluded to these points and 
accordingly proposed a 'revised version'.86 It is worth mentioning that the model of 
metonymy as a textual device proposed throughout this thesis covers all these aspects 
and gives a detailed account of relations and converse relations. It also provides 
justification for why a relation is sometimes interpreted in some certain ways while the 
converse of this relationship might not necessarily be so interpreted.87 
4.1.3.1.3. Metonymy and superordinateness 
Superordinateness is the converse of hyponymy and the two notions imply one another. 
A hyponym entails its superordinate whereas the superordinateness does not entail its 
hyponym. This statement can be reformulated differently drawing from the literature in 
semiotics as follows: a hyponym denotes its superordinate whereas a superordinate 
88 
connotes its hyponym. 
See for further detail Hasan's paper (1984) particularly page 202. 
87 
Compare for example the superordinate/hyponymy vs. hyponymy/superordinate and the discussion of 
denotation vs. connotation in linguistic signification between parts and wholes and between wholes and 
parts below. 
88 
It should be pointed out in this connection that the terms 'denotation' and 'connotation' have acquired a 
high degree of diversity in treatment. Garza-Cuar6n provides a six-way distinction between the two terms. 
'The first is the distinction between denotation, understood as the direct reference of a sign to an object, 
and connotation, understood as adjacent meaning which is added to primary meaning. The second is the 
relation between suppositio and significatio. The former here is the referential realisation of a sign in a 
given proposition or the property of a term to stand for something (or the'actual'representation of an 
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74. A: I saw a lion. 
B: I saw an animal.89 
A entails B because the relation of inclusion is logically necessary that a lion is an 
animal. In semantic terms we can say that A entails B. However, B does not necessarily 
entail A although it may presuppose it. The relation through which we move from the 
genus to the species is a relation outside language because it relates to culture and it 
relates to the notion of prototypical ity. However, the relation through which we move 
from the species to the genus is essentially linguistic. In the examples 
75. A: I cooked lamb. 
B: 1 cooked meat. 
I f you cooked 'lamb' you necessarily cooked 'meat' because 'lamb' is part of the 
concept 'meat'. However, i f you cooked 'meat' it is not necessary that you cooked lamb. 
Let us consider the following two examples: 
76. A : I bought a chair. 
B: I bought some furniture. 
I f we can think of a culture where the chair is a prototype of furniture then we can say 
that the whole typically signifies the part. So in this culture when the category 
'furniture' is mentioned it typically signifies 'chair'. This category is not only culture-
specific but also context-specific. So i f somebody says ' I need to buy furniture for my 
house' we activate a schema of sofas and beds more than desks. I f someone says ' I need 
object in a concrete sign). The latter is the assignation of a meaning to a form or the convention by means 
of which a form signifies a class of objects. The third point concerns the senses modern logicians associate 
with the terms denotation and connotation. Denotation is used to refer to those subjects of which a term 
can be predicated, or simply the object to which a term refers. Connotation, in turn, is the set of properties 
that determine membership in a given class. This pair of terms are [sic] generally associated with other 
pairs such as extension-intension and comprehension-extension. The fourth is the distinction between 
denotation, as a referential meaning, and connotation as emotive meaning (the association of images, 
experiences and values). The fifth is the opposition between the denotation of a word, as its principal, 
primary, fixed or literal meaning, and its variable and ambiguous connotations, as secondary meanings 
added figurative or metaphoric senses and affective values. The sixth is the point in which Urban suggests 
that there are three different kinds of connotation: conceptual connotation, which is the abstraction that 
most words imply, intuitive connotation, which is the conjuring up of meaning itself, the intuition of the 
world or of objects through meaning, and emotional connotation'. Garza-Cuar6n (1991: 119-120). 
89 
Compare the example of'dog' and 'animal' by Dickins (1998: 301-302) which addresses a similar 
issue of the role of denotation and connotation in euphemistic expressions. Cruse gives the example: 
'I'm going to take the animal for a walk'which is used instead of'I'm going to take the dog for a walk'. 
Cruse then argues that this substitution is 'no longer neutral - to produce a neutral utterance, the speaker 
must use dog. The effect of avoiding the generic term in this way is often to add negative emotive 
overtones to the utterance' (1986: 155). 
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to buy furniture for my office' we activate a schema of chairs, an office desk, and so on. 
In all of these cases we are able to infer the part from the whole.9 0 Also in the examples: 
77. A: I hit him on the nose 
B: I hit him on the face. 
A entails B but B does not entail A because the part does not entail the whole. 
The textual theory of metonymy as I am developing it in this thesis allows us to combine 
both aspects of denotation and connotation in our analysis. We combine both language 
and context. We combine both the semantics and the pragmatics of text in the process of 
text analysis, text description and text interpretation and both the conventional and 
motivated aspects of language in text analysis. Moreover, the theory of metonymy as a 
textual tool does not necessarily require that the superordinate be mentioned in the text. 
Metonymy allows us to conceive of a superordinate as soon as the parts are mentioned 
even i f it is not present in the text. The notion of superordinate i f interpreted 
metonymically is a powerful tool for the analysis and interpretation of text and relates 
coherently with the metonymic principle actual for virtual especially when'virtual'is 
seen to correspond to 'whole/superordinate' and 'actual' to 'part/hyponym'. Within such 
an approach phonological recurrence in text for example has meaning because it 
signifies a system of repetition of similar sound species which belong to an abstract 
entity that stands as the ideal form of the sound repeated throughout the text. The same 
also applies to morphological repetition and syntactic parallelism, as well as to the 
semantic relations in text. 
Let us consider this example from Hoey9 1, which illustrates lexical patterns in text. I am 
interested in the patterns of superordinates and hyponyms in the text as these are of 
direct relevance to this section: 
78. A drug known to produce violent reactions in humans has been used for sedating 
grizzly bears Ursus actors in Montana, USA, according to a report in the New York 
Times. After one bear, known to be a peaceable animal, killed and ate a camper in 
This point will be further discussed in the next chapter when I discuss the notion of schematic 
knowledge and text organisation and interpretation. There I shall show that part/whole movement seems to 
be logical and therefore necessary whereas whole/part movement amounts to expectation by inferencing. 
This might or might not be satisfied by the progression of the text. And perhaps this is what creates the 
dynamic interactive process of text interpretation. 
9 1 Hoey (1991: 37). 
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an unprovoked attack, scientists discovered it had been tranquillised 11 times with 
phencyclidine, or 'angle dust', which causes hallucination and sometimes gives the 
user an irrational feeling of destructive power. Many wild bears have become 
'garbage junkies' feeding from dumps around human developments. To avoid 
potentially dangerous clashes between them and humans, scientists are trying to 
rehabilitate the animals by drugging them and releasing them in uninhabited areas. 
Although some biologists deny that the mind-altering drug was responsible for 
uncharacteristic behaviour of this particular bear, no research has been done into 
the effects of giving grizzly bears or other mammals repeated doses of 
phencyclidine. 
The following diagram illustrates the patterns of superordinate/hyponymy in text 85 
above: 
humans animals 
scientists (user) mammals 
biologists bears 
Figure 4.7. Patterns of C O N C E P T F O R C O N C E P T relation in text 78. 
We can see that the CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT metonymic relation is responsible for 
connecting lexical items like 'humans', 'scientists' and 'biologists' because they are 
metonymically related as superordinates and hyponyms. Similarly, the lexical items 
'animals', 'mammals' and 'bears' are also metonymically related via the metonymic 
representational relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT. 
Metonymy helps us also to see models of superordinates and hyponyms even in cases 
where there exists no explicit hierarchy, because the hierarchy can be implicit and latent. 
This approach allows us to see the repetition o f ' i t was through the war ' in text (79) 
below as a species of a general structural parallelism in the text, which is also 
manifested by other recurrences in the text, either of the same type or of a slightly 
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different type. Consider the following text from Hatim and Mason, again from the 
Khomeini speech. 
79. It was through the war that we unveiled the deceitful face of the World 
Devourers. It was through the war that we recognised our enemies and friends. It 
was during the war that we concluded that we must stand on our own feet. It was 
through the war that we broke the back of both Eastern and Western superpowers. 
It was through the war that we consolidated the roots of our fruitful Islamic 
revolution. It was through the war that we nurtured a sense of fraternity and 
patriotism in the spirit of all the people. It was through the war that we showed the 
people of the world -in particular the people of the region - that one can fight 
against all the powers and superpowers for several years. 
4.1.3.1.4. Metonymy and meronymy 
Meronymy is a semantic relation of inclusion in which the semantic domain of a lexical 
item is seen to be branching in a lexical hierarchy. Meronymy is the lexical relation of 
93 
part/whole. Defining meronymy is not easy as Cruse suggests. Perhaps the best way to 
define meronymy is to say that the lexical relation is perceived in the formula 'A has X ' . 
I f A has X then X is a meronym of A. Let me give some examples: 
80. Hands have fingers. 
81. Faces have noses. 
82. Cars have wheels. 
As we have seen in various parts of this thesis, the part/whole relation is a fundamental 
relation of metonymic reasoning. Therefore, the link between metonymy and meronymy 
is evident. Cruse94 illustrates of the nature of the relation of meronymy as follows: 
heal trunk 
^ 
finger fore 
arrn leg 
Figure 4. 8. Cruse's illustration of meronymic relations. 
92 Hatim and Mason (1997: 149). 
93 Cruse (1986: 160). 
Cruse (1986: 157). 94 
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The most interesting aspect of Cruse's discussion is his distinction between two notions 
related to part/whole relations. The first is 'meronomy' and the second is 'meronymy'. 
The difference between these two concepts as Cruse perceives it is that 'a meronomy is 
a lexical hierarchy whose relation of dominance is the lexical relation of meronymy'.95 
So meronomy is the structure whereas meronymy is the relation. This interpretation is 
evident from Cruse's later clarification that 'the semantic relation between a lexical item 
denoting a part and that denoting the corresponding whole will be termed meronymy'.96 
As regards meronomy Cruse argues that'.. .there is first of all a true meronomy, whose 
structure is determined by purely linguistic criteria'.9 7 
Relevant to this thesis is Cruse's distinction between'meronomy'and'labelled part-
whole hierarchy'. The former, according to Cruse, is the 'true meronomy' which is 
based on linguistic criteria. The latter is 'formally identical to the corresponding extra-
• • • 98 • 
linguistic hierarchy'. Cruse makes it clear that his concern in his book is 'meronomy' 
because it is the linguistically-based hierarchy. I argue here that a theory of metonymy 
accounts for both linguistic and extra-linguistic inclusion relations and hierarchies. The 
textual theory of metonymy as I am developing it throughout this thesis is a theory of 
linguistic and extralinguistic (i.e. cognitive) 'stand for' relations, the most notable 
relation among these being CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT which is based on part/whole relations. 
The following passage illustrates how metonymy explains both linguistic as well as 
extralinguistic networks of part-whole relations. 
83. The city was quiet. The streets were all covered with snow. He walked up the 
street. The shop round the corner was the only place to find something to eat. In the 
food section he stretched out his hand to the shelf to take some cheese and a piece of 
bread. He paid and continued his aimless night journey. 
In the above text we can think of 'a city' meronomy in which the part/whole relations 
are not actually linguistic but extralinguistic, i.e. ontological relations. This is to say that 
9 5 Ibid, (ff.l: 180). 
9 6 Ibid. (159). 
9 7 Ibid. (160). 
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street does not really relate to city by means of semantic inclusion but by means of 
cognitive inclusion. The following is a model of the meronymic relations in the above 
passage: 
city 
street 
shop 
food section 
the shelf 
some cheese piece of bread 
Figure 4.9. A model of meronymic relations in text 83. 
4.1.3.2. Metonymy and Collocation 
I have indirectly mentioned collocation previously in chapter 2 section 2.2.1.3. when I 
discussed the different theories of metonymy, and particularly when I discussed 
Ullmann's theory of semantic deletion. I argued that one aspect of a semantic theory of 
metonymy is that it is collocational. Here I am concerned with elaborating on this 
concept but I should start with a general definition of collocation. Crystal defines 
collocation as 'a term used in lexicology by some (especially Firthian) linguists to refer 
to the habitual co-occurrence of individual lexical items'." Crystal argues that 
'collocations are then a type of syntagmatic lexical relation'. 1 0 0 From this definition it is 
clear that there seem to be at least two traditions with regard to collocation. 
The first is the Firthian tradition which proposes a lexical dimension to the 
environmental co-occurrence. In this sense collocation means the set of predictable 
lexical items which co-occur next to each other. Perhaps the classical example of this 
kind of co-occurrence relations is the difference between the words 'pretty' and 
'handsome'. The word 'pretty' collocates with 'girl ' whereas 'handsome' collocates 
with 'boy'. The reverse of this will lead to some kind of foreignness and oddity. Perhaps 
9 8 Ibid. 
9 9 Crystal (1991: 62). 
189 
Chapter Four Metonymy and Text Cohesion 
a clearer example would be the collocation between 'resounding crash' but not 
'resounding tinkle'. The former seems to collocate perfectly well while the result of the 
latter is a little incongruous. Perceived as such, collocation in the Firthian sense is 
entirely a lexical phenomenon. Therefore, i f collocation is a kind of syntagmatic lexical 
relation and i f metonymy is essentially combinational then the link between the two in 
the creation of text is evident.101 
The second tradition is that of Halliday and Hasan which extends the scope of 
collocation over lexical boundaries to explain textual patterns based on this lexical 
aspect. Halliday and Hasan define collocation as 'the cohesion that is achieved through 
the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur', and claim that this type of 
lexical relation is the most problematical of all lexical cohesive devices.102 The 
treatment of collocation by Halliday and Hasan is very useful as far as textuality is 
concerned because they took the concept outside its traditional domain and promoted it 
to also explain textual phenomena. However, their treatment of the concept is rather 
general and as Hoey argues 'Under this heading [collocation] Halliday and Hasan 
include a ragbag of lexical relations, many of which have no readily available name'.1 0 3 
Among the examples they provide are the following: boy ... girl, stand up ... sit down, 
like ... hate, wet... dry and so on and so forth. The view of collocation as problematic 
is raised up again by Hasan who asserts that: 
Altogether the notion of collocation proved problematic. While I 
firmly believe that behind the notion of collocation is an intuitive 
reality, I have come to accept the fact that unless we can unpack the 
details of the relations involved in collocation in the Firthian sense, it 
is best to avoid the category in research. The problems of inter-
subjective reliability cannot be ignored. 
Hasan here seems to be rather skeptical about the validity of the notion of collocation 
because of its rather loose nature. She suggests a theory of lexical cohesion without 
collocation and her classification does not show this relation at all. She conceives of two 
1 0 0 Ibid. 
1 0 1 See Firth (1957: 124-127) where the term 'collocation' is suggested as a technical term. In (1957: 11) 
Firth argues that 'collocation is not to be interpreted as context by which the whole conceptual meaning is 
implied. Nor is it to be confused with citation .... Collocations of a given word are statements of the 
habitual or customary places of that word in collocational order but not in any other contextual order and 
emphatically not in any grammatical order'. 
1 0 2 cf. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 284). 
1 0 3 Hoey (1991:7). 
1 0 4 Hasan (1984: 195). 
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major types of lexical cohesive devices. The following is a reproduction of her 
classification105: 
Catefiories of lexical cohesion: 
A. General 
i . repetition 
it. synonymy 
i i i . antonymy 
iv. hyponymy 
v. meronymy 
leave, leaving, left 
leave, depart 
leave, arrive 
travel, leave (including co-hyponyms, leave, 
arrive) 
hand, finger (including co-meronymys, finger, 
thumb) 
B. lnstantial 
i . equivalence 
i i . naming 
i i i . semblance 
the sailor was their daddy; you be the patient, 
I ' l l be the doctor 
the dog was called Toto; they named the dog 
Fulffy 
the deck was like a pool; all my pleasures are 
like yesterdays 
As we can see the table above does not include collocation among the lexical cohesive 
devices. Hasan's comment on the absence of this lexical cohesive device is that 'it 
proved remarkably difficult to operationalise this category sufficiently to ensure 
consistent analysis. But the reason for its exclusion is not entirely negative. Many 
relations previously handled under this rubric are now subsumed in the revised 
version 
106 
Collocation is not only a semantic but also a cognitive phenomenon, since it involves 
regular co-occurrence. It occurs when certain words acquire a sort of currency and 
conventionality because of standing next to each other or perhaps more precisely 
because of co-occurring in the same textual and contextual environment to the extent 
that some of these lexical collocations (which are semantically, cognitively and logically 
related) can actually be omitted and the meaning will still remain the same because the 
whole perceptual understanding is supplied by our cognition. Many part/whole 
metonymies are actually of this sort. These are either of the FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR 
CONCEPT, CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT or CONCEPT FOR THING. In other words these relations can either 
be in the realm of form, in the realm of cognition or in the realm of reality. So the 
established conventionality between 'the ladies toilets' allows for an ellipsis to take 
place without affecting the semantic content and the processing of the message. This 
1 0 5 Ibid. (202). 
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allows for expressions like 'the ladies', 'the gents', 'the barber's' and so on to be used 
quite frequently in language. 
The established cognitive association between 'the city', 'the street' and 'the shop round 
the corner' in example (83) above is a good illustration of a cognitive association based 
on a relation of co-occurrence which is essentially collocational. This relation of co-
occurrence is cognitive because 'streets' and 'shops round the corner' are not essential 
components or critical features of the semantic structure of 'a city'. However, the 
relations of co-occurrence are built via cognitive reasoning of 'concomitance'. The third 
type of collocation is semantic or ontological and this concerns phenomenological 
realities. The example of the 'keel' being used instead of the ship is a case in point. The 
'keel' is an essential or a prototypical part of a ship. Conversely, the 'nose' is a 
prototypical part of a 'face' so when we use the whole to stand for the part in 
expressions like ' I hit him on the face' while the hit was actually on the nose for 
instance, the substitution is based on a whole for part relation. 
Metonymic collocation in all of its three forms is a major factor in text generation 
because the set of lexical items that co-occur may stretch over a passage to give it unity 
and continuity of occurrences.107 The set of collocations in text is a major factor 
influencing text membership and text typology. Based on the three previously 
mentioned relations which link collocation to metonymy, it is possible to argue that 
collocation is not only an organising principle in text but also a fundamental factor in 
text generation. This is an argument that runs against Hoey's (1991) and Phillips' (1985) 
arguments of regarding collocation as a purely organising principle. However, their 
insights should be seen within their framework and purpose of analysis. By the same 
token, my observations about metonymic collocation should be seen within the context 
of my own analytical framework. 
Collocation is a constitutive device because it links all the three realms of phenomena, 
the world of concepts, the world of forms and the world of things. Collocation creates 
text and allows for the creation of the linguistic specification of register and text 
typology. It does not merely organise text. The set of collocations in text largely 
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determines the type of text and specifies the kind of register to which that particular text 
belongs. While Hasan excludes 'collocation' from her 'revised version' of the lexical 
cohesive devices I shift the notion of collocation from text cohesion, i.e. from a 
regulative notion, to text generation, genre membership and register membership, i.e. to 
a constitutive notion. I am able to do this because the traditional relations covered by 
'collocation' in Halliday and Hasan are already accounted for by other relations 
specified in the system. For example, the pair 'come' and 'go' which are traditionally 
seen as an example of collocation, are actually taken care of by the stand for relation 
which is based on category membership, i.e. both of 'come' and 'go' are co-hyponyms 
of a general category of 'movement'. This is to say, collocation as a cohesive device 
becomes redundant. 
It is also interesting to note that Hasan admits that her exclusion of'collocation'from 
lexical cohesion has resulted in a text analysis which is deprived of a fairly 
comprehensive cohesive device, such that some relations which are categorised as 
cohesive were in fact previously described as collocative, and these cannot be explained 
by the relations she proposes instead of collocation. In this regard Hasan maintains that 
although the above minimised the effects of the exclusion of 
collocation, it does not entirely cover the phenomena handled through 
collocation. Certain relations intuitively recognised as cohesive 
cannot be accounted for in the revised version.1 0 9 
Hasan gives the words 'ship', 'sailor' and'sea'as examples of'collocation'that are, 
according to her, difficult to handle by other relations within the'revised version'. I 
believe that metonymy as defined in this thesis solves this problem, in that the words 
'ship', 'sailor' and 'sea' are very closely related to one another as parts of a general 
idealised cognitive model of the sea experience. In some psychological studies these 
idealised cognitive models are described in terms of schemata. Thus the phenomenon is 
handled within the model I am proposing and there is no need to regret the exclusion of 
collocation from the 'revised version'. Hasan acknowledges that a broader view of 
textuality is able to solve the problem of finding ways to explain relations within text. 
She specifically mentions 'coherence' as this broader view. It is to this vital aspect of 
textuality that I turn in the next chapter. However, before I begin the discussion of text 
1 0 7 Phillips (1985) addresses the nature of collocation and how it organises large-scale texts. 
See Baker (1992: 52) who argues for a registral nature of collocation. 
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coherence it is important to remind the reader that the argument that this thesis attempts 
to put forward is that metonymy as a textual tool subsumes both cohesion and 
coherence, form and meaning, language and context, semantics and pragmatics. It also 
goes beyond this to include a stylistic aspect of textual analysis, through the 
incorporation of the systematic patterns of phonological, morphological and syntactic 
repetition in text. 
In a later 1 1 0 work Halliday provides a summary of the theory of cohesion in one chapter 
in which he retains almost all the arguments he and Hasan proposed in (1976). Two 
points can be raised regarding this chapter. The first is that the chapter addresses almost 
all the cohesive devices discussed in the 1976 Cohesion in English but with a different 
focus. In this chapter Halliday tries to provide a more comprehensive scope of cohesion 
in which text connectivity is not limited to the explicit formal devices but is also evident 
in implied ones. This is a remarkable shift as it acknowledges clearly the cognitive 
aspect involved in text organisation and processing. The role of inferencing here is 
obvious and this takes the theory outside semantics and well into pragmatics. The 
second point is that Halliday in this chapter speaks about the notion of coherence and 
maintains that 'for a text to be coherent, it must be cohesive; but it must be more 
besides'.111 Halliday admits that his theory of cohesion is not adequate as a theory of 
text meaning because text meaning involves much more than formal connectedness in 
text. 
Metonymy is the signifying relation which combines both aspects of textuality: that of 
linguistic structuring and that of cognitive structuring. I am not implying that linguistic 
patterns are not cognitive patterns or that cognitive patterns can be realised without 
linguistic patterns. Rather, I am positing that the theory of metonymy as semiotic 
configuration between the realms of words, concepts and things is able to account for 
the multidimensional nature of text. It will help us interpret the linguistic patterns listed 
as cohesive devices and will also take us beyond this to interpret unsaid but implied or 
concealed facts about the culture and ideology of the text. The choice of one aspect of a 
thing/concept to stand for the whole thing/concept is essentially a cultural and 
1 0 9 Hasan (1984: 203). 
1 , 0 Halliday (1985: chapter 9). 
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ideological matter. Metonymy will help us reveal or, to use a more critical term, 
deconstruct these mysteries. So far I have outlined the significance of metonymy as a 
textual tool for the interpretation of the formal patterning of text. In the next chapter I 
will attempt to illustrate the other side of the coin. This concerns the ways in which 
metonymy helps us carry out inferences and judgments about how the text hangs 
together and how it makes sense by means of revealing the set of cognitive relations 
metonymy creates in the generation and organisation of text. 
We have seen so far that Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion limits the scope of the 
notion and confines it to a rather marginal role and places it under the textual 
component of the semantic configuration of text. The proper place of cohesion should 
however pervade the entire model of signification. As I showed in 4.1.1. the sound has a 
cohesive role in the harmony of the text just as the word and the phrase do. Besides, 
cohesion, whether on the phonological, grammatical, or semantic level, is always 
motivated by factors from outside language. This makes the concept of cohesion a 
transparent one which pervades all linguistic levels, and which is motivated by higher 
levels of signification. 
4.2. Summary 
In this chapter I discussed the theory of cohesion as propounded by Halliday and Hasan 
in their classic joint work (1976) and also in later work. The aim of the chapter was to 
relate each of the principles of text cohesion to one aspect of metonymic operation. I 
went on to claim that metonymy is in fact not only a theory of formal connectedness in 
text but is also a pragmatic theory of textuality. It will be the task of the following 
chapter to investigate this latter aspect. 
1 1 1 Halliday (1985: 318). 
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Chapter Five: Metonymy and Text Coherence 
As a conceptual process of locating a 
reference point, metonymy belongs to the 
wider set of strategies offinding a point 
in the common reference space between 
a speaker and a listener that can serve 
as a bridge or link to the intended 
referent.1 
5.0. Introduction: 
In the previous chapter I have shown that metonymic relations of FORM FOR FORM, FORM FOR 
THING, THING FOR FORM, CONCEPT FOR FORM and of FORM FOR CONCEPT can actually be integrated 
into a textual model of formal and semantic connectedness in text. This I have termed 
the cohesive power of metonymy. In this chapter I argue that metonymic processes as 
text organising principles are not limited to the set of formal or semantic bonds in text. 
Rather these processes go beyond this to explain the pragmatic dimension of text 
generation, organisation and interpretation. This chapter builds on the relations of the 
formal component and goes beyond that to investigate the dynamic interaction between 
language, cognition and context in text creation and organisation. The metonymic 
representational relations to be discussed in this chapter are CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT, CONCEPT 
FOR THING, THING FOR CONCEPT and THING FOR THING. This I term the coherence power of 
metonymy. This chapter is particularly an attempt to answer the question how, from a 
metonymic perspective, a text is perceived to form a unified whole and how it is 
perceived as meaningful. There are several approaches to the pragmatic aspect of 
meaning and one could be tempted to investigate all of these but given the shortage of 
space I shall limit the scope of this chapter to discussing the theoretical framework of 
what has been generally referred to as Schema Theory2. The following claims underlie 
the chapter: 
• I f metonymy is a mode of representing knowledge then it should tell us how this 
knowledge is stored and used in real life interactions between thought and text. 
1 Driven (1999: 275). 
2 
See the definition and discussion of this theory below. This term has been treated as the general area of 
conceptual representation of knowledge in the mind. See for example the list of references in de 
Beaugrande and Dressier where they discuss the elements of this theory (1981: 90). 
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• I f metonymy is a fundamental principle of our cognitive structure , then it should 
be able to explain how cognitive continuities are established and licensed in text. 
• I f text coherence means basically text prediction and text expectation then 
metonymy as a principle of conceptual contiguity and causality is capable of 
assisting us in predicting what could be coming next in text. 
The chapter will specifically address the relevance of the five major knowledge 
structures commonly discussed in the literature on schema theory. These are frames and 
scenarios proposed by Minsky (1975), schemata proposed by Bartlett (1932) and 
Rumelhart (1976), scripts, plans and goals discussed by Schank and Abelson (1977) and 
prototypes and stereotypes discussed in Ungerer and Schmid (1996). The chapter aims 
to integrate all these notions into a unified cognitive framework and relate them to the 
concept of metonymy in its cognitive and textual aspect to account for continuities and 
coherence in text. 
5.1. Metonymy and coherence 
Coherence is that text property which makes a text logically accessible and conceptually 
relevant to its context. But is coherence a property of text as a formal and static entity or 
is it a property of text interpretation as an interactive and dynamic process? Charolles 
argues that: 
No text is inherently coherent or incoherent. In the end, it all depends on the receiver, and 
on his ability to interpret the indications present in the discourse so that, finally, he manages 
to understand it in a way which seems coherent to him - in a way which corresponds with 
his idea of what it is that makes a series of actions into an integrated whole'.4 
This section aims to show that coherence is actually a feature of interpretation which is 
dynamic and interactive within a multidimensional spectrum in which the text is only 
one dimension. More importantly, the section primarily aims to show that the concept of 
metonymy as developed throughout this thesis is also capable of accounting for the 
dimension of text coherence. Halliday and Hasan do not discuss text coherence at all in 
their (1976) book. However, later they begin to realise the importance of the notion, and 
Hasan in her (1984) paper addresses the issue of the contribution of cohesion to the 
coherence of text. Halliday and Hasan (1989) address the issue of coherence more 
clearly. In the following paragraphs I will consider the notion of coherence as presented 
3 This hypothesis has been demonstrated in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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in Halliday and Hasan. I will then proceed to address the notions that have come to 
characterise the study of coherence in text like frames, goals, scripts, plans and goals. 
In her article 'Coherence and Cohesive Harmony', Hasan provides a textual theory of 
coherence by relating it to the notion of cohesive harmony and more precisely to the 
cohesive chains in text. These are identity and similarity chains.5 This textual theory is 
supported by a claim which Hasan tries to prove in her paper. This is that 'the basis for 
textual coherence lies in cohesion'.6 More explicitly she argues that 'situational 
coherence is not a prior requirement for the existence of coherence in a text which 
describes these situations'.7 Hasan here argues against her and Halliday's earlier 
argument in Cohesion in English (1976) that 'reference to the situation is the prior form 
of reference, and that reference to another item within the text is a secondary or derived 
Q 
form of this relation'. Halliday and Hasan (1976) go even further to suggest that'it is 
certainly possible that, in the evolution of language, situational reference preceded text 
reference'.9 
The main problem with Halliday and Hasan's theory of cohesion is that they initially 
placed it under the textual component of the semantic system of language. This is a 
reductionist view of the notion of cohesion and a gross limitation of the scope of the 
phenomenon of text connectivity. The insufficiency of a formal approach to text forced 
the development of a wider notion of textuality which is'coherence'. However, under 
the principles of their approach they could not escape the formal orientation of their 
treatment of connectivity in text. Therefore, the question that arises is 'what is the 
reason behind the variation between the following two texts?' The first is after Enkvist 1 0 
and is densely cohesive but does not make sense. 
4Charolles(1983:95). 
5 C f . Hasan (1984). 
6 Ibid. (210) 
7 Ibid. 
8 Halliday and Hasan (1976: 32). 
9 Ibid. 
1 0 Enkvist (1978: 110). 
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1. I bought a Ford. A [sic] car in which President Wilson rode down the Champs 
Elysees was black. Black English has been widely discussed. The discussion 
between the presidents ended last week. A week has seven days. Every day I feed my 
cat. Cats have four legs. The cat is on the mat. Mat has three letters. 
The second text is adopted from Brown and Yule 1 1 and does not show any cohesive 
devices and yet makes sense. 
2. Epistemics Seminar: Thursday 3rd June, 2.00p. m. 
Steve Harlow (Department of Linguistics, University of York). 
'Welsh and Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar' 
Instead of answering this query by resorting to the context of situation and the context 
of culture as the main reasons behind this variation, Hasan extends her formal approach 
to suggest that the set of cohesive chains can explain text coherence. My argument is 
that, although the theory of cohesion might be legitimately formal in the sense that it 
looks for the interrelationships between formal ties in the text, coherence is essentially a 
phenomenon that is best understood through reference to the extralinguistic setting 
whether in the immediate context of situation or in the broader context of culture. 
Although Halliday's writings about the subject of language as social semiotic discuss 
the notion of 'context', these discussions regrettably restrict this notion to the higher 
levels of linguistic signification particularly to those of language variation. This notion 
developed in these writings into the notion of 'register', which in practice concerns the 
variation in language determined by diversity of circumstances of'use', and in theory 
concerns the configuration of the three components of the context of situation, i.e. field, 
tenor and mode. Field is realised by the experiential component of the semantic system, 
tenor is realised by the interpersonal component, and mode is realised by the textual 
component. It is under this final component that Halliday and Hasan place 'cohesion' 
and it is this reductionism that led to their overall formal theory of cohesion. 
Hasan's treatment of the notion of coherence as 'the property of unity or that of 
12 
'hanging together' on the basis of 'cohesive harmony' or the set of 'cohesive chains' 
in text makes 'coherence' entirely a property of text. It is vital to point out that this is 
"Brown and Yule (1983: 223). 
, 2 Hasan (1984: 181). 
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contradictory to her own assumption that 'textual coherence is a relative, not an absolute 
property, so that it is possible to rank a group of texts on a cline from most coherent to 
least coherent'. ~ My argument here is that i f coherence is entirely a property of text 
then it is objective or at least it can be both objective and deterministic. This is to say 
we could reach a consensus about it since all that is needed is to count the number of 
ties and the number of chains of these ties in a text. I f we take the word 'relative' further 
we shall notice that it indirectly involves reference to the reader whom Hasan intends to 
exclude from her analysis. 
Widdowson argues in favour of a distinction between cohesion and coherence and 
concludes that cohesion is 'the overt, linguistically signalled relationship between 
propositions' and that coherence is 'relationship between illocutionary acts'.1 4 This 
treatment agrees with the definitions which Hoey provides for cohesion and coherence. 
Hoey defines cohesion as 'a property of text whereby certain grammatical or lexical 
features of the sentences of the text connect them to other sentences in the text'. 1 5 On 
the other hand, Hoey defines coherence as 
a quality assigned to text by a reader or listener, and is a measure of the extent to which the 
reader or listener finds that the text holds together and makes sense as a unity. It is not 
therefore identifiable with any combination of linguistic features and will never be absolute. 
The same text may be found coherent by one reader and incoherent by another, though an 
overwhelming consensus can be achieved for most naturally occurring texts.16 
The link between the text and the non-linguistic world outside the text is clear in 
Widdowson's and Hoey's treatment of the concepts of coherence. Hoey's approach is 
more explicit in assigning the property of coherence to the reader or the listener. It is 
this approach that is adopted in this thesis. 
Similar distinctions between the two notions have also been put forward by other 
scholars such as Cook who defines cohesion as 'formal links between sentences and 
between clauses'.17 He defines coherence as 'the quality of meaning, unity, and purpose 
1 3 [bid. (184). 
1 4 Widdowson (1978: 28,31). 
1 5 Hoey (1991: 266). 
1 6 Ibid. (165-266). 
1 7 Cook (1989: 156). 
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1 Q 
perceived in discourse'. Cook reviews the origins of discourse analysis and addresses 
the long-standing question of how to account for the description of pieces of language 
longer than the sentence to find out what gives these stretches unity and meaning. He 
comes to the conclusion, which supports my argument here of the need to: 
(a) distinguish between cohesion and coherence and 
(b) establish the notion of coherence on the contextual level of linguistic signification. 
Cook concludes that 
if we are to find the answer to the problem of what gives stretches of language unity and 
meaning, we must look beyond the formal rules operating within sentences, and consider 
the people who use language, and the world in which it happens as well . 1 9 
This has been precisely my argument throughout this thesis: we need more than the 
notion of cohesion to account for the interpretation of text. In my model of metonymic 
relations in text I have placed cohesion at a lower level, i.e. the semantic level, where 
the metonymic relations realising it are those of FORM FOR FORM/CONCEPT/THING and the 
converse of these relations. On the other hand I have placed coherence on a higher level, 
i.e. the semiotic level, where the common metonymic relations are those of CONCEPT FOR 
CONCEPT/THING and the converse of these relations. These are believed to be inclusive of 
interdomain relations uniting the world of things, concepts and language. 
Cook regards the formal patterning of discourse as only one element in the 
interpretation of discourse. The other factors influencing text or discourse interpretation 
are the understanding of the set of functions language actually performs in certain 
circumstances. Cook mentions the theory of speech acts propounded by the philosopher 
Austin and later developed by John Searle. Speech act theory explains language use as a 
series of actions and in this way it probes deeply into the set of relations beneath the 
surface of the text. There are also other factors that account for the way in which 
stretches of language are perceived as meaningful unified wholes. Among these are the 
conversational principles proposed by Paul Grice; these account for how meaning is 
negotiated in discourse by the assumption that people normally adhere to principles like 
those of truthfulness, brevity, clarity and relevance. The flouting of any of these maxims 
leads to implicatures, i.e. inferred meanings. Perhaps all of these issues can actually be 
subsumed under the more general principle of text interpretation, i.e. that of the role of 
18 
19 
Ibid. 
Ibid. (13). 
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knowledge in creating and interpreting text. This is the issue that I am going to dwell on 
in sections (5.2.- 5.7.) of this chapter. 
The general theme of the nature of knowledge of the world and how it contributes to the 
creation of text has also been a major aspect of de Beaugrande and Dressler's theory of 
coherence. De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981) define coherence as the aspect of text 
which 'concerns the ways in which the components of the T E X T U A L WORLD , i.e. the 
configuration of CONCEPTS and RELATIONS which underlie the surface text, are mutually 
90 
accessible and relevant'. De Beaugrande and Dressier maintain that coherence in text 
concerns the actualisation process of virtual 'meanings' into actual 'senses'. They view 
the coherence of text as the 'continuity of senses'. This involves a great deal of work on 
the part of the reader and the listener because this continuity is attainable only through a 
process of negotiation between the 'presented knowledge' which the speaker/writer 
gives in the text and the 'stored knowledge' which the listener/reader has about the 
world. As de Beaugrande and Dressier suggest the negotiation is between meaning in its 
virtuality and sense in its actuality. 
5.2. Metonymy and schema theory 
9 1 
Schema theory (ST) is one of the theories that look into the nature of how conceptual 
structures are constructed in the human brain. More generally ST looks at how 
knowledge structures are organised in the human brain and how they are used in the 
processing of text. This section tries to establish the relationship between the various 
modes of knowledge construction in the human brain and the various processes of 
metonymy to show that our cognition is fundamentally metonymic and that textual 
knowledge is also metonymically constructed and metonymically interpreted. The 
chapter will not consider the debates about the validity or otherwise of the various 
proposed mathematical models of machine intelligence because this is outside the scope 
of this thesis. What this chapter intends to do, rather, is to investigate the issue of text 
coherence in its human aspect and relate this to the various metonymic processes, to 
show that coherence in text is achieved through an interaction between shared 
De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 4). 
21 
Other theories also exist, for example frame theory, theory of higher level knowledge structures and 
script theory see for details Schank and Abelson (1977) De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981) and Cook 
(1989). 
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knowledge which is metonymically constructed and organised in memory, and 
inferencing principles that are metonymically motivated. 
Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus (1995) provides a three-fold definition of the 
concept of 'schema': 
1. A plan, diagram, or scheme, 
2. (In the philosophy of Kant) a rule or principle that enables the understanding to unify 
experience. 
3. Logic, (a) a syllogistic figure, (b) a representation of the form of inference. 
The three definitions, it can be noted, are related and they together provide a unified 
definition of the concept schema in the sense we are concerned with here as 
representational structure. Schema theory is the theory of mental representation of 
stereotypical knowledge. It can be argued that schema theory had its origins in the way 
of thinking known as structuralism and more particularly in the theory of structural 
psychology known as Gestalt psychology. The major claim of Gestalt psychology is that 
perception is carried out according to 'gestalt laws of perceptual organisation'. The 
most important tenets of gestalt psychology as discussed in Koffka (1935) and 
Wertheimer (1958) are the following: 
• 'principle of proximity': this is essentially the principle of adjacency which states 
that adjacent elements will be perceived as related. 
• 'principle of similarity': similar elements tend to be perceived as one element. 
• 'principle of closure': perception tends to complete uncompleted figures. 
• 'principle of continuation' : continuous and not severely interrupted elements will 
be perceived as wholes. 
These laws or principles of perception indicate that perception is essentially metonymic 
because it is based on cognitive relations of contiguity and association. In fact, under the 
principle of association which is the basic metonymic principle we could include all the 
four principles mentioned above. This justifies the choice of the model of schema theory 
as a framework for this chapter. 
De Beaugrande and Dressier maintain that schema theory goes back to Bartlett (1932), 
who according to van Dijk and Kintsch was 'a psychologist working within the gestalt 
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tradition'. De Beaugrande and Dressier trace the development of the theory onward in 
the works of Rumelhart (1975), (1977b); Kintch (1977b); as well as others.23 I am not 
particularly concerned here with the history and development of the theory as this has 
already been discussed in detail in van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), Schank and Abelson 
(1977) and Cook (1990) as well as others. What concerns me rather is what the theory 
postulates and how this relates to the processes of metonymy and to the overall 
development of a textual model of metonymy. Schema theory postulates that our 
cognition of the world is essentially holistic. 2 4 The basic claim of schema theory, as 
Cook puts it, is 'that a new experience is understood by comparison with a stereotypical 
• • 9S 
version of a similar expenence held in memory'. So in a sense there are two processes 
involved in this cognition. One is accommodation in which the person accommodates a 
concept or an image or a sound, and structures that image, concept or sound into a 
stereotype or into a whole with internal coherence. The other process is that of 
modification in which the person modifies previous concepts or experiences in the light 
of new experiences. Here he may either reinforce a previous stereotype or modify it to 
96 
accommodate new data. 
It should be noted that schema theory is a theory of human understanding and this 
applies to the processing of linguistic data as well as to other types of data like the 
sensory data of smell, taste, sight, etc. Due to the fact that we are able to learn about 
sensory data other than linguistic data only through language, the linguistic 
manifestation of our cognition is perhaps the most widely studied phenomenon in 
schema theory and it is the type that I will be concerned with in this chapter. Schema 
theory is a pragmatic theory of understanding based on shared knowledge which 
facilitates the process of inferencing and makes communication possible between 
^ Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983: 3). 
2 3 See de Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 90). 
2 4 This obviously contrasts with Rosch's (1975) model of categorisation which is essentially 
interactionist. There is interaction both ways up and down. From the basic level people generalise to 
reach superordinates and at the same time they also make discriminations to make subordinates. 
2 5 Cook (1990: 1). 
26 
This view was propounded by the Genevan psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980) in relation to 
cognitive development in children. 204 
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people. The relationship between schema theory and the textual theory of metonymy is 
evident in virtue of the following observations. 
Schema theory postulates the existence of mental structures called schemas or schemata 
in the brain, which correspond to the three domains of reality, mind and language. 
According to Cook ' i f an intelligence is to process discourse, it wil l need language 
schemata, text schemata and world schemata'. This interdomain nature of schemata is 
reminiscent of the interdomain nature of metonymy proposed in this thesis. The textual 
theory of metonymy developed in this thesis also postulates that metonymies are stored 
as stereotypical representations of language structures and conceptual structures which, 
once activated, operate in facilitating understanding by means of the conceptual 
relations they establish in text. As argued above in chapters 2 and 3, metonymy does 
cross these three domains and provides a coherent understanding of language, 
epistemology and ontology. I argue here that these schemata as mental structures are 
essentially metonymic structures because they operate in discourse under metonymic 
operations of PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART, CAUSE FOR E F F E C T and E F F E C T FOR CAUSE. 
I shall now give an example of how schema theory works in text processing and show 
how this is related to metonymic processes in text. Schema theory postulates that the 
mental structures called 'schemata' or 'frames' help us in two ways not only in input 
processing which is the interpretation process but also in output processing which is the 
generation process by making our contribution to the discourse concise and relevant. 
The text in (3) below is interpreted as perfectly meaningful and relevant and thus as 
coherent because it builds on an assumption of some further knowledge of detail to be 
supplied by our knowledge store. 
3. I got up, washed, had breakfast and left for work. 
The four actions mentioned in (3) above can be termed 'global actions' not merely 
specific actions because each of these global actions involves several other sub-actions 
that we do not need to mention because they are supplied by our conceptual structure of 
previous experience. So each of the four actions mentioned in text (3) above stands for 
the sub-actions involved in a metonymic relation of CONCEPT FOR CONCEPT via a PART FOR 
WHOLE metonymic relation 
Cook (1990: 7-8). 
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Now our understanding of the statement depends on our activation of this global 
knowledge of the everyday-routine of getting up, and in fact any further detail of the 
specifics of this knowledge structure would be regarded as redundant. The same thing 
applies to the acts of washing, having breakfast and leaving for work. This concision 
and compactness in language is a precise operation of metonymic reasoning. This 
whole/part metonymic relation is the default case of both generating and interpreting 
text. However, there is also the unmarked form of these two processes. For example, i f 
the originator of the above is a witness in court of a road accident, the last global action 
of 'leaving for work' would not be sufficient because the judge wil l most likely 
interrupt the flow of the text and ask the witness to mention the details of the action. She 
might be asked to give further details whether she went to work alone or with someone 
else and whether she took the bus, taxi, underground and so on. 
Al l these schematic operations of knowledge structures are nothing but metonymic 
operations of the part for the whole and the converse of this process and they function in 
activating shared knowledge so as to rid communication of redundancy or in fact to give 
metonymic details i f need be. I f further in the text we encounter the phrase 'the bed' 
with the definite article 'the', we would not be surprised simply because this has been 
activated via the 'getting up' schema. Similarly, i f the phrase'the car'or any other 
mode of transport is mentioned in the definite we will not ask 'which car?' because this 
is supplied by our 'going to work'schema. This is essentially a process of part/whole 
metonymic reasoning. This chapter argues that much of the coherence of text is heavily 
dependent on the recognition of metonymic relations underlying the surface structure of 
the text. 
The fact that metonymy is essentially representational operating through a 'stand for' 
relation provides ample evidence that metonymy is strongly linked to the notion of 
schemata. Moreover, the claim that 'the mind, stimulated either by key linguistic items 
in the text (often referred to as triggers'), or by the context, activates a schema, and uses 
no 
it to make sense of the discourse' is very supportive of the strong relationship between 
metonymy and schema theory. The word 'pen' in example (4) below 
4. The pen is mightier than the sword 
Cook (1990: 7). 
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is a trigger of the schema of 'knowledge' of which the'pen'is a part or perhaps an 
instrument with which it is in a stand-for relation by virtue of stereotypical cultural 
association. Schema theory proposes that knowledge is structured around global 
structures in our brains corresponding to what different writers term either plans, goals, 
frames, scripts or scenarios. Once this global pattern is activated then the details can be 
left unmentioned because they will be supplied by the schematic structure in our 
cognition. The various components of one version of schema theory which is the SPGU 
(Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding) model of Schank and Abelson (1977) testify 
to the strong linkage that I intend to establish between this version of the theory and 
metonymic processes in text. 
Bartlett's schema theory is often confused with Minsky's frame theory and Schank and 
Abelson's script theory. It should be pointed out that there is a great deal of 
terminological confusion and phenomenal overlap between these theories since all of 
them are set up to deal with more or less the same phenomena, i.e. to account for 
knowledge structures and to understand the processing and production of texts . This 
overlap in terminology is typical of the rapidly expanding discipline of linguistics which 
began in the 1970s to cover various new areas not trodden before especially in the field 
of computational linguistics. Sometimes the war of terminology conceals a failure to 
achieve substantial success in the investigation of phenomena. 
There are also of course obvious differences between all of these terms. These 
differences will be addressed in various sections of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is 
generally the case that these theories all agree on a general premise, which is as Maida 
states, that 'modules of knowledge impose coherence on experience'. Whether we 
submit to a frame theory, schema theory or a script theory or to them all together, or in 
fact to any other approach in the field, the outcome will still be the same as far as 
metonymy is concerned. This is because the same premise still holds for all of these 
theories that metonymy is essentially knowledge-based and is systematically structured 
and causally and contiguously triggered. With respect to the problem of terminology it 
should be noted that this chapter adopts the general term 'schema theory' to designate 
'the theory of mental representation of knowledge structures'. For the subsystems of 
mental structure the chapter follows the division provided by Schank and Abelson 
Cf. Maida, Anthony S. (1987: 302). 
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(1977) in the SPGU. The chapter also incorporates terms from de Beaugrande and 
Dressier (1981) especially those pertaining to schemata. With regard to the notion of 
frames this mainly draws from the discussion outlined by Maida (1987). 
As far as the specific terms are concerned there is quite a lot of disagreement about 
terminology in the literature on schema theory. Some scholars, like Schank and Abelson 
(1977), talk about scripts, plans and goals as crucial components of the theory. De 
Beaugrande and Dressier (1981) discuss a general notion which they call 'global 
patterns' under which they include frames, schemata, plans, goals and scripts. Other 
terms like scenarios, stereotypes and prototypes have also been suggested.30 Instead of 
pursuing the debates and arguments of the proponents of one term or the other I shall 
adopt a different attitude towards the classification and attempt to integrate these terms 
in a unified treatment of knowledge structure that also reflects my conception of 
metonymy both as an aspect of knowledge and an aspect of pragmatic application of 
this knowledge in text. The following diagram shows my proposed classification of 
knowledge in memory and relates this to theoretical aspects of metonymy. 
Knowledge 
Descriptive Knowledge (What) Procedural Knowledge (How) 
F] es 
crints -4 
es and Schemata Conventional Arbitrary 
>• Scenarios 
'lans and Goals 
Prototypes Stereotypes 
Figure 5.1. A unified model of knowledge structures. 
30 See for example Sowa (1984) and Minsky (1975). 
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The diagram above shows that we can conceptualise knowledge structures in memory as 
comprising two major modules. One is the module of entities or the storage of 
conceptual items each with its own specifications. We also can call these the module of 
words. The second is the procedural model of stringing together. We can call this also 
•a i 
the module of rules of sequencing and combination. Here the conceptual items are 
actually combined in various modes to make up models and networks of knowledge 
structures, i.e. thought. The model refers to the first module as the knowledge of the 
'what' and gives it the quality of being descriptive, while it refers to the second module 
as the knowledge of the 'how' and deems it procedural. According to this model, frames 
and schemata are actually the same thing because they both pertain to description of 
states and conceptual categories. These are assumed to exist in memory in architectural 
structures based on a hierarchy or some other forms of contiguity like causality and 
association. From now on whenever the word 'schemata'is used it will refer to both 
schemata and frames. 
In my discussion of all these components of our schematic knowledge I shall therefore 
treat schemata and frames as two aspects pertaining to the same phenomenon, which is 
the knowledge of things or entities. By the same token I shall also treat scripts and 
scenarios as pertaining to the realm of experience and sequenced events. However as the 
model shows they will be treated separately because they pertain to two different types 
of sequenced events; one is conventional and the other is arbitrary. With regard to plans 
and goals I argue that they explain the arbitrariness of the scenario. Therefore, I shall 
discuss these two aspects separately to show the subtle differences between them and 
how they both give explanation to arbitrary scenarios. 
Due to the fact that scenarios are essentially arbitrary they do not show any internal 
coherence because of their very nature as creative and inventive. Goals, therefore, give 
this internal coherence to these scenarios and plans serve to realise specific procedures 
to achieve specific goals in the scenario. As for prototypes and stereotypes I have placed 
them at the bottom of the model in order to show that both of these terms account for a 
characterisation of the specific features of each of the two paradigms in the model. I 
argue that frames and schemata are established via the interaction with prototypical 
knowledge and that scripts and scenarios are established by means of stereotypical 
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knowledge. More of this discussion shall be provided in the sections which treat the 
relationship between metonymy and these two concepts sections 5.3-5.7. The double 
headed arrows in the model indicate the interactive nature of the model and the dialectic 
relationship between its components. None of these components operates in isolation. 
Let me now outline the theoretical aspects that relate this model of knowledge in 
general and language and cognition to metonymy. The two modules of knowledge 
postulated correspond to the structural notions 'paradigmatic' and 'syntagmatic'. These 
are believed to underlie all linguistic and cultural behaviour. The link between the 
model and metonymy is evident when we know that metonymic processes are based on 
these fundamental notions. First, the word/concept/thing is selected from a paradigm 
and then a syntagmatic relation is abstracted between the item substituted and the item 
substituted for. These syntagmatic relations are based on the two principles of 
contiguity and causality. The descriptive module of knowledge in the model above is 
actually the paradigmatic level where knowledge is stored in the form of entities and 
objects. The procedural module outlined in the model above corresponds to the 
syntagmatic level where, after the selection, entities and objects are stringed and 
combined. More importantly the model above captures the two fundamental metonymic 
principles, i.e. that of contiguity and causality. I relate schemata and frames to the 
metonymic principle of contiguity because I argue that descriptive knowledge is 
contiguously stored because it makes use of conventional knowledge of how things are 
structured mainly through category membership relations of part/whole and adjacency 
relations. I also argue that arbitrary knowledge is made coherent only through the 
metonymic principle of causality which involves intentions and interests, plans, 
scenarios and goals. Hence conventional knowledge is made meaningful through 
contiguity relationships and arbitrary knowledge is made coherent through causality 
relationships. These are fundamentally metonymic. 
5.3. metonymy and schemata 
In the previous section I discussed the notion 'schema theory' but I did not specifically 
address the concept schemata. What are schemata, how do they operate in text 
understanding and how are they related to metonymic operations in text processing? 
The two terms 'words' and 'rules' are generally based on a recent public lecture by Pinker. The terms 
also appear in his book Words and Rules (1999). 
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This section attempts to provide an answer to these questions. As I mentioned earlier the 
coinage of the notion of schema is usually attributed to Bartlett who maintains that: 
schema refers to an active organisation of past reactions or of past experiences which must 
always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, 
whenever there is any order or regularity of behaviour, a particular response is possible 
only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet 
which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary 
32 
mass. 
We notice a great deal of behaviouristic thinking and terminology in the quotation from 
Bartlett. The definition revolves around certain behavioural and observable concepts 
like reactions, responses, experiences and mass. Yet the definition is obviously a 
detailed account of the concept of schemata especially when it relates it to the notion of 
experience. This shows that Bartlett is using the term in a general sense to mean the 
general knowledge structure which pertains to both object organisation and to sequences 
of events and actions. It should be noted however that the notion of schemata developed 
in this chapter is different from Bartlett because it is limited to the set of objects and 
entities activated by a part/whole or whole/part metonymic reasoning. 
Rumelhart defines the concept of schema as 
an abstract cognitive representation of a generalised concept or situation. A schema 
contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that characterise the major 
constituents of the situation or concept in question. 
The first thing that we notice in the definition is the cognitive orientation, unlike 
Bartlett's definition which is behavioural. This actually explains each work within its 
predominant intellectual climate. Rumelhart's definition has the same generality as 
Bartlett's and both definitions differ from the treatment of the notion of schema 
developed here in the manner explained above. Schema here is treated as the 
organisation of descriptive knowledge which includes knowledge about objects, entities 
and concepts. 
Cook defines schemata as 'mental representations of typical situations and they are used 
in discourse processing to predict the contents of the particular situation which the 
discourse describes'.34 De Beaugrande and Dressier define schemata as 'global patterns 
Bartlett (1932: 201). 
Rumlehart(l977:290). 
Cook (1989: 69). 
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of events and states in ordered sequences linked by time proximity and causality'.35 I 
find Cook's definition more satisfactory than de Beaugrande and Dressler's because it is 
compatible with the model developed above in section 5.2. Cook actually highlights the 
specific properties of schemata as mental representations of typical situations and as 
pertaining to the prediction of the contents rather than the sequence of these contents. 
Minsky, the originator of the frame theory, holds a general view of frames which I have 
regarded here in the model above as the same thing as schemata. Minsky defines the 
notion of'frame' as 
a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of 
living room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds 
of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what 
one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are not 
confirmed. 
It is clear that Minsky regards 'frames' as general knowledge structures exactly the 
same way de Beaugrande and Dressier treat 'global patterns'. This is evident in the fact 
that Minsky designates these frames to both descriptive and procedural knowledge. 
Moreover, Minsky's definition of 'frames' is the same as that of de Beaugrande and 
Dressler's account of schemata. The definitions of schemata and frames provided by de 
Beaugrande and Dressier on the one hand and Minsky on the other are unsatisfactory as 
far as my proposed model is concerned. This is because they confuse frames, schemata, 
plans and scripts and do not allow for a systematic understanding of knowledge 
structures, which I believe is crucial. In view of this, my model attempts to designate a 
general term for the higher-level knowledge structures, and propose differences between 
the parts of this superordinate entity based on epistemological classification of these 
knowledge structures. According to a more recent argument, language knowledge for 
example is essentially knowledge of words and knowledge of rules.37 
It should be noted that de Beaugrande and Dressler's account of the notion of 'frames' 
is compatible with the model proposed above. They define frames as 'global patterns 
that contain commonsense knowledge about some central concept, e.g.'piggy banks', 
3 5 De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 90). 
3 6 Minsky (1975: 212). 
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'birthday parties', etc. Frames state what things belong together in principle, but not in 
what order things will be done or mentioned'. Although this proposal agrees with my 
model with regard to frames as an inventory of entities having categorical 
specifications, the new element in the model I propose is that it also treats schemas as 
the same phenomenon. This is something with which de Beaugrande and Dressier 
would not agree since they treat schemas the same way I treat scripts, i.e. as structures 
of sequenced events. 
Within descriptive knowledge I also discuss a further knowledge structure which 
concerns the notion of prototypes. This mainly relates to schemata as this latter deals 
with concepts, entities and objects. This is briefly discussed by de Beaugrande and 
Dressier39 under the notion of'inheritance' 4 0 which the authors define as 'the transfer 
of knowledge among items of the same or similar types or subtypes'.41 The authors 
suggest three types of inheritance which can be represented in the following three 
diagrams: 
Class 
Subclass Instance Analogised 
Figure 5.2. The three types of inheritance. 
The model of inheritance is perhaps a further specification of the notion of frame or 
schema. This is because it is a natural or a general semantic principle which specifies 
class membership in the real world or perhaps in the semantic cognitive world. Frames, 
on the other hand, are more general in this regard in that they account for class 
3 7 See for further details of this proposal Pinker (1999). 
3 8 De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 90). 
3 9 Ibid. (91). 
40 
De Beaugrande and Dressler's notion of inheritance is very closely related to the notion of prototypes 
discussed by Rosch (1975) and the notion of'best example' discussed by Ungerer and Schmid (1996). 
4 1 Ibid. 
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membership in a pragmatic sense in which not only are the semantic relations of 
inclusion and exclusion involved in class identification, but also some other pragmatic 
factors which bring together textual worlds that are otherwise unrelated and which bear 
on the process of text generation, organisation and interpretation. 
So in this section we are actually introduced to a specific type of mental structure. This 
describes entities and specifies their category membership or other contiguous 
associations between these entities or concepts. This is expressed in metonymic terms as 
specifying the concepts' part/whole relationships and other causal and associative 
relations between these concepts. We are not however in the realm of time- and context-
bound and sequenced events to which I designate the term scripts. The notion of scripts 
is an issue which will be dealt with in section 5.4. in this chapter. A good example of a 
schema would be a 'city' schema which involves several small parts contributing to this 
global pattern; once this higher level knowledge structure is triggered the whole schema 
is activated. 
Schemata also help us localise our perception and understanding. In fact, this is a 
common technique used by the cinema industry. Some films start a particular scene by 
zooming in on the visual space and hence the cognition space from the whole to the part 
in a consecutive series of whole/part movements. In these films the scene begins with a 
global shot of the whole city, then it zooms down to one block, further to one street, 
further to one house and further to one room. This metonymic movement is exploited to 
facilitate the audience involvement and emphasise the gestalt or holistic perception. 
This corresponds to the notion of 'universe of discourse' in discourse analysis and it 
aims to tell the receiver that every thing said or seen in this particular episode should be 
interpreted within the global shot which the scene started with. 
Schemata are also useful in a more practical sense. They help us in keeping to the 
maxims of cooperation in conversation. Of paramount importance among these maxims 
are the maxims of quantity and relevance. I f we give more information than expected 
we might be interpreted as being facetious and demeaning the intelligence of our 
audience. It is for this reason that Arab and western rhetoricians equally define 
eloquence as brevity. Schemata help us to maintain a friendly atmosphere with the 
audience because we are not being monotonous and boring. 
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Schemata help us in recovering ambiguities of reference in text and in resolving 
problems of definiteness. Consider example (5) below: 
5. The time was running fast and the train was due in half an hour. The weather 
was also very bad. We had to call a taxi. The driver was an old man who could not 
help very much with the luggage. 
In example (5) we find that the noun phrase (NP) 'the driver' and the (NP) 'the luggage' 
are definite. This is not compatible with pedagogical grammatical rules which dictate 
that a noun phrase cannot be definite unless it is one of its kind or it has been mentioned 
previously in the text and thus made known to the receiver. However, a textual model of 
metonymy resolves the problem via the schematic knowledge of part/whole 
relationships. Metonymy as a schematic representation of knowledge states that the 
schema of 'taxi' consists of a driver as an essential part of it. So it is plausible to 
maintain that the definiteness of the NP 'the driver' is cognitively justified and the 
concept 'driver' is made available to the reader even before encountering it in the text 
because it is salient in the universe of this particular textual world. Similarly, the 'train' 
schema activates a 'travel schema' which guarantees that the NP 'the luggage' is 
supplied, thus making it definite. 
Classical Arabic grammatical treatises address this issue by postulating a sort of 
semiotic treatment of it. The phenomenon is known as al al- 'ahdiyyah which can be 
roughly translated as the 'al of knowledge (or familiarity)' because definiteness in 
Arabic is realised via the definite article al. Arab grammarians were puzzled by this 
phenomenon of a noun appearing with al when it has not been mentioned earlier in the 
text, and is not one of its kind or a generic noun. They dealt with it by postulating that 
there are actually three modes of definiteness. In a sense they dealt with the concept of 
definiteness from the three domains of epistemology, ontology and language. Ibn 
Hisham (d. 1360) says: 'al might also function as a definite article and as such it is of 
two types: knowledge-based al and generic al'.42 
Hasan provides a more detailed definition of al al- 'ahdiyyah. He states that 'al al-
'ahdiyyah is the al which attaches to an indefinite noun and adds to it a definite aspect 
capable of making the referent of this noun definitely identifiable in cases where it 
Ibn Hisham (n.d.: 49). 
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would otherwise be general and unspecified'.43 Hasan also discusses the other type of 
definite al which, like Ibn Hisham, he calls the generic al and defines it as 'the al which 
attaches to the indefinite to give it the meaning of a genus without implying 
knowledge'.4 4 This is in contradiction with another view that Ibn Hisham mentions 
about the difference between the generic al and the knowledge-based al. This holds that 
the generic al is also used to identify the knowledge-based al. This is because generic 
nouns are also known in cognition and they are distinct from each other 4 5 
What concerns us here in this section is the knowledge-based al (the al al- 'ahdiyyah) 
This is of three types. The first type is that which is termed al al-ma'hiidatu 
dhikriyyan,46 i.e. al which is known by means of it being mentioned in the text. This can 
be more idiomatically translated into the 'textually known' al. Among the examples Ibn 
Hisham provides for this category are the following Qur'anic verses: 
6. Kama 'arsalnii ila fir'awna rasiilan fa'asa fir'awnu al-rasiila. The Qur'an 
(73:15-16).'7 
7. Alldhu niiru al-samdwati wa al- 'ardh mathalu nurih'i kamishkatin fiha misbahun 
al-misbahu fizujdjah. The Qur'an (24: 35).** 
As can be seen in the two verses above we have the noun rasiil 'messenger' mentioned 
twice. The first is without al and the second with al. The first is indefinite and the 
second is definite by virtue of the fact that it has been mentioned in previous text. This 
is the reason that Arab grammarians termed this type of definiteness or this type of al as 
al-ma 'hiidatu dhikriyyan. Among the secular examples Ibn Hisham gives for this type 
of al is example (8) 
8. 'ishtaraytu farasan thumma bi 'tu al-faras.49 
4 J Hasan (n.d. : 423). 
4 4 Ibid. (425). 
4 5 See for further details Ibn Hisham (50). 
4 6 This is also called al- 'ahad al-dhikri see for example Hasan (n.d. 420). 
4 7 'As we sent down a messenger to the Pharaoh, but Pharaoh disobeyed the messenger'. 
4 8 'Allah is the Light of the heavens and earth. The likeness of His Light is that of a niche within it a 
lamp. The lamp is in glass'. 
4 9 
/ bought a horse. Then I sold the horse. 
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This type of al is essentially cohesive by the virtue of being textual or formal, i.e. 
explicitly stated in the text. However, the link is fundamentally semantic and cognitive 
because it is a process of cognitive derivation of the aspect of specificity by means of 
mentioning the noun twice to familiarise the reader with its reference. There is an 
interaction of signification between the two worlds of form and things and this is 
mediated by the world of concepts. So in one type of semiotic domain of signification 
we can actually perceive of all the three domains at play. 
The second type is that which they call al al-ma 'htidatu dhihniyyan, i.e. al which is 
known by means of it being present in the cognition of the interlocuters or by virtue of 
the fact that it is well established in the universe of discourse. This could be 
idiomatically translated as 'the cognitively known' al. Here Arab grammarians 
explicitly refer to the existence of the thing in the cognition of both the speaker/hearer 
or writer/reader. Ibn Hisham gives two Qur'anic verses as examples of al al-dhihniyyah. 
9. 'idh humafi al-ghari. The Qur'an (9: 4 0 ) / ; 
JO. 'idh yubdyi'iinaka tahta al-shajarati. The Qur'an (48: 18). 
The nouns ghar 'cave' and shajarah 'tree' are definite in both examples even though 
they are not mentioned earlier in the text. Arab grammarians argue that both are deemed 
definite by virtue of the fact that they are salient in the cognitive domain of the 
discourse. In short they are present in the minds of the receivers. 
However, this is not an adequate explanation because the question is how are they made 
present in the receivers minds? I think that both occurrences of ghar 'cave' and 
shajarah 'tree' in examples (9) and (10) pertain to the first type of al which is the 
textual al. Although it is true that both nouns are not mentioned previously in the text, 
i.e. in the Qur'an, there is no way that they can be cognitively constructed from 
nowhere. One could argue that the schema of travelling which is the topic of example 
(9) which pertains to the migration of the Prophet Mohammed and his friend Abu Bakr 
from Makka to Madina activates the slot 'cave' and thus makes 'cave' definite. I f we 
think in this way, however, our argument will be rather weak because a travelling 
Compare the concept of al- 'ahad al-dhihni in Ibn Hisham (p: 50). 
'When they were in the cave' 
When they gave you their allegiance under the tree. 
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schema does not necessarily involve a slot of a cave even i f this travelling schema is 
culturally specified to travelling in Arabia. 
My claim then is that this al is textual and not cognitive because both nouns, i.e. 'cave' 
and 'tree' are made definite by virtue of the fact that they have been mentioned in other 
texts, i.e. the history of the Prophet which tells us that he and his friend stayed for three 
nights in a cave called the Cave of Thawr between Makka and Madina. Without this 
textual information we would find difficulty in understanding the definiteness of the 
word 'cave'. The same thing applies to the word 'tree'. I f we were not told in another 
text, i.e. the history of the Prophet, that the allegiance took place under a tree we would 
find it difficult to explain the definiteness of the noun 'tree'. 
Hasan provides some examples which I find interesting as far as cognitive al is 
concerned. The examples include: 
11. 'indama yas 'alu tdlibun zami'lahu: ma al-jadidu fi al-kulliyyati?54 
12. hal katabta al-muhddharah55 
13. hal 'anta dhahibun'ila al-bayt56 
The words kulliyyah 'college', muhddharah 'lecture' and bayt 'house' are definite 
because they are present in the cognition of the two participants in the discourse and not 
because they are previously mentioned in the text or because they are present in the 
situation of the discourse. Nevertheless, one could argue that the definiteness of these 
nouns in the examples is justified on the grounds of schematic knowledge that the two 
individuals have. This is the schema of'studying'which involves a college, a lecture 
and much more than this. As regards the third example it is easily accounted for by 
means of a 'studying script' which involves the sequenced actions that are stereotypical 
of this life situation. We would expect a student finishing college to go to his house. 
The third type of al is what the Arab grammarians call al al-ma 'hiidatu hudhuriyyan, 
i.e. al which is known by means of it being present in the physical context of the 
5 3 Hasan (n.d. 50). 
5 4 What is new in the college? Said by a student asking his classmate. 
5 5 Did you write down the lecture. 
5 6 Are you going to the house? 
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utterance. The item or entity is existent in the situation of discourse. This could be 
idiomatically translated as 'the existential' al and conventionally as 'the ontological al' 
It might also be referred to as the exophorical al, by which is meant that the thing 
referred to is a salient entity in the context of situation of discourse. Ibn Hisham gives 
the following examples of this type of al. 
C O 
14. yd 'ayyuha al-rajul 
15. kharajtu fa 'idha al- 'asadu.59 
The argument Ibn Hisham raises concerning these two examples is that the first is 
definite by virtue of it coming after a vocative and the deictic 'you'. Both the vocative 
and the deictic are strong indices to the fact that the referent is known by it being 
present in the physical context. This also applies to the second example which has the 
deictic expression 'there'. Hasan60 provides another example highlighting the role of 
contextual factors in this type of al. 
16. 'inda ru'yatu katibin mumsikin bi qalaminfiyadihi taqiilu, al-waraqah, taqsidu 
khudhi al-waraqah al-hadhirah fi maqami al-hadith.61 
Hasan argues that these utterances are made definite by means of the circumstantial 
factors surrounding the speech event. In the first example the situation makes the paper 
known because it is existent in the situation. The three modes of definiteness in the 
Arabic grammatical scholarship again correspond to three domains of knowledge. The 
domain of language is represented by the al al-dhikriyyah, the domain of things and 
objects is represented by the al al-hudhuriyyah, and finally the domain of concepts is 
represented by the al al-dhihniyyah. This corresponds to my overall argument of 
metonymy as a representational relation connecting the world of concepts, the world of 
words and the world of things. 
As I have mentioned earlier the terms 'schema' and 'frame' are both generally used to 
denote knowledge structures in memory. Thus we encounter uses like schematic 
representation of knowledge which roughly means general conceptual representation of 
5 7 Compare the concept of al- 'ahad al-hitdhiiri in Ibn Hisham (p: 50). 
5 8 O you the man! 
59 
l went out, and there was the lion. 
6 0 Hasan (425). 
6 1 Upon seeing a writer holding a pen in his hand, you say: 'the paper', meaning 'take the paper', which is 
present in the context of the speech. 
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knowledge. This should not concern us because I have already specified what I mean by 
schemata and frame with respect to the scope of this thesis. Since I have argued above 
that frames are actually schemata, what is said about schemata equally applies also to 
frames. As we can talk of a city schema we can also talk about a city frame. We can 
also talk about a room frame, supermarket frame, hospital frame and school frame and 
so on and so forth. Al l these types of knowledge structures include knowledge about the 
contents of these domains as referred to in Cook's definition. In fact, i f we go back to 
the originator of frame theory, Marvin Minsky, we find the ultimate legitimacy for our 
conception of schemata and frames as descriptive and designating contents and entities 
or concepts. The classical example of a frame given by Minsky himself consists of an 
imaginary anecdote describing the experience of seeing a room. In his illustration of this 
perception and expectation experience Minsky describes an interactionist model of 
frame activation, assimilation and modification. We are made to believe that the 
expectations and perceptions all pertain to the realm of entities which we expect to see 
in the room. This equally applies to the world of language. It is not limited to the realm 
of vision but also to the realm of language processing which is the expression of these 
visual experiences. 
It should be noticed that metonymy operates in the realm of schemata and frames in 
both directions. That is from the particular to the general or what is referred to in 
metonymic terms as from the part to the whole and vice versa. So i f we encounter a text 
which relies on mentioning wholes or generalities and leaving the reader to supply the 
details from his schematic memory, then we perceive this text as coherent simply 
because the details are taken to be given and known. Usually metonymic networks 
operate on both directions in the same text and this is what gives coherence to this text. 
For an example of a text that depends heavily on metonymic reasoning for its coherence 
and unity in terms of its details, consider the following example of an office schema 
/ T O 
from an introductory part of a crime story after Van Dijk : 
/ 7. Clare Russell came into the Clarion office on the following morning, feeling tired 
and depressed. She went straight to her room, took off her hat, touched her face 
with a powder puff and sat down at her desk. Her mail was spread out neatly, her 
C.f. Minsky (1975: 221-222). 
Van Dijk (1977: 98). 
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blotter was snowy and her inkwell was filled. But she didn't feel like work. She 
pushed the mail away and stared out of the window. 
In this example we have two types of schemata. The first is the office schema which is 
triggered by the word 'office' giving naturalness to the parts of this schema and making 
them easier to interpret in relation to the general pattern. The second is the person 
schema of Clare Russell herself. For the first type we could have this metonymic model 
of coherence: 
Office 
Room 
desk mail blotter inkwell window 
Figure 5.3. The office schema model in text 17. 
The second model is that of the person of Clare Russell herself which can be 
represented as follows: 
Clare Russell 
She 
her hat her face 
She 
Figure 5.4. The person schema model in text 17. 
Actually the text fuses both schemata in one to suggest unity between the person and the 
office and work. The coherently combined schema is represented in the diagram below: 
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Clare Russell 
She Clarion office 
desk man b otter inkwell window 
er 
er 
Figure 5.5. A combination of the two models in text 17. 
In this example we find the frame or schema of an office activated, the details being 
supplied by our prototypical knowledge of offices, e.g. that they contain desks, mail 
trays, inkwells and so on. So in this example we have the global pattern activated and 
some of the details mentioned as i f known. As such the text is perceived as a unified 
whole describing a schematic representation that we construct as soon as we encounter 
the word 'office'. The same thing applies to other types of schemata. For example in a 
school schemata we would normally expect teachers, tables, chairs, blackboard, chalk, 
and depending on when and where this school is contextualised we could also have 
some other elements of what constitutes a school like computers, overhead projectors 
and televisions, etc. 
The above are examples of texts in which the whole is mentioned and some of the 
details are also mentioned but in which the interpretation of these details is made easy 
by means of the activation of the global pattern. As I argued above, metonymy functions 
both ways and in the following we shall see how parts of a frame or a schema could 
actually make it easy for us to work out the whole and perceive of the context of the 
text. In the following text for example the context is a kitchen and by mentioning some 
details of this schema we are able to go from the specific to the general even before we 
actually reach the mention of the word 'kitchen' which comes only late in the passage. 
The text is from Like Water for Chocolate (1992: 9) by Laura Esquivel: 
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18. Take care to chop the onion fine. To keep from crying when you chop it (which is 
annoying), I suggest you place a little bit on your head. The trouble with crying over 
an onion is that once the chopping gets you started and the tears begin to well up, 
the next thing you know you just can't stop. 
As soon as we encounter the expression 'chop the onion' the schema of a 'kitchen' is 
activated. The text actually uses the word 'kitchen' a few lines later only as a qualifier 
of the word 'table' and not as a headword and with further parts of this schema. The text 
describes the birth of a baby called Tita as follows: 
19. Tita was so sensitive to onions, any time they were being chopped, they say she 
would just cry and cry; when she was still in my great-grandmother's belly her sobs 
were so loud that even Nacha, the cook, who was half-deaf could hear them easily. 
Once her wailing got so violent that it brought on an early labour. And before my 
great-grandmother could let out a word or even a whimper, Tita made her entrance 
into this world, prematurely, right there on the kitchen table amid the smells of 
simmering noodle soup, thyme, bay leaves and coriander, steamed milk, garlic and 
of course onion. 
We can see from this text that the parts could easily signify the whole and this 
part/whole signification provides unity and ensures that expectations are met. Even the 
digression to the issue of Tita being in her mother's belly and the explanation of her 
birth does not actually obstruct the functional continuity of our schema because this 
digression is, as it were, a sub-schema functioning to give further explanation of the 
superschema. This is more obvious in schema interaction and interplay with other 
cognitive mechanisms like scripts, plans and goals, which wil l be the subject of 
subsequent sections of this chapter (sections 5.4-5.7). One particularly interesting aspect 
that can be raised here is the use of the deictic expression 'there' in right there on the 
kitchen table. This shows that there is actually strong reason to believe that the 'kitchen 
schema' is not only supplying all the details but also making them concrete in the mind 
of the receiver. Such an extralinguistic ontological reference can be understood because 
the 'kitchen schema' is so pervasive in our cognition as text receivers that the deictic 
and exophoric reference is easily resolved. 
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Example (20) below is a narrative text in which I intend to show how metonymic details 
establish cognitive structures and create cognitive models of text processing: 
20. In the town there were two mutes, and they were always together. Early every 
morning they would come out from the house where they lived and walk arm in arm 
down the street to work. The two friends were very different. The one who always 
steered the way was an obese and dreamy Greek. In the summer he would come out 
wearing a yellow or green polo shirt stuffed sloppily into his trousers in front and 
hanging loose behind. When it was colder he wore over this a shapeless grey 
sweater. His face was round and oily, with half-closed eyelids and lips that curved 
in a gentle, stupid smile. The other mute was tall. His eyes had a quick, intelligent 
expression. He was always immaculate and very soberly dressed. Every morning the 
two friends walked silently together until they reached the main street of the town. 
Then when they came to a certain fruit and candy store they paused for a moment 
on the sidewalk outside. The Greek, Spiros Antonapoulos, worked for his cousin, 
who owned this fruit store. His job was to make candies and sweets, uncrate the 
fruits, and to keep the place clean. The thin mute, John Singer, nearly always put his 
hand on his friend's arm and looked for a second into his face before leaving him. 
Then after this good-bye Singer crossed the street and walked on alone to the 
jewellery store where he worked as a silverware engraver.64 
The first thing that attracts us in this text is the metonymic representation of the 
referential relation of the type C O N C E P T F O R C O N C E P T to ensure unity and continuity of 
reference in text. Let me show how these referential relations are established by means 
of metonymic structuring which is largely schematic mapping forms onto concepts and 
things, i.e. the forms of pronominal reference stand in metonymic representational 
relationship with its signified concepts and referents of this referential expressions. The 
following is an illustration of how these referential relations are actually metonymically 
structured. 
From Carson McCuller (1961: 7). 
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Two Mutes 
I 
They 
I 
They 
They 
f 
The twc friends 
The one who The other mute; 
The two friends 
T J 
They 
They 
They 
The Greek The thin mute 
Spiros Antonapoulos John Singer— 
Ms 
Mis 
Him He 
Figure 5.6. Metonymic referential relations in text 20. 
The diagram above shows how we can perceive of referential networks in text as 
essentially metonymic building up cognitive models of whole/part and part/whole 
relations which provide unity and coherence to text. One particularly interesting aspect 
of text coherence that this text shows is that it seems that there is a process of textual 
transformation in terms of the knowledge allocation to particular elements in the text. 
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This is a phenomenon that is more especially apparent in texts with cataphoric reference 
as is the case in the text above where the description and the use of pronouns and 
common nouns actually precede proper nouns. Once the receiver of the text reaches the 
point where proper names are mentioned s/he seems to make a transformation in which 
the name then replaces the descriptions by pronouns, nouns and adjectives that preceded 
the proper name. This textual strategy seems to be vital to assist interpretation and 
resolve ambiguity in text interpretation. 
Another aspect of cognitive connectivity in the above text is found in the organisation of 
schematic knowledge of the physical setting of the text. The text is anchored in the 
situational context of a town. The following diagram shows the set of metonymic 
relations present in the text with regard to the schema of a town. 
The town 
The house The street 
The main street of the town 
Jewelry Shop Fruit and candy store 
engraving Silver Fruit Candies and sweets 
Figure 5.7. Metonymic relations within the town schema in text 20. 
It is clear from the above illustration that the schema of the contextual background of 
the text determines the progression of the text. The diagram shows a remarkable balance 
in the schematic structure of the concept of 'street' in terms of the details given to each 
of the two participants' type of job. In the top left-hand corner of the diagram we have 
the schema 'house' which stands alone in the schematic structure. This indicates that the 
house is not a significant element in the generation and organisation of this text. It 
serves a minor function in the production of the text in that it provides the text with a 
point of departure from which to start. This allows the camera eye of the text to move 
away from this point out to describe the outside world, i.e. the street and the two people 
in question. Just as syntactic structures are represented in the generative tradition using 
226 
Chapter Five Metonymy and Text Coherence 
tree diagrams, one can argue that textual structures can be similarly represented. 
Cognitively speaking the head of this text is the schema ' street'which further sub-
branches, yielding a right-branching diagram. In syntactic terms, the schema 'house' is 
a non-head element and therefore it does not further sub categorise for any other 
elements. 
One can actually go on and on in the description of several types of schemata activated 
in the reading of this text. Where one stops basically depends on the level of delicacy 
that one adopts and the level of detail one wishes the analysis to account for. Therefore, 
I shall limit myself here to presenting one more schematic representation pertaining to 
the characteristics of the two people involved in the text. For the sake of reference I 
shall present a somewhat surface structure representation of this text taking into 
consideration the process of transformation that I have mentioned in the above model. 
This process actually takes the element 'proper names' and puts it at the beginning of 
the text in order to make the interpretation clearer and the processing easier. In the 
following diagram straight lines indicate direct metonymic relations and curved lines 
indicate indirect metonymic relations. 
The two mutes \ 
Spiros Antonapoulos John Singer 
Physical Features 
Clothes tall dress eyes 
C T5K lariel snr wea Green stuffed sloppily face 
I 'A ay sh p ess or Yellow in front Trousers oily roun 
hps eyelids 
Figure 5.8 Metonymic relations within the characters' schema. 
It is noticeable from the diagram above that in cognitive domains we do not have 
regular patterns like those in linguistic domains especially i f the schemata are employed 
to realise certain plans to achieve certain goals . For example, in the domain of language 
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we have those languages which are left branching and those languages which are right 
branching, depending on the place of the head in relation to other elements in the 
structure. In cognitive structure, however, the branching is determined by the intentions 
of the originator of the message and the requirements of the context. On some occasions 
we have right branching and on other occasions we have left branching. Model 5.8. 
above shows left branching and this suggests that Spiros Antonapoulos could be the 
main character or element of the narrative, hence a detailed description about his 
physical appearance and his clothes. It seems as i f these features have special bearing on 
the development of the plot of the narrative. One should, however, be very careful in 
making such a generalisation especially in the field of literature where one's schemata 
are not always satisfied and one's expectations not always met. This is due to the fact 
that literary language relies heavily on defamiliarisaion65 which basically means 
shocking the receiver by deviating from his established schematic knowledge. 
It should be noted that this detailed description is based on metonymic details and relies 
on parts forming wholes or wholes categorising their parts. By contrast, in the 
description of the other 'mute', i.e. John Singer, we have only wholes without 
mentioning parts. Apart from the concept 'eye'there is a remarkable tendency to use 
general terms in the description of Singer. For example, the concept 'tall ' which 
suggests that his body is tall and this in turn by implication suggests that he has long 
legs, long arms and long fingers and so on. Al l these details are not mentioned but our 
schema of 'someone who is tall' supplies them. With regard to his clothes again the 
general approach is adopted in their description. Apart from telling us that he was 
always immaculate and very soberly dressed we actually have no idea about the details 
of his clothes. However, the general schema of someone who is soberly dressed will 
supply plausible details. In both cases whether that of the detailed description or that of 
the general description, cognition is aided by metonymic reasoning of the synthetic and 
analytic structural relations between wholes and parts, and is assisted by metonymic 
understanding of cognitive movements between this structural network. 
The concept of defamiliarisation is a central notion in Formalist Criticism propounded by the Russian 
school of linguistics and Poetics. For details of the school and the concept see Havranek (1932), 
Mukarovsky (1932), Shklosvsky (1917) and Fowler (1996). 
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5.4. metonymy and scripts 
As the model of knowledge in section 5.2. above shows the concept of scripts lies at the 
heart of our stereotypical and conventional knowledge. This means that scripts are 
mental structures of stereotypical knowledge of events. What is meant by the word 
'stereotypical' is that the knowledge is conventionally available to the individual by 
means of cultural saliency. Dyer et al define the concept of script as 'a knowledge 
structure containing a stereotypic sequence of actions'. 6 6 They continue 'scripts encode 
culturally shared knowledge of stereotyped actions that occur in socially ritualized 
activities, such as going to stores, restaurants, and museums; riding trains and subways; 
attending plays and banquets; and playing games or driving cars'. Two important 
points can be said about the definition of scripts provided by Dyer et al. The first one is 
that they are essentially related to sequenced events and actions and not to entities and 
content. The second point is that they are culturally shared and thus conventional. These 
two important aspects distinguish scripts from frames and schemata on the one hand and 
from scenarios on the other as captured in my model in section 5.2. 
Schank and Abelson provide a similar definition to that of Deyer et al emphasising the 
aspect of a script as a representation of sequenced events. Their definition runs 'a script 
is a structure that describes an appropriate sequence of events in a particular context'. 
They further affirm the view of 'scripts being conventional' a view that is also held by 
Dyer et al and is strongly emphasised in the model I proposed in section 5.2. above. In 
this regard they maintain that'scripts handle stylized everyday situations'.69 Reisbeck 
& Schank treat a frame as a fundamentally stable set of facts about the world whereas a 
script is more dynamic in that it accounts for 'a standard sequence of events that 
describe a situation'. 
0 0 Dyer et al (1987: 980). 
6 7 Ibid. 
6 8 Schank and Abelson (1977: 41). 
6 9 Ibid. 
7 0 Reisbeck and Schank (1978: 254). 
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As regards the function of scripts Schank and Abelson argue that 'what scripts do, then, 
is to provide connectivity'. They provide this connectivity by means of facilitating 
prediction in text in terms of what sequences of events one should expect, in a restaurant 
for example. One could imagine the set of actions involved in a restaurant script to start 
with the customer getting into the restaurant, looking for a table, sitting down, looking 
at the menu, ordering, eating, paying and then leaving. I f one of these acts is not 
mentioned our scriptal knowledge supplies it. 
De Beaugrande and Dressier define scripts as 'stablised plans called up very frequently 
to specify the roles of participants and their expected actions'. Although the treatment 
conflates the notion of scripts with the notion of plans it tells us something important 
about scripts which we should take into consideration. This is that scripts are not always 
global patterns of knowledge in the sense that they do not form holistic concepts of 
stereotypical situations. They are often reduced to the viewer's perspective but they are 
still universally standard and culturally shared. This means that the script of a restaurant 
for example, is not homogeneous. Rather it varies according to the person viewing it. A 
restaurant script of a customer is different from a restaurant script of the cook or the 
owner of the restaurant. This is to say that the set of actions prescribed for each of the 
above roles will vary. This point further highlights the need for differentiating between 
schemata and scripts. While all the above participants will have more or less a unified 
view of the schema of a restaurant they would have different representations of the roles 
and actions each one should abide by in the restaurant. 
In the example: 
21. 1 got up, washed and had breakfast. 
There is a great deal of detail that is missed out, and to provide this we rely on 
metonymic inferencing based on script activation. Each of the three acts involved in the 
example actually stands for a whole series of smaller acts needed to accomplish it. I f 
after this text the following text is encountered: 
22. 1 was annoyed upon finding out that there was no hot water. 
we would not find a problem interpreting it because this sub-act would be available 
thanks to the 'washing schema' and to the metonymic relation of C O N C E P T F O R C O N C E P T 
7 1 Ibid. (40). 
7 2 De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 91). 
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which is based on the metonymic relation of PART FOR WHOLE , which enabled us to 
construct this schematic representation, and to recover it when the need arose. The 
script of someone washing activates other detailed scripts in our memory, and one of 
these being the act of using water to wash. Moreover, this subscript on its own becomes 
a superscript for further minute detail, which this subscript itself activates. Among these 
is the subscript that people get irritated i f the water is cold when they get up in the 
morning. However, the washing script itself might be said to be universal because it 
seems that human beings irrespective of their different cultures, generally wash when 
they get out of bed. The subscript relating to 'hot water' is not universal because it is 
quite easy to imagine a world where people do not get irritated i f the water is cold in the 
morning and in fact one could imagine a world where people get irritated i f the water is 
hot. Nonetheless, both types of scripts are still culturally shared and thus they do not 
lose their autonomy, in contrast with those knowledge structures which are not 
culturally shared. 
I want now to elucidate further the difference I am proposing between a schema and a 
script. The most important thing about schemata is that they help us predict entities and 
objects within certain knowledge domains. Scripts, on the other hand, involve more than 
mere entities. In fact, scripts include these entities in a textured manner. That is they 
involve them with the action sequence of the whole stereotypical act. Therefore, scripts 
are more comprehensive than schemata because while the former group involves both 
entities and actions the latter includes only entities. The treatment I propose for 
metonymy as a script goes beyond the modern figurative account on metonymy which 
can be illustrated as follows: 
23. The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 
The lexical view of metonymy deems the treatment of this example as an issue of 
deferred or shifted reference based on a metonymic process of the type T H E THING 
ORDERED FOR THE PERSON ORDERING THAT THING. However, this treatment of metonymy as a 
figure of speech, i.e. a lexical phenomenon, fails to capture the power of metonymy as a 
text organising principle. 
Example (23) is not only metonymic in its lexical or referential aspect but is also 
metonymic in its textually scriptal aspect. The example activates the script of a 
restaurant. This script tells us that the person who ordered the ham sandwich had 
already found a table and sat down and perhaps had read the menu. The restaurant script 
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also tells us that he must have ordered a ham sandwich although the text does not 
explicitly tell us so. The script similarly tells us that he had been waiting for so long that 
he was getting impatient, and that he would perhaps not leave a tip or come again to this 
restaurant. Finally, the script tells us that the person ate a ham sandwich although 
nowhere in the text is this mentioned. I f we gave this example to a reading class and 
asked them: what did the person eat? The answer would be: he ate a ham sandwich. 
This information is supplied by our scriptal knowledge because we know that when 
people order things in a restaurant they eat them. In this way, metonymy has a powerful 
function in terms of putting the example text in its wider textual context. In fact, this 
understanding makes the example not only a part of a wider world but renders it the 
creator of this wider context, thanks to our metonymic understanding. The treatment of 
example (23) as a lexical phenomenon is not sufficient because it does not tell us why 
the person is referred to by the thing he ordered. A scriptal metonymic treatment does 
tell us that the principle of saliency is paramount and is a driving force behind text 
generation. This is to say that the script of a restaurant and the participant roles within 
this script make the metonymic use necessary as a form of dehumanising the relation 
between the customer and the waitress. This is because all that is important for the 
waitress in this script about Mr. or Mrs. X is that he/she ordered a ham sandwich. 
Schank and Abelson argue that scripts are usually invoked by means of certain 
conceptualisations. These are essentially key elements which activate the whole script. 
They maintain that there are four types of what they term headers. The first type of 
script header is the precondition header (PH) and this 'triggers the script reference on 
the basis of a main script precondition being mentioned in the text'. 7 4 They claim that 
(24) for example, 
24. John was hungry 
is a PH for the restaurant script. This gives a chance for the receiver to predict what is 
going to be said in the next text from the available data in front of him. So upon 
understanding that John was hungry, we could predict that he is going to try to fulf i l l a 
need, which is getting fed. One of the paths in our script for getting fed might be a 
restaurant. So in this sense the restaurant is metonymically predicted by means of the 
metonymic relation CAUSE FOR EFFECT . The cause of going to the restaurant which is 
7 3 See for further detail Schank and Abelson (1977: 48-49). 
7 4 Ibid. 
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'hunger' stands for the effect of this hunger. Hunger activates and facilitates the 
prediction of the entity 'restaurant' by means of metonymic causality that can be 
phrased as 'because he was hungry he went to a place to eat'. This universal knowledge 
is followed by the option of cultural knowledge. This is the schema of a restaurant with 
the possibility of other paths in the script. For example the person might go home for a 
meal or go to a takeway and eat in the park. Nonetheless, all these paths within the 
script of 'getting fed' will be activated and it is the progression of the discourse that will 
either confirm or deviate from each of these paths. 
The second type of script header is that which Schank and Abelson call the 
'instrumental header' (IH). The authors argue that this type of header comes up in 
situations where there are usually two or more contexts. The idea is that in such 
situations where two frames are activated by the script usually one of them is an 
instrument for the other main frame. In the example which the authors provide'John 
took the subway to the restaurant' there are two frames activated. One of them, the 
subway schema or frame is actually an instrument to achieve the main schema, the 
restaurant. This conceptualisation of a main header and an instrument header in script 
organisation is useful in many respects. It helps in predicting the direction and the 
progression of the discourse and explains how branching is possible in some elements in 
the script while it might not be in some other elements. It is also useful because it tells 
us that the progression of the text will dwell much on the main script, i.e. the restaurant 
in the example above as the target of the text. We expect further elaboration on the 
'restaurant script'. The subway script is only instrumental and as such it will not be the 
main part of the epistemic dimension of the discourse. So, as we can see, certain scripts 
can be suppressed by the way we expect the discourse to proceed. We expect no more 
elaboration on the subway script apart from that which has already been mentioned. 
However, both scripts, i.e. the subway and the restaurant script will be kept open to 
account for the interpretation of the discourse to come. 
The third type of script header is the locale header (LH). This explains the particularly 
specific types of scripts which as soon as they are mentioned in the text reinforce the 
retrieval of stereotypical knowledge of certain sequenced and determined actions and 
events related to that script. Examples of locale headers are schools, hospitals, churches, 
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prisons, museums and so on, where both the entities as well as the set of actions to take 
place can be easily expected and predicted. However there is a problem here with the 
activation of a particular script and the various participant roles involved in the script. 
The best examples of this case are church, hospital and the prison scripts where each 
one of these would demand a certain specified set of actions to take place. 
These actions however will differ according to the role of the participant involved. For 
example we would expect the behaviour of someone going to church for the sake of 
performing the service to be radically different from the behaviour of someone visiting 
the church as a tourist. Similarly, the person going to prison as a criminal is not going to 
behave as someone going to prison as a visitor. So for the person going to prison as a 
prisoner we would use the construction, 
25. He went to prison 
whereas for the person going to prison as a visitor we would use the structure 
26. He went to the prison. 
The definite article here has the function of specifying the role of the participant and 
thus characterising the type of script to be activated. 
This particular aspect has been formally taken care of by the language and has become a 
component of the grammar of English in this example. Arabic however does not make 
this formal distinction with regard to the change of the role of the individual involved 
by using the definite article, as it is the case in English. However, it seems that Arabic 
depends heavily on the semantics of the verb to make such a distinction. So 
27. Huwa dhahaba 'ila al-sijn (He went to prison) 
would automatically be interpreted as 
28. He was there as a visitor. 
But 
29. 'ukhidha 'ila al-sijn (He was taken to prison) 
would be readily interpreted as 
30. He was taken there as a prisoner. 
Arabic tends to use a completely different verb to show the distinction pertaining to the 
participant roles. By using two different verbs, Arabic makes use of this potential to 
provide economy of interpretation and hence to activate one and only one of the two 
possible scripts. The way the text is constructed in the passive to show that the person 
involved was in prison as a prisoner is a subtle aspect of the thematic structure of the 
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The fourth type of script header is that which Schank and Abelson call the internal 
conceptualisation header (ICH). The case with the previous type of header is that two 
types of scripts are activated and depending on the role of the person involved the 
interpretation is accessed via one of these two scripts. The situation in this case is fairly 
similar; the person involved has two roles and the text activates both roles but only one 
is primary to the interpretation of the text. The difference between LH and ICH is that 
while the ambiguity in the former is disambiguated by means of formal possibilities, i.e. 
the definite article, the ambiguity in the latter is disambiguated by means of resolving 
the role pattern of participants in the schema. This is coupled with resorting to the 
oncoming discourse which further specifies the type of role that should be activated and 
the type of role that should be suppressed. This is to say it is the progression of the 
discourse that determines which role is to be activated. 
The example of the 'waitress' given by the authors and reproduced here as (31). 
31. John went to visit his friend Mary who was a waitress. While he was waiting for 
her, he ordered a hamburger 
is characteristic of this situation. The main role of a waitress is to work in restaurants to 
give orders to the customers. As soon as we encounter the word'waitress'in a text the 
metonymic reasoning of PART FOR WHOLE functions to help us access the restaurant 
schema. However, the case here is quite different because the role of a 'waitress' here is 
not called up for its main unmarked function, i.e. as a person taking orders in a 
restaurant, but for its marginal marked function, i.e. as a friend. The mention of this 
friend as being a waitress is a piece of bypassing information and an internal 
conceptualisation, thus the restaurant schema is only marginally activated. 
Let us imagine that in a text from a novel in Arabic we encounter the word ma 'dhiin 
which means 'the authorised marriage contracts conductor'. The word ma 'dhiin will 
automatically activate the script of marriage or wedding. However, depending on the 
role this particular element, i.e. the ma'dhiin takes on, the interpretation and the 
expectation of the progression of the discourse will change. If, for example, we were 
told in previous discourse that Ahmad had a friend who is a ma 'dhiXn and that he was 
coming to visit him in the house, we would expect that the principal role of this element 
in the text would be suppressed in favour of the marked role of him as just a friend. 
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However, we need to keep open the path of a possibility of a marriage contract to be 
conducted because, we must bear in mind the potential for script deviation that is 
characteristic of literary language. 
As we have seen throughout the discussion of the notion of script, the processes of 
script activation and text expectation are based on metonymic relations of PART FOR 
WHOLE, WHOLE FOR PART, CAUSE FOR E F F E C T or E F F E C T FOR CAUSE . The reason why this is so is 
that the actions and sequences in scripts are normally universal or at least culturally 
shared. So in a sense we have as it were in-built systems for identifying sequences in 
such scripts without much difficulty because they are part of our being human or being 
members of social communities. Let me provide here an example showing the role of 
metonymic reasoning in script activation in another text. This is a poster that was put up 
some time ago in my department. 
32. Arabic Language/Linguistics/Literature Seminars 
Abdul Gabbar al-Sharafi (research student) 
'The Construct in Modern Standard Arabic: NSO Genitive Constructions' 
10 March, J. 10p.m. Seminar Room. 
The above text activates a 'seminar script'. The text as it stands is very fragmented, yet 
it is perfectly coherent. The text exploits the knowledge that is shared among a specific 
community to establish coherence links. It is through metonymic reasoning that we 
actually construct the parts and the sequences of the event. Indeed, the whole text as it 
stands involves nothing but descriptive knowledge and does not involve any action or 
account of procedural knowledge. It is our script knowledge that supplies us with the 
details or the verbs that are missing. Each of the above descriptive concepts suggests a 
contiguous procedural sequencing of the event at large once the global script of a 
seminar is activated. A fuller text of the version above might be (33) below: 
33. As a part of the Arabic Language/Linguistics/ Literature Seminars, Abdul 
Gabbar Al-Sharafi who is a research student will talk on the issue of 'the Construct 
in Modern Standard Arabic: NSO Genitive Constructions. The talk will be held on 
the 10'" of March at 1.10 p m. in the Seminar Room. 
Scripts facilitate global understanding but they do not perform this function on their 
own. In fact, scripts become coherent themselves only when our cognition supplies the 
details of a script or sometimes the logic behind the specific sequencing of events in the 
script in case of script deviation from our shared knowledge. I f this logic of sequencing 
which is fundamentally causal based on CAUSE FOR E F F E C T or E F F E C T FOR CAUSE metonymic 
relations is missing, a script will not be able to function properly in text generation, 
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organisation and interpretation. Equally i f the part for whole reasoning which is 
essentially metonymic, as we have seen in the various examples in this section, is 
missing from a script, the whole structure of a script is bound to collapse. This is 
evident in machine text processing because in case of a machine nothing can be taken 
for granted and every piece of knowledge must be computed. This shows what a huge 
amount of knowledge and cognitive reasoning the machine needs to be able to process 
text. In the case of human processing of text there is usually a considerable amount of 
underestimation of the powerful processes of organisation and conceptualisation of 
thought into coherent discourse. I believe metonymy is one of the fundamental 
principles of thought organisation which makes it possible for this thought to conform 
to culturally shared scripts. In short, metonymic reasoning of causality and contiguity is 
a prerequisite for any process of script activation. More importantly, the conception of 
metonymy as essentially a relation of representation allows for each mode of knowledge 
to stand for another via contiguity or causality. As we have seen so far in the examples 
discussed in the previous two sections, metonymy provides mental access that helps us 
move from one domain of knowledge to another to account for the coherence of 
discourse. 
The notion of causality should not, however, distract us from the fact that scripts 
represent standard stereotypical situations that are either universally or culturally 
shared. Such distraction could actually cause a confusion which I want to avoid. I f 
scripts are explainable only through causality then it might be argued that they are not 
universal or culturally shared, as we have to think always about the cause. However, we 
should not go too far in stressing the notion of causality here. Causality here still has a 
universal aspect or at least a culturally shared aspect. In other words we can think of 
global causality and local causality. So in the example: 
34. Tom was hungry. He went to a restaurant. 
there is a strong causal connection between the two sentences which can be expressed as 
'because John was hungry he went to a restaurant'. The point that I want to make is that 
this notion of causality should not be confused with the concept of scenarios which I am 
going to discuss in the next section. The reason is that this causality is itself universal 
because as human beings when we become hungry we look for food. Even the second 
part of the text is culturally shared because now in many cultures when people are 
hungry they go to restaurants. On the other hand, the causality pertaining to scenarios is 
a rather restricted form of causality and this is only explainable by means of other 
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Consider the following example: 
35. John went to the toilet. 
Here, the script of a toilet is activated but hardly would anyone ask why John went to 
the toilet because the reason is universally known. It is part of our cultural knowledge 
that we accumulate throughout our lives. However, there are many actions in our 
behaviour that are difficult to explain because they are arbitrary and these require a 
different version of causality to account for them. This is what might be termed personal 
or contextually bound causality, and it explains certain arbitrary behaviours that do not 
conform to general stereotypical patterns. An important point that should be made at 
this stage is that scripts being stereotypically universal or culturally based are quite 
limited; it seems that the conception of a script as a stereotypical sequence of events 
leads to the conceptualisation of text processing as static and involving the stable 
imposition of ready-made formulae of standard situations. This is obviously not totally 
true because text coherence and text interpretation are essentially dynamic. This 
dynamicity is evident in many situations where our expectations are not actually met. 
Let us now consider the following text: 
36. John was hungry. He was looking for a restaurant. He remembered a good, 
cheap one he had been to before. But it was quite far away. John thought about 
taking a taxi but he was not sure he had enough money. He then decided to take the 
underground. Inside the station he went directly to the ticket machine and 
purchased a single ticket to Baker Street. 
In this example we have the general script of 'someone hungry' and it is easy to predict 
what will come next in the text. However, this prediction that the person in question will 
have food is only very general. The details of how he attained this goal are not 
accounted for in the script and in fact they cannot be specified by our scriptal 
knowledge because there are many ways, in fact infinite ways, to achieve this goal. The 
details in the above example are given to us by the various scenarios which are set to 
achieve the goal. The construction of these scenarios is arbitrary in the sense that it is 
not predictable via a global pattern. The topic of arbitrariness in text generation, 
organisation and interpretation is one that I turn to in the following sections. 
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5.5. metonymy and scenarios 
What are scenarios? How do they differ from other knowledge structures discussed in 
this chapter? How do they contribute to text coherence and thus facilitate text 
interpretation? How do they relate to metonymic reasoning? This section will try to 
answer these questions. Again the literature on knowledge structures conflate the notion 
of scenarios with that of schemas and scripts and sometimes with the notion of 
frames. Scenarios as discussed in this chapter are knowledge structures which 
resemble scripts but which differ from them in that while scripts are explained by 
conventional sequences of actions, scenarios are explained by means of specific 
causality which pertain to particular interests and intentions. 
As the model in 5.2. shows, scenarios are treated here as arbitrary knowledge structures. 
However, a word of caution is necessary here regarding the notion of arbitrariness. This 
term has acquired a strong semiotic connotation especially in connection with 
*7Q 
Saussurean structuralism which propounds that linguistic signification is arbitrary in 
the sense that there is no logical or intrinsic connection between the signifier, i.e. the 
linguistic expression, and the signified, i.e. the meaning of that expression. In this case 
the Saussurean theory of linguistic signification denies 'motivatedness' in language.80 
Q 1 
The notion of arbitrariness as presented in this chapter , it should be noted, does not 
have this terminological load. The simple reason for this is that the fundamental 
principle underlying this thesis and indeed many other accounts of the role of 
metonymy in our language and thought " is that there is a considerable amount of 
motivatedness in language and cognition and that metonymic signification is 
contiguously and causally motivated. 
7 6 C.f. Brown and Yule (1983: 246). 
7 7 C.f. Sanford and Garrod (1981: 110). 
7 8 C.f. Minsky (1975: 240-246). 
7 9C.f.Harris(1983: 67). 
O f ) 
Ibid. (69). See for a critique of Saussure's theory of arbitrariness Keller (1998: 130-140). 
See also the discussion of the notion of motivatedness of linguistic signification that I provide in 
chapter 3 section 3.2.1. above. 
8 2 C.f. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Gibbs (1994), Fass (1997), 
Goatly (1997), Lakoff (1999), Radden and Panther (1999). 
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Therefore, the notion of arbitrariness in this chapter should be taken in a restricted sense 
to denote a situation where the prediction of text does not rely on universal or cultural 
standards but rather on personal intentions and individual manipulations of context to 
achieve certain goals. We can, to some extent, accept the notion of arbitrariness in the 
Saussurean sense i f it is applied to the relation between the signifier and the signified in 
individual lexical items as in the examples provided by Saussure himself. Saussure 
postulates 'there is no internal connexion, for example, between the idea 'sister' and the 
French sequence of sounds s-6-r- which acts as its signal'. However, it is quite 
difficult to accept the notion of 'arbitrariness' when we deal with text. The reason is that 
in the realm of text we are actually dealing with intentions, biases, prejudices and 
ideologies that cannot be thought to be arbitrary but strongly motivated. 
Within one script we might encounter one or more scenarios. I f we look at example (36) 
above we find that the 'John hungry' script allows us to predict that the following text 
will be an explanation of how this hungry person will feed himself. We know this 
because of stereotypical knowledge. So in this case taking a taxi or the underground is a 
scenario of transferring oneself to one particular place to get fed. Within this scenario of 
transferring location we can encounter one or more scripts depending on the choice of 
the means of transport. So i f the choice was for a taxi, the taxi script will be activated in 
our memory and the details will be automatically supplied. I f however, the taxi script is 
activated but then later on suppressed in favour of another more convenient choice as is 
the case in the example above, the taxi script is then shut and the underground script is 
activated to account for the interpretation of the oncoming text. 
The interactive nature of the process of script and scenario activation and in fact 
between all other knowledge structures in text processing is crucially important84 
because the assumption is that these mechanisms are not autonomous and obviously 
cannot function in isolation. Rather they collaborate to make sense of text. The schema 
allows for the activation of a script and the script enables the activation of a scenario 
which is explained by the set of plans and goals governing the whole act of 
communication. This is, in fact, the rationale behind my integrated model of all these 
8 3 Harris (1983: 67). 
8 4 This is shown by the use of double headed arrows in the model in 5.2. 
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mechanisms. In the literature these are usually discussed separately and with a great 
deal of overlap and confusion between them. Here I attempted to systematise them and 
treat them as a chain of problem solving and inferencing mechanisms, such that where 
one fails the other comes in to solve the problem. 
The model in 5.2. is inspired, to some extent, by de Beaugrande and Dressler's 
classification of what they call 'control centres' which they include in their account of 
text coherence. By 'control centres' they mean 'points from which accessing and 
processing can be strategically done'. They classify these control centres into primary 
concepts and secondary concepts. The model in 5.2.was indirectly inspired by the 
notion of 'primary concepts' proposed by de Beaugrande and Dressier, though their 
discussion of knowledge structures like schemata, frames and scripts and so on was also 
to some extent confused as I have shown in section 5.2. of this chapter. The primary 
concepts de Beaugrande and Dressier suggest are the following: 
(a) Objects: conceptual entities with a stable identity and constitution. 
(b) Situations: configurations of mutually present objects in their current states. 
(c) Events: occurrences which change a situation or a state within a situation. 
(d) Actions: events intentionally brought about by an agent. 
I have related the notion of schemata to the notion of 'objects' suggested by de 
Beaugrande and Dressier to denote conceptual entities with stable identity and 
constitution. Similarly, I have designated the term 'script' for the notion of situations 
proposed by the authors to refer to the mutually present objects in their current states 
which is the appearance of the objects in stereotypical sequence of events. With regard 
to the notion of 'events' suggested by the authors I have associated it with the notion of 
scenarios taking into consideration that these are not standard situations with 
conventionally predictable roles and objects. Rather they are arbitrary events and 
sequences of events that derive their interpretation from the knowledge of the tactics of 
the specific causality of the situation. In fact, it is the next step in de Beaugrande and 
Dressler's classification that helps to explain the intentionality and direction of these 
events. So in a sense it is the plans and the goals which explain the scenarios. 
8 5 De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 95). 
8 6 Ibid. 
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One could perhaps extend the argument of conventional vs. arbitrary knowledge to 
account for general epistemic patterns. For example, one could argue that descriptive 
text is generally conventional. It conforms to real accounts of ontological specifications 
of properties. It stems from well-established conventions shared by human beings in 
general. So the sense of contiguity is well-rooted in descriptive reasoning and is usually 
coached via contiguous associations like part/whole relations, cause/effect relations, 
maker/made relations and so on. However, i f we move to the other end of the cline of 
descriptive vs. argumentative text we have the kind of knowledge one might call 
political or perhaps more generally ideologically loaded. This pertains to texts with 
argumentation whether, for example, in religion or in politics. This is characteristically 
unpredictable and depends heavily on scenarios which are explained only by recourse to 
the intentions and interests of the participants. So while descriptive knowledge relies 
heavily on scripts, argumentative knowledge relies heavily on scenarios. The sign 
looses its referential power in argumentative knowledge, more of the epistemic ground 
of the discourse is symbolic, and there is a large number of abrupt conclusions. The 
referential power of the sign is more or less stable in descriptive knowledge. Descriptive 
knowledge can be associated with narrative and descriptive or expository discourse 
while argumentative knowledge can be associated with argumentative discourse in 
general. This latter depends on activation of various scenarios in the process of the 
interpretation. 
Consider the following example from al-Sharq al-'Awsat Newspaper: 
37. kuntu dd'iman dhidd ar-ra'is rabin, kuntu 'u'dridhuhu wa 'uqdwimuhu 
wa'uqabbihu min tasarrufdtihi al-'ariifati dhidd al-'arab, waldkinni hazintu 
limasra 'ihi, wa sha 'artu bi 'annana khasirnd khasman qawiyyan kdna yu 'arqilu al-
mufdwadhdt, wa kdna yatashaddadu fi mawdqiflhi dhidd al- 'arab waldkinnahu 
kdna yuhibbu bildda.hu, wa qad hdrabana wa ntasara 'alaynd thumma harabnahu 
wa ntasarnd 'alayhi fi 6 'uktubar. 'istankartu masra 'ahu li 'annand dhidd al-
'ightiyaldt sawd' kdna al-majrii 'alayhi sadiqan 'am khasman, wa kdna 'ahamma 
ma f i hddhd al-hddith al-mu 'Urn 'annahu 'athbata 'anna al- 'arab laysti wahdahum 
maydan al- 'ightiydldt, bal 'inna 'isrd "il kadhdlik tusharikuna hddha l-bald'. wa 
nahmadu allaha 'anna rabin qutila biyadi yahiidi, wa law kdna al-qatilu 'arabiyyan 
lanhdlat 'alayna al- 'ittihdmdt min kulli makdn, wa lama baqiya 'arabiyun wdhidun 
bighayr 'an yuttaham bi 'annahu qatil ra "is wuzard' 'isrd "il. 'amma al- 'an fal qdtilu 
shakhsun wdhidun la maldyin al-'arab alladhina yuttahamuna bikulli shay'in 
yahduthu fi al- 'dlam. 
87 
A colomn entitled fikrah 'idea' written by Mustafa AmTn when Rabin the Israeli Prime Minister was 
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Translation: 
I was always against Rabin. I hated his violent actions against the Arabs, and opposed 
him in whatever ways I could. However, I was sad when he died. I felt that we had lost 
a powerful adversary, who, while he may have hampered negotiations and adopted an 
extreme attitude towards the Arabs, nonetheless loved his country. He fought and 
defeated us in 1967, then in 1973 we fought and defeated him. I felt revulsion at his 
death, because one must be against assassination regardless of whether the victim is a 
friend or an enemy. The most important aspect of this sad incident is that it showed that 
the Arabs are not the only people who go in for assassinations. Israel is also afflicted by 
the same disease. I thank God that Rabin was killed by a Jew. I f the assassin had been 
an Arab, accusations would have been flung at us from all directions. There wouldn't 
have been a single Arab who hadn't been accused of the killing of the Israeli Prime 
Minister. Now, however, it's clear that the killer was a single person, not millions of 
Arabs who find themselves accused of everything that happens in the world. 
The first sentence in the text does not topicalise or set the scene for a global schema or 
script as it is usually the case in narrative and descriptive text. Normally, the 
topicalisation is a syntactic aspect which has a textual role. This role is to activate a 
conceptual knowledge structure which is the schema to account for the oncoming 
discourse and integrate it with the activated schema or script. In example (37) above we 
do not seem to have such activation; neither do we have topicalisation, as the sentence 
begins with the verb to which the subject is annexed as is the case in the canonical VSO 
word order in the unmarked Arabic sentence. So what does this sentence activate and 
how does it facilitate the interpretation of oncoming discourse? Actually, the sentence 
activates a scenario of someone opposing someone else. We do not know why. The 
reasons are explained later on from the point of view of the originator of the discourse. 
This point is crucially important in the scenario interpretation of text because the text is 
heavily loaded with ideological bias. 
The difference between a script and scenario is that while there is some sort of 
activation of conceptual knowledge involved in both, the activation of the former helps 
in prediction of further text and establishes a shared understanding between the sender 
and the receiver of the text. In the latter, on the other hand, there is an activation of 
some sort of event which is not conventionally shared between the sender and the 
receiver. Rather this action or event is expressed from the point of view of the sender 
which might not necessarily agree with the receiver's own perspective. According to 
our conception of global patterns of knowledge we would expect the text above to 
continue with one script in which the writer or sender will continue hurling expressions 
of hatred and opposition throughout. However, this is not the case. Rather the text mixes 
several scenarios leading to multiple interpretations, which is characteristic of political 
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In scenario activation we proceed in the text because we are keen to know why the 
actions are the way they are presented. In script and schema activation, apart from 
deviant and defamiliarised schemata and scripts of poetic or literary language, we 
normally proceed in the text with quite sound expectations. When we encounter a text 
beginning with ' in the hospital ' we activate a schema of a hospital. As a result 
concepts like nurses, doctors, beds, x-rays and so on will be supplied by our memory 
and as we go on in the text we take these items as given. The same thing applies i f we 
activate the hospital script. Here in addition to the set of things and objects that are 
treated as given we will also be able to supply a great number of sequenced actions and 
roles for participants in the script. However, with the text above it is difficult to imagine 
a situation that is universal where someone is against someone else by convention. This 
kind of conceptualisation necessarily requires that there are specific reasons for this 
attitude. 
In the text above there is no global pattern that is activated and the whole text is 
embroiled in a socio-cultural plot which although it depends on wider historical events 
is essentially a sequence of unpredictable actions each with its own causality pattern. 
Expressions in the text such as 'u'aridhuhu wa 'uqawimuhu wa 'uqabbihu min 
tasarrufatihi al- 'anifah dhidda al- 'arab T was always against Rabin. I hated his violent 
actions against the Arabs' seem quite predictable because these are compatible with the 
sense of'someone being against someone' which has been activated in the first sentence 
of the text. However, it is strange to find the expression walakinn'i hazintu limasra 'ihi, 
'However I was sad when he died'. This is because we would not normally expect 
someone who hates another to feel sorry for his death. However, this is justified i f we 
take into consideration that the text is argumentative and it makes use of several 
scenarios, perhaps the most relevant of which here is that the writer is trying to show 
sympathy with the deceased. Nonetheless, as will be shown later, this is just one among 
the scenarios that are invoked in the text. 
As I pointed out earlier, scenario activation is based on specific causality. In the text 
above the sequence of causality, it should be noted, is not mentioned in the order which 
we would normally expect, i.e. the cause preceding the effect. Rather we are first 
introduced to the statement of the expressions of hatred and opposition, i.e. the effect 
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even before knowing the reason. One could argue that the text here is displayed against 
a wider historical and socio-cultural background which explains the reason behind this 
hatred and opposition. However, although this might prove true to some extent, the text 
actually expresses the cause but only after the statement of the effect, i.e. tasarrufatihi 
al- 'ariifah dhidda al- 'arab 'his violent actions against the Arabs'. The fact that this text 
is displayed against the background of the Arab-Israeli conflict is evident in the use of 
the word 'al-mufawadhaf 'the negotiations' with the definite article although it has not 
been mentioned earlier. This shows that as soon as the text activates the global schema 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict by mentioning the word Rabin, the concept of 'negotiations' 
comes into mind and is thus treated as known. One could also argue that the word 
'negotiations' is definite here because it takes its specified reference from other texts 
salient in the socio-cultural background invoked by the text. 
With the word walakinni 'But I . . ' a new scenario starts. This is quite different from the 
previous scenario which exhibits a rather negative attitude towards Rabin. In this 
scenario we are informed that the death of Rabin is causing to the writer sadness and 
that the Arabs had lost a powerful adversary, and so on. On the surface these 
expressions seem to be praising Rabin but at a deeper level the same scenario of 
negative attitudes is still operating because although the phrase 'a powerful adversary', 
is presented as a way of praising, it is actually loaded with opposition and dislike. A 
powerful adversary is an enemy who is not just an enemy but an extreme enemy. The 
text goes on to explain that the Arabs had lost this powerful adversary who was 
hampering the negotiations and adopting an extreme attitude towards the Arabs. 
Obviously none of these qualities is liked by an Arab and the question that comes to 
mind is how it could be possible to claim that the Arabs had really 'lost' Rabin? It 
seems these expressions are mentioned here just to mislead the reader and force him to 
employ multiple scenarios, a feature characteristic of argumentative discourse. 
The text is an argumentative text. In this type of text the producer of the text utilises his 
power to force certain views and ideas on the receiver. Analysis of the balance of power 
relations in argumentative texts is an important technique to reveal the interaction 
between scenarios and expectations, the scenarios being the input from the text producer 
and the expectations the input from the receiver of the text. In this text, however, there 
seems to be no pattern of power exerted by the text producer. On the other hand, the text 
is torn between apologetic and hostile expressions. There is a general sense of trying to 
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please more than one party rather than imposing the producer's own plans. There is 
keen interest in compromise between conflicts of interest and this is achieved through 
the activation of multiple scenarios. This activation is warranted by metonymic relations 
of causality and contiguity in the sense that each state leads to the existence of another 
causally related state. 
The sentence waldkinnahu kana yuhibbu bilddahu 'but he loved his country' is put in 
the text as to misleadingly show sympathy with Rabin. In fact, however, the proposition 
expressed in this sentence is that he is the enemy of the Arabs i f he loves his country. 
This sentence might be a positive appraisal i f said by an Israeli but it is actually the 
opposite i f said by an Arab. Here it is just another way of allowing for a positive 
scenario to come in the interpretation to somewhat mitigate the rather negative general 
attitude. The text continues by mentioning the military confrontations between the two 
sides, i.e. the Israelis and the Arabs. The mention of wars is an indication of hostility in 
which bad memories are recalled for both sides. Thus in view of the scenarios of the 
text it is easy to see why the writer included this point in his article. Now let us consider 
another part of the text wa kana ahamma md ft hddha al-hadith al-mu 'Urn 'annahu 
'athbata 'anna al- 'arab laysu wahdahum mayddn al- 'ightiyalat 'An important aspect of 
this sad incident was that it proved that the Arabs are not alone in the field of 
assassinations'. This point is perhaps the statement of one of the main goals of the 
whole text. This is to show the triumph for the fact that not only Arabs assassinate their 
leaders as was the case with Sadat. 
Then comes the climax and pivot of the text which expresses the real motive of the 
article. This is the part which begins with wa nahmadu allaha 'anna rab'in 'we thank 
Allah that Rabin . . . ' . This shows clearly that the aim of the whole text is to use the fact 
that Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli to defend the Arabs from potential accusations 
and to show that they are usually wronged and misrepresented. It is clear from the 
scenario analysis of the text that the whole text is split between the conflict of scenarios. 
One scenario is activated and then soon it is suppressed in view of more global 
knowledge related to history and socio-political knowledge. In fact, the conflict between 
the scenarios activated and then suppressed is a natural reflection of the conflict 
between the author as a writer who should adopt an objective attitude towards the 
incident and the author as an Arab who has his own emotions and ideologies. 
Nonetheless, all these apparently contradictory scenarios in fact run coherently to realise 
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the ultimate goal of the text which is to express the fact the Arabs are usually 
misrepresented. 
The writer seems to be following an objective and universal code of conduct in 
mitigating his attitude towards the incident. In fact, it could be argued that he is neither 
happy nor sad regarding the incident. What he is interested in is to use the incident to 
draw analogies of how the incident reflects bias and prejudice. The author wants to 
blame the international community for applying double standards when it comes to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. This is evident from his concluding remarks 'amma al- 'an falqdtil 
shakhs la malayin al- 'arab, "Now, however, it's clear that the killer was a single person, 
not the millions of Arabs'. 
The writer wants to say that i f the assassin had been an Arab, then all the Arabs would 
have been accused of terrorism but because it is now clear that the assassin was an 
Israeli the world will treat it as an individual case. The fact that scenarios are based on 
localised causality is what makes scenarios basically metonymic structures, because 
metonymy realises causal relations underlying sense continuity which give the text its 
unity and coherence. Standard or universal causality is actually part of schematic 
knowledge because once we read that 'John is hungry' we expect that he will get fed. 
However, the conflict of intentions and interests in scenario manipulation is by no 
means conventional. Rather it is the result of continuous negotiation with the text and its 
own epistemic as well as ontological dimensions of knowledge. It is clear from the 
above example that text coherence depends largely on identifying the set of cause/effect 
relations not only on the linguistic presentation of facts but also by going deeper and 
consequently wider than that. That is by taking the formal text as only one resource and 
searching for other sources of knowledge that contribute to our understanding of the text 
as purposeful and thus make it stand as a coherent and meaningful unit. 
Minsky discusses an interesting point which proved useful to my discussion of the three 
main knowledge structures, i.e. schemata, scripts and scenarios. Minsky elaborates the 
go 
following point sketched in Winston : 
What does it mean to expect a chair? Typically, four legs, some assortment of rungs, a level 
seat, an upper back. One expects also certain relations between these "parts." The legs must 
be below the seat, the back above. The legs must be supported by the floor. The seat must 
be horizontal, the back vertical, and so forth. Now suppose that this description does not 
Winston, P. (1970). 
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match; the vision system finds four legs, a level plane, but no back. The "difference" 
between what we expect and what we see is "too few backs". This suggests not a chair, but 
on 
a table or bench. 
On the basis of the above quotation we can draw a conclusion bringing together the 
three concepts I have been discussing in this chapter. Minsky talks about the 'typical' 
features of a chair. I relate this aspect to the notion of schemata which I have argued to 
contain knowledge of entities. Then Minsky deals with what he calls 'relations'. These 
are obviously the structural relations between these entities. They are structural in the 
sense of category membership and thus forming structures. The notion of'relations' can 
also be expanded somewhat to include 'sequential' relations, covering both 'spatial and 
temporal' dimensions. In this case it is easy to postulate that this level of'relations' 
pertain also to the notion of script as I have outlined it above. Then we come to the 
notion of 'deviation' which is expressed by Minsky using the expression 'not 
matching'. I take this level of representation to belong to the third category where our 
global or universal expectations are not met due to specific reasons. This is the level of 
scenarios. 
Now theoretically speaking these three levels of representation, i.e. schemata, scripts 
and scenarios correspond to the three levels of metonymic representation. The first is 
the entity or the selection level where two word/things/concepts are made to be forming 
a system. This level can also be termed the paradigmatic level of metonymic 
representation. It consists of words/concepts/things which corresponds to the level of 
typicality referred to in Minsky's discussion and to the notion of schemata in my 
account. The second level of metonymic representation is the level where one of the two 
entities is actually put in the representational string. This is the syntagmatic level of 
metonymic representation which corresponds to the level of relations in Minsky's 
account and to the notion of script in the conceptual structure of our knowledge. The 
third level is the level of 'not matching' as referred to in Minsky's argument. This 
consists of unpredictable connections which are explainable only via contiguous means. 
This is the level of metonymic interpretation which involves a great deal of reasoning 
and searching for various types of association. The jump from the lexical domain of 
metonymy outlined here to the textual level of interpreting text is actually guaranteed by 
the nature of metonymy as an essentially combinatorial aspect of language and thought. 
Minsky (1975: 252). 
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5.6. metonymy and plans 
I f coherence in discourse were always achieved via stereotypical situations which 
describe frequently encountered situations and sequences of events then this would 
make it easier for us to understand any type of text without much effort. Or in more 
technical terms this would put understanding always in the default mode. In fact, 
according to this view any model of scriptal knowledge would be sufficient to account 
for text processing and therefore we would not need to look for other types of 
knowledge structures. A moment's thought however will reveal that this is not the case 
because human understanding is far more complex than this reductionist view of 
standard knowledge structures. There are many types of text that we wrestle with to 
understand. Human generation and interpretation of knowledge is much more complex 
than a model of stereotypicality associated with schemata or scripts could account for. 
For this reason Schank and Abelson proposed the notion of 'plans' to account for 
situations where 'people can deal with situations that they have never encountered 
before. They can do this because they have access to the mechanisms that underlie 
scripts'.9 0 
Schank and Abelson define a plan as a theoretical entity which 
is intended to be the repository for general information that will connect events that cannot 
be connected by use of an available script or by standard causal chain expansion. A plan is 
made up of general information about how actors achieve goals. A plan explains how a 
given state or event was prerequisite for or derivative from another state or event.91 
They further assert that 'plans describe the set of choices that a person has when he sets 
out to accomplish a goal'. It is clear from Schank and Abelson's treatment of plans 
that they regard plans as devices which explain people's intentions. The nature of plans 
as used in this chapter is instrumental in the sense that they give connectivity to certain 
actions that are otherwise disconnected. The role of plans is explanatory and they give 
information as to why a set of sequence is made contiguous although there seems to be 
no explicit thread of continuity between its parts. The example from Gibbs is a good 
9 0 Schank and Abelson (1977: 70). 
9 1 Ibid. 
9 2 Ibid. 
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illustration of the role of the metonymic relation of causality in explaining the role of 
plans and goals in activating scenarios. 
The example tale provided by Gibbs runs as follows: 
38. He wanted to be king. 
He was tired of waiting. 
He thought arsenic would work well. 
Without activating the metonymic relation of causality, the interpretation of this text is 
severely hampered. The coherence of this text is based on the activation of a certain 
scenario which is established by means of the identification of the plans and purposes 
underlying the text. The text activates a scenario of someone planning to be king and 
indirectly alludes to the state of the affairs that there is already a king and that is why he 
has to wait for a long time and as a result has become tired of waiting. This state allows 
for some action to take place. This action is actually a plan and it aims to get rid of the 
cause of this tiresome waiting situation, which is the existence of the present king in this 
example. The mention of the word 'arsenic' activates a whole scenario of plotting an act 
of poisoning the present king to get rid of him. Without metonymic reasoning of 
causality and without scenario activation by identifying the set of plans that underlie the 
text, the text would be extremely difficult to understand. This shows how the role of 
metonymic reasoning is fundamental in discourse processing. These processes, it should 
be noted, are not alien to the cognitive structure of our brains as it is sometimes believed 
in certain figurative accounts of metonymy. Rather they are processes that are 
fundamental parts of our thought and cognition. 
De Beaugrande and Dressier define plans as 'global patterns of events and states leading 
up to an intended goal'. 9 4 This definition seems to confuse frames and schemas in the 
use of the phrase 'global patterns'especially i f we know that the authors regard these 
latter two as different. The definition is rather general also because it uses the term 
'plan' to designate events and states which lead to intended goals. Any event or action, 
i f deliberate, leads to an intended goal so there is nothing specific about plans to make 
them different from scripts for example. Here, I shall dwell on the intentional aspect 
highlighted by de Beaugrande and Dressler's definition. A plan is a purposeful action in 
Gibbs (1994: 330). 
De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981: 90-91). 
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the sense that it serves to explain why a particular scenario is presented in the way that 
it is. Let us look at the following text from Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (April, 17 th, 
1993). The text shows how metonymic reasoning of causal relations underlying the text 
is actually a fundamental aspect of text coherence. 
39. Bada 'a nizdm hukm ar-ra "is al- Iraqi saddam husayn hamlatan mukhatjatjatan 
litajfif qitd 'atin wasi 'atin min 'ahwdr al- 'irdq kawasilatin lihirman al-mutamarrid'in 
fi al-janub min 'ayi ghita', wa li 'ijbdr sukkan al 'ahwar 'nfusahum 'Id al-khudhu' 
lisaytarati an-nizam f i baghddd. 
Translation: 
The regime of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein began a planned project to drain 
vast areas of Al-Ahwar in Iraq as a means of depriving the rebels in the south from any 
cover and to force the people of Al-Ahwar themselves to submit to the dominion of the 
regime in Baghdad. 
The understanding of this text is first of all based on an understanding of a metonymic 
relation of CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED . This is evident in the attribution of the act of 
draining to Saddam Hussein's regime although the act itself is not actually carried out 
by Saddam Hussein or any member of his government. This metonymic reasoning at the 
beginning of the text reveals and exposes a latent ideology and an implicit blaming 
attitude against Saddam Hussein by a Saudi-owned newspaper. The attribution of the 
act of draining Al-Ahwar is a technique to throw the blame for the action on Saddam 
Hussein and his regime because they are the controllers of the people who actually 
carried out the draining. The controlled, i.e. the people who performed the action of 
draining, are basically workers for Saddam Hussein's regime. Besides they are not 
known any way, in which case it is difficult to blame them. In such cases where the real 
doer of the action is not known or not important enough to be known or to be blamed, 
then our cognition shifts the reference from the real doer of the action to the cause 
behind the doing of the action. In this way the responsibility for this act of 
environmental catastrophe is thrown onto Saddam Hussein and his regime. 
The coherence of the text also depends on metonymic reasoning in a more specific way. 
Without identifying the network of plans, goals and scenarios in the text it is impossible 
to understand the text. Without establishing a relation of cause/effect between the act of 
draining and the act of depriving the rebels of any cover the text will not stand as a 
meaningful whole. Not only that but also we have to supply information that is not 
actually mentioned in the text. Our metonymic reasoning of causality will tell us, 
though the text itself does not help us in this regard, that when an area is drained of 
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water then the trees dry up and the land is denuded of cover. Also we have to make yet 
another metonymic inferencing process by which we use our general knowledge of the 
world that rebels usually hide under trees and therefore the removal of the foliage of 
these trees make the lives of these rebels at stake. Moreover, the fact that the removal of 
the foliage of the trees and perhaps subsequently the trees altogether deprives the rebels 
of shelter to hide, forcing them to submit and surrender to the attackers, which is in this 
text the regime in Baghdad. Without these inferencing processes text unity and text 
continuity will be disrupted. 
It should also be noted here that the amount of knowledge our metonymic reasoning of 
causality and contiguity supplies us with depends heavily on the level of detail required 
and the level of sophistication our knowledge should have. For example, there are still 
several metonymic processes of cause/effect relations that are not mentioned in the 
analysis above let alone the text. For instance, the causality in the draining process 
might be elaborated more in such a way as to show minute details of causal chains, such 
as the fact that lack of water in the land causes lack of water in the roots of trees. Lack 
of water in the roots of trees causes lack of water in the stem and this leads to lack of 
water in the leaves. When the leaves do not have water they become yellow, dry up and 
fall, leaving the tree without leaves. In fact, the account would be more detailed than 
this i f we were to adopt a zoological or botanical analysis of what actually happens in 
the roots, stem and leaves when there is no water. 
Our metonymic reasoning of CAUSE FOR E F F E C T relations underlying the text helps us 
interpret the text as a purposeful unit on the basis that each state is either a result of 
another state or a state that initiates a further state. This causal connectivity in the text is 
not the only way we can perceive of metonymic roles in text interpretability however. In 
fact, the text is also interpretable by means of other metonymic relations of structural 
perception of part/whole organisation. The mention of wholes deems the parts of these 
wholes known and thus accessible in the memory. This facility ensures that the amount 
of language we use in our communication is minimised and that language is economical 
enough to avoid redundancy. Language as a system of communication stands against a 
cognitive representation that is far more detailed than what is actually made explicit in 
speaking or writing, as the text above shows. In this sense the essence of cognition can 
be seen to represent a metonymic operation in which the linguistic elements of 
communication stand for the whole realm of cognition. 
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The word 'arsenic' in example (38) above helps a great deal in resolving the 
interpretation problems associated with the very elliptical form of the scenario. In the 
following example we find the word 'gun' as a useful tool to activate specific plans 
which help to realise the goals at which the initiator of the text is aiming. 
40. John needed some money. 
He took the gun and headed towards the local bank. 
We have a robbery scenario here in this example and this interpretation is warranted by 
the mention of the word 'gun'. We understand that the state of being in need of money 
leads to a state of trying to get money. At this stage there are several plans or actions for 
the scenario to proceed. John might take one of his valuable things and sell it. Within 
this plan-based scenario, the gun could actually be a valuable antique gun that John has 
inherited, because he is now in need of money he has taken the gun and is heading 
towards the bank to put it as a pawn to borrow money from the bank. However, this 
interpretation is not directly accessible because the description of someone needing 
money and going to the bank carrying a gun is in its unmarked interpretation highly 
suggestive of a robbery scenario. 
Another path in the scenario would be that John might phone one of his relatives or 
friends and ask for help. However, the text imposes on us a specific progression. 
Because the progression of the text through the robbery scenario is supported by default 
plan interpretation we would normally expect that other plans of getting money had 
failed. I f our interpretation was to be directed towards the 'valuable antique gun' 
interpretation we would normally expect some more specification to be explicit in the 
text to guide us to take that particular path of reasoning. For example, we would expect 
that the text would explicitly state that 
41. John was in need for money. John decided to pawn his antique gun so he carried 
his gun and headed towards the local bank. 
Of course each of these scenarios would activate a particular path of text understanding 
and prediction and each would activate a particular setting and a specific script. We 
would for example expect the robbery scenario to take place at night when there is no 
one in the bank whereas we would expect the 'gun pawning' scenario to take place 
during the day and more precisely during work hours. 
From the above discussion of the role of plans in text understanding and text prediction 
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we can see that processes of both understanding and prediction in text are interrelated 
and each depends on the other. It seems that our understanding of a text is based on our 
prediction of the progression of causality with regard to the set of plans underlying the 
linkage between events and actions. In the same way our prediction of the progression 
of the text relies heavily on our understanding of the current state of affairs that the text 
is describing and the mechanism the text is employing to stand as a unified whole. 
Metonymic reasoning provides text understanding and text prediction with a unique tool 
that does not limit understanding to one or two cognitive principles but rather integrates 
all the available knowledge structures to work in an interactive manner to test 
hypotheses and attest the most probable ones with evidence from the text and from other 
sources outside the text. Thus the hypothesis of the chapter is that metonymy as a 
representational relation provides mental access that cuts across the three domains of 
language, mind and reality. 
One of the examples that Schank and Abelson provide for the notion of plan is very 
suggestive of a metonymic relation of CAUSE FOR E F F E C T . Their example95 is: 
42. Willa was hungry. 
She took out the Michelin guide. 
In this example there is ellipsis not very much different from the ellipsis in 
43. John went to McDonalds. 
In Willa's story in example (42) above the second sentence strongly invokes an 
elliptical element which is 'to search for a restaurant'. In example (43) there is an 
elliptical element which is 'the restaurant which is called McDonalds'. There is not a 
very big difference between the two types of ellipsis except that in the second example 
the reference is fairly fixed and is invoked by well-established cultural semiosis. 
However, in the first example there is only a sense of expectation and although the 
causal linkage strongly activates a scenario of searching for a restaurant in the guide it is 
still an expectation. Example (43) is also metonymic in the causally-driven expectation 
sense also. One should expect an elliptical element to continue. This is 'to eat' because 
this element is supplied by the schema of a restaurant that it contains 'food' and by our 
script of going to a restaurant which tells us that people go to restaurants to eat. 
C.f. Schank and Abelson (1977: 71). 
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5.7. metonymy and goals 
Goals are more general plans. A plan may describe a specific action in a scenario to 
achieve a general goal. Text coherence is, among other things, a dialectic interaction 
between the fulfilment of the goal, or the declining of that goal i f it is not fulfilled and 
resorting to another goal. The following text from Naguib Mahfouz's Za'balawi 
illustrates how text coherence is governed by the overall goal that the text sets out right 
from the start. The text begins with the following: 
44. 'iqtana 'tu akhiran bi 'anna 'alayya 'an 'ajid ash-Shaykh za 'baldwi. 
'I was finally convinced that I had to find Sheikh Za 'balawi'. 
This start actualises a general goal and text coherence depends heavily on pursuing this 
goal. In other words the writer is expected to subsequently elaborate on how he fulfilled 
this goal. In fact, for a few lines after this statement the writer gives the background as 
to why he needs to find Sheikh Za'balawi. Mahfouz spends a considerable amount of 
time giving the reader the background of this overall goal. He tells us that Za'balawi, 
according to the narrator's father, is a holy man, a saint who was able to solve all sorts 
of problems. The text tells us also that the narrator was in a crisis and that was the 
reason why he was searching for Za'balawi. Within the description of the actions and 
events that were carried out to fu l f i l l the goal of finding Sheikh Za'balawi, we 
encounter several other scenarios and plans contributing to the fulfillment of the goal. 
For example, the following text tells us that the narrator remembered what his father 
had told him about the location of Za'balawi which is a prerequisite state for the person 
to transfer his location to that place to fulf i l l the goal of finding this Sheikh . 
45. wa tadhakkartu 'anna 'abi qdla 'innahu' 'arafahu fi bayt ash-Shaykh qamar bi 
khan ja'far, wa huwa Shaykh min rijal ad-din al-mushtaghilin bilmuhdmah ash-
shar 'iyyah. Faqasadtu baytahu wa 'aradtu at-ta 'akud min 'annahu md zdl yuqim fih 
fasa 'altu bayyd 'fill asfal al-bayt, fanazara 'ilayya bistighrdb wa qdl: 
- ash-Shaykh qamar! Tarak al-hay min 'ahdin ba "id, wa yuqdl 'innahu yuqim fi 
gardin 
siti wa 'anna maktabahu bimayddn al-azhar wastadlaltu 'aid 'unwdn maktabihi 
bidaftar at-tilifun, wdhahabtu 'ilayhi min tawwifi 'imdrat al-ghurfah at-tijariyyah. 
Translation: 
I remembered that my father had told me that he had known him in Sheikh Qamar's 
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house in Khan Ja'far. Sheikh Qamar was a clergyman whose profession was that of 
lawyer in Islamic courts. I headed towards his house. But I wanted to make sure that he 
was still living there. So I asked the "foul" seller at the basement of the house. The man 
looked at me strangely and said: 
Sheikh Qamar! He left the block long ago. It is said that he now lives in Garden City 
and his office is in Al-Azhar Square. I found out his address from the phone book and 
went to him immediately in the Building of the Chamber of Commerce. 
From the text above we can see that there are several actions that took place all of which 
contribute to the realisation of the main goal. Going to see Sheikh Qamar and asking 
the man who sells 'foul ' at the basement and consulting the phone book are all actions 
to achieve the general goal. In fact, these actions are predictable or at least easy to 
process because of the activation of the general goal of the text. Al l these actions are 
causally linked and thus their interpretation is processed by means of CAUSE FOR E F F E C T 
metonymic relations. Identifying a goal is also a metonymic process in the sense that a 
text is usually perceived as purposeful, i.e. as having a general goal. This general goal 
functions like a holistic cognitive domain from which specific actions and plans derive 
their interpretation and meaningfulness. 
The search for Sheikh Qamar which occupies the whole text above is only an 
instrumental secondary goal to serve the general goal of the text, i.e. to find Sheikh 
Za'balawi. The actions within the secondary goal are scenarios realising the set of 
particular plans. This chain of interconnectedness of plans, scenarios and goals is the 
unique characteristic of metonymic reasoning of the relations PART FOR WHOLE and CAUSE 
FOR E F F E C T and the converse of these relations. In this case the unity of the text is 
cognitively maintained by means of structural integration and cognitive causality. This 
interconnectivity is what provides the text with coherence and meaningfulness and 
makes its interpretation possible. In fact, the overall plot of the story revolves around 
this general goal of searching for Sheikh Za'balawi. The text goes on with this goal, 
which however also includes several digressions to other scenarios and elaborations on 
various plans in order to fulf i l l it. 
The idea that there is a central aim of the story ensures that the text hangs together and 
that digression and elaboration are assumed to be serving the main aim in one way or 
another. This feature is not only a characteristic of narrative discourse to which the text 
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above belongs but also a feature of almost all types of text. The understanding of this 
centrality is metonymically-based. This is because this feature derives from a general 
principle that all communication is purposeful. For example, an expository text 
describing a room will have the general aim of enumerating the features of this room. 
The description might take various forms. It might begin from the place where the 
initiator of the discourse is located and move further from this point. It might then move 
left or right or in fact in any direction and come back to the point of origin. This 
movement in the description is easily interpretable because of a fundamental principle 
of our cognitive structure. This is the metonymic principle of contiguity, i.e. cognitive 
contiguity or ontological contiguity. This is to say the description might be accessed 
from the cognitive schema of a room that has been activated once the concept of room is 
encountered. Or the description might be accessed from the real arrangement of the 
things in the room. 
To take another example from non-verbal communication let us consider this 
hypothetical situation in which a student comes to see his supervisor in his office upon a 
fixed appointment. However, the student finds the professor busy in a telephone 
conversation. The conversation extends for a long time. Now i f the student starts 
making frequent yawns and looking at his watch then this means that he is trying to 
communicate something. These actions are purposeful and thus their interpretation is 
based on causality since we assume that he is doing these actions because he is bored 
and he wants to tell the professor that he might be missing another appointment perhaps. 
In fact, in order to understand the situation we have to assume that these actions are 
purposeful and causally linked to the context. 
Goals have been a subject of intensive research in cognitive as well as social 
psychology because they provide a guide to the interpretation of human behaviour.96 
Schank and Abelson provide a taxonomy of these goals. They divide goals into seven 
types according to three categories. The first category is that which involves striving for 
desired states. The second category involves avoidance of undesired states. The third 
category involves intermediate subgoals. Under the first category they recognise three 
types of goals. The first is the satisfaction goal which is a 'recurring strong biological 
Schank and Abelson provide a list of references which relate to the study of goals and to their 
terminology: 'instincts' McDougal (1932), 'needs'Murray (1938),'values'Allport and Vernon (1951), 
'ways of life' (1956). C.f. Schank and Abelson (1977: 111). 
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need'.9 7 Satisfaction of hunger, satisfaction of sex and satisfaction of sleep are typical 
examples of this category. These types of goals are very useful in text interpretation and 
text prediction because they are so basic to our lives that they are easy to predict and 
pursue in text. I f the satisfaction of one of these goals is invoked and the goal itself is 
not satisfied we tend to predict that there will be persistence to try and succeed in 
satisfying it. Generally there is no goal substitution in this type of goals and this stems 
from the fact that they are very basic to our life. For example we do not expect a goal to 
sleep i f not satisfied to change to a goal to play. 
The second type is what they call the enjoyment goal which is 'an activity which is 
optionally pursued for enjoyment or relaxation'. Good examples of enjoyment goals 
are travelling, doing exercise, entertaining and so on. These goals are useful in 
providing text coherence by virtue of the fact that they allow for optional goals to 
proceed i f the original goal is not satisfied, but this substitution is governed by various 
other factors. Generally the substitutions are not radical shifts of goal; rather they are 
usually mild changes. For example we would not expect someone who goes to the 
movie and finds it full to decide to go to see the Pyramids instead (unless the situation 
of the discourse happens to be in Giza in Egypt). 
The third type of goal in the first category is what Schank and Abelson call the 
achievement goal. This is 'the realisation, often over a long term, of some valued 
acquisition or social position'. 9 9 Examples of this type of goal include striving to have 
possessions, a good job, and social relationships, and so on. These are useful in text 
coherence because they actually stand for a number of plans that we expect to take place 
to realise this goal and because of their long term nature we expect that they will occupy 
a great deal of time and hence of text in order to materialise. It seems that a great deal of 
realist narrative texts revolve around these goals. The whole text in this case is a 
realisation of one particular goal. 
The first type of goal in the second category is the preservation goal which is geared 
towards 'preserving or improving the health, safety, or good condition of people, 
9 7 Ibid. (112). 
9 8 Ibid. (113). 
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position or property'. 1 0 0 We might understand, in fact we did, the goal in Za'balawi's 
text above as 'to search for Sheikh Za'balawi'. However, the real goal was actually one 
of preserving health. Because according to the background information that the text tells 
us the narrator had some health problems. In this case, searching for Sheikh Za'balawi 
was actually an instrumental goal serving to achieve the ultimate goal which is to 
preserve his health. It is actually a chain of goals and subgoals and further subgoals all 
of which are causally linked in a specific order. Text coherence depends heavily on 
identifying this chain of causal connectivity and it is believed that the way to identify 
this linkage is through metonymic reasoning of CAUSE FOR E F F E C T relations. 
The second type of goal in this category is what Schank and Abelson call 'crisis goal' 
and define as ' a special class of preservation goals'. 1 0 1 Because they acquire a sense of 
urgency and as a result they are given priority they are called crisis goals. Immediate 
action is deemed vital in this situation. The threat is actual in the case of crisis goals and 
not potential as is the case in preservation goals. The two remaining types of goals are 
the instrumental goal and the delta goal. These two types of goals are intermediate goals 
and they help to allow for a condition that is conducive to another goal. The two types 
of goal are quite similar except for the fact that the former is script-based while the 
latter is plan-based. In other words, instrumental goals are more standard than delta 
goals. This is because an instrument usually indicates the purpose of its use by means of 
convention whereas delta goals are more of scenario based goals which are explained by 
means of various sets of plan boxes which pertain to intentions and interests. 
In addition to the fact that goals and also plans are essential text coherence tools and 
that they are all integrated into a metonymic model of textual causality, they are also 
experiential accounts of how text progresses and leads to the degree of expectation and 
prediction. No matter what type of goal might underlie a particular text, our perceiving 
of this text as coherent and our understanding of it as meaningful depends on the 
dynamic interaction between our background knowledge and the knowledge presented 
in the text. This dynamic interaction is essentially metonymic in the first place in the 
sense that the textual knowledge stands for (i.e. in representational mode) the 
9 9 Ibid. (114). 
1 0 0 Ibid. (115). 
1 0 1 Ibid. (116). 
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background knowledge. On another level, the textual knowledge also relates to the 
background knowledge in a metonymic relation of PART FOR WHOLE . On yet another 
further level of conceptualisation the understanding of the various types of goals that 
might underlie a text is dependent on a dynamic interaction between what is potential 
and what is actual via stand for relations. As we have seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
one of the major metonymic processes is that which relates or substitutes the potential 
to/for the actual and the converse of this relation. 
I f we attempt a further discussion of how goals, and in fact all other knowledge 
structures which I have been discussing in this chapter, contribute to text coherence we 
shall find that the interpretation of these knowledge structures is largely based on an 
understanding of 'context'. This understanding in turn makes the interaction between 
our knowledge as readers and text knowledge possible and effective. In our 
communication and cognition we will register from among the various types of goals, 
scripts, plans, schemata or scenarios that are virtually activated only what is 'relevant' 
to the context of situation of the discourse. Let us consider the following examples from 
schemata to make this point clear. 
46. I bought a village house which is 200 years old. 
47. I now live in a house next to the town centre. 
48. The house that I bought recently is very expensive. 
49. The house where I live is very cheap. 
Now let us imagine our house schema in the four different situations above. Obviously, 
the first thing that comes to our mind regarding the house in the first example is that it is 
historic, built in stone, has high walls, small windows, no parlour, and perhaps is rather 
castle-like. But is this a prototypical example of a house? The answer is definitely no. 
But how did it come to our mind quickly although it is not the best example of a house 
that we have in our minds? l u J The answer is that the type of house schema that comes to 
mind by default mode is that which is invoked by the context of the discourse and not 
This term was first coined by the anthropologist Bornislaw Malinowski in 1923, 1935. Malinowski 
defines context as the environment of the text. For further details on this notion see Halliday and Hasan 
(1989: 5-6). 
1 0 3 Rosch discusses the notion of 'prototypes' in her studies of cognitive categories and human 
categorisation. In her research she aims to refute the relativist view of human cognition. She aims to 
establish that there are stable prototypical categories that we as human beings store in our minds to be 
used as reference points for cognition and understanding. See for details Rosch (1973) and (1975). 
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that virtual and universal prototypical category. The same thing would apply to the other 
examples of house schemas in examples 48-49. However, we should not go very far in 
cognitive localisation to assume very specialised contexts for cognition. Contexts do not 
normally stand in isolation because they will always conjure up associations with other 
related contexts and thus the retrieval of one context might also conjure up other related 
contexts. Therefore, it is better to perceive the notion of context here as the cultural 
context which brings into the congnitive process much more than the immediate 
situation. 
The issue of context in its cultural and immediate aspects has been increasingly used in 
cognitive discussions of communication and with especial reference to the notion of 
relevance. This began in recent years with the publication of Sperber and Wilson's 
(1986) book bearing the word 'relevance' as its title. I argue that metonymy is a 
fundamental asset to context interpretation and hence a very strong help to the notion of 
relevance. Formally, metonymy represents the syntagmatic level of linguistic 
arrangement and here syntagmatic is not limited to the sentential level but extends to the 
textual level. Perceived as such, metonymy provides a linguistic environment for the 
text. Cognitively, metonymy is based on the notion of contiguity and this applies to both 
the realm of concepts as well as to the realm of things. In this case, metonymy provides 
a clear understanding of the context of situation also. This interactive mode of 
knowledge between language, mind and reality makes our communication concise and 
our comprehension relevant. The metonymic representational relation is pervasive in all 
types of knowledge structures I have discussed so far. 
5.8.Summary 
This chapter has shown how metonymy could be used to develop a theory of text 
coherence. In this regard the chapter has brought to light a number of issues that are 
vital to both text coherence and metonymic reasoning. The chapter began by outlining 
the rationale for a unified metonymic approach to coherence. This is that the researchers 
have typically proposed an overlapping and somewhat confusing interdependent 
relation between the notions of cohesion and coherence. Metonymy clarifies the 
distinction and integrates the two notions into one model of formal and pragmatic 
metonymic relations connecting text on the one hand and relating text to its context on 
the other. In this way text stands as a unified coherent whole. The chapter concentrates 
on one theory of coherence known as'schema theory'. The discussion, however, was 
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not restricted to the level of cognition but was extended to include speaker's intentions 
and contextual factors affecting the choice of one rather than the other option of text 
progression. The chapter offers an integrated model of the various types of knowledge 
structures and relates this model to the nature of metonymy as essentially 
representational. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis examined the following four hypotheses related to metonymy: 
1. The scope of metonymy has been severely reduced and the potential of 
metonymy has been largely underestimated in previous1 accounts of the 
trope. 
2. Metonymy is semiotic in nature. 
3. A semiotic approach to metonymy leads to a comprehensive theory of 
metonymy as representation that cuts across the ontological, 
epistemological and linguistic dimensions of metonymic signification. 
4. A textual theory of metonymy could be developed based on the 
representational view of metonymy. 
The study has shown that the semiotic treatment of metonymy is necessary to take the 
trope beyond its traditional limitation. The study has also shown that a semiotic 
approach to metonymy is crucial for the development of a textual theory of metonymy. 
The textual model of metonymy is constructed in chapter 3 of this thesis and is put to 
the test in chapter 4 and 5 where the analysis of texts is carried out using the nine 
metonymic relations proposed in the textual model of metonymy. The analysis of texts 
was successful and provided deep insights into the processes of text organisation and 
interpretation. In the following paragraphs I shall suggest some areas of further research 
on metonymy. 
Metonymy and definiteness 
I have alluded to the notion of definiteness in various parts of this thesis especially in 
chapters 4 and 5. The term 'definiteness' refers to the semantic phenomenon in which a 
particular referent is perceived to be known or specific and thus when referred to by 
means of linguistic form it is marked by a definite article in some languages like the 
English 'the' and the Arabic al. However, the fact that both English and Arabic use 
definite articles to mark this semantic phenomenon does not mean that the two 
languages share the same mechanism of expressing definiteness. It seems that Arabic 
tends to use the definite article more than English and this becomes obvious when 
1 By previous accounts of the trope I mean studies on metonymy that are previous to this study from 
Greek rhetorical scholarship up till present-day discussions in figurative theory and cognitive linguistics 
circles. This will be clear once the reader has gone through chapter one and two of this thesis. 
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writings of Arab advanced learners of English are assessed. I would say that from my 
informal observations more than half of the mistakes advanced Arab learners of English 
make are mistakes with the definite article 'the'. They tend to overuse it in places where 
native speakers of English would not. This suggests that the semantic space of 
definiteness is not the same in both languages. I believe that a metonymy-based 
investigation of this discrepancy will reveal a great deal about the space of definiteness 
each language provides for its speakers. This means that i f we apply the knowledge 
model proposed in chapter 5 of this thesis we could account for the phenomenon of 
definiteness as a theory of knowledge and how it is structured in human cognition by 
various languages and how this structuring is reflected in texts. 
Metonymy and anaphora 
In rhetoric, anaphora refers to 'a popular figure of speech involving repetition of the 
same word at the beginning of successive clauses, sentences or verses'.2 In linguistics it 
is 'a term used in grammatical description for the process or result of a linguistic unit 
deriving its interpretation from some previously expressed unit or meaning (the 
antecedent)'. Metonymy is related to anaphora in terms of what has been called 
'indirect', 'conceptual' or 'bridging inference' anaphors. These, as Stirling argues, 'can 
be broadly characterised as instances of reference where there is no explicit identical 
antecedent for the referring nominal expression, yet nevertheless it is felt that its 
interpretation depends in some systematic way upon the linguistic context'.4 The 
example given for this phenomenon is: 
1. We checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm. 
Here 'The beer' is interpretable by virtue of a part-whole metonymic reasoning in which 
'beer' is part of the supplies normally provided in picnics. From a psychological 
perspective this text is interpretable by virtue of an activation of a specific schema. This 
is the 'picnic supplies' schema. In this schema there is an item 'beer' and this gets 
activated every time the 'picnic supplies' is mentioned within a specific cultural 
background. 
2 Wales (1989: 23). 
3 Crystal (1991: 19). 
4 Stirling (1996: 69). 
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Stirling includes a table of types of anaphoric relations in a corpus of GP consultations. 
The percentage of indirect reference is 11.4% of the data. This is quite a significant 
figure, which indicates that indirect reference amounts to a large proportion of textual 
patterning. This in turn highlights the important role of metonymy in the organisation 
and interpretation of text. It would be interesting to investigate this in other languages 
and in settings other than the one in Stirling's study. 
Metonymy and relevance 
The principle of relevance as formulated by Sperber and Wilson states that 'every act of 
ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance'.5 
They define 'ostensive communication' in a formulaic form as 'the communicator 
produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience 
that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions {1} ' . 6 It should be noted that the principle 
of relevance plays a major role in the use and interpretation of metonymy because it is 
this principle which determines the selection process of the vehicle of the metonymic 
signification. So in the 'forenoon sleeper' example discussed above, the principle of 
relevance is at work in governing the selection of the vehicle to be the'forenoon' 
because as I said earlier this is culturally marked as not the time for sleeping except for 
those who are prosperous. This example represents cultural relevance. One can also use 
the 'ham sandwich' example to illustrate situational relevance. This dehumanising 
aspect of customer-waiter interaction is situationally relevant because for the 
waiter/waitress the most relevant aspect of the customer is the thing he/she ordered. The 
waiter/waitress does not need to establish intimate relations with the customer for the 
situationally based communication of providing the order. The issue of relevance should 
even be extended along the lines of the extension of the concept of metonymy to text. In 
the script structure of a restaurant, each participant has his own script which is relevant 
to him as a participant. I have argued in chapter 5 that a waiter/waitress has his own 
script of a restaurant and a customer has his own script of a restaurant according to the 
set of roles each one plays. The owner of the restaurant will have a different restaurant 
script. These relevance theoretic aspects make communication possible and discourse 
5Sperber and Wilson (1986: 158). 
6lbid. (155). 
265 
Conclusion 
coherent. This particular aspect of metonymic process needs more detailed and further 
investigation. 
Metonymy and semantic change 
I have a strong intuition that a considerable amount of semantic change is 
metonymically motivated. This is perhaps the reason why it is fairly common that when 
people encounter a name be it a proper name or a common name for the first time they 
usually ponder about the rationality behind it, i.e. why it is the way it is. This is more 
evident in proper names although the general rule is that names are not rational or as it 
is commonly known in Arabic al 'asma' Id tu 'allal. When it comes to name a new born 
baby, parents usually look for possible meanings and then choose the name accordingly. 
This is perhaps more relevant in Arabic than any other language that I know of and is 
still in common practice as far as the Arabic context is concerned. 
But what is the role of metonymy in semantic change? As we have seen in chapter two 
of this thesis Ullmann's theory of metonymy is a theory of semantic change and it is an 
area of research that should be stressed here. A metonymic basis of semantic change is a 
compelling argument and it is suggested here that a full-scale study of semantic change 
in any language based on this perspective will witness to the validity of this argument. 
Besides, the role of metonymy in creating meaning should be highly appreciated by 
lexicographers. In other words, metonymy should be the closet friend of dictionary 
makers and these are required to consider the role of metonymy in creating meanings 
and senses. 
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